

Essays on Kant's Anthropology



Edited by Brian Jacobs

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Kant's lectures on anthropology capture him at the height of his intellectual power and at crucial stages in the development of his philosophical system. They are also immensely important for advancing our understanding of Kant's conception of anthropology, its development, and the notoriously difficult relationship between it and the critical philosophy.

This collection of new essays by some of the leading philosophical commentators on Kant offers the first comprehensive assessment of the philosophical importance of this material that should nevertheless prove of interest to historians of ideas and political theorists. There are two broad approaches adopted: A number of the essays consider the systematic relations of anthropology to the critical philosophy, especially speculative knowledge and ethics. Other essays focus on the anthropology as a major source for the clarification of both the content and development of particular Kantian doctrines.

The volume will also serve as an interpretative complement to a forthcoming translation of the lectures in the *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*.

Brian Jacobs has taught political philosophy at Cornell University and is currently president of Akademos, Inc., an Internet company dedicated to new models of course material distribution for higher education.

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BRIAN JACOBS

PATRICK KAIN



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Essays on Kant's Anthropology

Introduction

Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain

No other issue in Kant's thought is as pervasive and persistent as that of human nature. Posed as the peculiarly Kantian question, "what is the human being?" (*Was ist der Mensch?*)¹, this may be the sole concern that appears consistently from Kant's earliest writings through the last. In Kant's lectures – on logic, metaphysics, ethics, and education – it is difficult to find a text completely free of anthropological observation. Reaching far beyond considerations of ethics and history, moreover, the question of human nature is also present in Kant's most "scientific" reflections. In the conclusion of *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* from 1755, a text principally dedicated to applying Newton's theory of attraction and repulsion toward understanding the emergence of the heavens, Kant closes with this comment:

It is not even properly known to us what the human being truly is now, although consciousness and the senses ought to instruct us of this; how much less will we be able to guess what he one day ought to become. Nevertheless, the human soul's desire for knowledge (*Wißbegierde*) snaps very desirously (*begierig*) at this object that lies so far from it and strives, in such obscure knowledge, to shed some light.²

The "critical" project that would take shape some twenty years later is partly an extension of this very concern. It is "the peculiar fate" of *human* reason, the way its aspirations and interests outstrip its powers, which motivates the famous critique of traditional metaphysics found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.³ Moreover, one of Kant's more

specific concerns in that work involved the status of human nature in relation to the emerging human sciences. In the eighteenth century, natural history borrowed experimental and taxonomic methods from the physical sciences of the previous century, methods that had little use for notions of the “soul” or for any substance other than a material one.⁴ Like many of his time, Kant believed that this approach posed a challenge to humanity’s unique place in the cosmos, threatening to leave humanity undifferentiated among the world of beings. Kant concluded that a solution to this problem could be found only by abstracting from anthropological observation. The doctrine of Transcendental Idealism is partly an attempt to articulate a doctrine of a self that is at once an object of empirical natural science and history, subject to the “mechanism of nature,” and also a rational being able to cognize the natural world and having a “vocation” that transcends nature.⁵ Similarly, in his mature moral theory, Kant held that one could identify the supreme principle of a pure moral philosophy only by abstracting from all specifically human characteristics. Thus, “a metaphysics of morals cannot be based upon anthropology. . . .” Although, to be sure, this “metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles of application, and we shall often have to take as our object the particular *nature* of human beings, which is cognized only in experience, in order to *show* in it what can be inferred from universal moral principles.”⁶

Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology

Given the emphasis within the critical philosophy upon a “pure” and rather abstract characterization of the self, it is perhaps surprising that Kant simultaneously carried out a long-standing inquiry into empirical anthropology. In the winter semester of 1772–3 Kant first offered a lecture course on anthropology, a course he repeated every winter semester for the next twenty-three years. While Kant was not the first German academic to lecture under this title, he made clear from the first lectures that his course would consider the topic in quite a unique way. Although Kant chose as a last resort the “empirical psychology” section of Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica* as his textbook, he consciously broke with it and a tradition of German anthropology stretching back to the sixteenth century, a tradition that tended to conceive of

anthropology as a unified science of theology and physiology.⁷ Kant was explicit about giving up “the subtle and . . . eternally futile investigation into the manner in which the organs of the body are connected to thought,” in favor of a doctrine of empirical observation (*Beobachtungslehre*) without any admixture of metaphysics.⁸ Kant also stressed that, as an alternative to this tradition, his version of anthropology would have a *pragmatic* orientation. As he would later explain in the preface to his own textbook,

A systematic treatise comprising our knowledge of human beings (anthropology) can adopt either a *physiological* or a *pragmatic* perspective. – Physiological knowledge of the human being investigates what *nature* makes of him; pragmatic, what *the human being* as a free agent makes, or can and should make, of himself.⁹

Rather than offer a merely theoretical account of human affairs, useful only for theorizing in the schools, Kant intended to provide a “doctrine of prudence” (*Lehre der Klugheit*)¹⁰ toward which future citizens of the world could orient themselves. Following the lead of works such as Rousseau’s *Emile*, Kant aimed to provide observations of peoples and cultures useful for his auditors to get on in the world, to conduct commerce and politics with a greater understanding of human beings and of human relations.

For Kant, “anthropology” is not a study of other cultures in the sense of comparative “ethnography,” although as a pragmatic inquiry into the nature of human beings in general it does draw in part upon such works. Kant’s “sources” include not only travel accounts of distant regions, but also plays, poetry, histories, novels, physiology, and philosophical works. In the lectures on anthropology, one is as likely to encounter a reference to Laurence Sterne’s *Tristram Shandy* as to Lucretius’ *De rerum natura*. Kant draws upon these sources to provide an empirical and useful account of the powers of the human mind in general and the vocation of the human race. Given these interests, one might refer to Kant’s anthropology as a “philosophical anthropology” were it not that such a phrase would strike Kant as an oxymoron, given his critical view that philosophy is an entirely rational and nonempirical enterprise, while anthropology is completely empirical.

Kant’s lectures on anthropology were his most popular academic offering, in terms of attendance, interest, and accessibility.¹¹ As Kant

noted, interest in the course came largely from his ability to draw salient examples from literature and ordinary life;¹² a number of extant reports describe the appeal that these held for their auditors.¹³ Kant lectured on anthropology every winter semester between 1772–3 and his retirement in 1796, making it also one of his most regular and enduring courses. Indeed, had Kant ceased philosophical work before 1781, the publication year of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he would have been known in his time principally as a minor philosophy professor who offered popular lectures on anthropology. Shortly after his retirement, Kant compiled his notes from his lectures into a “textbook,” published in 1798 under the title *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Yet, long before the publication of this text, interest in this course reached well beyond the students in Königsberg. By the late 1770s, Kant’s anthropological views were likely appreciated by a wide circle of intellectuals and statesmen in Berlin, including Moses Mendelssohn and the Minister of Education von Zedlitz.¹⁴ And by the late 1780s, several followers of the critical philosophy were seeking copies of student notebooks from Kant’s anthropology lectures.¹⁵

The Challenge of Kant’s Anthropology

Given the significance that anthropological questions had for Kant and his contemporaries and the enormous quantity of recent scholarship on Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy, one would expect a significant body of literature on Kant’s anthropology and its relevance to other aspects of his thought. Yet, since Benno Erdmann first introduced the topic for scholarship more than a century ago, Kant’s anthropology has remained remarkably neglected.¹⁶ This neglect is hardly surprising, since most of the student notes from Kant’s lectures on anthropology were first published in 1997, and, for most of the twentieth century, the political situation in Eastern Europe made widespread access to many of the students’ manuscripts extremely difficult. Part of this neglect is also due to the textbook that Kant had published in 1798. This work, which Kant compiled shortly after his retirement, lacks much of the refinement of his previously published works, leading some initial commentators to suggest that it betrays the age of its author.¹⁷ More importantly, however, the *Anthropology* and the course on which it was based contain a number of considerable

tensions with other aspects of Kant's thought, tensions that have left even sympathetic readers understandably puzzled about the status and place of anthropology in Kant's system and the relation of this to his other works. In the early stages of the German "Academy" edition of Kant's works, for example, editors Erich Adickes and Wilhelm Dilthey struggled with one another about where the *Anthropology* should be placed within Kant's *corpus*.¹⁸ As their correspondence reveals, this dispute was as much about differing views of what the work *is* as about its place in an edition of collected works.¹⁹

In one sense, Kant made his intentions quite clear: he proposed a pragmatic empirical anthropology. The problem is, as commentators have noted, that it is not at all clear how these declared intentions fit with some central claims of his critical philosophy.²⁰ In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, for example, Kant insisted that an empirical anthropology must be physiological and must exclude freedom. With respect to the observable, empirical character of human beings, he wrote, "there is no freedom; and according to this character we can consider the human being solely by *observing*, and as happens in anthropology, by trying to investigate the moving causes of his actions physiologically."²¹ In other words, in the critical philosophy there seems to be no room for a consideration of the human being as a "free-acting being" in an empirical world governed by the "play of nature."²² The idea of such a pragmatic anthropology also seems to conflict with Kant's claim that anthropology must eschew metaphysical speculation. Moreover, it is unclear how the pragmatic anthropology is related to what Kant called, in the context of his moral philosophy, a "practical" or "moral anthropology": the application of pure moral philosophy to human beings,²³ or how it is consistent with the sharp distinction between pure and empirical investigations that his moral philosophy insisted upon.

Yet, while the ambiguities, tensions, and apparent contradictions present in Kant's conception of anthropology might explain its neglect, they simultaneously highlight its significance for a thorough understanding of Kant's thought in particular as well as its place in the broader philosophical and intellectual history of the emerging human sciences of which it is a part. They lead to numerous questions: How does the content of the lectures and *Anthropology* relate to Kant's declared intentions for the discipline? Does Kant offer a

coherent conception of anthropology, either as a discipline or as an element of a philosophical system? How would such a conception relate to the claims of the critical philosophy? Does the content of Kant's anthropology shed new light upon or require a reevaluation of any important aspects of Kant's theoretical or practical philosophy? In which respects does Kant break with his contemporaries' notions of anthropology? Might the tensions within Kant's anthropology teach us something about the origins and philosophical foundations of the modern human sciences?

Kant's anthropology is important, however, not only because of the questions it raises about Kant's philosophical system or the history of the human sciences. It is also important as an unambiguous counterpoint to the still prevalent view that, in Wilhelm Dilthey's words, "in the veins of the knowing subject, such as . . . Kant [has] construed him, flows not real blood but rather the thinned fluid of reason as pure thought activity."²⁴ Kant's anthropology lectures present the acting and knowing subject as fully constituted in human flesh and blood, with the specific virtues and foibles that make it properly human. This is an account that can and should be taken seriously in its own right.

The Occasion for This Collection

The publication in October 1997 of a critical edition of student notes stemming from Kant's anthropology course offers a unique opportunity to reexamine Kant's anthropology and address many of these important questions in a more adequate way. Edited by Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark, the latest volume of *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (the first in more than a decade) contains more than 1,500 pages of student notes drawn from seven different semesters of the anthropology course during its first seventeen years. Much of this material will soon appear in English in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* volume entitled *Lectures on Anthropology*, which will appear shortly after the series' new edition of Kant's work on *Anthropology, History, and Education*. In contrast to Kant's own published work of 1798, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, these lecture notes, most of which will be made available for the first time, capture Kant both at the height of his intellectual power and at numerous points throughout

the development of his philosophical thinking. This new material has the potential to advance significantly our understanding of Kant's conception of anthropology, its development, and the notoriously difficult relationship between it and the critical philosophy. This new material, however, presents several interpretive difficulties. Because the student notes are certainly not verbatim transcripts of Kant's lectures they must be read in the light of Kant's published works and other literary remains if they are to provide authentic insight into Kant's views. Given the problematic relationship pragmatic anthropology has to some of those other works, this is no easy task.

The language of Kant's lectures on anthropology, too, is quite foreign to that of the critical philosophy: in these lectures wit and playful observation are the dominant forms of expression. And the breadth of Kant's sources for these lectures is impressive: in these newly published lecture notes, Kant refers to nearly a thousand sources.²⁵ The interpretive tasks, then, are considerable. This English-language collection of essays is intended to serve as such an interpretive complement to the documentation of the German critical edition and the new volumes of *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*.

In response to the extraordinary opportunity and challenge presented by this wealth of new material, we have invited a number of the leading philosophical commentators on Kant to reflect upon the relationship between Kant's anthropology and the theoretical, ethical, aesthetic, political, and historical dimensions of his philosophy. Although this volume is written by philosophers and particularly aimed at a philosophical audience with historical interests, it should also be of interest to cultural historians, historians of the human sciences, political theorists, and the range of humanists concerned with aesthetic theory (such as art historians and literature scholars). Given the significance of Kant's anthropology to each of these disciplines, a complete appropriation of this new material can only emerge from multiple- or inter-disciplinary work. We hope that this collection of essays will serve as an invitation for those with expertise in these other areas to engage this interesting new material as well, and contribute to this much-neglected area of Kant studies.

The essays in this volume tend to reflect one of two broad approaches. On the one hand, a number of the essays are concerned

with the systematic *relation* of anthropology to the critical philosophy – especially its relation to the claims of speculative knowledge and ethics. On the other hand, several of the essays focus on the anthropology as an important *source* for clarification about the content and development of Kant’s views on particular topics of interest.

The collection begins with a brief account by Werner Stark of his findings about the historical circumstances surrounding the note-taking, copying, and compilation process that generated the extant student notebooks. Stark then examines the origins and philosophical motivation for the anthropology course and what they reveal about its relation to Kant’s moral philosophy. Stark argues that Kant’s introduction of the separate course on anthropology was motivated by his adoption of a “pure” conception of moral philosophy and claims about the “dual nature” of human beings. Pointing to connections between the conception of “character” developed in the anthropology lectures of the 1770s and the developing moral philosophy of that period, Stark argues that there is a reciprocal relationship between anthropology and moral philosophy, which parallels the reciprocal relation between the empirical and intelligible character of the human being.

Allen Wood also argues for a mutually supportive relationship between anthropology and Kant’s ethical, social, and historical thought. Anthropology, he suggests, is concerned with “the empirical investigation of freedom,” an examination of human nature based upon the assumption that we are free. Despite Kant’s concerns about the unsatisfactory state of anthropology as a discipline and the inherent difficulties involved in the study of human beings, Wood points out, Kant argued for the distinctiveness of the human capacity for self-perfection and the collective historical task to which it gives rise. The centrality of Kant’s conception of human “unsociable sociability” reveals an Enlightenment conception of humanity that is social and historical, contrary to individualistic readings held by critics of Kant’s ethics.

In “The Second Part of Morals,” Robert Louden argues that Kant’s anthropology lectures contain a distinctively *moral* anthropology, the complement to pure moral philosophy concerned with the application of morality to humans. These lectures contain moral messages concerning human hindrances to morality and the importance of judgment sharpened by experience, and the discussion of the “destiny of

the human species” provides a “moral map” of the human *telos* to situate our agency and identify the means necessary to our moral end. To the extent that the motive for and use of the anthropology is grounded in a moral imperative, Louden suggests, the lectures contribute to moral philosophy, even in the narrowest sense. While Kant’s execution of this task is “deeply flawed,” Louden concludes, it is an important part of the *Übergang* project of bridging nature and freedom.

In contrast to the first three essays that argue that anthropology and ethics are complementary and integral parts of Kant’s system, Reinhard Brandt’s essay suggests that the lack of a “guiding idea” anchoring the discipline of anthropology renders such an apparent connection with morality accidental. Brandt’s survey of the *Anthropology* and lectures leads to an interpretation of anthropology as an aggregate of three historical layers containing several points of contact with other aspects of Kant’s philosophy, but lacking a moral focus. Even the discussion of character, he argues, has a pragmatic rather than moral point. In a second section, Brandt contrasts Kant’s conception of the vocation or destiny of the human being with its rivals, suggesting that Kant’s focus on the destiny of the species, rather than the individual, and his emphasis upon the “invisible hand” of the inclination mechanism relies upon a Christian-Stoic teleology that can bring good out of evil. This theodicy, Brandt argues, is intended to show how moral good will result, perhaps in spite of individual choices.

Brian Jacobs outlines three notions of anthropology in Kant’s work and then considers the lectures on anthropology collectively as the “proper academic discipline” that Kant had initially set out to make for them, and hence as a precursor to the contemporary human and social sciences. Kantian anthropology, Jacobs argues, shares not only basic elements of these disciplines but also some of their fundamental concerns. The problematic status of the *metaphysical* aspect of the inquiry, which appears most directly in Kant’s various conceptions of character, ought to be viewed as a first instance of a systematic inquiry into human behavior that cannot adequately account for the special status of its object.

In the first essay that concentrates upon the significance of the new material as a source for Kant’s views on particular topics, Paul Guyer

argues that the lectures give us new insight into the novelty of the “critique of taste” found in the *Critique of Judgment*. Perhaps surprisingly, the anthropology lectures from the mid-1770s reveal that Kant had already analyzed many of the distinctive features of aesthetic experience and judgment discussed later in the third *Critique*. Yet it is the anthropology lectures from 1788–9 that first characterize the harmony found in aesthetic experience and artistic creativity as a form of *freedom*. This account of the harmony, Guyer argues, is what facilitated the real novelty and *raison d’être* of the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment”: a treatment of artistic and natural beauty as “evidence of nature’s hospitality to freedom,” consistent with an emphasis upon the distinctiveness of aesthetic experience.

Howard Caygill contends that the anthropology lecture course played a significant role in the development of the epistemological theory of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In his early lectures on logic and metaphysics, Kant rejected, following Baumgarten and Meier, Wolffian dismissals of sensibility as a type of confused knowledge and he explored some complementary aspects of the sensible and intelligible contributions to cognition. This is still a long way, however, from the critical claim that synthetic *a priori* knowledge can come only from the synthesis of sensibility and understanding. It was only in the novel lecture course on anthropology, Caygill suggests, that Kant could find the space to reflect upon the nature of sensibility free of the disciplinary constraints of logic and metaphysics and develop these reflections into the critical conception of sensibility. The lectures on anthropology reveal that Kant’s “Apology for Sensibility” (a section title in the 1798 *Anthropology*) is a transformation of Baumgarten’s defense of aesthetics into an increasingly systematic defense of sensibility as distinctive type of intuition.

Susan Shell notices several significant changes in the conception of happiness found in Kant’s anthropology lectures of the 1770s and early 1780s and explores the origins and impact of such changes upon Kant’s moral and political thought more generally. In the lectures before 1777, she argues, Kant emphasized the pleasure involved in “feeling one’s life activity ‘as a whole’” and considered happiness to be achievable through virtue and self-control. This early conception also emphasized gratitude for a providential order and the role of

social conflict and the special contribution of women in promoting social progress. According to Shell, Kant's views changed significantly in the late 1770s, when he adopted Count Verri's idea that human life must involve more pain than pleasure because pain rather than the anticipation of pleasure is what moves us to act. By the early 1780s this change led Kant, she suggests, to a "critical" assessment of the attainability of happiness that is darker than Rousseau's; a theory of human progress that stresses political and racial factors rather than the sexual and aesthetic factors prevalent earlier; and an emphasis upon work, especially human effort toward moral perfection, as the only way to make life worth living.

Noting that one important, explicit objective of Kant's "pragmatic" anthropology is the doctrine of prudence that it embodies, Patrick Kain looks to the anthropology lectures as a source of clarification about Kant's conception of prudence and his broader theory of practical rationality. Kain argues that, on Kant's theory, prudence is the manifestation of a distinctive, nonmoral rational capacity concerned with one's own happiness or well-being. In conjunction with related texts, the anthropology lectures provide helpful clarification about the content of prudential reflection and, contrary to some recent interpretations of Kant's theory of practical reason, imply that the normative authority of prudence, while compatible with the supremacy of morality, is prior to and conceptually independent of moral norms.

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Brian Jacobs

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Patrick Kain

Notes

1. For the instances of Kant's usage of this phrase, see Jacobs, "Kantian Character and the Problem of a Science of Humanity," in this volume.
2. Immanuel Kant, *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels)*, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (formerly the Königlichen Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902–) (1: 366). Apart from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, all references to Kant are to the volume and page number of this "Akademie-Ausgabe." References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the standard A and B pagination of the first and second editions.
3. *Critique of Pure Reason*, preface to the first edition, A vii.
4. This approach was promoted, above all, by the French taxonomist Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon (1707–88). *Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière* (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1749).
5. *Critique of Pure Reason*, preface to the second edition, B xxviii, xxix, xxxii. This suggestion is born out in the sections devoted to the Paralogisms and the Third Antinomy. In the preface to the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant suggests that one of the two most important criticisms of the first edition of the first *Critique* was that concerning his doctrine of the self – how we can be on the one hand a free noumenon, on the other a determined empirical phenomenon (5: 6).
6. *Metaphysics of Morals*, 6: 217. Cf. *Groundwork*, 4:388–9; "Moral Mrongovius II," 29: 599.
7. Marate Linden, *Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Bern: Herbert Lang, 1976), 2. The humanist Otto Casmann, for example, in his work *Psychologia anthropologica; sive Animae humanae doctrina* (1594), suggests that anthropology is the "doctrine of human nature," whereby the latter "is an essence participating in the dual nature of the world, the spiritual and the corporal, that are bound together in unity." As the title of Casmann's work suggests, "anthropology" was a term with contemporary currency that Kant chose to appropriate for his own, rather different, purposes.
8. Kant, letter to Marcus Herz, toward the end of 1773 (10: 145–6).
9. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, preface (7: 119).

10. Kant uses this term frequently in the anthropology lectures but seldom in the major published works. Cf. Friedlaender 25: 471, Mrongovius 25: 1210; also *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 800 / B 828.
11. On enrollment in the Anthropology course, see Stark, "Historical Notes and Interpretive Questions about Kant's Lectures on Anthropology," in this volume.
12. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, preface (7: 121), Letter to Herz (10: 146).
13. Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann, for example, reports that Kant's anthropology lectures were "an extremely pleasant instruction" that commanded the most attendance of all of Kant's lectures. Ludwig Ernst Borowski, Andreas Christoph Wasianski, and Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann, *Immanuel Kant: Ein lebensbild*, 2nd ed. (Halle: Hugo Peter, 1907), 125. Cf. Manfred Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 204–5.
14. Their likely familiarity would have come via copies of student notes and / or Herz's lectures in Berlin. See 25: lv; 10: 224, 236, 244–6. Minister von Zedlitz was particularly interested in Kant's lectures on physical geography.
15. 25: lvi; 10: 485–6, 11: 170, 498, 508.
16. See editor's introduction in Immanuel Kant, *Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie*, ed. Benno Erdmann and Norbert Hinske (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann, 1992 [original, 1882–4]). Until quite recently, there were only a few notable exceptions, including Frederick Van de Pitte, Monika Firla, Norbert Hinske, and Richard Velkley.
17. Upon its publication, for example, Goethe viewed the book with some distance, suggesting that Kant had succumbed to prejudice in his increasing years: "In spite of the excellence, sharp wit, and magnificence which our old teacher always retains, it seems to me that [the book] is in many places limited [*borniert*] and in still more illiberal." Goethe to C. G. Voigt, December 19, 1798, cited in Immanuel Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, 6th ed. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1980 [original 1798, 1800]).
18. Their correspondence on this question appears in Gerhard Lehmann, *Beiträge zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Philosophie Kants* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969), 13–26.
19. Holly Lyn Wilson, "Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology and its Relationship to Critical Philosophy," Dissertation (Ann Arbor: Pennsylvania State University, 1989), 24–33.
20. See, for example, Mary Gregor, "Translator's Introduction," in Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), ix.
21. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 550 / B 578.
22. Cf. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 7: 120.
23. *Groundwork*, 4: 388–9; "Moral Mrongovius II," 29: 599. (An idea that has puzzled commentators in its own right.)

24. Wilhelm Dilthey, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, vol. 1 of *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Bernhard Groethuysen (Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1922 [original, 1883]), viii.
25. Reinhard Brandt's indispensable line-by-line commentary on the 1798 *Anthropology* identifies the sources used in that text and illuminating parallel passages in the lectures and other parts of Kant's *corpus*. *Kritischer Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, 1798* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1999).

Historical Notes and Interpretive Questions about Kant's Lectures on Anthropology¹

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Translated by Patrick Kain²

Interest in the recently published critical edition of student notes from Kant's lectures on anthropology prompts me to reflect on the edition from two perspectives. On the one hand, as co-editor of the edition I find myself in the role of a neutral, impartial reporter on the contents of and background to the historical-critical edition. Thus, in Part I of this essay, I will attempt to recount the most important information concerning the transmission of the lectures, taken from the "Introduction" to that volume of *Kants gesammelte Schriften*.³ On the other hand, I can also assume the role of a reader of the text and pose substantive questions to the "author," and accordingly, act as an interpreter of the texts. Thus, in Part II, I will act as a philosophical "reader" and interpreter, addressing two sets of questions: the first concerning the origins and development of the anthropology course, the second concerning the relationship between the anthropology and ethics courses, and their systematic position in Kant's critical philosophy.

I

First, some general background information on the lectures, essential to a historical understanding of them: beginning in 1772, Kant's "private course" on anthropology became a standing feature of his lecturing activity at the *Albertina*, the university at Königsberg. Kant placed the anthropology course, which he taught in the winter

semester, in a certain parallel with the course on physical geography that he had introduced earlier, at the very beginning of his career as a lecturer (*Privatdozent*) in 1755. From the winter of 1772–3 until the summer of 1796, a steady alternation took place every year between geography in the summer and anthropology in the winter. Both courses had been invented by Kant; neither belonged to the established canon of areas or academic disciplines taught by the philosophy faculty. Over the years, both “novelties” found significant interest among the Königsberg students; the number of students attending the courses – for which they each had to pay four *Reichstaler* – rose quickly and remained at a consistently high level, as measured by Königsberg standards. On average, forty-two students attended the course on anthropology each year, which was typically announced as: “*Anthropologiam secundum Baumgartenii Psychologia empirica*” in the official Latin *catalogus lectionum*.⁴

According to established practice, the lecture course was laid out as a German-language commentary on a Latin textbook, although with the peculiarity in this case that the textbook, the third part of Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica*, served, and *could* serve, as a framework for the content of the course only *in part*.⁵ Thus Kant gave lectures and his students “wrote down” notes (*geschrieben nach*) and sketched out notebooks (*Hefte*), thereby creating the most important material basis for the further transmission of the lectures to the present day.

A second complex of important information concerns the status of the currently accessible student notes (the *Nachschriften*). The value of these student “manuscripts” has already been grappled with for quite a while in the Kant literature, in part explicitly, in part implicitly. The following questions have repeatedly arisen: how reliable are the texts? Or: in the attempt to correctly understand what Kant meant, should these student notes, Kant’s literary remains (the *Nachlaß*), and his published writings be relied upon and cited in the same way? Or: is it justifiable to expend the effort required for a historical-critical edition on the notes of students? What profit could we expect from them?

It is my opinion that behind such skeptical questions there stands, for many, a good deal of historical misunderstanding, if not willful ignorance. Against such things I cannot and do not wish to argue here. But as a matter of methodology, I consider an acquaintance with the

most important of the historical peculiarities surrounding the transmission of such texts, including the “notebooks,” indispensable for those who want to use them. Fortunately, a historian or detective who wants to shed some light on the origins of these texts quickly comes across a number of helpful observations. In this vein, without pretending to any systematic order, I offer the following observations and conclusions, which are presented in greater detail in the “Introduction” to volume 25 of the Academy edition of *Kants gesammelten Schriften*.⁶

(1) Of the extant student notes, the vast majority are copies (*Abschriften*), more precisely, copies prepared by hand, almost mechanically, from written prototypes that were subsequently lost or destroyed. This fact is no accident: the extant student notes are to be viewed as the end result of a production process, the circumstances of which are, in principle, as accessible to historical research as any other past event. And it does not appear to be accidental that texts of this kind stem exclusively from the time after 1770. A constant demand, a market, for notes of Kant’s lectures emerged only in the spring of 1770, after Kant was called to a full professorship in the philosophy faculty of the *Albertina*. As the extant pieces indicate, this market was supplied by a number of different producers. On closer examination, the fact that Johann Gottfried Herder, perhaps Kant’s most famous pupil, took and preserved notes of Kant’s lectures as a “lecturer” (*Privatdocent*) between 1762–4 is not a counterexample to this thesis, since taken as a whole, Herder’s notes manifest a different, essentially more provisional and personal character than any of the other known notes or course notebooks.⁷

(2) To the best of my knowledge, historians have devoted little attention to the usual practices of instruction at Protestant universities in the eighteenth century – to the way teaching or learning took place there. So I have tried to determine, with something more than a mere first approximation, the circumstances surrounding the creation of the student notes and the intentions of their producers. Based upon this study, I have ruled out the possibility that extended passages from the notes could be considered to be any kind of verbatim report – such as a stenographic record – of any of Kant’s lectures. Taken by itself, the relative brevity of the notes speaks against such a possibility. In addition, stylistically, the notes read as if they were taken from a freestanding lecture rather than a textbook-based, commentary-style

lecture: only relatively seldom in the notes is the textbook author (Baumgarten) referred to. Even more seldom is a “lecturing self” portrayed – phrases like: “In what follows, *I* will indicate . . .” or “*I* am of the opinion, that . . .” are encountered only in exceptional cases.

(3) There is a whole series of clues for the thesis that the prototypes used in the production of the extant copies were themselves essentially composite in character: the notebooks only came about by joining together the notations of several “note-taking” students. A complete set of notes for a given semester’s course composed entirely by a single individual, if any such existed, would represent a radical exception. In addition, it is clear that sets of notes continued to be copied independently of changes and developments in Kant’s lectures over the years. Thus, for example, in 1791 long passages of notes dating back to 1772–3 were used to enrich notes apparently stemming from the then current semester.⁸ Among the twenty complete texts that were available for the present Academy edition of the anthropology lectures, only two – *Philippi* and *Mrongovius* – can be traced back to writers whose presence as auditors of the relevant courses can be historically confirmed; moreover, neither Philippi nor Mrongovius should be seen as the sole producers of the texts that bear their names.

(4) Three arguments can be briefly outlined on behalf of the high quality of the copied texts. First, one must know that – at least at Prussian Universities in the eighteenth century – there was an established tradition or culture of taking notes at oral speeches. On this point, one should think, above all, of religious instruction; in areas heavily influenced by Pietism, it was customary to memorize Sunday sermons and face written questioning about them afterward. The pedagogical aim of this practice was the reproduction of what was heard and not the presentation of the auditor’s own thoughts. In addition, in the case of Kant’s lectures on anthropology, two special types of corroboration have emerged. First, the so-called “*Reflexionen*” from the anthropology *Nachlaß* (volume 15, in the third part of the Academy edition) offer the possibility of verifying the reliability of the student notes. These fragments, including Kant’s own *Kollegentwürfe*⁹ for his lectures between the 1770s and the 1790s, contain, although in an admittedly sketchy way, the same content and trains of thought found in the students’ notes. Second, in the course of annotating the students’ notes for publication, it became clear that the very thoughts and

reflections that Kant developed and presented in his lectures appeared a bit later in articles he published in the 1780s.

(5) None of the remaining questions about the origins of the texts justify any fundamental rejection of the unique historical sources that research on the student notes has made available. The information about Kant's anthropology lectures is sufficiently confirmed, given the multiplicity of the notes' transmission. For volume 25 of the Academy edition seven texts were constructed, which, taken together, allow us to trace a stepwise development of the lecture course, from its first offering in the winter of 1772–3, through the second half of the 1780s. And for the years after that, although the source material is insufficient to document a complete set of lectures for any given semester, the material can still establish important particular developments. While the background or framework of presentation for the course may seem to remain the same, we can see just as clearly how Kant revised his lectures over time, and that his publications stood in a constant correspondence with the lectures. There is no substantive difference between the doctrine of the lecturing professor and the views presented in his writings for a wider audience. Nevertheless, while reading or citing from the student notes, one should always keep in mind that the verbal formulations found in them only reproduce Kant's own words in an attenuated or obscured way. Still, the notebooks *can* accomplish this much: through them we can gain reliable information about the development of the philosophical intuitions, arguments, and thematic interests of the philosopher from Königsberg.

To conclude my historical observations, a third point can be quickly stated: the *Anthropology* is quite unique among the works of the *author* Immanuel Kant. One of the requirements for lecture courses in eighteenth-century philosophy departments, which was usually observed, was that a printed textbook was supposed to form the basis for the commentary or lectures of the professor or *Privatdocent*. Kant lectured in accord with this requirement. Historically noteworthy, however, is the fact that he never composed and published his own textbook for use in any of his courses.¹⁰ Presumably, one explanation for this noteworthy fact is Kant's deep pedagogical conviction that his students should not "learn philosophy," but rather ought to learn "how to philosophize." Thus, in terms of form, the oral doctrine of Kant's lectures stands in a special tension with his published works. It is only in

the case of the *Anthropology* that Kant would later resolve this tension, that is, with the publication of his “textbook” in 1798. In the potentially parallel case of physical geography, he did not think he had enough time left to complete the job.¹¹

Before I move on to the second, interpretive, part of my comments, I would like to insert a remark on the critical edition of the lectures on anthropology produced in Marburg: throughout this project an explicit attempt has been and continues to be made to produce something new, in terms of both methodology and content. The published volume, the conventional edition, is enhanced by access to the data which underlay its creation: computerized transcriptions of the manuscripts of student notes from Kant’s anthropology courses, complete sets as well as fragments, are being made available on the Internet.¹² In addition, various indices and supplementary information that document and clarify the editorial steps taken between transcription and the final critically constructed texts are also available there.

II

Now to the second part: the critical questions of a philosophical reader. My interpretive comments will concern two questions. First, how did the course on anthropology emerge? And, second, what is the relationship, according to Kant, between anthropology and moral philosophy?

Before tackling these questions, one should first take note of what might initially appear to be a superficial point: one thing that distinguishes the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* from the anthropology lectures is the fact that Kant published the book in 1798. On further reflection, the fact that the transmission of the notes began much earlier, namely, in the winter of 1772–3, is actually quite significant: the course began at a time when, although the idea of a “critique of pure reason” had already been conceived, its actual execution (in 1780–1) would demand almost a decade more of concrete development. The temporal gap is even more pronounced in the case of Kant’s developing conception of moral philosophy: the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* had to wait until 1784–5 to be completed.¹³ In the published *Anthropology* of 1798, his last publication, Kant is in a position to look back in a double sense: explicitly, on his more

than thirty years of lectures that “aimed at knowledge of the world,” (7: 122.10) and implicitly, on the fully developed system of his “critical philosophy.”

Before I address the aforementioned questions, a second prefatory remark seems necessary. These questions about the genesis of the lectures and the “relation between anthropology and ethics” are not unrelated. For example, if one looks for a *ratio essendi*, some particular topic to be addressed by the newly conceived course on anthropology in 1772–3, then it is not at all obvious in advance that this unknown quantity will be independent of moral philosophy. On the contrary, it seems quite natural to expect a connection between the two disciplines, since each is concerned with human beings and their actions. Thus, one should keep in mind that the motivation for the distinction between these two interpretive questions is primarily methodological; ultimately, they may in fact be concerned with the same thing.

Finally, I should not leave a third, personal note unmentioned. For years now, the two editors of volume 25 of the Academy edition have disagreed about the role and relevance of the anthropology. In contrast to Reinhard Brandt, I am of the opinion that an internal, positive relationship exists between Kant’s lectures on anthropology and his moral philosophy; more precisely, that the notes of the lectures *indicate* some such relationship, at least for certain phases in the development of the critical philosophy (which I use as shorthand for the period following 1781). In other words, I believe that Kant considered anthropology to be an integral part of his philosophy (including his critical philosophy), and that it is not to be reckoned as a mere appendage to the system. Moreover, I do not think it is sufficient to understand the lectures on anthropology held from 1772–3 onward as merely “pedagogical” with a view to the students, or to consider them as “popular philosophy” completely distinct from the critically turned system of philosophy. The positive and critical content of the anthropology, in my opinion, cannot be reduced to a mere doctrine of prudence.

Now to the two questions.

Concerning the genesis of the anthropology course, there exists very little by way of historical, detailed reports. From university documents, we learn only the fact that Kant lectured, without formal announcement, on this topic for the first time in the winter of 1772–3; the announced “Theoretical Physics according to Erxleben” did not

take place “*ob defectum auditorum*” (due to a lack of auditors), but “in its place, the Anthropology was offered from 9–10 [o’clock].”¹⁴ Aside from the text of the student notes, the first known substantive comment about the actual occasion for this choice is found in a letter from Kant to his former student Marcus Herz from the end of 1773 (Letter #79 in the Academy edition).¹⁵ In this letter, Kant reports fully and for the first time since his long programmatic letter to Herz of February 21, 1772, on the progress he has made on his proposed critical revision of the received metaphysics. Through his “new science” Kant hoped “to give to philosophy, in a lasting way, a different turn that is far more advantageous for religion and ethics” (10: 144.29–30). The new science of transcendental philosophy, in fact, was to be a critique of pure reason and to consist of two parts: a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals. Kant introduced a description of his own plans in conjunction with very brief allusions to two works of his pupil. First, Herz’s recently published review of Ernst Platner’s *Anthropology* (Platner was a physician teaching in Leipzig) provided Kant an occasion to sketch his own contrasting conception of anthropology. Second, Kant formulated an essential kernel of his own moral philosophy in view of a publication Herz planned on this topic.

On the subject of anthropology, Kant wrote Herz:

The intention that I have [for the lecture course on anthropology] is to make known the sources of all the sciences: of morality, of skill, of social intercourse, of the methods of educating and ruling human beings, and with that everything practical. Thus I seek phenomena and their laws, rather than the ultimate conditions of the possibility of the modification of human nature in general (10: 145.29–34).¹⁶

And on ethics:

A mere pure concept of the understanding cannot provide the laws or prescriptions of that which is solely sensible, because, in this respect, [such a pure concept] is wholly undetermined. The highest ground of morality must not be inferred from mere delight; it must itself satisfy in the highest degree, for it is no mere speculative representation, but rather must have motive power, and therefore, though it is indeed intellectual, it must still have a direct relation to the primary incentives of the will (10: 145.9–17).

I consider it scarcely imaginable that Kant could have made these statements in such close proximity to one another and in the common context of the statement of his own plan of the critique, without having

in mind some reciprocal relation between the two subjects. We might thus say that the seed of this question about the relationship between anthropology and ethics is already found in this letter from the “end of 1773.”¹⁷ Moreover, considering that the recipient of the letter had been an auditor of the entire range of Kant’s lectures during the second half of the 1760s,¹⁸ it is directly relevant that Kant’s written announcement of his courses for the winter semester of 1765–6 had described the relevant subjects under a common rubric, the “doctrine of virtue,” and not in terms of the separate disciplines of ethics and anthropology (which he came to separate by 1772–3 at the very latest).

Kant writes, in that “Announcement” of 1765:

In [the lectures on] the doctrine of virtue I shall always begin by considering historically and philosophically what happens, before specifying what ought to happen. In so doing, I shall make clear what method ought to be adopted in the study of the human being. And by human being here I do not only mean the human being as he is distorted by the mutable form which is conferred upon him by the contingencies of his condition, and who, as such, has nearly always been misunderstood even by philosophers. I rather mean, the unchanging nature of the human being, and his distinctive position within the creation. My purpose will be to establish which perfection is appropriate to him in the state of primitive innocence and which perfection is appropriate to him in the state of wise innocence (2: 311–12).¹⁹

In other words, I believe that Kant was indicating to Herz at the beginning of the winter semester of 1773–4 that the establishment of the course on anthropology is bound up with a *change* in his course on moral philosophy. This interpretation of mine, admittedly, cannot be directly established by the lecture notes, because we do not possess any notes from the second half of the 1760s for comparison.²⁰ Extant notes, however, do allow us to compare the courses on anthropology and moral philosophy from the 1770s, and to examine how the relationship between the two is articulated in them.

Here again, what would seem to be a merely historical fact is significant. The table of Kant’s lectures as professor (that is, between 1770 and 1796)²¹ reveals that once he began teaching the course on anthropology (winter 1772–3), he never taught ethics again without holding a parallel course on anthropology: No ethics without anthropology! And for the second half of the 1770s it is also: No anthropology without ethics! This fact is significant for the content of the courses, because Kant must have reckoned that at least some students would hear the

two courses side by side in a single semester. Consequently, there ought to be a direct relationship between the claims of the lecture notes about the connection between the two disciplines: in the ethics course, nothing could be claimed about anthropology that would run contrary to what these same students would hear in the anthropology course, and vice versa. Moreover, in cases where there are extant notes of both disciplines from the same period, a commentator must be cognizant of such connections.

Fortunately, in addition to the various student notes from the anthropology course, an entire group of student notebooks have survived from a course in moral philosophy from the middle of the 1770s. On the basis of three manuscripts, Paul Menzer edited a set of notes from this course, first published in 1924, which, as far as I know, first appeared in English in Louis Infield's 1930 translation.

In the introductory passages of the notes from this ethics course (1774–5)²² it says:

The science of the rules concerning how a human being ought to behave is practical philosophy, and the science of the rules concerning his actual behavior is anthropology; these two sciences are closely connected, and moral philosophy cannot endure without anthropology, for one must first know of the agent, *whether he is also in a position to accomplish what it is required of him, that he should do*. One can, indeed, certainly consider practical philosophy even without anthropology, or without knowledge of the agent, only then it is merely speculative or an Idea; so the human being must at least be studied accordingly. . . . So one must know of the human being, whether he can also do what is required of him (27: 244).²³

The relationship between anthropology and moral philosophy is determined by the difference between *is* and *ought*: the same human behavior can and will be considered from two perspectives. Anthropology considers the actual behavior, the observable actions. Moral philosophy seeks to evaluate this behavior, these same actions, insofar as it establishes and grounds criteria for judgment.

Completely analogous is a statement in the opening passage of the *Anthropologie-Friedlaender* (1775–6):

The human being however, the subject, must be studied to see whether he can even fulfill *what it is required of him, that he should do*. The reason that moral philosophy and sermons, which are full of admonitions of which we never tire,

have little effect is the lack of knowledge of human beings. Moral philosophy must be connected with the knowledge of humanity (25: 471–2).²⁴

Thus, by the middle of the 1770s, Kant had abandoned the way of connecting the two perspectives that he had sketched under the title of the “doctrine of virtue” in the announcement of his courses for winter semester 1765–6. The reason for this change is quickly found, if one considers the positive doctrine of the lectures on moral philosophy. Perhaps it is enough, in the context of this brief commentary, merely to mention that in the ethics course Kant advocates the concept of a *pure moral philosophy*, which takes no account of any empirical conditions. He is firmly convinced, in the 1770s, that he can identify a “pure moral principle” and establish it argumentatively.²⁵ In the 1760s, he had still approached moral principles empirically, after the model of English moral philosophy. The passage on moral philosophy from the aforementioned letter to Herz from the “end of 1773” is, to my knowledge, the earliest evidence in Kant of a conception of morality in which empirical considerations are completely and deliberately renounced.²⁶ Kant informed Herz that, from now on, the *mundus intelligibilis* and the *mundus sensibilis* are separate in the field of practical philosophy as well as in theoretical philosophy. And yet, as the course on anthropology taught in all phases of its development, the human is a “being” that participates in both worlds.

Thus, my answer to the question about the relation between anthropology and moral philosophy in Kant is thus an apparent paradox: anthropology and ethics must be separated, and yet, at the same time neither can be thought independently of the other. Kant’s doctrine of the double nature of the human being is mirrored in the differences between these two disciplines or lecture courses. And the systematic location of this doctrine is, in a double sense, the *beginning* of the anthropology: the doctrine of a human ego (*einen Ich*) “as animal and intelligence.” On the one hand, the doctrine of the consciousness of the ego (*das Ich-Bewußtsein*) or “self-consciousness” is the first substantive chapter of the anthropology. On the other hand, the recognition of the double nature of the human being is what presents Kant with the task of a specifically philosophical, as opposed to medical, anthropology.

Yet, even with this recognition of anthropology’s dual beginning (vis-à-vis the self-conscious ego and the task of a philosophical

anthropology), the task I identified at the beginning of this section is not completed. In particular, we still lack a satisfactory answer to the very concrete question: why did Kant establish a *separate* course on anthropology? The emphasis here lies on the word “separate,” because it is clear, on the basis of various independent sources, that Kant had already discussed anthropological questions in courses he taught in the 1760s.²⁷ My thesis goes a step further: I maintain that an adequate understanding of the two disconnected parts of the course is connected with the recognition of anthropology’s dual beginning. In other words, I contend that the two-part structure eventually assumed by both the course and the published book is connected with the dual origin of Kantian anthropology: a theory of self-consciousness and the insight into the dual nature of the human being that emerges with it.

Heretofore, the plentiful opinions and treatises written on the topic of the “origin of the anthropology” have concerned themselves only with questions about either the relation between anthropology and physical geography as “pragmatic courses” or the relation of Kantian anthropology to “empirical psychology,” considered as a sub-discipline of the Wolff-Baumgarten metaphysics. Accordingly, the first and second parts of the anthropology course have always been treated separately. The question of how the two parts are connected or related has been noted in the literature, but it nevertheless remains unanswered.

What does the structure of the course on anthropology look like? With the exception of the student notes from the first two attested offerings (in the winter of 1772–3 and the winter of 1775–6), and leaving aside the introductory remarks, the remaining four sufficiently documented courses (from the years 1777–8, 1781–2, 1784–5, and 1788–9) manifest the same structure that Kant used in the published *Anthropology* of 1798. (Information about the courses of 1791–2 and 1793–4 is too limited for comparison on this point.) There is an explicitly formulated division into two parts. The first part contains an *empirical psychology*, which draws on the similarly titled section of the Baumgarten textbook used in the course.²⁸ It is divided into three parts: (1) the faculty of cognition, (2) the faculty of pleasure and displeasure (with a special section on taste, the location of which is shifted vis-à-vis Baumgarten’s presentation), and finally (3) the faculty

of desire. The second part of the course, for which there is no model in Baumgarten's textbook, is designated "characteristic." The exposition in this part roughly reproduces Kant's own work from 1764: the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*.

At this point, a look at the two oldest sets of student notes reveals that in neither of these sources from the first semester (1772–3), that is in neither *Collins* nor *Parow*, is there an explicit two-part division conforming to this structure. Nonetheless, there is a clearly recognizable break signaled by the turning away from the model of the textbook. And this is now my first claim: this new, comparatively short "section" found after the break is quite clearly assigned an original anthropological task of its own. In *Collins*, we read:

Characters are nothing other than that which is peculiar to the higher capacities. Indeed, in each human being there lie great incentives and preparations for every kind of activity, but there also lies *a higher principle in him to make use of all of the capacities and incentives*; to sacrifice and to restrain sensations, etc. The constitution of these higher powers makes up the character. Thus, one also says nothing, if one uses the word "character" to refer to a human being's capacities; [it concerns] *how he makes use of them*, and what he will do (25: 227).

And similarly in *Parow*:

But [the human being] also possesses something distinct from all this apparatus, namely, *the faculty to make use of all these powers, faculties, talents*; to let his desires have free play or to hold them back; the character of human beings rests on the constitution of this higher power. Thus, the determination [*Bestimmung*] of human character depends, not on his drives and desires, but rather solely on the manner *in which he modifies these*. We thus ask only about how the human being uses his powers and faculties, to which final end he applies them (25: 437–8).

In both cases, the promise that was made at the beginning of the "Introduction" is being fulfilled with these sentences. Again, first *Collins*:

We will observe the human mind in all conditions, in healthy and sick [conditions], in confused and in primitive conditions, [in relation to] the first principles of taste and the judgment of the beautiful, the principles of pathology, sensibility, and inclination. *We will give an account of the character of various ages and especially sexes, and seek to draw them from their sources* (25: 8).

And *Parow*:

Here one can learn about the sources of all human actions and the characters of human beings in their interconnection that one finds scattered only here and there in the sciences, novels, and occasional moral treatises. One can thus derive from its sources each trait of humanity that one notices in a writing, and in this manner increase one's knowledge of human beings (25: 244).

The notetakers captured the decisive point in the introduction only quite cursorily and somewhat vaguely, so it is easily overlooked. Yet, the use of the words “character” and “source” provides a clear signal. *Character* is the source of human actions that is discussed throughout the course of the lectures. And character is – as already noted – defined as a “higher faculty to make use of the faculties and capacities.” Character is precisely that with which human beings distinguish *themselves* from one another. The respective character of each is an accomplishment, an activity of the subject that can be morally appraised. In *Parow*, the text of the previously cited passage continues with the words:

Thus in order to be able to determine the character of the human being, one must be acquainted with the ends set for him by his nature. The characters of human beings are all moral, for moral [philosophy] is just the science of all the ends to which we direct our faculties and toward which we strain. Character is a certain subjective rule of the higher faculty of desire. The objective rules of this faculty contain morality; consequently, the peculiarities of the higher faculty of desire constitute human character (Parow ms. 307).²⁹

In a somewhat pointed manner one could say that the capacity for character is the fourth faculty considered in the anthropology, a fourth element emerging from a consideration of the foregoing triad.³⁰

The subsequent course, from the winter of 1775–6, also contains a clear formulation of the task set for the second part of the anthropology. In *Prieger* we read:

Since, with human beings, character is the most important thing, it is necessary for us to seek out its source. The good character is the good will. . . . One also calls character “conduct of thought” [*Denkungsart*], but without thereby indicating the constitution of the understanding. For, just as “will” has a general [meaning], but in this context only “disposition” [*Gesinnung*] is understood, in the same way the concept of the understanding also has a general meaning, but in this context it only means *the faculty of making good use of [one's understanding]* (Prieger ms. 119–20).³¹

It is evident that a direct connection with the moral philosophy of the middle of the 1770s is being articulated, as we see on the next page:

One does not know why it happens that [some] human beings have no moral feeling – one can neither have insight into nor explain whether it comes from the extension or the refinement [of feeling]. *The incentive to act according to good principles could well be the idea* that if all were to so act, then it would be a paradise. This urges me, for my part, to contribute my all, so that, if it is not so, the fault does not lie with me. In this manner is the concept of the good an incentive, and this is the good character (Prieger ms. 121).³²

The anthropology course from the winter of 1775–6 also contains two substantive additions toward the end. A section called “On the Character of Humanity in General” is inserted before what had been, in the earliest courses, the final section on the “Character of the Sexes” and the conclusion takes the form of a passage entitled “On Education” (*Von der Erziehung*). This supplementation is quite clearly undertaken in connection with the contemporaneous course on moral philosophy. At one point near the end of those ethics lectures we read: “with respect to the difference between the sexes, one can consult anthropology . . .”; and “anthropology” is likewise explicitly cross-referenced for its treatment of the question, associated with Rousseau, concerning the “difference between the state of nature and the civil state” (27: 466).³³ On a related note, a starting point for Kant’s political philosophy is also established in the anthropology course: the first time Kant treats the concept of “majority” or “coming of age” (*Mündigkeit*) is in this section, the “*Charakteristik*.”³⁴

The internal logic of the anthropology course, taken as a whole, includes the following steps:

Introduction

(A) the ego (*das Ich*)

(B) the three faculties (= empirical psychology)

(C) character (= moral anthropology or the moral [action-oriented] side of the ego)

The task of anthropology – at least through the mid-1770s – is to investigate the use the human being makes of his “faculties.” The proper object of anthropology is that which Kant later calls the “empirical character” of human beings, while the domain of the

“intelligible character” is assigned to moral philosophy. But Kant never leaves any doubt about the fact that the two characters he is observing indeed belong to one and the same human being. The difficult reciprocal relation between the two characters gives birth, on the level of philosophical theory, to the tension between anthropology and moral philosophy.³⁵

In conclusion, I would like to confirm with two further observations that this *ratio essendi* of anthropology (at least that of the 1770s) in “investigating the character of the human being” is no mere construction from the student notes.

First, in several reflections from the 1770s, Kant asserted the previously described task of the “characteristic” in his own hand.³⁶ One such passage reads:

The latter [i.e., pragmatic anthropology] examines what the human being is only far enough to draw out rules concerning what he can make of himself or how he can make use of others. [It is] not psychology, which is a scholastic discipline (Refl. 1502a, 15: 800.12–14).

Second, the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) contains the same argument. Kant used the word “anthropology” exactly three times there: in the first case in the depiction of the difference between “conduct of sensibility” (*Sinnesart*) and “conduct of thought” (*Denkungsart*), or “empirical and intelligible character” respectively, through which the critical philosophy is enabled to assume “human freedom” (A 550/B 578).³⁷ Kant must have first worked out this decisively important position during the 1770s; in the middle of the 1770s, he did not yet have this conception at his disposal, as the student notes from the anthropology and the ethics courses from this period show.³⁸

The relationship between these two disciplines – as already mentioned – mirrors, on the level of philosophy, the relationship between the two characters in and/or of human beings. If one compares the relation between these two characters with the two sides of a coin, then this “human coin” has a peculiar characteristic: the images on the two sides resemble one another. Neither side is independent of the other, rather, they stand in a fixed relation to each other – at least a similarity relation. And it seems to me that Kant regarded it as precisely the task of the human subject, of every self, to make this resemblance as close as possible.

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Notes

1. Based upon a paper presented at the Central Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in Pittsburgh, April 1997.
2. The translator would like to thank Steve Naragon for generously sharing his work on an earlier translation of this paper, and Felicitas Munzel for

comments on an earlier draft of this translation and providing an advance version of her forthcoming translation of the *Friedlaender* notes, which are the basis of several passages translated here.

3. Kant / AdW 25: lv–cxv. Unless otherwise noted, citations refer to this “Academy edition,” cited by *volume: page number. line number*. References to the manuscripts themselves, as opposed to the published edition, will be cited by manuscript name, followed by “ms.” and the page number in the manuscript.
4. Arnoldt IV, 330.
5. For further explanation, see the discussion of the structure of the anthropology course in Part II, pp. 26f.
6. See especially, pp. lv–cxv.
7. Menzer 1911, Irmscher 1964, Irmscher / Adler 1979. Recently, part of the Herder notes of Kant’s Physical Geography, which had previously been believed lost, has been recovered; these notes, along with others, are being prepared in Marburg for publication in volume 26 of the Academy edition.
8. This is the case with the *Dohna*, *Matuszewski* and *anonymus-Berlin* manuscripts. Arnold Kowalewski’s 1924 edition is based entirely upon the *Dohna* manuscript.
9. That is, the outlines and rough notes Kant prepared for his own use in lecture – his lecture cribnotes (also in vol. 15).
10. cf. Stark 1992.
11. See the concluding footnote from the introduction to the 1798 *Anthropology* (7: 122 n). For more background, see Stark 1993, pp. 61–4.
12. http://www.uni-marburg.de/kant/webseite/gt_lv_ant.htm. I would like to use this opportunity to call attention to the possibilities for using this technology to advance worldwide cooperation in Kant research.
13. The traces (*Spuren*) of the development of Kant’s thoughts on moral philosophy between 1762 and 1785, which are found in his published works, letters, and literary remains, are, as a few recent works (Kuehn 1995, Schwaiger 1999, Stark 1999) recognize, witnesses to a dynamic that older studies (Henrich 1957–8, Henrich 1963, Schmucker 1961, Henrich 1965–6) failed to adequately recognize.
14. *Archiwum Państwowe w Olsztynie*. Signatur: XVIII/1, 200, fol. 431 and fol. 492–3. Johann Christian Polykarp Erxleben, *Anfangsgründe der Naturlehre*. Göttingen 1772. See Stark 1993, p. 328.
15. I believe this letter can be dated, more precisely, to October 25, 1773. In support: it is peculiar that Kant sent a letter without a date. This is understandable, if one supposes (as Arthur Warda has already noted) that Kant typically sent multiple, completely finished letters on a single “mail day.” In this case, it could easily happen that a date entry was omitted. Because the destination of this undated letter #79 is Berlin, I suppose that it was sent along with #77 (October 25, 1773, to the publisher Friedrich Nicolai). Both letters are transmitted without address pages, and in each

letter, the Kant portrait just published in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* is discussed.

16. Emphasis added. Translation of this and subsequent passages from Kant's correspondence is based upon Kant / Zweig 1999.
17. If one agrees with my attempt to give a precise date to this letter, then the statements about the new anthropology course also take on a specific hue: they occurred almost contemporaneous with or very shortly after the corresponding introductory comments of the 1773–4 course. The enrollment list for this course (*Subscriptionzettel*), preserved in the New York Public library's "Herter Collection," is dated October 3, 1773 (25: c–ci).
18. Herz matriculated in Königsberg on April 21, 1766, and left the city in August 1770; cf. Erler / Joachim 1910–17 and Kant's letter to Herz from August 31, 1770 (10: 95).
19. Emphasis added. Translation is based upon Kant / Walford 1992. In direct discourse, the passage reads in its entirety:

For the time being, I shall lecture on universal practical philosophy and the doctrine of virtue, basing both of them on Baumgarten. The attempts of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, although incomplete and defective, have nonetheless penetrated furthest in the search for the fundamental principles of all morality. Their efforts will be given the precision and the completeness that they lack. In [the lectures on] the doctrine of virtue *I shall always begin by considering historically and philosophically what happens before specifying what ought to happen*. In so doing, I shall make clear what *method ought to be adopted in the study of the human being*. And by human being here I do not only mean the human being as he is distorted by the mutable form which is conferred upon him by the contingencies of his condition, and who, as such, has nearly always been misunderstood even by philosophers. I rather mean the *unchanging nature of the human being, and his distinctive position within the creation*. My purpose will be to establish which perfection is appropriate to him in the state of primitive innocence and which perfection is appropriate to him in the state of wise innocence. It is also my purpose to establish what, by contrast, the rule of [human] behavior is when, transcending the two types of limit, he strives to attain the highest level of physical or moral excellence, though falling short of that attainment to a greater or lesser degree. This method of moral enquiry is an admirable discovery of our times, which, when viewed in the full extent of its programme, was entirely unknown to the ancients.

20. Herder's notes, which stem from the first half of the 1760s, can be compared in only a very limited fashion. For Kant had made it clear, in apparently his sole letter to Herder (May 9, 1768), that he had already made significant progress specifically in areas of moral philosophy:

As for my own work, . . . I have, since we parted, exchanged many of my views for other insights. My principal aim is to know the actual nature and limits of human capacities and inclinations, and I think I have finally more or less succeeded as far as ethics is concerned. I am now working on a *Metaphysics of Morals* in which I fancy I shall be able to present the evident and fruitful principles of conduct and the method that must be employed if the so prevalent, but for the most part sterile, efforts in this area of knowledge are ever to produce useful results (10: 74).

21. cf. the previously mentioned Internet site at http://www.uni-marburg.de/kant/webseite/gt_v_tab.htm. Based upon Arnoldt / Schöndörffer 1907–9.
22. On the dating of this course, see Stark 1999.
23. Emphasis added. Translations of Kant's lectures on ethics are based upon Kant / Heath / Schneewind 1997, 27: 244.16–22; Kant / Gerhardt 1990, p. 12.
24. Emphasis added. Ms. 399/400, ms. 12–13; cf. Petersburg, ms. 6; Menschenkunde, ms. 7. (1781–2) *Menschenkunde* (25: 858).
25. See the exposition under “On the Supreme Principle of Morality,” Kant / Heath / Schneewind 1997, pp. 65–73. Cf. the incomplete text in 27: 274–8. Like Schneewind / Heath, Gerhardt, pp. 46–56, supplements this text with text from *Moral-Mrongoivius* (27: 1425–30).
26. Exactly corresponding to the alternative mentioned in the lecture text from 1774–5: “The theoretical conception of morality (which does not specify a theory, but only a concept from which a theory can be constructed) consists in this, that moral philosophy rests either on empirical or intellectual grounds, and must be derived from either empirical or intellectual principles.” Kant / Heath / Schneewind 1997, p. 48. 27: 252.29–34; Kant / Gerhardt 1990, p. 22.

In the present developmental context, it is important to note that Kant clearly indicates, with his distinction between “theoretical conception” (*Lehrbegriff*) and “theory” (*Lehrgebäude*), that what he is teaching his students in the mid-1770s is a still uncompleted programme – the *Grundwork* is still another ten years away! A preview (*Vorform*) of the programmatic clarification was already grasped by Herder at the beginning of the 1760s: “An ethic for man, *determined* in his nature, by his knowledge, powers and capacities, has yet to be written.” Kant / Heath / Schneewind 1997, p. 28. 27: 62.21–5; Kant / Irmischer 1964, p. 151.

27. A few hints about Kant's anthropological interests prior to 1772–3: First, at least since Menzer 1911 and the Herder notes (1762–4), it is clear that from the beginning of his philosophical reflections “the human being” (*der Mensch*) and his place in the cosmos had been a central theme. This is not surprising, if one thinks of the broadened, contemporary formulation of the theme: the vocation or destiny (*Bestimmung*) of the human being. Although there are no special texts devoted to it, this theme is treated in many passages in Kant's nonacademic publications prior to 1770, as Menzer has shown. Herder, who personally attended the lectures in Königsberg (1762–4), reports, among other things, about this time period, that Kant took up “every natural discovery he was aware of” and appreciated it. Thereby he would always return to the “unbiased [*unbefangene*] knowledge of nature and to the moral worth of human beings” (Malter 1990, p. 57, n. 47). Second, in the primary source for our knowledge of Kant's engagement with Rousseau, his personal copy of his own *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* of 1764, he wrote: “The greatest concern of a human being is to know how he

- can properly fulfill his place in the creation and to correctly understand what one must be to be a human being." Kant / Rischmüller 1991, p. 36; cf. also the associated commentary, n. 33,1 on pp. 187–8. This passage is also found in 20: 41.19–21. Menzer had already called attention to this passage. Menzer 1911, p. 145. Finally, in the sketch for a 1768 portrait Kant is depicted holding a book; a few lines of text are legible, including the words "Anthropology or the knowledge of the nature of human beings" (Clasen 1924, p. 12). Thus, it cannot be assumed that the subject "Anthropology" was new to Kant, nor that he first began to teach students about it with the beginning of the separate course in 1772–3.
28. See the previously mentioned Internet site at http://www.uni-marburg.de/kant/webseite/gt_anko1.htm. Here a table displays, like a concordance, information on the relationship between sections of Baumgarten's textbook and Kant's lectures on anthropology.
 29. cf. 25:438. Note: the *Brauer* manuscript contains a variant in the second sentence: "The characters of human beings are all moral, for morality is just the science of all the ends *which are established by the nature of the will and which are proscribed by the objective laws of the will* to which we direct our faculties and toward which we strain." Brauer ms. 182.
 30. This organizational principle manifests the "1, 2, 3 / 4" pattern that Brandt has identified in Kant's table of judgments and throughout western intellectual history. cf. Brandt 1998.
 31. Emphasis added. cf. Friedlaender 25: 648–9.
 32. Emphasis added. cf. Friedlaender 25: 650.
 33. Kant / Heath / Schneewind 1997, pp. 217–18. 27: 466; Kant / Gerhardt 1990, pp. 264–5. Once again, the comparison with the thematically corresponding comments at the conclusion of the Herder notes of the ethics lectures is significant. cf. 27: 88–9; Kant / Irmischer 1964, p. 178; not included in the selections in Kant / Heath / Schneewind 1997.
 34. *Mündigkeit* is discussed in the "Characteristic" at Friedlaender 25: 682. But it is also briefly discussed earlier in Friedlaender/Prieger. See Friedlaender 25: 543; Prieger ms. 59–60.
 35. I would like to point out G. Felicitas Munzel's recent study (1999) that, thematically and in its execution, closely corresponds with my own reflections about the development of Kant's theory of character.
 36. Refl. 1113: "Character is the general governing principle in human beings for the use of their talents and attributes. Thus, it is the constitution of their will and [is either] good or evil" (15: 496.7–9).
 Refl. 1179: "With a good character, the essential thing is the worth placed in oneself. . . for character signifies that the person borrows the rule for his actions from himself and the dignity of humanity" (15: 521. 16–20).
 Refl. 1482: "Knowledge of the world is 1. knowledge of nature, 2. knowledge of human beings, but human beings also have a nature. Here the use of this knowledge will also be considered" (15: 660.3–5, a later addition to the rest of this remark).

Refl. 1494: “it does not depend on his inclinations or passions, but rather what use he makes of them” (15: 757.9–10).

Refl. 1518: “Character or conduct of thought [*Denkungsart*]. . . . <The disposition [*Beschaffenheit*] of the will, to make use of all one’s natural aptitudes>” (15: 867.16–19, angle brackets indicating a contemporaneous addition).

Refl. 5616: “The higher faculty of choice [*Willkühr*] is the capacity [*Vermögen*], to make use of one’s incentives or sensible stimuli according to their laws, but always in accord with the representation of the understanding (in relation to the final and universal end of sensibility)” (18: 256.9–12).

37. The two other passages: A 842 / B 870; A 849 / B 877.

38. Paul Menzer was still surprised in 1924, in his introduction to the ethics lectures of the mid-1770s, that “the doctrine of intelligible freedom . . . played in fact no role in them”; Kant / Gerhardt 1990, p. 287.

Kant and the Problem of Human Nature

Allen W. Wood

“What is the Human Being?”

Kant sometimes treated this question as the most fundamental question of all philosophy:

The field of philosophy in the cosmopolitan sense can be brought down to the following questions:

1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?
4. What is the human being?

Metaphysics answers the first question, *morals* the second, *religion* the third, and *anthropology* the fourth. Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of this to anthropology, because the first three questions refer to the last one” (Ak 9: 25).¹

What Kant actually thought about this fundamental question is harder to discover. Kant’s lectures on anthropology, which he delivered regularly after 1773 and were the most popular lectures he gave, have not been widely studied and only recently have the transcriptions of them been published. But even in these lectures, Kant was reluctant to address the most fundamental question. As we shall see later, this reluctance anticipates some of the issues (about human freedom and about the historical variability of human ways of life)

that have led others since Kant's time to declare that there is no such thing as "human nature" uniformly and equally determining all human beings at all times and places.² But Kant does not doubt that there is a single nature common to human beings. Nor does he have any doubt that the investigation of this nature is the proper object of the branch of human knowledge he calls "anthropology." Kant argues against doing what he calls a merely "local anthropology" – studying only the behavior or characteristics of human beings as they are found in a particular time and place. "Anthropology, is not a description of human beings but of human nature" (Ak 25: 471). Further, he does not think that "local" knowledge of human beings is even a starting point for an investigation of human nature in general. On the contrary, Kant thinks that a "local knowledge of the world" must rest on a "general knowledge of the world" (a knowledge of human nature as such) if it is to be useful to us (Ak 25: 734). Kant rightly sees that our deepest interests, both prudential and moral, in studying ourselves and other human beings always lies in discovering what the members of the human species have in common. This is what makes it both possible and necessary for us to take human beings as a subject of our investigation. The search for a common human nature, and the presupposition that there is here a genuine object of inquiry, is even what gives (paradoxical) force to all rhetorical declaration that there is no such thing. Like all such skeptical paradoxes, moreover, these declarations make sense at all only when seen as *caveats* or correctives against overconfidence in particular findings or methods. Taken literally and for themselves, they could not lead to any productive line of investigation, but would simply put an end to every study of human beings by depriving such inquiries of their point.

Pragmatic Anthropology

Kant's reluctance to discuss the fundamental question "What is the human being?" appears rather to be due to his convictions about its inherent difficulty, about our limited capacities to acquire knowledge of human nature in general, and about the poor state of anthropology at present even in relation to its inherently limited possibilities. We

find these worries expressed as early as *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755):

It is not even known at all to us what the human being now is, although consciousness and the senses ought to instruct us in this; how much less will we be able to guess what one day he ought to become. Nevertheless, the human soul's desire for knowledge snaps very desirously at this object, which lies so far from it, and strives, in such obscure knowledge, to shed some light" (Ak 1: 366).

Kant's desire to lecture on anthropology, and even to reconceptualize the study of human nature, was apparently stimulated in 1772 by his dissatisfaction with the "physiological" approach to the subject taken by Ernst Platner. According to a 1773 letter to Marcus Herz, Platner's popular treatise on anthropology provoked Kant to institute an empirical study of human nature aimed at avoiding Platner's "futile inquiries as to the manner in which bodily organs are connected with thought" (Ak 10: 146).³ Kant's "pragmatic" approach is grounded on a repudiation of the idea that human beings can be fruitfully understood in merely physiological terms. Human beings must be viewed as free agents, not as mere links in a causal mechanism; anthropological inquiry must be the activity of a free agent engaging other free agents.

In calling his approach to anthropology "pragmatic," Kant uses the term in four distinct (though related) senses.

(1) *Pragmatic versus physiological*. First, as we have just seen, Kant distinguishes the *pragmatic* approach to the study of human nature from the *physiological* approach he finds in Platner. The latter, he says, studies only what nature makes of the human being, whereas pragmatic anthropology considers "what the *human being* as a free agent makes, or can and ought to make, of himself" (Ak 7: 119). Pragmatic anthropology deals with human actions, and with human nature as something that is in part self-produced by free action. From this description, it looks like pragmatic anthropology is intended to include "practical anthropology" – the empirical part of moral philosophy (Ak 4: 388), since that study is also supposed to deal with human nature in light of human freedom and what human beings *ought* to do. This impression is confirmed by some of the manuscript versions, especially by the Mrongovius version (1784–5) that is most contemporaneous with the *Groundwork*. There the part of pragmatic anthropology

entitled “Characteristic,” which deals with human character and action, is called the “practical part of anthropology” (Ak 25: 1367).⁴ The scope of pragmatic anthropology is broader than that of practical anthropology since it seeks knowledge of human nature in light of *all* the uses we may choose to make of this knowledge, and not only for its moral use.

The “self-making” of the human being denoted by “pragmatic anthropology” must be taken to include the way each of us is (and ought to be) made through the actions of others and the influence of society. In Kant’s view, human beings are human at all only through the actions of others who educate them: “A human being can become human only through education. He is nothing but what education makes of him” (Ak 9: 443). Kant also holds that the development of our human predispositions is a social process, a result of the collective actions of society (most of which are unknown to and unintended by individual agents (Ak 8: 17–18). Moreover, in Kant’s view the evil in human nature is a social product, and our fulfillment of our moral vocation *ought* to be social in nature (Ak 6: 93–100): our only hope for human moral improvement lies in an ethical community with shared or collective moral ends. (On all these points, the common characterization of Kant as a moral “individualist” could not be more mistaken.)

(2) *Pragmatic versus scholastic.* Kant intends pragmatic anthropology to be a “knowledge of the world” (*Weltkenntnis*) as distinct from a *scholastic* knowledge. (Ak 7: 120) The latter involves knowing or being acquainted with the world (*die Welt kennen*), but a truly pragmatic knowledge of human nature involves “having a world” (*Welt haben*): “The one only *understands* the play (*Spiel*), of which it has been a spectator, but the other has *participated* (*mitgespielt*) in it” (Ak 7: 120, cf. 25: 9, 854–5, 1209–10). In other words, pragmatic anthropology is supposed to involve the oriented sort of knowledge of human nature that people gain through interacting with others rather than the theoretical knowledge of a mere observer. At the same time, however, Kant emphasizes (as we saw previously) that anthropology must be *Weltkenntnis* also in the sense that it is *cosmopolitan* in its scope.⁵ It must be a universal knowledge involving acquaintance with and reflection on the entire species (Ak 7: 120).

(3) *Pragmatic as useful.* The term “pragmatic anthropology” refers not only to our knowledge of human nature insofar as it is a *result* of

human actions, but also to knowledge acquired with the aim of *using* it in action. When we study memory, for example, as pragmatic anthropologists, Kant says, we are not mere “spectators of our play of ideas” but we “use our observations about what has been found to hinder or stimulate memory in order to increase its scope and efficiency” (Ak 7: 119). (This use of “pragmatic” is explicitly derived from the idea of “pragmatic history,” or the study of history undertaken for the purpose of utility in action [Ak 25: 1212]. In Germany the term was particularly applied to Hume’s historical writings.)⁶ “Utility” here is meant to encompass technical knowledge, prudential knowledge, and moral knowledge. Kant’s emphasis on the *pragmatic* character of his anthropology is partly to be explained by the popular intent of the lectures, which leads him to advertise the utility as well as the worldly character of the information he is providing.⁷

(4) *Pragmatic as prudential.* Yet in naming his lectures “pragmatic” Kant is also sometimes thinking of his theory of the three kinds of rationality, contrasting the pragmatic with both the *technical* and the moral. That aligns the pragmatic with prudence – with a knowledge that furthers our happiness, especially through the use we make of other people (Ak 25: 469, 1210). Kant’s audience is often being told what will help them to use their own capacities to advance their ends, especially their well-being, and also what will help them make use of the characteristics of others for their own advantage (Ak 7: 312).

The Empirical Investigation of Freedom

Alasdair MacIntyre doubtless speaks for many when he comments that Kant’s only conception of human nature is one that involves merely “the physiological and non-rational side of man.”⁸ As we have seen, however, his assertion could not be farther from the truth. It was in fact precisely the project of repudiating Platner’s version of this conception of anthropology that got Kant interested in the subject in the first place. Nevertheless, there are real grounds in some of Kant’s texts for people to think that his conception of anthropology must be as MacIntyre describes it. We therefore need to look at the part of Kantian doctrine those texts express and show how it can be reconciled with his pragmatic approach to anthropology.

Remarks like MacIntyre's result from an acquaintance primarily with Kant's writings on metaphysics and the foundations of ethics, and from a certain (mistaken) projection of what his metaphysical views imply about the empirical investigation of human beings. We all know from the first two Critiques and the *Groundwork* that Kant regards human freedom as theoretically indemonstrable and empirically unrecognizable. We know also that Kant regards the empirical world of nature as a strictly deterministic causal mechanism, in which no free agency could be found, and therefore that he locates our free agency in the noumenal world, inaccessible to empirical investigation. He therefore also infers that if human beings are considered merely as parts of the natural world that is accessible to our empirical cognition, human actions cannot be regarded as free.

All actions of human beings in the domain of appearance are determined in conformity with the order nature, . . . and if we could exhaustively investigate all the appearances of the wills of human beings, there would not be found a single human action we could not predict with certainty and recognize as proceeding necessarily from antecedent conditions. So far, then . . . there is no freedom (KrV A 550/B 578).

Since the past is no longer in my power, every action I perform is necessary from determining grounds which are not in my power; that means that at the time I act I am never free" (Ak 5: 94).

If it were possible for us to have so deep an insight into a human being's character . . . that every, even the least incentive . . . were known to us, then his future conduct would be predicted with as great a certainty as the occurrence of a solar or lunar eclipse (Ak 5: 99).

Based on such eye-catching statements, it is easy to form lively expectations about Kant's conception of the natural or empirical study of human nature. We think he must project anthropology or empirical psychology as a mechanistic natural science that altogether excludes human freedom and treats human behavior as merely part of the mechanism of nature. We therefore do not expect to find in Kantian anthropology any empirical investigation of human beings as free agents, much less a naturalistic investigation of the development of the rational capacities which presuppose freedom. Kant's talk of two "standpoints" and of considering ourselves in "speculative" and "practical respects" (Ak 4: 455) are easily interpreted as a theory positing two radically different and wholly incommensurable conceptions on

ourselves: that of the “spectator,” from which I must view all human beings (including myself) as causally determined natural automata, and that of the “agent,” from which I view myself as a free but wholly unrecognizable member of a supernatural noumenal realm.⁹

But this picture entirely ignores Kant’s view, expressed quite clearly both in all three Critiques and throughout his ethical works, that our only coherent conception of ourselves, as moral agents or even as subjects of theoretical judgment, is one which presupposes from a practical standpoint that we are free (KrV A 546–7/B 574–5, A 801–2/B 829–30; Ak 4: 447–8, 5: 3–4, 50–7, 6: 213–14, 8: 13–14, 17). Although Kant never pretends to seek or find empirical *proofs* of human freedom, his empirical anthropology always proceeds on the fundamental presupposition that human beings are free, and throughout it interprets the empirical observations it makes on the basis of this presupposition. As pragmatic, Kantian anthropology even emphasizes those very features of human life that he takes to be empirical manifestations of freedom – the development of new capacities, the variability of ways of life, the progress of human culture, the development of reason and the historical phenomenon of Enlightenment. Though Kant does anthropology from what he calls a “pragmatic viewpoint” (the standpoint of human action), he never suggests that this viewpoint is radically incommensurable with the viewpoint of an empirical observer of human affairs. Kant places anthropology right alongside physical geography, seeing these two studies as the two main divisions of our empirical acquaintance with the natural world in which we live (Ak 9: 157; cf. KrV A 849/B 877). As we have seen, the contrast to which Kant appeals is not that between the moral agent and the detached spectator of a deterministic causal order, but that between the “scholastic” standpoint, making detached observations of no use to the human world, and the “pragmatic” standpoint, engaged in the empirical investigation of human actions for the purpose of understanding others and interacting with them based on prudential and moral interests.

Statements like the ones quoted from the first two Critiques must always be read in light of that fact that Kant denies that we can ever be in a position to have anything approaching an exhaustive knowledge of the appearances of the human will. These statements therefore express only metaphysical propositions, and do not indicate anything about any possible program of empirical research into human actions.

That is because in Kant's view, the "if" clauses in these statements about our knowledge of the causes of human actions are never true and can never be true. Thus in speaking of the unpredictability of human history Kant says explicitly that the future "is not discoverable from known laws of nature (as with eclipses of the sun and moon, which can be foretold with natural means)" (Ak 7: 79). There is no prospect that we will ever be in a position to have detailed knowledge of the psychological causes of individual human actions or to predict human actions as we predict astronomical events. Metaphysically we know that as natural beings we fall under the universal causal mechanism. But our capacity to investigate this causality empirically is virtually nonexistent. Commonsense guesswork may enable us to foretell what people will do some of the time, but in Kant's view there never could be anything approaching a *predictive science* of human behavior as the science of mechanics permits us to predict the motions of the heavens or of balls rolling down an inclined plane. If there is to be any empirical investigation of human nature at all, it will have to proceed on an altogether different basis.

One factor here is Kant's denial that there is any solution to the mind-body problem (KrV A 381-404). We can never know whether the empirical self is a material or an immaterial thing, and any noumenal self wholly transcends our powers of empirical cognition. No causal connections between the corporeal and the mental can even be made intelligible to us, much less empirically investigated. Hence any mechanistic laws governing acts of the mind would have to involve a psychological determinism cut off from the causality of objects of outer sense that is investigated by physics. As we shall see in just a moment, Kant also thinks our awareness of the appearances of inner sense is characterized by uncertainty and deceptiveness, and no study of them can ever achieve the precision of a genuine natural science (Ak 4: 471, cf. Ak 7: 121). Insofar as Kant has a conception of its methods at all, he thinks of anthropology as following the looser method of biology, based on regulative principles of teleological judgment.

The Unsatisfactory State of Anthropology

In Kant's time the study of human nature was generally treated under the heading of "empirical psychology" (it was Baumgarten's treatment

of this science that Kant used over many years as the text for his lectures on anthropology).¹⁰ Though his earliest lectures on anthropology (1772–3) appear to equate anthropology with empirical psychology (Ak 25: 8), he later refers to “empirical psychology” as the part of anthropology that deals only with appearances of inner sense (Ak 25: 243; KrV A347/B405). Kant was always dissatisfied with the way his predecessors dealt with both subjects. Both in his earliest lectures and in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he criticizes the practice of confusing the questions of empirical psychology with those of metaphysics or transcendental philosophy, which must claim *a priori* status (Ak 25: 8, 243; KrV A 848–9/B 876–7). Yet in the *Critique* he also makes the following strange concession:

Nevertheless, in accord with the customary scholastic usage one must still concede [empirical psychology] a little place (although only as an episode) in metaphysics, and indeed from economic motives, since it is not yet rich enough to comprise a subject on its own and yet it is too important for one to expel it entirely or attach it somewhere else where it may well have even less affinity than in metaphysics. It is thus merely a long-accepted foreigner, to whom one grants refuge for a while until it can establish its own domicile in a complete anthropology (the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature) (KrV A 848–9/B 876–7).

From this remark it is evident that Kant regards neither empirical psychology nor anthropology as currently in a satisfactory state. It is equally evident that he regards empirical psychology as only one part of anthropology, which in turn is a subfield of the empirical doctrine of nature, and hence a branch of “applied” rather than “pure” philosophy (KrV A 848/B 876). But he regards such a subject as incapable of mathematical treatment, hence incapable of becoming a natural science in the proper sense (Ak 4: 471).

We must concede [he says] that psychological explanations are in very sad shape compared to physical ones, that they are forever hypothetical, and that for any three different grounds of explanation, we can easily think up a fourth that is equally plausible. . . . Empirical psychology will hardly ever be able to claim the rank of a philosophical science, and probably its only true obligation is to make psychological observations (as Burke does in his work on the beautiful and sublime) and hence to gather material for future empirical rules that are to be connected systematically, yet to do so without trying to grasp these rules (Ak 20: 238).

Here Kant's skepticism about empirical psychology contains two elements: first, doubts in principle about its prospects as a natural science, and second, doubts arising from the fact that the study of empirical psychology is presently still in a highly unsatisfactory state even relative to its limited possibilities. Kant is doubtful of our capacity to study human nature even when we do it as well as we can. For the present Kant seems to be recommending that anthropology content itself with making unsystematic observations, which are only later (as the science matures) to be taken up into empirical rules. But even when empirical psychology reaches a more satisfactory form, Kant seems to think that psychological explanations will never be more than hypothetical or conjectural. For this reason he has little to say about the scientific structure of empirical psychology. The same seems to be true of empirical anthropology (the larger study of which empirical psychology is a part).

Some of Kant's doubts in principle about the prospects for anthropology are due to general epistemological considerations, such as the standards for scientific knowledge and the fact that the subject matter of anthropology cannot meet them. But other doubts could be described as due to the findings of anthropology itself. Kant thinks that what we do know about human nature gives us reason for distrusting our abilities to know ourselves.

The Indefinability of Human Nature

Although he places the question "What is the human being?" at the very foundation of philosophy, Kant also thinks it is *impossible* to define what is peculiar to the human species. For, he says, this species is only one possible variant of rational nature, yet we are acquainted with no other variants with which to compare it and arrive at specific differentia (Ak 7: 322). Whatever we say about human nature, its predispositions and its propensities, can have only a provisional character.

Since Kant's time "anthropology" has come to refer primarily to the study of the customs and folkways of different peoples. Kant's sense of the term includes this meaning since he thinks the empirical observation of human behavior can be extended through travel or through reading the accounts of travelers (something Kant did

avidly) (Ak 7: 120). Histories, plays, and novels – Kant specifically mentions Shakespeare’s tragedies, Molière’s comedies, Fielding’s novels, and Hume’s history of England – are also “auxiliary” sources for the anthropologist, even though fictional works often represent human nature in an exaggerated fashion (Ak 7: 121, 25: 7, 472, 734, 858, 1212–14). But as we noted previously, Kant thinks all “local” knowledge of human beings presupposes a general or “cosmopolitan” knowledge of human nature, without which it can never be satisfactory or pragmatically useful.

The real difficulty of anthropology lies in discerning regularities in human behavior that might be indicative of human nature as such. Most regularities in people’s behavior, Kant observes, are due to *habit*. But habits provide reliable information only about how a person acts in familiar situations. We could tell which regularity a habit really displays only if we could see how it might make the person behave in unusual circumstances. Yet if we look at human beings in varying situations, we see that different circumstances merely produce *different habits*. What habits tell us about a person’s underlying principles of action is always ambiguous, for any habit is consistent with a variety of traits or dispositions. Further, habits *must* be ambiguous in this way if they are to perform one of their essential psychic functions, which is to conceal and disguise people’s real motives and principles (from others, and from themselves). This makes it difficult in principle to formulate any reliable generalizations at all about human dispositions. Kant concludes that it is “very difficult for anthropology to raise itself to the rank of a formal science” (Ak 7: 121).

The Difficulty of Self-Knowledge

As we have now begun to see, Kant’s anthropology involves a complex individual psychology, but this positive theory itself helps to underwrite some of Kant’s doubts about the possibility of human self-knowledge. For it forces us not only to the conclusion that the laws governing human behavior are extremely variable, but also compels us to admit that their discovery is blocked by obstacles thrown up by human nature itself. Kant denies that we can know even in our own case the principles on which we act. Kantian anthropology says that human beings have a strong tendency to conceal and disguise the truth about

themselves: “The human being has from nature a propensity to dissemble” (Ak 25: 1197). If someone notices we are observing him, then he will either become embarrassed, and hence unable to show himself as he really is, or else he will deliberately dissemble, and refuse to show himself as he is (Ak 7: 121, 25: 857–9).

In order to see human nature as it truly is, we would have to observe behavior that is un-self-conscious. But human nature in its full development occurs only in civilization, and it is one of the effects of civilization to make people more vulnerable to the opinions of others, hence more sensitive to the way others perceive them. “In crude people their entire humanity is not yet developed,” but if we observe more cultivated people, “then [we] run into the difficulty that the more educated (*gebildet*) the human being is, the more he dissembles and the less he wants to be found out (*erforscht*) by others” (Ak 25: 857).

If we try to avoid this difficulty by engaging in self-observation, then we must either do this when we are in a purely contemplative mood, when the true nature of our desires is not displaying itself, or we must attempt it when we are agitated, when our own motives are bound to distort both the data and our observations. “When our incentives are active, we are not observing ourselves; and when we are observing ourselves, our incentives are at rest” (Ak 7: 121).

Kant distinguishes between merely “noticing” oneself (which we do haphazardly all the time) and “observing” oneself (in a methodical way). The latter (he claims) would be necessary for a scientific anthropology, but it is inherently untrustworthy. When a person is being observed by others, “he wants to *represent* himself and makes his own person into an artificial illusion” (Ak 7: 132). It is just the same when we study ourselves: “Without noticing what we are doing, we suppose we are discovering within us what we ourselves have put there” (Ak 7: 133). Kant is thus very much in agreement with Nietzsche’s critique of “naive empiricism”: the “inner” world of our sensations and feelings is even less trustworthy and more “phenomenal” than the world of external objects. Hence those who have sought to make a meticulous record of their inner lives usually record only lies and self-deceptions; zeal in self-honesty leads sooner to enthusiasm and madness than to truth. For those who undertake “this hard descent into the Hell of self-knowledge” (Ak 25: 7), coming to know the deeper truth about

oneself usually produces only anguish and despair, which unfits them equally for knowledge and for action (Ak 7: 132–3). “Nothing is more harmful to a human being than being a precise observer of himself” (Ak 25: 252); “All self-scrutinizers fall into the gloomiest hypochondria” (Ak 25: 863, cf. 25: 477–8, 865).¹¹

When Kant’s readers come across statements of his view that individual human motivation is self-opaque (e.g., in the *Groundwork*, at Ak 4: 407), they tend to associate it with his metaphysical theory of freedom, which locates our agency entirely in the intelligible world. But this is just another form in which Kant’s views on anthropology have been misunderstood on the basis of false projections based on his metaphysics. In fact, matters make sense only if viewed just the other way round. It would make little sense to draw empirical conclusions about how far we can understand human behavior from a metaphysical theory whose truth Kant insists we can never know. Kant’s conjectures about noumenal freedom are possible only because we can never have satisfactory empirical knowledge of the mind. If we had reliable access to the natural causes of our behavior, then it would be quite untenable to claim that the real causes are different from these and transcend all experience. Kant’s view that we are psychologically opaque has more to do with a set of ideas more often associated with later thinkers, such as Nietzsche and Freud. Kant holds that most of our mental life consists of “obscure representations,” that is, representations that are unaccompanied by consciousness; if we ever learn about them at all, we must do so through inference (Ak 7: 135–7). This is partly because many representations are purely physiological in origin, and never *need* to reach consciousness. But in some cases, Kant thinks, we have a tendency to *make* our representations obscure by pushing them into unconsciousness. “We play with obscure representations and have an interest, when loved or unloved objects are before our imagination, in putting them into the shadows” (Ak 7: 136). The paradigm example of this, he thinks, is the way people deal with their *sexual* thoughts and desires.

Humanity and Other Animal Species

Despite the difficulty of saying anything determinate about the nature of the human species, Kant does attempt to identify, at least tentatively,

both (a) what makes humans different from other animal species and (b) what seems to distinguish human beings from the general concept of a possible species of rational beings in general. Regarding (a), Kant says:

Thus what remains to us for indicating the human being's class in the system of living nature and thus characterizing him is nothing but this: he has a character that he himself makes, in that he has the faculty of perfecting himself in accordance with ends he takes for himself; whereby he can make himself, from an animal endowed with a *capacity for reason* (*animal rationabilis*), into a rational animal (*animal rationale*); and as such he first, *preserves* himself and his species; second, exercises, instructs and *brings up* his species for domestic society; and third, *governs* it as a whole that is systematic (ordered in accordance with rational principles) and fitted for society (Ak 7: 321–2).

Following Rousseau, Kant identifies as the distinctive feature of humanity the faculty of *self-perfection*.¹² Kant rejects the traditional definition of the human being as *animal rationale*, allowing only that the human being is an *animal rationabilis* (Ak 7: 321). Human beings are *capable* of directing their lives rationally, but it is not especially characteristic of them to exercise this capacity successfully. Rather, rationality must be viewed as a *problem* set for human beings by their nature, for whose solution not nature but human beings are responsible. The traditional definition is also defective in that it belongs to rational capacities to open our nature to modification by being the source of perfectibility. Reason, regarded as an empirical sign of our freedom, is precisely our capacity for an *indeterminate* mode of life, one that is open-ended and self-devised, in contrast with the life of other animals, which is fixed for them by instinct (Ak 8: 111–15). So understood, the traditional definition is only a confession that human nature is in principle indefinable in the way the natures of other living beings are; yet this characteristic itself, understood in the right way, can be used as something like a definition.

In the passage quoted previously, Kant distinguishes three functions of the capacity for reason in human life. Human beings alone determine for themselves how they will live; they set their own ends and then develop for themselves the faculties they will need in order to achieve those ends. This applies *first* and most fundamentally at the level of the *preservation* of individuals and the species. For all

other living species, Kant thinks, their mode of life is determined for them by natural instinct, and their innate faculties are suited to that mode of life. But human beings must invent their own relationship to nature, and Kant is struck by the wide variety of such relationships human beings have adopted in different climates and situations on the earth's surface. *Second*, in domestic society human beings must pass on their perfected capacities from one generation to another through *education*. (Kant realizes, here at least, that the difference between human beings and other creatures is really only a matter of degree. From Linnaeus he draws the observation that young birds must be taught by their parents the songs characteristic of their species, and that the songs of finches and nightingales differ from one country to another, thus showing that animals are capable of "a tradition, as it were" [Ak 7: 323 and note].)¹³ *Third*, human beings are capable of determining for themselves the form of their social interactions with one another, by adopting shared principles for the government of social wholes.

These three functions of reason in human life seem to correspond to three rational "predispositions" ascribed to human beings a bit later in the *Anthropology*. His account parallels his discussion of human predispositions in the *Religion* (Ak 6: 26–8), but with some interesting modifications. In common with other animals, human beings have a predisposition to "animality," to instinctive desires and behavior aiming at self-preservation, reproduction of the species, and sociability (association with members of their own kind). But human beings also have predispositions to "humanity" – to set their own ends according to reason, and to "personality" – to give themselves, and to obey moral laws through pure reason. In the *Anthropology*, however, he divides the predisposition to humanity into the "technical" predisposition to devise and apply means to the ends people set, and the "pragmatic" predisposition to unite their ends into a single end of well-being or happiness, and to interact rationally with other human beings so as to make use of them to promote one's own happiness (Ak 7: 322).

We may conjecture that Kant sees the *technical* predisposition of humanity as corresponding to the function of *self-preservation*, by devising means to acquire food and the other necessities of life for oneself and others. Kant treats the transition from a hunter-gatherer and a pastoral economy to an agricultural economy that can sustain urban life as the crucial development in human history, underlying property

relations and (consequently) forms of the political state. His views on this matter strikingly anticipate Karl Marx's materialist conception of history.¹⁴ The pragmatic predisposition would then correspond to the second function, that of *educating* the species and transmitting learned behavior through historical traditions. Thus Kant goes on to identify the pragmatic predisposition with the human capacity for *culture*. This connects the transmission of cultural tradition both to our prudential concern with individual well-being and to the interactions between people in which they attempt to use one another for selfish advantage. It is there also that he asks the Rousseauian question whether human beings are ultimately better off (happier) for the progress of culture, or whether they would not be more content if they remained in a crude or uncivilized state (Ak 7: 323–4). Finally, the moral predisposition to personality would correspond to the function of *governing* society through self-given rational laws. The main issue here is the conflict between our innate propensity toward evil and our capacity for moral good, and which will eventually prove victorious in the course of human history (Ak 7: 324).

Kant sums up his discussion of the three predispositions in a way that further supports the conjecture, identifying three kinds of historical progress:

The summation of pragmatic anthropology in regard to the vocation (*Bestimmung*) of the human being and the characteristic of his education (*Ausbildung*) is the following. The human being is destined (*bestimmt*) through reason to be in a society with human beings, and in it through the arts and sciences to *cultivate, civilize and moralize* himself (Ak 7: 324).

“Cultivation” is the historical development of our *technical* predisposition to devise means to our ends (most basically, our end of self-preservation); “civilization” is the historical development of our *pragmatic* predisposition to pursue our total well-being or happiness through modes of life involving other people that can be transmitted from each generation to the next through tradition and education; “moralization” is the development of our predisposition to *personality*, devising and striving to obey rational laws through which the terms of people's social interactions themselves are made rational, and human society becomes a *system* of ends united and combined – what the principle of morality calls a “realm of ends” (Ak 4: 433).

Humanity and Other Possible Rational Species

Regarding (b), the distinguishing mark of the human species in relation to other possible rational beings, Kant also offers a conjecture:

What is characteristic of the human species in comparison with the idea of possible rational beings on earth in general is that nature has placed in them the germ of *discord* and willed that out of it their own reason should produce *concord*, or at least the constant approximation to it; which latter is indeed in the idea the **end**, but in the plan of nature the first (discord) is the **means** for a highest, to us inscrutable, wisdom – to effect the perfection of the human being through progressing **culture**, even if through much sacrifice of the joys of life for human beings (Ak 7: 322).

In comparison to other *animals*, what distinguishes human beings is that they have a collective history that they themselves are to make, by “cultivating,” “civilizing,” and “moralizing” themselves through their faculty of reason. In comparison to the idea of other possible rational beings on earth, what distinguishes human beings is the specific conditions under which their rational faculty has developed, and, in light of these conditions, the specific historical task their reason sets for them. Human reason develops, namely, under conditions of “discord,” or as Kant elsewhere calls it, “antagonism” or “unsociable sociability,” that is, “the propensity [of human beings] to enter into society, bound together with a mutual opposition that constantly threatens to break the society up” (Ak 8: 20). Human beings are sociable creatures in the sense that their animality makes them seek out members of their own kind, both for reproduction and for cooperative activities relating to their survival. But beyond this, they are also social creatures insofar as they possess the rational capacity to be self-aware and to esteem themselves. For as nature has made them, this self-esteem is combined with a competitive impulse to seek a superior status in relation to other human beings, and to wish that things might go as I will them rather than as others will them to go.

[The human being] finds in himself the unsociable characteristic of wishing to have everything go according to his own wish. Thus he expects opposition on all sides because, in knowing himself, he knows that he, for his own part, is inclined to oppose others. Yet it is this resistance which awakens all the powers of the human being, making him overcome his propensity to laziness; and it

drives him, by means of the mania for honor, domination or property, to seek status among his fellows, whom he cannot *stand*, but also cannot stand to *leave alone* (Ak 8: 21).

Social life, therefore, is for human beings a life of discord and discontent, which, because these features of life are the means by which nature develops our rational capacities, tends to be all the more so the more we become cultivated and civilized. "It is as if [nature] had cared more about [the human being's] rational *self-esteem* than his being well off" (Ak 8: 20). Yet discontent and discord are only nature's means for developing rational capacities that are capable of directing human life to ends that are quite different, and even fundamentally opposed, to those devices through which nature has made them possible. And the same social condition under which reason develops provides the conditions for mutual communication and a "pluralistic" perspective, which is capable of overcoming the "egoism" of our unsociable sociability and of making reason self-critical through the systematic inclusion of the point of view of others within rational thinking (Ak 7: 128–30, 200, 228–9, cf. 5: 294–6). The moral law given by reason tells us that all rational beings are of the same absolute worth as ends in themselves (Ak 4: 429). This law directs us not to seek to dominate others or resist their ends, but instead to combine our ends with theirs into a single mutually supporting system, or "realm" of ends (Ak 4: 433). Consequently, from the standpoint of this law, the self-conceited impulse to have one's own way is a propensity to *evil*, which must be combated through the struggle for virtue. Because the source of the evil against which we struggle is social, it would be futile for individuals in isolation each to strive after his own virtue; so the struggle against it must take a social form. But since the law of virtue is a law of autonomy, and virtue must rest on a free disposition, the "ethical community" that struggles for it must be voluntary rather than coercive. Its model is not a political state but a rational and enlightened form of religious community (Ak 6: 94–102). It is with an expression of hope for such a community, striving after a "cosmopolitan combination" (or realm of ends), that Kant brings his lectures on anthropology to a close:

In working against the [evil] propensity [in human nature] . . . our will is in general good, but the accomplishment of what we will is made more difficult by the fact that the attainment of the end can be expected not through

the free agreement of *individuals*, but only through the progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically combined (Ak 7: 333).

Human Nature as Social and Historical

To the extent that Kant has a conception of human nature, therefore, what is fundamental to it is a conception of human beings as having a collective history that is theirs to make freely, and in this history a vocation to struggle against their own propensities to unsociability, self-conceit, and inequality toward a free and universal community in which all human striving is combined into a single “realm of ends.” This conception of human nature is an authentically *enlightenment* conception, just as Kant’s critical philosophy as a whole is the greatest and most characteristic product of the intellectual and social movement, known as “the Enlightenment,” which remains the unique source in the world for all progressive thought and action (at least insofar as it has its roots anywhere in the Western tradition).

Loose terminology such as “individualistic” and “ahistorical” can of course bear many senses. But once we come to understand the way Kant raised and responded to the question: “What is the human being?” which he saw as fundamental to all philosophy, we are in a good position to see that when these two terms have been used pejoratively in polemics against both Kant and the Enlightenment, they have nearly always been ignorantly misapplied.

Notes

1. Kant’s writings will be cited here by volume: page number in the Berlin Akademie Ausgabe (Berlin: W. DeGruyter, 1902–), abbreviated “Ak,” except for the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which will be abbreviated “KrV” and cited by A / B page numbers. The fact that Kant regarded anthropology as fundamental in this way has been widely known since Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, translated by James Churchill (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 214. The first three famous questions (without the anthropological one listed as more fundamental) are most prominently asked at KrV A 805 / B 853.
2. “[This question] is encountered neither in the lecture notes nor in Kant’s notes for the lectures. It appears in the field of anthropology only in a Kantian manuscript (still kept today in Rostock) in which Kant set down

the text for the [*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*], but was not transferred into the book. It contradicts the sober inventory of experiences with which Kant wanted to introduce students to ways of dealing both with themselves and with other human beings" (Reinhard Brandt, "Kants pragmatische Anthropologie: Die Vorlesung," *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 19 [1994], p. 43) (cf. Ak. 25: 859).

3. Ernst Platner, *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweisen* (Leipzig: Dukische Buchhandlung, 1772). The book was reviewed by Kant's student and friend Marcus Herz in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* 20 (1773); Kant's comments about his own lectures on anthropology are in reference to this review.
4. The explicit division into "didactics" and "characteristics" is found only in Kant's published version (Ak 7: 123, 284). But "Characteristic" is distinguished by a new heading in Collins (1772–3) (Ak 25: 218), Parow (1772–3) (Ak 25: 426), Friedländer (1775–6) (Ak 25: 624), Pillau (1778–9) (Ak 25: 814), Menschenkunde (1781) (Ak 25: 1156), Mrongovius (1784–5) (Ak 25: 1367); in Busolt (1788–9), character is discussed under the heading "Doctrine of Method" (Ak 25: 1530).
5. Kant distinguishes two parts of *Weltkenntnis*: pragmatic anthropology and physical geography (Ak 25: 733).
6. For example, by Herder. See also Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark, *Einleitung*, Ak 25: xv, and Reinhard Brandt and Heiner Klemme, *Hume in Deutschland* (Marburg: Schriften der Universitätsbibliothek, 1989), pp. 53–5.
7. Kant contrasts his "pragmatic" approach to anthropology with the "pedantic" approach of Platner, and in this connection even makes a virtue of the popularity of his approach, which he thinks is necessitated by the inherent limits and the unsatisfactory state of our present knowledge of human nature: "Our anthropology can be read by everyone, even by ladies getting dressed (*bei der Toilette*)" (Ak 25: 856–7).
8. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 52.
9. "Kant does not and cannot offer a single model of human action that can both serve for empirical explanation and guide choice" (Onora O'Neill, *Constructions of Reason* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], p. 70). This way of reading Kant's doctrine of the "two standpoints" is extremely common, even among those who are uncomfortable with his theory of noumenal freedom. Cf. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative* (New York: Harper and Row, 1947), p. 267; Lewis White Beck, *Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 194–6; Beck, *The Actor and the Spectator* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975); Robert Paul Wolff, *The Autonomy of Reason* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 222; Wood, "Kant's Compatibilism," in Wood (ed.) *Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 57–72; Christine Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. x–xii. And Kant

is often appealed to by those who think that there is a radical difference between the standpoint of an agent and that of an observer, so that the former view of ourselves is radically opposed to any scientific or naturalistic picture of ourselves. (For instance, see George Henrik von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971], pp. 198–9.) This interpretation may be largely correct as an account of Kant's solution to the metaphysical problem of free will, but it goes wrong whenever it projects metaphysical hypotheses (which can never be more than problematic in Kant's view) onto Kant's theory of our empirical knowledge of human nature.

10. The earliest discussion of Kant's source for these lectures in Baumgarten is Benno Erdmann, *Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie* (Leipzig: Fues, 1882). A more recent treatment is Norbert Hinske, "Kants Idee der Anthropologie," in Heinrich Rombach (ed.), *Die Frage nach dem Menschen* (Munich: Alber, 1966).
11. Kant is borrowing his phrase from J. G. Hamann, *Abälardi virbii Chimärische Einfälle über den Briefe die neueste Literatur betreffend*, J. Nadler (ed.), *Sämmtliche Werke* (Vienna: Herder, 1949–57), 3: 164: "This descent into the Hell of self-knowledge paves the way for deification" (cf. Ak. 25: 7, 7: 55). Kant's principal targets here are religious self-observers, such as Pascal, Haller, Gellert and Lavater (Ak 7: 132–3, 25: 863). But he speaks approvingly of Montaigne's cooler and more skeptical style of self-examination, because he sees it not as a morbid exercise in introversion but as an invitation to put oneself in the author's place, and hence to make observations of universal validity (Ak 25: 472, 735). Knowledge of oneself as an individual is for Kant a moral duty, always burdensome and always to be undertaken soberly, with a view to moral improvement (MS 6: 441–2). Those to whom self-examination is an occasion either for pleasure or for moral paralysis are not discharging that duty properly, and are substituting lies and deceptions for the knowledge they should be getting.
12. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men*, *Oeuvres complètes*, B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond (eds.) (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1964), 3: 142–3, 202–14.
13. But Kant sees this fact as generating a puzzle: "But where did the first song come from? For it was not learned, and if it arose in accord with instinct, why do not the young inherit it?" This puzzle seems to be consequent on the extreme strictness with which Kant takes the thesis that animal behavior results solely from instinct. According to this thesis, as Kant understands it, in the brutes learned capacities themselves must be explainable entirely on the basis of instinctive capacities for learning. Since the first song taught by a bird to other members of its species could not have been learned in this way, and is not itself instinctive, Kant's conception of the instinctive capacities of brutes seems incapable of explaining it. Kant conjectures that birds may have begun singing by imitating sounds they heard from other sources in nature (Ak 7: 323 n). But I think we should

just admit that this is one respect, among others, in which Kant tends to oversimplify and underestimate the mental capacities of nonhuman animals.

14. See Allen Wood, "Kant's Historical Materialism," in Jane Kneller and Sidney Axinn (eds.), *Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998), and *Kant's Ethical Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), ch. 7.

The Second Part of Morals

Robert B. Louden

The Missing Link?

There are many important reasons for turning to Kant's lectures on anthropology. Anthropology was a new academic discipline in the late eighteenth century, and Kant played a pivotal role in its creation.¹ Kant sometimes claims (and others have followed him on this point) that the fundamental questions of metaphysics, ethics, and religion "could all be reckoned to be anthropology," on the ground that they all refer to the question "What is the human being?" (*Jäsche Logik* 9: 25; cf. letter to C. F. Stäudlin of May 4, 1793, 11: 414; *KrVB* 833; *Metaphysik-Pölitz* 28: 534). Examining the various versions of the lectures could perhaps help one see what led Kant to occasionally describe anthropology as a kind of transcendental *Urdisziplin*.² Similarly, Kant's anthropology inaugurates the continental tradition of philosophical anthropology, out of which numerous twentieth-century intellectual movements both grew (e.g., existentialism) and reacted against (e.g., Foucault's early "archaeological" work). A close look at Kant's lectures might help one better understand the roots of these and other related philosophical projects. Also, a comparative examination of the various versions of the lectures would enable one to test Benno Erdmann's "senility thesis" – namely, his claim (which others have extended to all of Kant's last publications) that Kant's 1798 *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* represents only "the laborious compilation of a seventy-four year old man as he stood on the threshold of decrepitude."³ Finally, the wealth

of materials provided by the various anthropology lectures enables one to see how Kant's ongoing work in anthropology profoundly affected (and was in turn affected by) many other areas of his philosophical project (e.g., theoretical philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of history), in ways that are only now coming to be understood.

But for me, the major incentive for exploring Kant's anthropology lectures has always been to get a handle on the mysterious "counterpart of a metaphysics of morals, the other member of the division of practical philosophy as a whole, . . . moral anthropology" (*MdS6*: 217). Students of Kant know all too well about "the first part of morals," that is, "the metaphysics of morals or *metaphysica pura*." This first non-empirical or pure part of morals "is built on necessary laws, as a result it cannot be grounded on the particular constitution of a rational being, [such as] the human being" (*Moral Mrongovius II* 29: 599; cf. *Gr 4*: 389). But what about "the second part"; "*philosophia moralis applicata*, moral anthropology, to which the empirical principles belong" (*Moral Mrongovius II* 29: 599)? "Moral anthropology," as the term suggests, "is morality applied to the human being" (*Moral Mrongovius II* 29: 599).

In his writings and lectures on ethics, Kant repeatedly invokes the term "anthropology" when describing this second, empirical part of ethics. Often, as in the previous citations, the favored phrase is "moral anthropology"; sometimes it is "practical anthropology" (*Gr 4*: 388); and sometimes it is simply "anthropology" (*Gr 4*: 412; *Moral Philosophie Collins* 27: 244; *Moral Mrongovius I* 27: 1398). This frequent employment within the practical philosophy texts and lectures of the term "anthropology" as a shorthand means of conveying what "the other member of the division of practical philosophy as a whole" is about gives readers who turn to the anthropology lectures a thoroughly legitimate expectation that the myriad mysteries of Kant's *philosophia moralis applicata* will finally be addressed in some detail. Those who approach these lectures with ethics in mind are inevitably driven by the hope of finally locating a missing link in Kant's system of practical philosophy, a link that will give his ethics the much needed material content and applicability to human life that critics from Hegel to Max Scheler and extending on to contemporary descendants such as Bernard Williams, Alasdair MacIntyre, and many others have claimed is nowhere to be found in Kant.

Fooled by Hope?

However, when one does examine Kant's anthropology lectures with ethics in mind (more specifically, with the aim of tracking the details of the "second part" of morals), it is easy to get frustrated. For nowhere in these lectures does Kant explicitly and straightforwardly say anything like the following: "I shall now discuss in detail what, in my practical philosophy texts, I call 'moral anthropology' or 'the second part of morals'; showing how this second, empirical part relates to the first, non-empirical part of ethics, and why 'anthropology' in my particular sense of the term can properly be said to constitute this second part. . . ." Determining *why* Kant says nothing close to this is fated to remain a guessing game, but I submit that the following three interrelated points provide at least a good part of the answer.

First, the anthropology lectures are primarily an informal, popular project – not a scholarly exercise in technical philosophy. Kant's aim was not to contribute another tome toward "science for the school (*Wissenschaft für die Schule*)" but rather to promote "enlightenment for common life (*Aufklärung fürs gemeine Leben*)" (*Menschenkunde* 25: 853). The goal was to produce a "study for the world (*Studium für die Welt*)"; and this is explicitly a type of study that "consists not merely in gaining esteem for oneself from guild members of the school but also in extending knowledge beyond the school and trying to expand one's knowledge toward universal benefit (*zum allgemeinen Nutzen*)" (*Menschenkunde* 25: 853; cf. *Mrongovius* 25: 1209). As Kant remarks at the end of his 1775 essay, "Of the Different Races of Human Beings," which also served as an advertisement for his lecture course on physical geography for that year, he wanted to produce a kind of pragmatic "knowledge of the world (*Weltkenntnis*)," a knowledge that would "be useful not merely for *school*, but rather for *life*, and through which the accomplished student is introduced to the stage of his destiny, namely, the *world*" (2: 443 n; cf. *Friedländer* 25: 469, *Pillau* 25: 733–4, *Anth* 7: 120). Partly because of this strong *Weltkenntnis* aim, the anthropology lectures do not involve themselves with technical discussions of ethical theory.

Second (and partly as a result of the first point), the vocabulary of Kant's anthropology lectures also differs strongly from that of his practical philosophy writings. In the anthropology lectures, he

seldom employs the technical terminology and jargon of his more formal works. Because of these different vocabularies, the two bodies of work almost seem to be talking past one another – they often don't appear to link up. Reinhard Brandt, for instance, who seems particularly impressed with these lexical differences, points out that “neither in the lecture transcriptions nor in the book version [of Kant's *Anthropology*] are the words ‘categorical’ or ‘imperative’ or ‘autonomy’ cited”; which leads him to conclude on the skeptical note that “pragmatic anthropology is not identical in any of its phases of development with the anthropology that Kant repeatedly earmarks as the complementary part (*Komplementärstück*) of his moral theory after 1770.”⁴

Third (and this too is related to the previous points), there is often a formidable conceptual gap between Kant's anthropology lectures and his ethics texts, with the very idea of a *moral* anthropology hovering awkwardly between both fields; at home in neither. For the most part, Kantian anthropology is a descriptive, empirical undertaking; Kantian ethics a prescriptive, normative one founded on *a priori* principles. The concept of a *moral ought*, on Kant's view,

expresses a species of necessity and a connection with grounds that does not occur anywhere else in the whole of nature. In nature the understanding can only cognize *what exists*, or has been, or will be. It is impossible that something in it *ought to be* other than what, in all these time-relations, it in fact is; indeed, the *ought*, if one has merely the course of nature before one's eyes, has no meaning whatsoever (*ganz und gar keine Bedeutung*) (KrVA 547/B 575; cf. KU 5: 173).

Given this stern view of ethical norms, how *could* one legitimately expect to find a moral anthropology anywhere within the Kantian corpus? How can something that claims to be an empirical science also claim to be *moral* – normatively as opposed to merely descriptively *moral*, in Kant's infamous nonnaturalistic sense? Emil Arnoldt, in his 1894 study, describes this awkward “neither here nor there” status of Kantian anthropology as follows:

As a part of practical philosophy, Kant's anthropology stands under the legislation of reason according to laws of freedom, which prescribe what ought to be; on the other hand, even if it is morally-practical, it is part of a comprehensive

[empirical] anthropology which stands under the legislation of reason according to the concept of nature, which indicates what is. Kant did not determine this relationship more closely.⁵

The preceding three interrelated points are, I submit, all plausible explanations as to why we do not find a more detailed, explicit discussion of the elusive second part of morals within Kant's anthropology lectures. However, I do not at all believe that the proper conclusion to draw here is that there is no moral anthropology to be found in these lectures. On the contrary, although Kant unfortunately does not lay out a comprehensive, systematic articulation of "the counterpart of a metaphysics of morals" within any of these lectures,⁶ it is definitely the case that they reverberate strongly with multiple moral messages and implications. Our task as readers is to bring together, clarify, and (when possible) integrate these moral messages into Kant's overall philosophical project, rather than to continue bemoaning the fact that the anthropology lectures do not provide us with an explicit, systematic, and straightforward account of "the other member of the division of practical philosophy as a whole, . . . moral anthropology." In the remainder of my essay, I propose to begin this necessary work of clarification and integration. Although Kant nowhere (i.e., neither in the anthropology lectures nor anywhere else) hands over to readers a single, complete, tidy package of moral anthropology, I aim to show that a bit of careful detective work nevertheless can lead us to some fulfilled hopes regarding Kant's *philosophia moralis applicata*.

My cautious optimism regarding Kant's moral anthropology project is grounded first and foremost in statements made by Kant himself (albeit, in the case of the anthropology *Nachschriften*, as recorded by students and auditors).⁷ However, remarks made by some of Kant's earliest German- and English-language commentators regarding the nature, scope, and divisions of his anthropology also provide an important secondary textual source that gives further support for my interpretation. In 1797, one year before Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* appeared, Georg Samuel Albert Mellin published the first volume of his *Enzyklopädisches Wörterbuch der kritischen Philosophie*. In his preface, Mellin states that the "goal of this dictionary is to present the doctrines of the critical philosophy in their entire range, clearly, understandably, and convincingly."⁸ At the beginning of his impressive

six-page entry “Anthropology,” the author notes that Kant’s anthropology “divides into two parts, theoretical and practical.” “Practical anthropology,” Mellin elaborates later,

in the wider sense of the term, is the application of morality to the characteristic condition and situation of the human faculty of desire – to the drives, inclinations, appetites, and passions of the human being, and the hindrances to the carrying-out of the moral law, and it concerns virtues and vices. It is the empirical part of ethics, which can be called practical anthropology, a true doctrine of virtue (*eigentliche Tugendlehre*), or applied philosophy of ethics or morals (*angewandte Philosophie der Sitten oder Moral*).⁹

Mellin concludes his overview of Kant’s practical anthropology by noting:

The task of practical anthropology is to determine how the human being shall (*soll*) be determined through the moral law; or what the moral laws are to which human beings under the hindrances of feelings, desires, and passions are subject. . . . No one yet, not even from among the critical philosophers, has produced a practical anthropology from this single, correct point of view.¹⁰

Similarly, Carl Christian Erhard Schmid, in the fourth edition of his *Wörterbuch zum leichtern Gebrauch der kantischen Schriften* (1798), also subdivides Kantian anthropology into “theoretical” and “practical” parts. “Practical anthropology,” he writes, is

applied and empirical philosophy of morals, a true doctrine of virtue (*eigentliche Tugendlehre*) – it is the consideration of the moral law in relation to the human will, whose desires and drives are hindrances to the practicing of the moral law. Practical anthropology is supported on the one hand by principles of pure ethics (*reine Moral*) or the metaphysics of morals; and on the other hand by doctrines of theoretical psychology.¹¹

Finally, English author A. F. M. Willich, in his 1798 book, *Elements of the Critical Philosophy*, based in part on the author’s experience as an auditor of Kant’s courses “between the years 1778 and 1781 . . . and . . . again in summer 1792,” also subdivides Kant’s anthropology into theoretical and practical branches. “Anthropology,” Willich writes,

signifies in general the experimental doctrine of the nature of man; and is divided by Kant, into 1) *theoretical* or empirical doctrine of the mind, which is

a branch of Natural Philosophy; 2) *practical* applied, and empirical Philosophy of Morals; Ethics – the consideration of the moral law in relation to the human will, its inclinations, motives, and to the obstacles in practicing that law.¹²

It is perhaps ironic that we find a more succinct and focused discussion of the nature and aims of Kantian *practical* anthropology and its relation to the first part of ethical theory within these three early commentaries than we do in Kant's own texts. But each of them does track quite well with remarks Kant makes elsewhere concerning the second part of his ethics. For example, moral theory “needs anthropology for its *application* to human beings” (*Gr* 4: 412). Moral anthropology deals with “the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in the carrying-out (*Ausführung*) of the laws of a metaphysics of morals” (*MdS* 6: 217). “The reason that morals and sermons . . . have little effect is due to the lack (*Mangel*) of knowledge of the human being. Morals must (*muß*) be united with (*verbunden . . . mit*) knowledge of humanity” (*Friedländer* 25: 471–2; cf. *Moralphilosophie Collins* 27: 244).

These citations from Kant also suggest that Mellin, Schmid, and Willich were all closer both to the letter and spirit of Kant's moral anthropology than were twentieth-century commentators such as H. J. Paton and Mary J. Gregor, each of whom brashly dismissed the entire enterprise as a Rylean category mistake. According to Paton, for instance,

“applied ethics” is used [by Kant] for a special kind of moral or practical psychology (or anthropology as he calls it) concerned with the conditions which favour or hinder the moral life. . . . There is, however, no reason why we should regard such a psychology as practical: it is a theoretical examination of the causes of certain morally desirable effects. Still less is there a reason why we should regard it with Kant as a kind of applied or empirical ethics.¹³

Similarly, his student Gregor writes:

Moral anthropology is . . . not ethics but rather a sort of psychology, a study of the natural causes which can be made to contribute toward the development of moral dispositions and toward making our actions in fulfillment of duty easier and more effective. Why should Kant regard this science as a division of moral philosophy?¹⁴

Contra Paton and Gregor and in basic agreement with Mellin, Schmid, and Willich, I will argue in what follows both that we do find a

distinctively *moral* anthropology within Kant's anthropology lectures, and that Kant has compelling reasons for regarding moral anthropology as "the other member of the division of practical philosophy as a whole." At the same time, Mellin's last remark (previously cited), though probably not intended as a criticism of the "deeply esteemed professor" (Mellin to Kant, September 6, 1797, 12: 196), also hints at one further reason why we do not find more explicit discussion of *moral* anthropology within Kant's anthropology lectures. Kant did not see it as his task to develop a detailed moral anthropology. Though he states repeatedly that such a moral anthropology is necessary for the proper application of ethical theory to the human situation, and while he gives numerous hints in the anthropology lectures as well as elsewhere concerning what this moral anthropology should look like and what its aims should be, he does not himself produce a finished version of it. It remains an uncompleted task for others to take "this single, correct point of view" and produce a viable moral anthropology from the exploratory beginnings that he has left us.

Moral Messages

What then are the main moral messages contained in Kant's anthropology lectures, and how, when taken together, can they legitimately be regarded as constituting "the second part of morals?" The following list does not claim to be exhaustive, nor are the items in it necessarily ranked in order of importance. But I do think that the following fundamental themes, when considered together, do provide very plausible support for the claim (a claim which, as we saw previously, Kant himself gives readers ample grounds to assert) that we find a significant portion of this second part of ethics within the anthropology lectures.

Human Hindrances

Again, in his *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant states that the "counterpart of a metaphysics of morals" concerns "the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in the carrying-out of the laws of a metaphysics of morals" (6: 217). In other words, what specific passions and inclinations are human beings subject to that tend to make it relatively difficult (or, as the case may be, easier) for them to

adhere to moral principles? What is it about this particular biological species of rational being that makes it hard for them to act morally?¹⁵ Answering this question is part of the chief task of Kant's practical anthropology.

Generally speaking, it is in the first part of the anthropology lectures, where Kant discusses the different faculties and powers of soul of the human being (see, e.g., *Friedländer* 25: 624), that his analysis of human hindrances to morality is located.¹⁶ The most obvious example here concerns his discussions of egoism. In many versions of the lectures (e.g., *Pillau* 25: 735; *Menschenkunde* 25: 859–61; *Mrongovius* 25: 1215–20; *Busolt* 25: 1438–9; *Anth* 7: 127–30), strong warnings against the human tendency toward multiple varieties of selfishness are sounded very early on. The discussion of egoism in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* is the most fully developed account. Here three forms of egoism are singled out. The *logical* egoist

considers it unnecessary to also test his judgment by the understanding of others, as if he had no need at all for this touchstone (*criterium veritatis externum*). But it is so certain that we cannot dispense with this means for assuring the truth of our judgments that this may be the most important reason why learned people clamor so urgently for *freedom of the press* (7: 128).

In turning his back on this touchstone of truth, the logical egoist is thus in danger of sliding into incoherence. For our capacity to think correctly depends on our thinking “in community with others to whom we *communicate* our thoughts, and who communicate their thoughts to us” (*Was heißt?* 8: 144).¹⁷

Next, the *aesthetic* egoist, “a man content with his own taste,” one “who deprives himself of the progress toward improvement when he isolates himself with his own judgment” and who “seeks the touchstone of the beauty of art only in himself” (7: 129–30; cf. *Busolt* 25: 1438). Because aesthetic judgments on Kant's view are nonconceptual, “there can be no rule by which someone could be compelled to acknowledge that something is beautiful.” Still, when we call an object beautiful, we believe ourselves to be speaking “with a universal voice, and lay claim to the agreement of everyone, whereas any private sensation would decide solely for the observer alone and his liking” (*KU* 5: 215–16). The aesthetic egoist remains within the prison of his private sensations, thus forfeiting this opportunity to speak with a universal voice.

Finally, and worst of all, the *moral* egoist, “who allows himself to be so blinded by his advantages and privileges that he values others little” (*Menschenkunde* 25: 859; cf. *Mrongovius* 25: 1215, 1217, *Busolt* 25: 1438); and who “locates the supreme determining ground of his will merely in his own happiness and what is useful to him, not in the thought of duty” (*Anth* 7: 130).

Obviously, human beings’ widespread tendency toward egoism constitutes a major hindrance to “the carrying-out of the laws of a metaphysics of morals.” And in order to make progress in this area, clearly we “must restrain this emotion of self-love” (*Busolt* 25: 1438). But to return to the questions of whether and why the anthropology lectures can rightfully be regarded as constituting a significant part of “the other member of the division of practical philosophy as a whole”: the “human hindrances” part of these lectures is a key part of the story. The overarching goal is to figure out what human nature is like in order more effectively to further moral ends. How, given what we know empirically about human nature, can we make morality more efficacious in human life? In this broader sense, much of Kant’s opening analyses of the various faculties and powers of soul of the human being are at least indirectly relevant to the second part of ethics. For the aim is first to learn more about human beings and the world they live in, in order to determine what particular obstacles to the realization of *a priori* moral principles confront this particular species of rational being, and then to formulate species-specific strategies for dealing with these obstacles. Kantian anthropological knowledge must be objective, empirically accurate knowledge if it is to successfully serve the purpose for which it is intended. (If the information we gather concerning human beings is false, then we will not have succeeded in learning about the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder or help us in carrying out the laws of a metaphysics of morals.) But the motivation behind the desire to acquire such knowledge is clearly a *moral* one: we seek to understand ourselves and the world we live in in order to make morality more efficacious. In this basic respect, Kantian social science is not at all “value-free” but deeply value-embedded; that is, morally guided.¹⁸

Weltkenntnis

As noted previously (“Fooled by Hope?”) the anthropology lectures explicitly aim to impart a kind of informal, popular knowledge tagged

as *Weltkenntnis*; rather than a formal, scholarly knowledge of the sort that university professors were (and are) usually after. “There are two different ways to study, in the school and in the world. In school one learns scholastic cognitions (*Erkenntnisse*) that belong to professional scholars; but in contact (*Umgang*) with the world one learns popular cognitions that belong to the entire world” (*Mrongovius* 25: 1209). My previous point was simply that the strong *Weltkenntnis* aim of Kant’s anthropology lectures is one obvious reason why we don’t find more nuanced discussions of technical points about ethical theory and philosophy within these lectures. Now I wish to show how this aim of imparting *Weltkenntnis* to students and auditors of the anthropology lectures also constitutes an important part of a specifically *moral* anthropology.

Weltkenntnis divides into two parts: “the study of nature and of the human being” (*Friedländer* 25: 469; cf. *Menschenkunde* 25: 854); or, alternatively, “physical geography and anthropology” (*Collins* 25: 9; cf. *Geo* 9: 157). It is not just a *local* knowledge of human behavior “such as merchants have,” for this type of street-smart knowledge “is bound to place and time and also provides no rules for acting in common life” (*Pillau* 25: 734). Even a knowledge of the world acquired through first-hand travel (or reading the reports of others’ travels) is not yet full-fledged Kantian *Weltkenntnis*, because it “lasts only for a certain time, for when the behavior at the place where he was alters, then his knowledge of it ceases” (*Pillau* 25: 734). Instead, “strong reflection (*starke Reflexion*)” concerning “the human beings who are around us” is needed. This more reflective knowledge concerning human beings, Kant notes,

outdoes by far that which a thoughtless traveler receives. Human beings show the sources of their actions as much in this little space as in the world at large; for this only an attentive eye is required, and a traveler must first be provided with these concepts if he wants utility (*Nutzen*) from his travel (*Pillau* 25: 734).

What is called for is thus “attentiveness to human dispositions, which often show themselves under many shapes.” And this attentiveness is to be gleaned not just from first-hand observations of the people around one, but also from “plays, novels, history and especially biographies” (*Pillau* 25: 734; cf. *Menschenkunde* 25: 857–8, *Mrongovius* 25: 1213, *Anth* 7: 121).¹⁹

This rejection of merely local knowledge of human behavior in favor of a reflective, universal understanding means that *Weltkenntnis* ultimately entails a “knowledge of the human being as a *citizen of the world*” (*Anth* 7: 120; cf. *Pillau* 25: 734, *Geo* 9: 157, *Racen* 2: 443 n). It is “a knowledge of the stage (*Schauplatz*) on which we can apply all skill” (*Friedländer* 25: 469; cf. *Racen* 2: 443 n). And on Kant’s view, it is precisely due to the lack of *Weltkenntnis* “that so many practical sciences, for example moral philosophy, have remained unfruitful. . . . Most moral philosophers and clergymen lack this knowledge of human nature” (*Collins* 25: 9). Or, as the *Moralphilosophie Collins* transcription has it,

People are always preaching about what ought to be done, and nobody thinks whether it can be done, so that even the admonitions, which are tautological repetitions of rules that everyone knows already, strike us as very tedious, in that nothing is said beyond what is already known, and the pulpit orations on the subject are very empty, if the preacher does not simultaneously attend to humanity. . . . (27: 244).

In the *Groundwork*, Kant emphasizes that “morals needs anthropology for its *application* to human beings” (4: 412). “Morals,” which here appears to refer exclusively to the rational, nonempirical part of ethical theory (cf. 4: 388), needs anthropology in part because its *a priori* laws

require a judgment sharpened by experience, partly to distinguish in what cases they are applicable and partly to provide them with entry (*Eingang*) to the will of the human being and efficacy for his fulfillment of them (*Nachdruck zur Ausübung*); for the human being is affected by so many inclinations that, though capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is not so easily able to make it effective *in concreto* in the conduct of his life (4: 389).

In other words, human beings need *Weltkenntnis* in order to make morality work effectively in their own lives. Human beings cannot simply jump unaided into pure ethics; background knowledge of their own empirical situation is a necessary prerequisite. This necessary empirical background for moral judgment has been well described by Barbara Herman in her discussion of “rules of moral salience.” Such rules, she writes, are acquired

as elements in a moral education, [and] they structure an agent’s perception of his situation so that what he perceives is a world with moral features. They enable him to pick out those elements of his circumstances or of his proposed

actions that require moral attention. . . . Typically they are acquired in childhood as part of socialization; they provide a practical framework within which people act. . . . The rules of moral salience constitute the structure of moral sensitivity.²⁰

An important part of the task of a specifically *moral* anthropology is thus to contribute to human beings' "progress of the power of judgment" (cf. *KpV* 5: 154). This task is carried out in the anthropology lectures through the imparting of *Weltkenntnis* to listeners.

The Destiny of the Human Species

Finally, a third major way in which the anthropology lectures contribute to a specifically *moral* anthropology lies in their remarks concerning the destiny of the human species. Here Kant is trying to provide his audience with a moral map;²¹ a conceptual orientation and delineation of where humanity as a species is headed; along with programmatic hints concerning what needs to be done in order to move us closer to our normative destination. As his friend Moses Mendelssohn remarks in his own essay, "On the Question: What Does it Mean to Enlighten?," first presented as a lecture before the famous Berlin *Mitwochsengesellschaft* on May 16, 1784, "I posit, at all times, the destiny of the human being (*die Bestimmung des Menschen*) as the measure and goal of all our striving and efforts, as a point on which we must set our eyes, if we do not want to lose our way."²²

With this third moral message we find considerable overlap between Kant's lectures on anthropology and his philosophy of history (cf. n. 21), as well as with his lectures and essays on education (see, e.g., *Pädagogik* 9: 498–9, *Philanthropin* 2: 447). However, in my view this overlap does not detract from its importance within the anthropology lectures themselves. Rather, it serves to indicate both the underlying interconnectedness between different areas of Kant's work that tend still to be separated artificially by scholarly predilections and habits, as well as the central significance of the theme within many areas of Kant's philosophy. The strong teleological thrust of these descriptions of the destiny of the human species within the anthropology lectures also serves as a correction to the view that Kantian anthropology is simply empirical science, however broadly conceived one takes "empirical science" to be. While it remains the case that we do not find in these

lectures the ambitious project of a *transcendental* anthropology that makes good on the claim that all philosophical questions at bottom are anthropological questions tracking back to the human subject (cf. n. 2, previous), so also are we not merely being presented with a purely descriptive account of human nature and culture. Rather, the underlying vision of a gradually emerging worldwide moral community, extending slowly outward from its all-too-western-Eurocentric core but aiming ultimately at “a progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and towards the species as a system that is united cosmopolitically (*kosmopolitisch verbunden*)” (*Anth* 7: 334), lies somewhere between transcendental and merely empirical concerns.

Briefly, what according to the anthropology lectures is the destiny of the human species? The “experience of all ages and of all peoples” indicates that people “feel destined by nature to develop, through mutual compulsion under laws that proceed from themselves, a coalition in a *cosmopolitan* society (*cosmopolitismus*) – a coalition which, though constantly threatened by dissension, generally makes progress” (*Anth* 7: 331). In other versions of the lectures three crucial means toward the gradual establishment of this worldwide moral community are stressed: “a perfect civil constitution, good education, and the best concepts in religion” (*Pillau* 25: 847; cf. *Menschenkunde* 25: 1198, *Mrongovius* 25: 1427).

Concerning the first means, a better (if not quite perfect, because, as Kant reminds us in his more sober moments, we are talking about an “unattainable idea” that is to serve “merely as a regulative principle” – *Anth* 7: 331) civil constitution, the task is to develop a republican form of government where “each citizen must so to speak have his own voice” (*Mrongovius* 25: 1427), that is, where all citizens are involved in the process of making laws, and where the freedom, equality, and independence of all citizens is respected (cf. *TP* 8: 290). In “Toward Perpetual Peace,” Kant’s “first definite article for perpetual peace” is that “the civil constitution in every state shall be republican” (8: 349). In other words, he believes that republican forms of government are normatively superior to all others, and he predicts that eventually all nations will adopt republican constitutions.

Concerning the second means, improvements in education, the chief goal, as contemporary cosmopolitan Martha Nussbaum remarks, is to teach students to “recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give

its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, [their] first allegiance.”²³ Here Kant’s enthusiasm for the cosmopolitan program of Basedow’s Philanthropin Institute comes to the fore, as the following passage from the end of the *Friedländer* lectures indicates: “The present Basedowian institutes are the first that have come about according to the perfect plan of education. This is the greatest phenomenon that has appeared in this century for the improvement of the perfection of humanity, through it all schools in the world will receive another form” (25: 722–3; cf. *Moralphil. Collins* 27: 471). Education in Kant’s time was directed largely toward vocational/careerist aims, and so it remains today:

Parents usually care only that their children get on well in the world, and princes regard their subjects merely as instruments for their own designs. Parents care for the home, princes for the state. Neither have as their final purpose the best world (*das Weltbeste*) and the perfection to which humanity is destined, and for which it also has the disposition. But the design for a plan of education must be made in a cosmopolitan manner (*Pädagogik* 9: 448; cf. *Menschenkunde* 25: 1202).

Concerning the third means to furthering our collective destiny, religious discipline is also needed, “so that what cannot be achieved by external coercion can be effected by *internal* constraint (the constraint of conscience)” (*Anth* 7: 333 n). Or, as Kant puts it more ambitiously in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, the dominion of good over evil on our planet

is not otherwise attainable, so far as human beings can work toward it, than through the setting up and spreading (*Ausbreitung*) of a society in accordance with, and for the sake of, laws of virtue – a society which reason makes it a task and a duty of the whole human race to establish in its full scope (*das ganze Menschengeschlecht in ihrem Umfang*) (6: 94).

Although the above-mentioned trinity of political/legal, educational, and religious means toward the establishment of a cosmopolitan society receives pride of place in the anthropology lectures, on a broader scale Kant stresses that many more fundamental transformations in other areas of human social and cultural life are also necessary. And he also recognizes that we have a very long way to go:

The majority of human beings are still uncultivated (*noch roh*) and the thorough development of our talents is still lacking. Even the sciences are

gratifications (*Befriedigungen*) of the taste of the age, and do not aim at universal benefit (*allgemeiner Nutzen*). As concerns civilization, with us it is more an effect of taste and fashion rather than, as it should be, something grounded on maxims for the good of all (*zum allgemeinen besten*). Up until now we are merely refined and polished, but we do not have that which makes a good citizen. As concerns morality, we could say that in this area we have not yet come very far (*Mrongovius* 25: 1426–7; cf. *Menschenkunde* 25: 1198, *Päd* 9: 451, *Idee* 8: 26).²⁴

Unfortunately, just as the vast majority of human beings still “consider the step toward maturity to be not only troublesome but also highly dangerous” (*Aufklärung* 8: 35), so too, with respect to the three central means of improving the human condition, “we are so to speak in a three-fold immaturity” (*Mrongovius* 25: 1427; cf. *Menschenkunde* 25: 1198). The human species has not yet emerged from its self-incurred immaturity, and thus Enlightenment is still a long way off (cf. 8: 35). Nevertheless, even if “millennia are still required” for this emergence from immaturity to come about (*Friedländer* 25: 696; cf. *Moralphil. Collins* 27: 471), the moral map provided by the anthropology lectures shows us our destination and helps prevent us from getting lost, in addition to sketching out what we need to do to get there.

Moral Anthropology as *Practical* Philosophy

I have argued thus far that the various versions of Kant’s anthropology lectures, despite their generally informal, nontechnical nature and despite Kant’s failure to address systematically and in detail (in these lectures or anywhere else) the vital question of how his projects in anthropology and ethical theory link up with one another, nevertheless do offer us multiple moral messages – messages that, when interpreted sensibly and integrated together, do give us a solid sense of what his specifically *moral* (as distinguished from, e.g., *pragmatic*) anthropology is all about. In this final section, I wish to return to an important question touched on previously (“Fooled by Hope?”): does Kant have good reasons for regarding his moral anthropology as “the other member of the division of *practical* philosophy as a whole (*MdS* 6: 217)”; or, as Paton and Gregor (and, according to them, Kant himself, at least in *some* places) contend, is moral anthropology merely to be regarded as a part of *theoretical* philosophy? Alternatively stated, is Kant’s moral

anthropology indeed “the second part of morals” (*Moral Mrongovius II* 29: 599), that is, “the empirical part of ethics” (*Gr* 4: 388) – or is “moral anthropology” simply a misnomer?

Again, both Paton and Gregor hold (see nn. 13–14, previous) that Kant’s moral anthropology is a part of theoretical philosophy, on the ground that its primary focus concerns the study of those empirical facts about human nature that favor or hinder the carrying out of *a priori* moral principles by human beings. In order to qualify as a part of practical philosophy, they argue, moral anthropology would need to consist only of principles grounded “entirely on the concept of freedom (*gänzlich auf dem Freiheitsbegriffe*), to the complete exclusion of grounds taken from nature for the determination of the will” (*KU* 5: 173).

Kant’s most detailed defense of this rather austere conception of practical philosophy occurs in the “First Introduction” to the *Critique of Judgment* – a text that Kant originally discarded “because of its lengthiness” (Kant to Jakob Sigismund Beck, August 18, 1793, 11: 441), and that was not published in its entirety until 1914, in volume 5 of the Cassirer edition of Kant’s works. Paton refers readers to this text in justifying his rejection of Kant’s claim (in, e.g., *MdS*, *Gr*, and *Moral Mrongovius II*) that moral anthropology is a part of practical philosophy, though without citing from it. However, in order to get a better sense of the problem, it is worth citing at some length from this not terribly well-known text:

There is a prevailing misconception, which is highly injurious to the way science is to deal with these areas, about what should be considered *practical* in such a sense of the term that it deserves to be included in a *practical philosophy*. It has been deemed proper to include statesmanship and political economy, rules of household management and also of etiquette, precepts for the diet and the health of the body and soul alike (indeed, why not all professions and arts?) in practical philosophy because they all contain practical propositions. But practical propositions are distinguished from theoretical propositions, which comprise the possibility of things and their determinations, not by a difference in their content but by a difference in the way we represent them, and the former alone consider *freedom* under laws. All the rest are just applications of the theory of the nature of things to the way in which we can produce them according to a principle.... In short, all practical propositions which derive from the power of choice as cause (*Willkühr als Ursache*) what can exist in nature, belong to theoretical

philosophy as knowledge of nature; only those which give freedom its law are specifically differentiated by their content from the former of these (20: 195–7).

According to the preceding way of demarcating practical and theoretical philosophy, moral anthropology would appear to be part of the latter, because it is chiefly concerned with “the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in *carrying-out* the laws of a metaphysics of morals” (*MdS* 6: 217). This is the conclusion that both Paton and Gregor reach.

However, one major downside of their reading is that it makes Kant look doubly foolish. First, on their interpretation the very concept of “moral anthropology” (a term which, as we have seen, Kant explicitly uses in a wide variety of texts) becomes a misnomer. Something now counts as “moral” only if it is “practical” in the above stern sense of consisting exclusively of principles that are founded entirely on the concept of freedom. Second, Kant stands guilty of a rather blatant contradiction. For both Paton and Gregor recognize that Kant does assert in several texts that moral anthropology *is* a part of practical philosophy (e.g., *MdS* 6: 217, *Gr* 4: 388) – indeed, it is the existence of such assertions that leads them to criticize the coherency of the very idea of a Kantian moral anthropology.

One possible way out would be to emphasize that Kant unfortunately uses the term “practical” in two different senses. In the wider sense, practical principles “are simply general rules that regulate action. Some practical rules are moral, namely categorical imperatives, and some are nonmoral, for example, subjective maxims and hypothetical imperatives.”²⁵ In the narrower sense, “practical” is synonymous with “moral,” where both refer strictly to the possibility of categorical imperatives based on freedom. It is this second, narrower sense of “practical” that Kant uses in both of his introductions to the *Critique of Judgment*. For example, at the beginning of the second introduction (the only version Kant himself published), he stresses that “philosophy is properly divided into two parts that are quite different in their principles: theoretical, that is to say (*als*), *natural philosophy*; and practical, that is to say *moral philosophy* (for this is what the practical legislation of reason according to the concept of freedom is called)” (*KU* 5: 171; cf. *MdS* 6: 218). Keeping these two different senses of “practical” in

mind, we could then say that moral anthropology is practical in the broader but not in the narrower sense. And we could also halt our skirmish with Paton and Gregor; noting simply that when they dismiss the claim that moral anthropology is practical they are relying on the narrow sense of “practical,” whereas when we endorse it we are invoking the wider sense.

However, if we adopt this easy truce, Kant still stands doubly convicted – first, for not recognizing that his own use of “moral anthropology” doesn’t square with his narrower sense of “practical”; second, for asserting in some places that moral anthropology is part of practical philosophy and in other places that it isn’t. Only if we can also show that moral anthropology counts as practical in the narrower sense – “practical in accordance with laws of freedom” (*MdS* 6: 217) – is acquittal on these embarrassing charges possible.

How then could a moral anthropology “to which the empirical principles belong” (*Moral Mrongovius II* 29: 599; cf. *Gr* 4: 388) qualify as practical in this stern Kantian sense of being in accordance with laws of freedom rather than nature? On my view, it counts as practical in the narrow sense because the use that human beings are to make of these empirical precepts is free (determined by pure practical reason) rather than unfree (determined by the interplay of natural causes). We have a moral duty to learn how nature (particularly our own nature) works in order to put into effect “what reason prescribes to us” (*MdS* 6: 218); and so that reason can “make room for its own end, the rule of right” (*Frieden* 8: 367). In other words, a moral imperative lies behind the acquisition of this knowledge of our own nature; and because we are regulating our actions (in this case, our anthropological investigations into the nature of our species) by a moral motive, this regulation counts as practical, even though the resulting knowledge is theoretical – “theoretical” in Kant’s special sense of dealing with knowledge of nature. We are to learn about human nature and the world we live in precisely in order to bring about a moral realm; that is, to create the kingdom of ends (see, e.g., *Gr* 4: 439, 437–8). “The concept of freedom,” Kant stresses in the *Critique of Judgment*, “shall (*soll*) actualize in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws” (5: 176); and this can only happen in the sensible world if human beings use their knowledge of nature to promote moral goals. The moral law itself enjoins this goal of creating a moral world on us, and it enjoins

us further “to apply our powers toward the realization (*Bewirkung*) of it” (*KU* 5: 455).

In this larger sense, Kant’s moral anthropology is thus a key part of the ambitious *Übergang* project also articulated in the third *Critique* – the project, that is, of establishing a bridge between the seemingly separate worlds of nature and freedom, so that a moral world can be created out of nature (see *KU* 5: 175–6). And this also shows us why the debate over whether moral anthropology should count as practical rather than merely theoretical is much more than an internal terminological quarrel between Kant scholars.²⁶ Again, at bottom, anthropology and social science generally as envisioned by Kant are not at all Weberian value-free undertakings, but deeply value-embedded and morally guided projects: “The sciences (*Wissenschaften*) are *principia* for the improvement of morality (*die Verbeßerung der Moralität*)” (*Moralphil. Collins* 27: 462). Knowing ourselves and our world stands under the moral imperative of making ourselves and our world morally better. Ultimately, we seek anthropological knowledge in order to further the goal of moralization; that is, to promote “the *Übergang* from civilization to moralization (*Moralisierung*).”²⁷ Unfortunately, Kant’s 1782 estimate of how far humanity has progressed toward this goal would seem to apply equally well to our situation today, over two intervening centuries notwithstanding: “In progress of culture we have already come very far, in civilization we have come a short way, in moralization we have done almost nothing (*beynahe gar nichts gethan*)” (*Menschenkunde* 25: 1198).

None of this is meant to downplay the obvious fact that Kant provides readers with more than ample opportunities to criticize his moral anthropology. Nowhere is the project carried out systematically or in detail; it is riddled throughout by inaccurate empirical data (i.e., racial, ethnic, religious, and sexist prejudices), etc. But in trying to show both that we really do find a specifically *moral* anthropology within Kant’s eclectic anthropology lectures, and that this moral anthropology is at bottom deeply *practical* rather than merely theoretical, I hope I have also convinced readers of the fundamental importance of this neglected part of his philosophical project. Those of us who aspire to construct humanly useful ethical theories ought to consider more carefully Kant’s conviction that “the metaphysics of morals, or

metaphysica pura, is only the first part of morality; the second part is *philosophia moralis applicata*, to which the empirical principles belong” (*Moral Mrongovius II* 29: 599). This is not at all to say that the particular *philosophia moralis applicata* that we find sketched out in his anthropology lectures is a satisfactory one. It clearly is not. Rather, it remains for us today and in the future to develop a viable moral anthropology from the exploratory and fragmentary beginnings that he has left us.²⁸

Notes

1. For instance, in the opening section of the *Menschenkunde*, to which Brandt and Stark assign a tentative date of 1781–2, Kant states: “Knowledge of the human being we designate with a general name ‘anthropology’, which is not taught at any other academy” (25: 856; cf. *Friedländer* 25: 472, *Mrongovius* 25: 1210–11). And in a frequently cited letter to Marcus Herz written toward the end of 1773, Kant announces: “This winter for the second time I am giving a lecture course on anthropology, which I now intend to make into a proper academic discipline” (10: 138).
2. In the letter to Herz cited in note 1, Kant also asserts that his intention is “to disclose through anthropology the sources of all of the sciences (*die Quellen aller Wissenschaften*), of ethics, of skill, of human relations, of the method of educating and governing human beings, and therefore of everything that pertains to the practical” (10: 138). So even in 1773, he pins very high hopes on anthropology. But it is also the case that much of the material in the lectures is best described as informal, empirical, layperson-friendly science rather than *transcendental* anthropology.
3. Benno Erdmann, *Reflexionen Kants zur Anthropologie* (Leipzig: Fues, 1882), p. 37. On this point, I think a comparative analysis of the different versions of the anthropology lectures falsifies Erdmann’s claim.
4. Reinhard Brandt, “Einleitung,” in Kant, *Vorlesungen über Anthropologie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), pp. XLVI–VII, XLVI (Academy vol. 25). See also his “Ausgewählte Probleme der Kantischen Anthropologie,” in *Der ganze Mensch: Anthropologie und Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert*, edited by Hans-Jürgen Schings (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1994), p. 29. Although I do concur with Brandt’s basic contention that “pragmatic anthropology is not systematically integrated with Kant’s philosophy” (“Einleitung,” p. XLVII), I think it is a mistake to place so much weight on the issue of whether certain words do or do not appear in a text. A given topic can be addressed by many different words, and it would be unwise to conclude, for example, that an English author has nothing at all to say about the idea of God just because the word ‘God’ doesn’t appear in his texts.
5. Emil Arnoldt, *Kritische Excurse im Gebiete der Kant-Forschung* (Königsberg: von Ferd, 1894), p. 351. See also Norbert Hinske’s criticisms of Arnoldt’s long-winded attempt to resolve this dilemma in “Kants Idee der

Anthropologie,” in *Die Frage nach dem Menschen*, edited by Heinrich Rombach (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1966), p. 426 n. 30.

6. Here I am basically in agreement with Wolfgang Becker, who notes that “a ‘practical anthropology’ must, in its conception, in its systematic method, and in its carrying-out, be tied much more tightly to moral philosophy than is the case with [Kant’s] *Anthropology* [from a Pragmatic Point of View].” “Einleitung: Kants pragmatische Anthropologie,” in *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, edited by Becker (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1983), p. 14. I would also extend this remark to cover all of Kant’s anthropology *Nachschriften* as well.
7. A familiar word of caution bears repeating here. Obviously, one needs to be careful in citing from Kantian lectures that Kant himself did not publish. Kant, in another letter to Herz (October 20, 1778) sounds an appropriate warning: “Those of my students who are most capable of grasping everything are just the ones who bother least to take explicit and verbatim notes; rather, they write down only the main points, which they can think over afterward. Those who are most thorough in note-taking are seldom capable of distinguishing the important from the unimportant. They pile a mass of misunderstood stuff under that which they may possibly have grasped correctly” (10: 242; cf. Kant’s letter to Herz of August 28, 1778 at 10: 240–2).
8. Georg Samuel Mellin, *Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der kritischen Philosophie*, reprint ed., 6 vols. (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1970), 1: v. See also Mellin’s letter to Kant of September 6, 1797, where he writes: “I permit myself to send you the enclosed copy of [the first volume of] my *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Critical Philosophy*. . . I flatter myself that I have seized the spirit of this philosophy through a continuous, twelve-year study of it and that I have understood your writings, at least for the most part, deeply esteemed professor” (12: 195–6; cf. 12: 234, 303–4).
9. Mellin, *Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch*, 1: 277, 279.
10. Mellin, *Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch*, 1: 280.
11. Carl Christian Erhard Schmid, *Wörterbuch zum leichtern Gebrauch der kantischen Schriften* (Jena: Crökerschen Buchhandlung, 1798; reprint ed., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), pp. 62–3. The first edition of this work appeared in 1788.
12. A. F. M. Willich, *Elements of the Critical Philosophy* (London: T. N. Longman, 1798), pp. iii, 140. As noted previously (n. 1), Brandt and Stark assign a tentative date of 1781–2 to the *Menschenkunde*. They also assign a date of 1777–8 to the *Pillau* manuscript. So it is probable that Willich sat in on either or both of these versions of Kant’s anthropology lectures.
13. H. J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy* (London: Hutchinson, 1947; reprint, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 32.
14. Mary J. Gregor, *Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the “Metaphysik der Sitten”* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), p. 8. Gregor dedicated *Laws of Freedom* “to H. J. Paton” (p. v), and

co-dedicated her translation of Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974) to the memory of her "father and of Professor H. J. Paton" (p. v). A revised version of her translation is forthcoming in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* volume entitled *Anthropology, History, and Education*.

15. As one might expect, for the most part Kant does "focus on the negative" here – that is, he devotes far more discussion to species-wide hindrances to morality confronting human beings than he does to species-wide aids to morality. And while he generally succeeds in suppressing his extraterrestrial enthusiasms in the anthropology lectures ["we have no knowledge of *non-terrestrial* rational beings" (*Anth* 7: 321; cf. 7: 331, *Menschenkunde* 25: 859)], it is important to remember that throughout Kant's life he maintained the belief that human beings are only one subset of rational beings. This "human hindrances" aspect of practical anthropology does, I believe, make much more sense when placed alongside the assumption that there exists more than one species of rational moral agent. For instance, toward the end of his early work *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, he speculates that the inhabitants of "earth and perhaps Mars . . . would alone be in the dangerous middle road, where the temptations of sensual stimulations against the sovereignty of spirit have a strong capacity for seduction" (1: 366). The more intelligent inhabitants of Saturn, on the other hand, apparently aren't faced with such temptations. For discussion, see Mark Larrimore, "Sublime Waste: Kant on the Destiny of the 'Races'," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, supp. vol. 25 (1999), pp. 119–20. See also William Clark's discussion of "cosmo-anthropology" in "The Death of Metaphysics in Enlightened Prussia," in *The Sciences in Enlightened Europe*, edited by William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 45–2.
16. But this is not exclusively the case. Statements concerning human hindrances to morality can also be found in the second main division of the lectures, the so-called "Characteristics." For example, toward the very end of the *Menschenkunde* Kant stresses that "the human being has by nature a tendency to dissemble" (25: 1197; cf. *Anth* 7: 332).
17. See also Allen Wood's important discussion of "the pluralism of reason," *Kant's Ethical Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 301–2, in which he argues forcefully against Habermas's charge that Kant's conception of philosophy is "monological" or "solipsistic." In the conclusion to his discussion of egoism in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Kant states clearly that "the opposite of egoism can only be *pluralism*, i.e., the way of thinking of not being concerned with oneself as if one were the whole world, but of considering and conducting oneself as a citizen of the world. – This much belongs to anthropology" (7: 130).
18. *Contra* Max Weber's famous "requirement of 'value-freedom' in discussion of empirical matters," "Value-judgments in Social Science," in *Max Weber: Selections in Translation*, edited by W. G. Runciman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 81.

19. In our own time more and more social scientists have finally come around to the view that fiction also has truths to teach us about human nature. Moral theorists who are skeptical of the abstractions of theory also frequently turn to fiction in hopes of finding a clearer illumination of the moral life. Kant's conviction that anthropology should enlist the aid of history, drama, fiction, travel books, and biography no longer sounds as strange as it once did. At the same time, in other lectures he is quite critical of novels. "Reading novels," he warns, "in addition to causing many other mental discords, also makes distraction habitual" (*Anth* 7: 208). And only adults should be allowed to read novels: "all novels should be taken out of the hands of children," on the ground that they "weaken the memory" (*Pädagogik* 9: 473).
20. Barbara Herman, *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 77–8. For Kant though, *Weltkenntnis* is not typically "acquired in childhood as part of socialization." Its acquisition certainly *begins* in childhood, but, as we saw previously, what he has in mind is a more reflective knowledge of "the human being considered *cosmologically*" (*Geo* 9: 157) – a knowledge of what human beings share in common with one another and what they might be able to achieve in the future with one another. Such knowledge is not attainable by children.
21. Cf. Friedrich Kaulbach, who characterizes Kant's philosophy of history as "an orientation for praxis." "Just as a traveler helps himself to a map, in order to identify the way and the destination," so, analogously, moral agents can also benefit from a map that describes the *telos* of their efforts ["Welchen Nutzen gibt Kant der Geschichtsphilosophie?" *Kant-Studien* 66 (1975): 70, 78–9]. Kant's anthropology and geography lectures also contribute to this map-making venture, Kaulbach adds in another piece, insofar as they aim to provide the moral agent with "a plan, a map of the whole, within which one is able to determine one's own position and can trace out for oneself the path by which one can reach one's chosen goals. . . ." "Weltorientierung, Weltkenntnis und pragmatische Vernunft bei Kant," in *Kritik und Metaphysik. Studien. Heinz Heimsoeth zum achtzigsten Geburtstag*, edited by Friedrich Kaulbach and Joachim Ritter (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966), p. 61.
22. Moses Mendelssohn, "Über die Frage: was heißt aufklären?" *Berlinische Monatschrift* 4 (1784): 193–200; reprinted in *Was ist Aufklärung?: Thesen und Definitionen*, edited by Ehrhard Bahr (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974), p. 4.
23. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," in Martha C. Nussbaum with Respondents, *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), p. 7. See also her "Kant and Cosmopolitanism," in James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 25–57. (Also published in German as "Kant und stoisches Weltbürgertum," in *Frieden durch Recht*, edited by Lutz-Bachmann and Bohman [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1996], pp. 45–75.)

24. This passage also reflects the strong influence of Rousseau on Kant's thought. See especially Part One of the *Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts* (1750), reprinted in *The Basic Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, translated by Donald Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987).
25. Allen D. Rosen, *Kant's Theory of Justice* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 6 n. 2. Rosen refers to *KpV* 5: 19 as one prominent text where this wider sense of "practical" is used: "Practical *principles* are propositions that contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules" (see also *Gr* 4: 389, 400 n, 420–1 n).
26. See also Allen Wood's criticisms (*Kant's Ethical Thought*, pp. 194–5) of Paton's and Gregor's rejection of Kant's claim that moral anthropology is a part of practical philosophy. I agree with Wood that the inclusion of moral anthropology as part of practical philosophy is "both consistent with Kantian principles and quite illuminating as to the way Kant conceives of the [overall] system of moral philosophy" (195). However, our reasons for regarding moral anthropology as practical are somewhat different. Wood brings moral anthropology into practical philosophy by arguing that it concerns not just empirical information concerning the *means* to the fulfillment of our moral duties, but also, at least in some cases, a determination of "the *content* of . . . ethical duties" (195). Assuming for the moment that this claim is true (it is not uncontroversial), I don't see how it meets the challenge of Kant's narrower sense of "practical" – viz., his claim that to count as practical rather than theoretical, something must be based "entirely (*gänzlich*) on the concept of freedom" (*KU* 5: 173). I also think that Wood tends to underestimate the force of this challenge, in suggesting that we encounter it only in "the (unpublished) first introduction" to *KU* (194).
27. *Immanuel Kant's Anweisung zur Menschen und Weltkenntnis. Nach dessen Vorlesungen im Winterhalbjahre von 1790–1791*, edited by Fr. Ch. Starke (Leipzig: die Expedition des europäischen Aufsehers, 1831; reprint ed., New York: Georg Olms, 1976), p. 124. ("Starke" was a pseudonym for Johann Adam Bergk. Bergk also edited the *Menschenkunde* version of Kant's anthropology lectures, reprinted in *Ak* vol. 25.)
28. This essay borrows and builds on a number of points made in my previous work, *Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Versions of this essay were also presented as invited lectures to the North American Kant Society session of the American Philosophical Association Meeting in Minneapolis, May 2001; the IV Coloquio Kant, The State University of Campinas, Brazil; and the Department of Philosophy at the Federal University of Santa Catarina, Brazil, June 2002.

The Guiding Idea of Kant's Anthropology and the Vocation of the Human Being¹

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The Guiding Idea of Kant's "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View"

"Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View" – what is the unifying theme or guiding idea of this discipline, which Kant hoped to make into a field of study at the university? In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant mentions an "idea of the whole" (B xliv),³ and in the *Prolegomena* he attributes a "soul of the system" to transcendental philosophy (IV: 374). Pragmatic anthropology, however, although it is conceived systematically and as a science (*Wissenschaft*), is not a philosophical system – it neither belongs to philosophy in a strict sense, nor is it articulated as a system based upon an idea of reason. It is an empirical discipline like physical geography, the science ordered next to it both systematically and pedagogically. Nevertheless the unity and a central idea must be found in order to identify the perspective that explains which material is included and excluded from it.

If we turn to the published *Anthropology* of 1798, then we find the somewhat enigmatic three-part definition: the pragmatic anthropology concerns what a human being as a freely acting being "makes, can, or ought to make out of himself" (VII: 119). The title "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View" obviously does not do justice to the last component, the "ought," and therefore does not take up the whole thematic. Moreover, the titles of the two sections of the book, "Anthropological Didactic" and "Anthropological Characterization,"

hardly help. First, the division into two sections does not take into account how the program includes three parts; and, second, the concepts “didactic” and “characteristic” do not contain any specific reference to the particularity of the human being as a freely acting being. The two *subtitles*, however, read: “On How to Discern the Interior as well as the Exterior of a Human Being” and “On How to Discern the Interior of a Human Being from His Exterior.” Once again there is no reference to the theme of the freely acting human being and no hint of the “ought”; rather, Kant offers us the norm-free observation of human beings in terms of their real, yet hidden motives. David Hume could have also assayed such a topic, since free action does not play a role here.

At this point, we become entangled in an unintended examination of the two cited subtitles. But theories of every sort present themselves to us in texts, and texts are fixed in print and are subject to a fate about which we, as theorists, would rather not know. Disregard for the material basis of the text is one of the reasons why disputants of theory can first raise a big hermeneutical stir and then complain that they cannot see through all the commotion. In this case, it seems that the first subtitle was not written by Kant – after all, why do we need a book to teach us how to discern the exterior of a human being? Where would the problem be with such an activity, and where does the *Anthropology* ever treat this nonexistent problem? The second subtitle takes up the reasonable question of physiognomy, that is, how we can recognize or guess something about the inner character of somebody from his external facial expressions and gestures. But with the first subtitle, there is the problem of whether it even belongs to the text – thus to a certain extent, to the literary “physiognomy” of the Kantian theory itself. It is suspicious not only because of its aforementioned vacuity, but also because, as one can note with relief, it does not appear in Kant’s manuscript, which is preserved in the University Library of Rostock. This manuscript, known as “H,” begins only after the title page of “Part One.” This is not the place to explain fully how to establish that the transcriber of H derived the formulation of the subtitle of Part One from the subtitle of Part Two. I would simply like to point out that the marginalia in which the subtitle of Part Two is formulated also include the formulation “What is a human being?” Here, then, is the old anthropological question already found in Plato, *ti estin anthropos*. Kant deliberately rejects this question as the central question

of anthropology and replaces it, as I shall show, with the question about the vocation of the human being.

If the search for the guiding idea of the *Anthropology* refers us first to its title and its internal division into two parts, then the first attempt to locate it has failed. The titles of the two parts contain no reference to the human being as a freely acting being or to the specifically pragmatic point of view of the work. The concept of the didactic refers perhaps only to the expository technique of the first part, that is, its presentation in numbered sections, not to a substantive contrast between it and the second part, the “characteristic.” And the first of the two subtitles cannot help us further because it obviously does not stem from the author.

Two supplementary observations pertaining to this:

First, the text of the *Anthropology* is problematic as a whole, not only in this particular passage. The manuscript H, the first edition from 1798, and the second edition from 1801 are all available for examination. Since the changes from the first to the second edition certainly do not stem from Kant, on matters of detail, it is necessary to consult the first edition. But then we have the following problem: is the text of the first edition authentic? Who is the source of the differences between H and the first edition? H itself, Kant’s manuscript, is not publishable because it was intended to be editorially revised.⁴ Was this reviser responsible for *all* the interventions? Kant was notoriously uninterested in the philological condition of his publications, and a more precise examination of this text reveals that he did not read the fair copy of his amanuensis or editor, who is in any case unknown to us. Therefore, without philological commentary, the text should be relied upon only in its broader conceptual strokes – at the level of detail, it could well be that one is dealing, not with Kant’s theory, but with the text from the attic of an assistant.

The second observation is that even an examination of the student notes of Kant’s lectures on anthropology (vol. XXV of the “*Akademie*” edition of Kant’s works) does not lead to an unambiguous answer as to how the two parts of anthropology relate to the unified, guiding idea of a science that investigates what a human being as a freely acting being makes, or can or should make, out of himself.

In the lectures, the relation of the two parts of anthropology to one another is stated differently at different times. In *Parow* (student

notes from winter semester 1772–3), after the subheading “On the Character of the Human Being,” it says, without reference to the overall structure: “When one takes together everything with which a human being distinguishes himself: then we can consider the human being in four ways, namely . . .” (XXV: 426). What distinguishes people from one another is that which characterizes them. Thus cognition of a general faculty of the mind that everyone has at his disposal (discussed according to the classic anthropological scheme of cognition, feeling, and desire) is followed by cognition of the characteristic, distinguishing traits of individual people. This is also the organizational principle of the published first edition text of 1798. Yet, in *manuscript 400*, that is, *Friedländer* (1775–6), it says at the beginning of the second part: “Once we have become acquainted in the general part with the human being according to the powers and faculties of his soul, now, in a special part we must seek to apply the knowledge of the human being and to make use of it” (XXV: 624). Here the two parts are supposed to be distinguished in terms of the concepts “general-special” and “doctrine of faculties-application.” The structures of *Parow* and *Friedländer* cannot be linked without considerable difficulty.

Mrongovius (1785–6) contains this formulation:

Second or Practical Part of Anthropology, which Treats the Characteristics of the Human Being.

Because the first part contains the physiology of the human being and therefore, at the same time, the elements out of which the human being is composed; therefore the practical part of anthropology is that which teaches us how the human being is constituted in his voluntary actions (XXV: 1367).

The elements are analyzed in the first part, while in the second practical part, the actions are analyzed – but how are the two parts linked? Perhaps the relation between a doctrine of elements and a doctrine of method, found in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and familiar in logic since Gassendi, should be regarded as fundamental. *Busolt* (1788–9?) says differently yet again: “This characteristic (for anthropology is really a characteristic) is, in regard to its method, divided into the doctrines: 1. Of the Character of Persons / 2. . . . Sexes / 3. . . . Nations / 4. . . . Species” (XXV: 1437). *Dohna* (1791–2) proposes: “I. Doctrine of Elements. Theory of Anthropology. Concept. . . / II. Doctrine of

Method. The characteristic is the use of this, to distinguish one human being from another.”⁵

Indeed, it seems that Kant does not have at his disposal any unified idea out of which a clear articulation of his doctrine and the writings that represent it could arise. If one interprets the formula “what a human being makes out of himself, or can make or should make” loosely, then one recognizes the silhouette of the triad of actuality, possibility, and necessity. Such a reading calls our attention to the three layers of anthropology that can be accounted for using this triad and also has the advantage of recapitulating three different stages of development. At the first stage, there is the empirical psychology of Alexander Baumgarten, which considers the aspects of human psychology that are actually observed, and can be classified, and perhaps explained – empirical psychology in contrast to rational psychology. Kant adopted this conception in his first lectures of 1772–3. Kant uses Baumgarten as a foundation and supplements him in passages that owe their structure to Kant’s *Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764). The crux of the already mentioned two-part division can be traced back to these additions. At a second stage, there is a turn to the pragmatic, certainly attested by a letter to Marcus Herz from fall 1773 (X: 143–6), and, at a third stage, a theory section, indebted to Rousseau’s idea of the “*perfectibilité de l’homme*,” is added. In contrast to the rest of nature, the human being, that is, humanity as a whole, is determined to perfect itself. This third complex, introduced at the end of the anthropology course, considers the determination or vocation (*Bestimmung*) of the human being; the “should” refers to it.

The lectures of 1772–3 emphasize, *contra* Baumgarten, that the empirical discipline of psychology or anthropology as such does not belong to metaphysics. Moreover, they emphasize that the study of the human being constitutes his actual interest and is something that has been previously neglected. This lament, a commonplace in the literature available to Kant, cannot be raised today because empirical psychology has enjoyed overwhelming success in the meantime. In 1772 Kant also complained that the rich anthropological material already present in the diverse literary genres had not been fully exploited by theorists, and he names certain authors as his sources. However Wolff and Baumgarten and, before them, Hobbes and Pope might have arrived at their anthropological perspectives – certainly not

without careful study of historians and poets – Kant’s critique hits upon an important point: previous anthropological work had not stated its empirical sources. Kant does this and thus his anthropology stands between a study of human beings that merely claimed to be a science and the subsequent science that works empirically and identifies the procedures that yield definite results – a successor science that proceeds not only observationally, but also experimentally. But with this development, the successor science forfeits reference to the two other levels of Kant’s anthropology. When we read Kant today and learn something from him about prudent action in the world and about the vocation of the human race, this seems peculiar as a form of academic study. The form of science has been transformed and has led to academic resignation vis-à-vis questions about where our activity leads and within which parameters, on the whole, we act.

The transition from empirical psychology to pragmatic anthropology takes place after the first or second semester, signaled in the programme announced at the beginning of the course, but without effecting a major change in the subsequent content. The content was already keyed to the human setting of ends, because all of the human predispositions were already considered from a teleological perspective. In general, we can say that, from the beginning, the anthropology was conceived in the light of a Stoic teleology and that the Stoic-Roman motto “Man is born for action” served as a premise from the outset. At this second stage, with the emphasis on the pragmatic, it is pushed into the foreground. Moreover, it serves to delimit all attempts to transpose psychology in certain phenomenal areas into physiology. Ernst Platner and Charles Bonnet did exactly that in their half-psychological, half-physiological-medical anthropologies. For Kant, reference to the pragmatic orientation of anthropology is fundamentally linked with the idea that the theoretical, always fruitless investigation of the connection between body and soul is no longer a tenable topic for anthropology. The transcendental philosophy avoids this topic as well, if in an altogether different manner.

Pedagogically, this pragmatic turn transformed an introductory discipline into a capstone course that led from the school – that is, from the university – to the world. In the lecture schedule for summer 1775,

Kant states precisely this: academic “preliminary exercises in the knowledge of the world” should serve to

... add the *pragmatic* to the otherwise acquired sciences and skills, so that they are useful not only for school, but also for life, and so that the trained apprentice is introduced to the theater of his vocation, that is, to the world. To be able to order all future experiences according to rules he needs a preliminary outline of the twofold field which lies before him: that is, nature and the human being. Both pieces have to be *cosmologically* considered, that is, not according to the curiosities their objects contain as individuals ([as in] physics and the empirical doctrine of the soul), but rather according to what we can learn from their relationship to the whole, in which they exist and within which each takes its proper place (II: 443).⁶

An ego-centered psychology gives rise to an investigation of behavioral patterns in society; the emphasis on the observation of the individual shifts to an emphasis on an analysis of social contexts and the actions and reactions within them.

Here we have the polar tension between the ego and the world as a whole that determines the structure of the anthropology in a typically Kantian way. We step over into the world, to the theater of social action, and are prepared for it by a discipline that connects anthropology and the doctrine of the world. With this development, the phase in which psychological “curiosities” are supposed to incite the attention of the students is overcome; instead, anthropology now appeals to their interests as future acting citizens of the world. Curiosities certainly continue to be included; because they were too provincial for the geniuses in Weimar and Berlin, Kant’s *Anthropology* would never become a great success.

Pragmatic anthropology aims at a distributive doctrine of prudence; each student making an entrance on the world stage is equipped with a knowledge that facilitates the practical interaction with others and also with himself. Kant, however, has not yet identified either the common theme of the world theater in which he appears or which form of reason dominates, on the whole, the many strands of action that he encounters in the to-and-fro of life. This inadequacy of a merely pragmatic anthropology provided Kant with the opportunity to take up an issue that was discussed intensively in the 1770s and to add it to the work as a conclusion: the question about the vocation of humanity as a whole.

In merely pragmatic investigations, I never encounter “humanity” and the meaning of my acts and omissions, whether prudent or imprudent, comes up only in relation to specific actions or action-complexes. Starting with psychological peculiarities, and proceeding through the prudential interest of the individual, we reach, at a third stage, the rational question about the whole within which our action plays itself out. This last component – the idea of humanity as a historical-systematic unity – is introduced in the middle of the 1770s; it is found at the conclusion of the lectures and of the book. Aside from this, there are no further structural changes.

If this analysis of “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View” is correct, then the discipline does form a whole, although one that is primarily an aggregate of historical forces. As we have seen, this whole is never explicitly expressed in the lectures or in the book; rather it must be inferred from the genesis and inner logic of the lectures and the book.

A consequence of such a unified (if still three-level) anthropology is that the discipline reveals many points of contact with the other areas of Kant’s thought, however completely self-sufficient it is in its material-psychological grounding, its pragmatic statement of ends, and, third, its outlook on the point of action immanent in the world. “Pragmatic anthropology” is therefore not the discipline of practical anthropology, variously described by Kant, that was supposed to function as a complement to pure moral philosophy.

This thesis is confirmed by the part of the *Anthropology* that stands closest to moral philosophy: its claims about character formation (VII: 291–5). The suggestion is that, in ethics, a human being should legislate for himself and act out of duty. But, although this might appear to be a bridge to moral philosophy, two observations count against an exclusively moral reading. First, even in the discussion of character, the accent falls on pragmatic interaction: we know what to expect from a person with character, we can count on the fact that he will hold fast to an intention he has formed – the Stoic “*semper idem*” and “*tenax propositi*.” Morality is of interest only in so far as it yields a self-harmonizing stability in the people with whom we interact. We can rely upon them like clockwork. The second point is that there are also close points of contact with transcendental philosophy, the aesthetics of the *Critique of Judgment*, and with philosophy of law. Thus “anthropology”

is also a sort of summation of the remaining themes of Kant's philosophy, even if from an empirical-pragmatic perspective. Even the final topic, the vocation of the human being, is analyzed entirely empirically and as immanent to the world. The only decisive thing here is that Kant indicates a common denominator for human action as a whole.

The Vocation of the Human Being

In the "summary of the pragmatic Anthropology," a paragraph in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, the vocation of the human being is presented as apparently transcending the mere final *natural* vocation:

The summary of what pragmatic anthropology has to say about the vocation [*Bestimmung*] of the human being and the character of his development is as follows: the human being is destined [*bestimmt*] through his reason to live in a society of human beings, and in this society, through the arts and sciences, to cultivate himself, civilize himself, and moralize himself. No matter how great his animal instincts may be to abandon himself passively to the enticements of ease and comfort, which he calls happiness, [he is still destined] to make himself worthy of humanity by actively struggling with the obstacles that cling to him because of the crudity of his nature (VII: 324–5).⁷

This is indeed a summary of Kant's philosophy as a whole. It answers the three famous questions: "What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?" And, in fact, these three questions are not brought together by the question about essence and definition "What is a human being?", but by the question about purposes and ends: *to* what is a human being destined (*bestimmt*) by his nature and reason? Or, what is the vocation (*Bestimmung*) of the human species? Nature *and* reason – how should we think about the identity and/or difference between these two elements of vocation?

To begin with, two conceptions of the human vocation must be distinguished from Kant's. Although there is no evidence that either had a direct influence on Kant, we can use them to distinguish his position from other, competing conceptions, thereby grasping it more clearly.

First, consider the thesis that a human being distinguishes himself from other animals in virtue of being a *deficient being* (*Mängelwesen*). While Kant does indeed manifest some sympathy for this suggestion,

he does not conceive of a human being primarily as a deficient being, as does, for example, Protagoras, in the eponymous Platonic dialogue. According to the myth, Epimetheus equipped the animals with gifts to assure their survival, but no gifts remained for human beings: the human being was equipped with neither a coat of fur for protection from the cold and heat nor with hooves or claws – the human being was “naked, unshod, uncovered, unarmed”⁸ – so he makes his entrance on nature’s stage as a defective and deficient being (*Fehl- und Mängelwesen*). In order to address this hardship, after the fact, two sorts of things had to be added: first, the technical capacities needed for the conflict with nature (e.g., domesticated fire) and, second, shame (“*aidos*”) and justice (“*dike*”), needed for living together with people. With these compensatory gifts, the human being could subjugate or kill the originally superior animals, cultivate the earth, and live in cities with internal peace.

On Kant’s conception, the human being can indeed be considered a deficient being, but he does not receive any special gifts from the gods to even things out, to master the necessities of life. Rather, in the history of the species, the human being is forced by these necessities to create his own surrogate for his deficient natural endowment. The self-inflicted hardship created by a belligerent attitude becomes the driving stimulus that compels humans to settle the entire planet and found states, with fire and sword. But all of this is part of natural history and concerns a mere surrogate for our deficient animal endowment. In contrast, the vocation (*Bestimmung*) of the human being is the gradual emancipation from nature through self-determination (*Selbstbestimmung*), that is, ethical autonomy. The external legal form of states is still a coercive administration, of which even devils with merely instrumental reason are capable, at least according to a thesis of *Perpetual Peace* (VIII: 366–7).⁹ In contrast, the determination or vocation (*Bestimmung*) of the human being goes beyond the mere mastery of these hardships and demands the development of true justice and virtue; “*aidos*” (shame) and “*dike*” (justice) cannot be given to the human being as instruments – rather the human being has to ennoble himself to them.

So much for the contrast between Kant’s conception of the vocation of the human being and the idea of the human being as a deficient being, an idea revived, especially by Arnold Gehlen, in recent thought.

Second, Kant's conception of the vocation (*Bestimmung*) of the human being is also to be distinguished from that of Pico della Mirandola, who, in his treatise *De hominis dignitate* (written 1485, published 1496), has God speak of the creaturely indeterminacy of the human being:

Definita ceteris natura intra praescripta a nobis [sc. Gott] leges coercetur. Tu, nullis angustiis coarctatus, pro tuo arbitrio, in cuius manu te posui, ut circumspiceres inde commodius quicquid est in mundo. Nec te caelestem nec terrenum neque mortalem neque immortalem fecimus, ut tui ipsius quasi arbitrarius honorariusque plastes et factor, in quam malueris tute formam effingas.

A limited nature in other creatures is confined within the laws written down by Us. In conformity with thy free judgment, in whose hands I have placed thee, thou art confined by no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits of nature for thyself. I have placed thee at the center of the world, that from there thou mayest more conveniently look around and see whatsoever is in the world. Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal have We made thee. Thou, like a judge appointed for being honorable, art the molder and maker of thyself, thou mayest sculpt thyself into whatever shape thou dost prefer. Thou canst grow downward into the lower natures which are brutes. Thou canst again grow upward from thy soul's reason into the highest natures which are divine.¹⁰

Giambattista Vico will also speak later of the "indeterminate nature of the human being": "*L'uomo, per l'indiffinita natura della mente umana, . . .*" ["Man, because of the indefinite nature of the human mind . . ."]; or "*. . . che la mente umana, per la sua indiffinita natura, . . .*" [". . . namely, that the human mind because of its indefinite nature. . ."].¹¹

Kant does remark on the originally indeterminate (*unbestimmte*) nature of the human being. According to Kant, the human being's mental predispositions resemble his hand:

The characterization of the human being as a rational animal is already present in the form and organization of the human *hand*, partly by the structure, and partly by the sensitivity of its fingers and fingertips. By this, nature has not made him fit for manipulating things in one particular way, but rather, indeterminate [*unbestimmt*], fit for use in any way whatsoever and thus fit for the use of reason. In this way nature has indicated the technical predisposition, or the predisposition for skill, of this species as a rational animal (VII: 323).

Or again, in the *Physische Geographie Hesse*: “The human being is the most noble of animals. He is built in such a way that his posture and limbs show that he is laid out for more actions than any other animal.”¹²

However, the neo-Stoic in Königsberg does not find freedom in indeterminacy (*Unbestimmtheit*) as did the Platonist Pico della Mirandola. It might be that the hand is a specific, indeterminate (*unbestimmtes*) organ; perhaps the individual human being, undetermined (*unbestimmt*) by its creator, faces the question of whether he will acquire a definite character or choose to live permanently in the to-and-fro of new impressions and inclinations, whether he will turn himself to the things above or those below. Humanity on the whole, however, is unambiguously determined or destined (*bestimmt*) by providence to self-determination (*Selbstbestimmung*) and is compelled, with all of reason’s wiles and natural force, to acquire this ethical autonomy.

To summarize: in Kant, the *Bestimmung* of the human being is neither identical with the compensation for natural deficiencies nor with the filling in of gaps in moral fate by individual will.

But what exactly does “*Bestimmung*” mean? There seems to be no exact equivalent in Greek, Latin, or Italian for “*Bestimmung*,” as used by Kant and other German-speaking authors of his time. As Moses Mendelssohn pointed out, it means either *determinatio* or *destinatio*; it is the determination and determinate being (*das Bestimmen und Bestimmsein*) with respect to properties and is determination either *through* something or, secondly, *to* something.¹³ The first sense undergirds, for example, talk of a determinate (*bestimmten*) length: we can determine (*bestimmen*) the distance from the earth to the moon with increasing exactness. Events receive their determination (*Bestimmung*) through causal factors, which bring them forth in a determinate (*bestimmten*) place at a determinate (*bestimmten*) time. From the point of view of transcendental philosophy, this determination (*Bestimmung*) can be thought of as either previously existing or as something produced by subjective factors. In the latter case, the manifold of sensibility first receives its determinate form (*Formbestimmung*) through the subject – it is determined (*bestimmt*), that is, constituted, as object.

As for the second sense: *Bestimmung* as *destinatio* goes beyond the first sense through the addition of a teleological structure. Something is not only determined in its properties or *through* something – it can also be destined or determined (*bestimmt*) *to* something. According to

Mendelssohn and Kant, human beings are among those natural things whose existence and form we can grasp only insofar as we recognize the “to what” of their determination (*das Wozu seiner Bestimmung*). In Kant’s theory, the *determinatio* is a concern for the understanding, while the discovery of a *destinatio* is among the responsibilities of reason and reflective judgment. We recognize the end to which we are destined (*bestimmt*) only in our own capacity, that is, we are the cognizers and authors of our own vocation (*Bestimmung*) in the epistemological and moral-practical senses.

At this point, Mendelssohn and Kant part ways. While Mendelssohn focuses on the vocation of the individual and defends the meaning of the individual life against Thomas Abbt, Kant – in the wake of Rousseau’s idea of *perfectibilité de l’homme* – is from the outset interested in the vocation of humanity as a whole. Although Kant always remained interested in the vocation of individuals, the human being whose vocation is investigated in the *Anthropology* and in other related Kantian texts is not the isolated individual but quite clearly the species. Animals attain the purpose of their existence (*Daseinszweck*) as individual specimens, but human beings accomplish theirs only in the species, as part of humanity considered as a whole. With this conception Kant stands in stark contrast to most other German authors who have taken a position on the vocation question, including Spalding, Lessing, Thomas Abbt, and Moses Mendelssohn, as well as Herder.

Die Bestimmung des Menschen (“The Vocation of the Human Being”) is the title of a book by Johann Joachim Spalding that appeared in thirteen editions between 1748 and 1794. In the Spalding text, the “human being” is the individual (and the corresponding question is “what am I?”; a question apparently never taken up by Kant). Spalding’s book was followed by the great *Bestimmung* controversy between Thomas Abbt (1738–66) and Moses Mendelssohn. Abbt does not doubt that every human being has a vocation, but which is it? It must be recognizable by each individual himself; it has to be attainable by each, even in the case of a child who dies young. But what vocation could such a child know for himself and attain? Does Mendelssohn have an answer? Mendelssohn claims to: he accepts Leibnizian optimism. The whole is good, even when we do not recognize it as such in all its parts. The *Bestimmung* of each human being is “the practice, development, and training of all human powers and capacities,

in appropriate relation to one's station."¹⁴ In the whole of creation, each part is a true member, is simultaneously a means and a final end (*Endzweck*).

In the divine order, the unity of the final end reigns. All subordinate final ends are simultaneously means; all means are simultaneously final ends. Do not think that this life is mere preparation, the future life mere final end. Both are means, both are final ends. The intentions of God and the alterations of every single substance proceed with the same steps into the unfathomable.¹⁵

Every member of the organism constituted by the whole world is rescued *a priori* in its vocation, even when we are unable to recognize this.

In contrast to this formulation, Kant managed to establish a fundamentally new approach and problematic. The relevant whole is neither all of creation, nor the individual – rather it is the human species. The species is the parameter to which *Bestimmung* applies. For Plato and Aristotle, the human being was primarily citizen of a *polis* during his lifetime; the Stoics brought to Hellenism an expansion of the *polis* into the *kosmópolis* and saw the human being as citizen of the world, as citizen of an unlimited *societas generis humani*. Kant, going beyond this, conceives of the history of humanity as a “system” (VIII: 29) and the individuals as members and citizens not only of the *kosmópolis* contemporary to them, but as members and citizens of the human species in its historical dimension as well. The human being becomes thereby a member of and means to the future humanity.

What will always seem strange about this is that earlier generations seem to do their laborious work only for the sake of later generations, in order to provide a foundation for them, upon which the latter can raise still higher the building which nature has intended; that only the later generations will have the good fortune to live in the building on which a long series of their ancestors worked (though certainly without any intention of their own). . . . But as puzzling as this is, it is just as necessary once it is supposed that an animal species should have reason and [should] as a class of rational beings – each member of which dies while the species is immortal – achieve a complete development of its predispositions (VIII: 20).¹⁶

It is the same in the *Anthropology*: amongst the animals, left to themselves, each individual reaches its full *Bestimmung*, “but with human beings it is only the *species* [that achieves it]. Consequently, the human

race can work itself up to its vocation [*Bestimmung*] only by *progress* throughout a series of innumerable generations . . ." (VII: 324).

Kant's Stoic orientation toward the whole of nature, the integration of the individual into the fate of the whole species, is not, as it might appear here, limited to the human species. Rather, it applies to the remaining animal species as well, in which it should be the case that the species completes itself in the individual; yet the highest natural objective is the perpetuation of the species; the whole has primacy over the parts. When Kant speaks of "the most important [*angelegenen*] end, namely, the preservation of the species" (VII: 303), this applies to all living things.

As the deacon Wasianski reports, once, during a cool summer with a few insects, Kant "found a few young swallows dashed to pieces on the ground" under some swallows' nests and then discovered that the parents had thrown some of the chicks out of the nest in order to preserve the rest. Wasianski writes that Kant said, "At that moment, my understanding came to a standstill; there was nothing to do but to fall to my knees and pray."¹⁷ What the swallows did, contrary to the instinctual "parental drive of the animal to protect its young" (VII: 265), is, couched in the relevant Kantian terminology, sublime (*erhaben*). Thus the scene of genuflection and adoration that deacon Wasianski, although seen perhaps only with his spiritual eyes, reported as history. The swallows act contrary to the inclination and instinct of parental love, thus, one would be inclined to say: they act out of respect for the law, the universal law that is in one case the law for the preservation of the species of swallows, in another, for the *mundus intelligibilis* of rational beings.

Johann Gottfried Herder polemically assessed Kant's 1784 conceptualization in a letter to Johann Georg Hamann from February 14, 1785: "Good that I now know what I have from the *Herrn Magistro VII. artium*; and fortunate, that I do not need his childish plan according to which the human being is created for the species and the most perfect governmental machine at the end of time."¹⁸

Kant was certainly conscious of the problem presented by the sacrifice of the individual for the whole. As a human, the individual might be sacrificed on the pyre that illuminates reason's way on its path to the whole. As a person, as an autonomous individual being, he simultaneously flees from the course of history: "on that remarkable

predisposition of our nature, noticeable to every human being, never to be capable of being satisfied by what is temporal (since the temporal is always insufficient for the predispositions of our whole vocation [*Bestimmung*]) leading to the hope of a *future life*" (B xxxii).¹⁹ This settles the vocation of the individual human being independently of his integration into the vocation of the species. In the *Anthropology* there is no analogue for this; in it, humanity as a whole forms a temporized system that is destined or determined (*bestimmt*) to realize its nature, namely autonomy. One precondition, which is still (or still seems to be) an element of natural history, is the establishment of a legal system among necessarily republican or democratic states. Nature uses the inclination mechanism of human beings to achieve this goal independently of the contingent rational actions of humans. What we encounter here is a variation on the "invisible hand" – our egoistic, inclination-determined actions are embedded in a whole in which they promote the end of humanity. Kant's commitment to teleology necessarily leads to a celebration of evil as a means to the good. According to Kant, following the neo-Stoic/Christian tradition, evil: "to the extent that it puts the drives for self-preservation into motion, stimulates the germ of the good, insofar as this comes into existence in the struggle with evil" (Refl. 1448, XV: 632); thus, "a temple of cowardice, infidelity, and envy" (Refl. 536, XV: 235). "Thanks be to nature for incompatibility, for jealously competitive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess or to rule!" (VIII: 21). Compare this with the "three natural predispositions" described in the *Mrongovius* notes: "1. sloth, 2. cowardice, and 3. deceitfulness" (XXV: 1420–3). The general maxim in *Critique of Judgment* correspondingly reads: "Everything in the world is good for something; . . . nothing in it is in vain; and by means of the example that nature gives in its organic products, one is justified, indeed called upon, to expect nothing in nature and its laws but what is purposive in the whole" (V: 379).²⁰ "Everything in the world" – included in this world are human culture and putatively free human actions in it. Under the harmless heading "of the highest physical good" Kant declares his teleological insights:

Of the three vices of sloth, cowardice, and deceit, the first appears to be most contemptible. A judgment of sloth, however, may often be quite unjust to a person. For nature has wisely given some people an instinctive aversion to

continuous work – an instinct that is beneficial both to themselves and others – because, for example, they cannot stand to exert themselves for too long or too frequently without exhaustion, but need to pause for rest. Thus, not without good reason, Demetrius could have allotted an altar to this demon (sloth) as well; because if sloth had not intervened, then restless wickedness would have caused far more trouble in this world than it already has. If cowardice did not have pity on humans, then belligerent bloodthirst would soon annihilate them; and if there were no deceit (which [guarantees that] among a great number of scoundrels united through conspiracy, for example, in a regiment, there will always be one to betray it), entire states would soon be overthrown by the instinctual corruption of human nature (VII: 276).²¹

This might, in fact, all be correct – but why the kowtow to nature for *wisely* arranging everything? Wisely – why not fiendishly? Kant’s commitment to teleology, especially the doctrine of the vocation of the human race, is built upon a revised Stoic foundation. We must regard the *pronoia*-directed nature as a purposively organized *totum*, in which each part serves every other. Ultimately, everything serves the end – which can no longer be a mere means – of human morality, in such a way that it becomes a *res sacra*, as the ancient Stoics insisted.

This theodicy is not a theoretical pastime, but rather a *desideratum* of pure practical reason, and indeed for the following reason. The law of freedom categorically commands human beings to perform actions without regard to nature or to what is good for the agent himself. The idea of ethical autonomy proscribes an anthropological grounding of ethics. However, if we imagine the world in which the free agent is supposed to act as a closed inferno with the “*Lasciate ogni speranza*” inscription over the entrance, then obedience toward ethical duty is as absurd as the labors of Sisyphus. Reason would become schizophrenic because it would demand, *qua* reason, something irrational. Therefore, the world in which humans act ethically must not be infernal and the function of evil must not be fiendish; rather, nature determines evil as a means to the good, nature conspires with evil – although only nature can do this – in pursuit of moral ends. Without a deistic or, rather, Christian-Stoic foundation to make this construct possible, Kant’s morality is chimerical and rests on nothing, as he himself puts it.²²

Within the Kantian natural and rational vocation of the human being, the maxim “*quem fata non ducunt, trahunt*” [whomever the fates

do not lead, they drag] is in effect. The human being, then, is like the dog bound to a cart that the old Stoics describe: he must run along with it or be dragged; that is to say, natural history goes its own brazen way. Providence intends the autonomy of human beings, and it does not leave it up to the vacillating moods of individual subjects to determine whether history will or will not accomplish her purpose. In order to accomplish this good end, nature avails itself of fire and sword; it provokes war and provisionally requires the “private vices” for a global economy. In contrast, however, the human being is forbidden to use these means for the achievement of the good. Human beings are strictly bound to moral lawfulness. The law tells a human being what he ought to do, that he ought, as the law commands, to act blindly for the good that is not within his power; and he may hope, with faith in providence, that the good will realize itself behind his back.

The vocation of the human being is conceived within a nature in which Christianity and Stoic teleology are combined. First, in the anti-Platonic, anti-Aristotelian teleology of the Stoics, the supreme Zeus-reason sets ends that the human being can appropriate for himself or not. If he does so, then he is wise; if he is unwilling or unable to do so, then fate drags him, like a dog that refuses to keep up with the pace of the cart to which it is bound. Second, in Christian theology, God fashions the world, not out of chaos (*hos kalliston* [the most beautiful possible] as it is called in *Timaeus*) that stands opposing or in conflict with him, but rather out of nothing. Thereby, the occasion for a conception according to which everything in this world must be good. Evil and badness are not simply dragged along and finished off at the end, they are rescued as good. The goodness can elude us because we are not aware of the plan for the world as a whole, or, as in Kant’s position, we know *a priori* that everything in the world is a means to the promotion of the ultimate end, and can usually show this. Evil is in reality good; selfishness promotes the common good. Kant participates in this Christian-Stoic conception of the world. We believe that in our purportedly free action we are pursuing a particular selfish end that is determined (*bestimmt*) by our inclinations, however, in fact, we are subjected to a vocation (*Bestimmung*) of providential nature and we contribute to the good of the world-whole without intending it. An invisible hand guides us to something we do not choose, but the philosopher knows that it is, always and *a priori*, good.

Notes

1. The German phrase "*die Bestimmung des Menschen*" has multiple meanings. In the present context, *Bestimmung* has traditionally been translated into English as "vocation" or "destiny," a translation that loses some important connotations of the German, as we shall see in the second section of this essay, pp. 96f.
2. This essay is a revision of a paper given in Halle on September 23, 1997. It often makes reference, sometimes not cited, to volume XXV of the "*Akademie-Ausgabe*" as well as to my *Kritischen Kommentar der Kantischen Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798)*. The *Kommentar* is available on the Web at <http://www.uni-marburg.de/kant/webseite/kommentar/kommentar.htm> and appeared as volume 10 of the *Kant-Forschungen* series, eds. Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1999).
3. The translators would like to thank Allen Wood and Felicitas Munzel for useful comments on drafts of this translation.
4. Citations to Kant's writings are from the "*Akademie-Ausgabe*" of *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (1st edition, Berlin 1900). Citations to *Critique of Pure Reason* are, however, according to the A- and B-Editions of the Meiner Press (Hamburg).
5. If the need arose, such an edition could only be considered responsible if it were a research edition accompanied by a facsimile of the original manuscript.
6. Dohna manuscript, p. 5. A transcription of this unpublished manuscript is available on the Marburg Kant-Archiv Web site at <http://www.uni-marburg.de/kant/archiv/dohna.zip>.
7. "... sondern was ihr Verhältniß im Ganzen, worin sie stehen und darin ein jeder selbst seine Stellung einnimmt, uns anzumerken giebt" (II: 443).
8. Translations of this and subsequent passages from *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* are modifications of Mary Gregor's translation (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974).
9. Plato, *Protagoras* 321c.
10. The term "instrumental reason," which the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School often invokes, is not attested to in Kant's writings, though the issue is clearly explained if one compares the triadic structure of human beings in the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* of 1793 (VI: 26) and the parallel passage in the "doctrine of virtue" of the *Metaphysics of Morals* of 1797 (VI: 418). The pattern that Kant (and Critical Theory) uses is older. Aristotle, for instance, uses the structure of, first, animal, second, instrumental-strategic, and, third, ethical love in his theory of friendship (*Nicomachean Ethics* VIII: 3).
11. Pico della Mirandola, *On the Dignity of Man*. Translated by Charles Glenn Wallis, *On the Dignity of Man. On Being and the One. Heptalus* (1965; Hackett: Indianapolis, 1998), pp. 4-5.
12. Giambattista Vico, *Principles of a New Science* I.ii.1; I.ii.32 (1725).

12. "Physische Geographie Hesse," ms. p. 81 (not yet published).
13. Mendelssohn in Thomas Abbt, *Vermischte Werke. Dritter Teil, welcher einen Theil seiner freundschaftlichen Correspondenz enthält. Neue und mit Anmerkungen von Moses Mendelssohn vermehrte Auflage* (1782; reprinted Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1978) II.14: "The word 'Bestimmung' means not only the positing [*Festsetzung*] of a predicate, from among many which could be applied to the subject, *Determination*; but also the positing [*Festsetzung*] of an ultimate end [*Endzweck*], to which a thing ought to be used as a means, *Destination*. . . . The 'Bestimmung of the human being' can refer not only to the determination, but also to the destination of the human being."
14. Mendelssohn in Abbt, p. 30.
15. Mendelssohn in Abbt, p. 220.
16. Translation of this passage from "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent" (1784) is a modification of Ted Humphrey's translation in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983).
17. Ehregott Andreas Christoph Wasianski, "Immanuel Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren," in *Immanuel Kant: Sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen*, ed. Felix Groß (Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek, 1912), pp. 213–306, citation at 293.
18. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Briefe. Gesamtausgabe*. vol. V (Weimar: Volkerverlag Weimar, 1977–), 106.
19. *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
20. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
21. Concerning this passage from Kant's *Anthropology*, see my *Kommentar*, p. 397–9.
22. Compare the preparation of the antinomy, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (V: 114). The idea is already present in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 811) ("... to regard the moral laws as empty figments of the brain [*Hirngespinnste*]...").

6

Kantian Character and the Problem of a Science of Humanity

Brian Jacobs

In the year following Kant's announcement in his famous letter to Marcus Herz that he was ready to bring forth a critique of reason, Kant announced in a letter to Herz that he had just begun lectures on anthropology and thought to make "a proper academic discipline" out of them.¹ It would take Kant nine years before he finally published the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but the lectures on anthropology went ahead as planned, and he continued his course on the topic each winter semester for the next twenty-four years. The impetus for Kant's letter concerned Herz's favorable review of the then just published work *Anthropology for Physicians and Philosophers (Weltweise)* by the popular Leipzig physician, Ernst Platner.² Kant suggested that his own version of anthropology would be quite different from Platner's for two reasons.

First, rather than offer merely theoretical approaches to human affairs, he would offer one whose orientation would be toward those issues that directly affect people. As opposed to the kind of knowledge that is useful only for theorizing in the schools, his would be useful for practice in the world. Second, Kant's version of anthropology would give up "the subtle and . . . eternally futile investigation into the manner in which the organs of the body are connected to thoughts."³ Kantian anthropology would remain purely a "doctrine of observation"⁴ without the admixture of metaphysics.

The first lectures confirm these initial intentions. In the lecture from 1772, for instance, Kant suggests that the subject matter

constitutes a “natural knowledge of the human being,”⁵ and hence its orientation is toward treating human beings like any other natural phenomenon – that is, as mere *appearance*. Anthropology, which Kant had yet to distinguish from “empirical psychology,” he notes at the opening of this lecture

is a kind of doctrine of nature. It deals with the appearances of our soul, which constitute the object of our inner sense and in exactly the way that the empirical doctrine of nature, or physics, deals with appearances. One thus comprehends immediately how little this doctrine can constitute a part of metaphysics, since the latter merely has for its subject matter the *conceptus puri*, that is, concepts which are given purely through reason or, at the very least, whose foundation of knowledge (*Erkenntniß Grund*) lies in reason.⁶

Nevertheless, despite Kant’s view that metaphysics and anthropology exclude one another (a view, moreover, that Kant will take up and reiterate particularly in the moral philosophy of the 1780s), there is substantial evidence that Kant found this more problematic than it first appeared as he began these lectures. “Knowledge of the world,” Kant thinks, consists of two parts, physical geography and anthropology.⁷ The former may not provide certain knowledge for the observer (because there are no *a priori* concepts attached to it), but there is obviously no implicit problem in treating a natural object according to natural laws and as part of a “doctrine of nature.”

Anthropology strictly conceived as a doctrine of observation, however, is clearly another matter. If critical philosophy is unambiguous in maintaining that from the perspective of a doctrine of nature the difference between humanity and the natural world is a matter of degree rather than essence, then it is also clear that there is no place in nature for the unique qualities that separate human beings *absolutely* from nature. Although Kant is hardly concerned with this problem as he first addresses anthropology, some of the shifts that occur through the course of these lectures are guided in part by Kant’s attempt to address it.

This essay proceeds in two parts. First, I will consider the place of anthropology in Kant’s work from three perspectives: from within critical philosophy, from the idea of a system (encyclopedia), and from the lecture course itself. I will also consider in what sense the anthropology lectures constitute the “proper academic discipline” that Kant

had initially hoped to make of them. Such a view corresponds, in part, with the many attempts in the eighteenth century to found a “science” of humanity based upon experience alone, without recourse to metaphysical speculation. In this respect, Kantian anthropology too is part of the early history of the human sciences.

In the second part, I look at Kant’s notion of character, which is vital at once to critical philosophy and anthropology. I argue that the shifting use of the term throughout the anthropology lectures – and particularly those of the 1780s – underscores the tension between the natural and rational perspectives of humanity within Kantian anthropology. As a normative idea, the willing “I” of critical philosophy is never fully constituted in experience; as a doctrine of observation, however, anthropology is always concerned with what is present, with knowledge derived exclusively from observable and representable experience. This much, at least, is common to Kant’s anthropology and empirical human and social sciences of today. As such, results of Kant’s attempt to separate strictly the rational and empirical knowledge domains with respect to anthropology may be instructive to the social sciences that have succeeded eighteenth-century human science.

When Kant approached the topic of anthropology in the early 1770s, the scientific study of humanity had already long been a topic of keen interest in European thought. As Christopher Fox suggests, “natural philosophers from Copernicus to Newton had forged a science of nature. Eighteenth-century thinkers sought to cap this with a science of human nature.”⁸

The examples of this abound in the work of the century’s major figures: Hume, Voltaire, Wolff, Raynal, Condillac, Condorcet, Smith, and later, Saint Simon. In the *Spirit of Laws*, Montesquieu suggests that the positive laws of a particular government are the consequence of universal laws and the “movement” or unfolding of a particular culture. Discovering these anterior relations, he thinks, will demonstrate that the “intelligent world is just as well governed as the physical world.”⁹

In the *New Science*, which precedes the *Spirit of Laws* by more than two decades, Vico suggests that human beings can know the civil world with greater certainty than the natural world because the former is a human creation. Religion, marriage, and burial constitute for Vico institutions on which “all men agree and have always agreed” and that

“will be able to give us the universal and eternal principles (such as every science must have) on which all nations are founded and still preserve themselves.”¹⁰

As much as Kant emphasized in his letter to Herz the popular nature of his new discipline as well as the impossibility of locating in it the source of the union of body and mind, he also suggested that its purpose is hardly limited merely to offering interesting observations. And it is this more significant side of Kantian anthropology that brings it into accord with many thinkers of his day. For in his version of anthropology, Kant explains to Herz, he intends to “open up the sources of all sciences, of morality, of skill, of social intercourse, of cultivating and governing men, and thus of everything that is practical. I seek, therefore, more phenomena and their laws than the first principles of the possibility of *modifying* human nature generally.”¹¹ As we will see, these “laws” do not have the level of certainty that Kant ascribes to natural laws, but they nevertheless suggest that, as Montesquieu had hoped to prove, the intellectual world is as well governed as the natural one.

Given the ambiguities of the subsequent lectures (as is now evident from the recently published student notes to these lectures), it would be unconvincing to argue that Kant simply did not carry out this proposal.¹² Nor could one argue that Kant intends by “laws” here strictly *subjective* laws of human behavior (which would carry no universal claim). In Kant’s later view, these latter are all that is available with regard to skill, social intercourse, education, and governing, but they are also wholly inadequate with regard to seeking the source “of all sciences” and “of morality.” It is likely, rather, that whereas Kant thought that one ought to give up the goal of locating the source of being and thought through anthropology, he still held the view that locating the source of science and morality is a task for this kind of inquiry. If this is the case, then the early view of the task of anthropology brings Kant remarkably close to Hume, who argues in the *Treatise of Human Nature* that “even *Mathematics, Natural Philosophy and Natural Religion*, are in some measure dependent upon a science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties.”¹³ For Hume, as for the early Kant, the science of human beings provides a groundwork on which one can consider all of the sciences that collect and attempt to render axiomatic human

experiences in the world. Beginning with the first *Critique* (published in 1781), however, Kant will repeatedly argue that one must thoroughly extirpate anthropology from any consideration of the source of reason and everything dependent upon it. Indeed, Kant will later point out that classical moral philosophy failed precisely because philosophers mixed anthropological material with considerations of pure *a priori* moral laws based exclusively on reason.¹⁴ Although Kant's earlier position might be dismissed as an error of "pre-critical" thought, the subsequent tensions in the relation between anthropology and critical philosophy as these areas of inquiry develop ought to give one pause.

Unlike many of his time, Kant was deeply skeptical that anthropology – or any other descriptive inquiry into human life – could ever claim the status of science in the formal sense. Kant's proposal in the *Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science* of 1786 that the "doctrine of nature" consists of two parts is presumably aimed at the claims of natural historians, such as Buffon, who had hoped to found a science of humanity based upon taxonomy and experimental method:

Thus the doctrine of nature can be divided into a historical doctrine of nature, which contains nothing other than systematically ordered facts of natural things (*Naturdinge*) (and would consist, moreover, of *natural description*, as a classing system of natural things according to similarities), and *natural history*, as a systematic presentation of natural things in different times and places.¹⁵

The distinction rests on the *kind* of certainty that the respective inquiries provide. "Only that science whose certainty is apodictic can be called *true (eigentliche)* science; knowledge that can hold merely empirical certainty is only figuratively (*uneigentlich*) so-called *knowing (Wissen)*."¹⁶ And since, as Kant makes repeatedly clear in the first *Critique*, certainty is only apodictic when it is tied to *a priori* concepts, the only kind of inquiry that has the status of science for Kant is that which is based on pure reason. This leaves Kant in the unfortunate position of denying that chemistry is a "science" in any strong sense.¹⁷ It is also an unambiguous rejection of Buffon's suggestion that "a series of like facts, or if one wishes, a frequent repetition and an uninterrupted succession of the same events, constitutes the essence of physical truth: that which one calls physical truth is only a probability, but a probability so great that it equals a certitude."¹⁸

If “historical doctrines of nature” are only figuratively sciences, then some are still less reliable than others. Of all such inquiries, Kant seems to think that the “empirical doctrine of the soul” is the most tenuous form of knowledge and “must always remain distant to so called natural science.”¹⁹ There are two reasons for this: “Firstly, since mathematics is not applicable to the phenomena of the inner sense and their laws, one must therefore bring into consideration the *law of continuity* in the flow of the inner changes [of the soul].”²⁰ This, Kant thinks, would then constitute “an extension of knowledge that would stand to that which the mathematics of the doctrine of bodies creates somewhat like the doctrine of the properties of a straight line stands to all of geometry.”²¹ Despite the possible appearance of certainty, then, the results would be meager indeed.

Second and most important, however, any doctrine of the soul is denied certainty

since in it the manifold of inner observation separate from one another only through the mere division of thought (*Gedankenteilung*), without remaining held apart and then combine in what ever manner. Still less, however, does another thinking subject submit itself to our attempts to determine an appropriate intention (*Absicht*); and even the observation in itself already alters and disarranges (*verstellt*) the state of the observed object.²²

Such a view of “empirical psychology” has led some interpreters to think that Kant’s own anthropology ought to be viewed in the same way. Norbert Hinske, for example, refers to the preceding passage when he argues that for Kant anthropology is “a science of questionable thoroughness and [therefore] subordinate.”²³ Kant offers some suggestion of the difficulties facing the “thoroughness” of anthropology in the preface to his published lectures on the topic, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. To the extent that anthropology is concerned with either the inner experience of another or of oneself, then it shares the same obstacles as the *Seelenlehre*. But anthropology faces the additional issue of cultural-historical particularity: for place and time have the effect of creating habits that have the appearance of “another nature,”²⁴ which is itself the arbitrary result of a particular place. “For the change of location (*Lage*) wherein the human being is set down through his fate, or in which he may also, as an adventurer,

set himself down, makes it far more difficult to raise anthropology to the level of a formal science.”²⁵

Couple this with the situation that anthropology does not have *sources* so much as mere “aids” (*Hilfsmittel*) – historiographies, biographies, plays, and novels ²⁶ – and it becomes quite clear that anthropology is a tenuous inquiry indeed. In this denial of certainty to both empirical psychology and anthropology, Kant is essentially claiming that experience of oneself and another is on an order altogether different than that of the natural sciences – an insight that the hermeneutical and phenomenological traditions would develop a century later.

What Kant means by “anthropology” is hardly unambiguous, and there is some question as to whether one could use the term without also applying one of the many adjectives that Kant uses to differentiate its various forms, such as pragmatic, practical, physiological, empirical, and even transcendental. And because, moreover, the meaning and tasks of anthropology for Kant shift not only over time but also across the topics on which he lectured, one can at best offer only an approximate sense of the discipline for Kant. Nevertheless, despite the suggestion of Hinske and others, anthropology, at least in its most mature form, is not a “doctrine of the soul” (*Seelenlehre*). The section of empirical psychology in Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica* may provide the basic structure for Kant’s lectures (as every lecture course was obliged to provide at the time), but neither it nor Platner’s own anthropology are decisive for Kant’s formulation of the discipline.

Indeed, to the extent that they tie themselves to speculative metaphysical theories of subjectivity rather than offer “knowledge of the world,” both Baumgarten’s empirical psychology and Platner’s anthropology serve as *counterexamples* of such a science for Kant: whatever use they may provide for the schools, they are nevertheless fairly useless for application in the world. “Since there is no other book on anthropology,” Kant says in a lecture from 1781, “we will choose as a guide the metaphysical psychology of Baumgarten, a man who is very rich in material and very short in exposition.”²⁷ As Kant repeatedly claims, his anthropology is one that has never before appeared in the academy. More importantly, however, Kantian anthropology as it appears in the 1780s and 1790s is increasingly more concerned with social, cultural, political, and historical-teleological characteristics than with purely

“psychological” ones. And as he makes clear from his “Idea” essay of 1784, Kant thinks that precisely *these* aspects of human life are as determined as natural events.²⁸

The most fruitful way to consider Kantian anthropology is from three overlapping and somewhat competing perspectives: as an aspect of theoretical and moral theory (critical philosophy), as an encyclopedic “science,” and as popular lectures. Kantian anthropology is all of these.

Concerning the first perspective, the expectations and requirements of philosophy, as delimited particularly in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Groundwork*, and the lectures on moral philosophy, set fairly rigid and certain notions of what the two principal forms of anthropology, practical and pragmatic, ought to look like. Although these forms are not explicitly distinguished with reference to anthropology in the first *Critique*, the empirical-physiological qualities uniting both of them appears here as an absolute counterpoint such that anthropology may receive concepts and ideas from philosophy but not provide any to it.

If in the first *Critique*, anthropology is what needs to be expurgated entirely in order to secure the space for concepts of reason, moral philosophy reserves a place for it as precisely this vital counterpart to *a priori* moral laws. In the *Groundwork*, Kant argues for a twofold metaphysics: one of nature and one of morals. “Physics would thus have its empirical but also a rational part. The same for ethics, although here the empirical part could be called especially *practical anthropology* and the rational [part] *morals*.”²⁹ Furthermore, “All moral philosophy is based entirely on its pure part and is applied to the human being; it borrows not the least from the knowledge of this latter (anthropology), but rather gives him, as a reasoning being, laws *a priori*.”³⁰

In the second *Mrongovius* lecture on moral philosophy (contemporaneous with the publication of the *Groundwork*), Kant suggests that this second part may be called “*philosophia moralis applicata*, moral anthropology,” and remarks that

moral anthropology is morals that are applied to human beings. *Moralia pura* is built on necessary laws, and hence it cannot base itself on the particular constitution of a rational being, of a human being. The particular constitution of a human being, as well as the laws which are based on it, appear in moral anthropology under the name “ethics.”³¹

Anthropology is *pragmatic* when it is directed not by moral principles, but rather by the desire to achieve, or to help others achieve, certain subjective ends. Kant associates pragmatic anthropology with the “doctrine of prudence” (*Lehre der Klugheit*).³² As prudence is employed in a number of ways, it is worthwhile to consider what Kant may mean by it.

Prudence suggests, first of all, the competitive and instrumental activity that helps people achieve the ends they set for themselves; hence a doctrine of such would be “the union of all aims which are given to us from our inclinations.”³³ In *Toward Perpetual Peace*, Kant argues that there is no conflict between justice (as practice) and morality (as theory), for otherwise “one would then have to understand under the latter a universal doctrine of prudence, that is, a theory of maxims by which to choose the most suitable means for the advantage of one’s goals (*Absichten*).”³⁴

But Kant also means by it an ethical “intelligence” that helps human beings resist acting simply on natural impulses. In the *Menschenkunde* lecture, for example, Kant suggests that prudence and wisdom are two aspects of reason that stand against instinct.

Instinct has long dominated: for the human being must have a direction (*Leitung*), even if it is also the universal direction of nature, where he is still blind and in a state of animality. But beyond that he is summoned gradually to develop reason in him, and then instinct loses its domination and reason dominates. It must be admitted that natural instinct remains, but we now have struggled with it so far that we prevent instinct from dominating while allowing reason to rule, e.g. anger is an affect of defense. Indignation makes men more resolved and firmer in preserving themselves . . . Although it is true that we must keep this impulse of self-preservation, as soon as reason begins to acquire domination we must also prevent these movements of the mind (*Gemüt*) from ending up in affect. The doctrines of prudence and of wisdom demand that the movements of the mind are always reduced to the measure that they do not become affects.³⁵

And in the *Groundwork*, Kant argues that prudence

is taken in a two-fold sense: firstly, it can bear the name “worldly prudence” (*Weltklugheit*) and secondly that of “personal prudence” (*Privatklugheit*). The first is the skill of a human being to have influence on others in order to use them for his goals (*Absichten*). The second is the insight to unite all of these

goals for his own lasting advantage. This latter is actually even the basis of the former's value (*Wert*), and he who is "prudent" in the first manner but not in the second – of him one could better say: he is clever and sly, but on the whole "imprudent."³⁶

Because Kant consistently argues in the ethics and elsewhere that such a "lasting advantage" is one that is based on justice and morality, it is clear that these latter confer "value" on prudence.

This particular ambiguity of the term, oriented as it is at once to individual and collective ends, bears a strong resemblance to the Aristotelian term *phronesis*. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle argues that *phronesis* "is a state of grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about what is good or bad for a person."³⁷ Like Kant's formulation of personal prudence, *phronesis* is not the particular deliberation about what is beneficial in "some restricted area – e.g. about what promotes health or strength – but about what promotes living well in general."³⁸

A second perspective of anthropology in Kant is that of a complete science of the human being, and one that therefore subsumes all other forms of human knowledge – anthropology that is, as *encyclopedic*. This view of anthropology, which seems to have emerged somewhat late, ought to be considered peripheral: first, because it is only seldom mentioned by Kant and second, because it really has no determinate place within Kant's major works. The primary source for this perspective in the published works is the *Logic*. Kant suggests there that the field of philosophy, "in this cosmopolitan meaning," may be divided according to the following questions: "1) What can I know? 2) what ought I do? 3) what may I hope? 4) what is the human being? *Metaphysics* answers the first question, *morals* the second, *religion* the third and *anthropology* the fourth. In principal, however, one could count all of these as anthropology, since the first three questions relate to the fourth."³⁹ Although this is not the only place one can find this structure of human inquiry, this view of anthropology nevertheless does not appear in any of the three *Critiques*. In the "Doctrine of Method" in the first *Critique*, Kant poses the first three questions. The first question is merely speculative, the second, practical, and the third, both theoretical and practical.⁴⁰

The first *Critique* predates the *Logic*, but this fact alone can not explain why the fourth question and response appear in the *Logic* but

not in the first *Critique*. The absence also exists because within the design of this latter, there is no place for such a view of anthropology. Philosophy, as the science of reason based on *a priori* concepts, ought to respond to the question as to the nature of a reasoning being (*Vernunftwesen*), but not to that of human beings in their “particular constitution.” Viewed from the other side, as Kant does in the earliest anthropological lectures, any science of humanity is destined to fail if it is integrated into metaphysics since the former is based entirely on “experiential knowledge.”⁴¹

Yet given the requirements of critical philosophy, why does Kant hold this encyclopedic view of anthropology *all*? If anthropology is truly an *applied* discipline, a mere appendage to an otherwise pure science of reason, then in what sense could it become the inquiry that encloses all human knowledge? In order to approach these questions, one would need to consider Kantian anthropology in its third perspective, that of the lectures themselves, and pose corollary questions: what, if any, is the relationship between the fourth question and answer and the anthropological lectures? Whether we agree with his view or not, does Kant think that the lectures were meant to respond to this question?

In an article addressing this issue, Reinhard Brandt argues that neither Kant’s own published text nor the lectures answer “the famous question: what is the human being?”⁴² According to Brandt, this question “is encountered neither in the [student] lecture notes nor in Kant’s notes for the lectures. It appears in the field of anthropology only in a Kantian manuscript . . . in which Kant set down the text for the book [*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*], but which was not transferred into the book. It contradicts the sober inventory of experiences with which Kant wanted to introduce students to ways of dealing both with themselves and with other human beings.”⁴³ Brandt is referring to a margin note to the manuscript for the published text in which Kant writes: “Anthropology // first part // anthropological // didactic // what is [the] human being? // 2nd part // anthropological // [how] is the uniqueness of each human being to be recognized.// The first is as it were the doctrine of elements, the second the doctrine of method of the study of [the] human being.”⁴⁴

Brandt is right to suggest that these lectures do not answer this “[famous] question,” at least not in a way that could be called an

encyclopedic account of human beings, uniting each of the three divisions of philosophical inquiry. But Kant may not have shared Brandt's view that such an answer would conflict with the content of his lectures. This is not the only place where Kant connects this fourth question to the lectures. In a letter to Carl Friedrich Stäudlin dated May 4, 1793, Kant writes:

The plan which I have held myself to for a long time consists in working out the field of pure philosophy toward the solution of the three tasks: 1) what can I know? (metaphysics) 2) what ought I do? (morals) 3) what may I hope? (religion); from which the fourth question ought to follow: what is the human being? (anthropology, on which I have held an annual lecture for more than 20 years).⁴⁵

The lectures suggest at times that anthropology is meant to play such a role. In the *Friedländer* lecture from the middle 1770s, Kant says that anthropology is not a "description of men but rather of the nature of the human being. Hence, we consider knowledge of the human being with respect to his nature."⁴⁶ And "Anthropology is a pragmatic knowledge of that which flows from [the human being's] nature, but it is not physical or geographic, since these are bound to time and place."⁴⁷ Kant also suggests that anthropology ought not be lectured next to other disciplines for it in and of itself forms a "whole" (*Gantzes*).⁴⁸

Kant thinks that anthropology forms a whole in another sense as well. In *Physical Geography*, Kant suggests that "knowledge of the world" (*Weltkenntnis*) or "cosmology" has two parts: one of nature and one of human beings. Physical geography would be about the world "as object of external sense," while anthropology is about the world as "object of inner sense, soul or the human being. The experiences of nature and of the human being together constitute the knowledge (*Erkenntnisse*) of the world."⁴⁹ Moreover, "Dealings with human beings expand our knowledge. Nevertheless, it is necessary to furnish a preparation for all future experiences of this kind, and that is what *anthropology* does; from this, one becomes acquainted with what is pragmatic in the human being and not [what is] speculative."⁵⁰

Still, all knowledge of the world, Kant continues, is knowledge of human beings because even geography has no other purpose than to describe the world in terms of a human habitat. "Since [the human

being] is his own final purpose,” as Kant put it in the published anthropology, so is knowledge of the human being the same as knowledge of the world, “although he constitutes only a part of the creatures of the earth.”⁵¹ In this sense, anthropology assumes two positions simultaneously with respect to knowledge of the world: it both forms one vital part *and* is the sum of these parts. Although such a cosmopolitan view is sometimes associated with figures such as Locke,⁵² one might also argue that Aristotle’s ethics is also a source for Kant, and that such an assumption of final purpose already lies within the concept of *phronesis*.

The “contradiction” Brandt sees between the margin note and the published anthropology text perhaps stems from a tension that had long lay within Kant’s anthropology course. It may be that a “true” science of anthropology is encyclopedic in the sense that it completes – or ought to complete – each of the three questions that philosophy poses for itself. But the “peculiar fate”⁵³ of human reason – that it must pose questions for itself that are beyond its capacity to answer – is perhaps most salient in the case of anthropology, a discipline from which we require so much yet which promises so little.

For Kant’s anthropology lectures are, for the most part, so many observations of “ordinary life”⁵⁴ that Kant claimed them to be. Not only do his auditors report how entertaining these lectures were,⁵⁵ but the preparatory outlines⁵⁶ and large parts of the published version bear out the view that Kant never meant this topic to be a meaningful contribution to a more strictly philosophical discourse. Indeed, Kant says a bit farther on in the previously cited lecture that anthropology is strictly concerned with human beings as phenomena that are organized according to such a doctrine of prudence: “to observe the human being, and his behavior, to bring his phenomena under rules, is the purpose of anthropology. . . . Everything which does not have a relation to the prudent behavior of men does not belong to anthropology.”⁵⁷ Precisely *because* Kant conceives anthropology as a doctrine of prudence, contrasting it with Platner’s own “scholastic” anthropology, the Kantian discipline remains opposed to all attempts at a unified subject.

Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher was among the first to suggest that *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, the textbook that Kant

published in 1798, two years after his final lecture on the topic, is substantially at odds with the critical project. In his review of the book the year following its publication, Schleiermacher suggests with biting irony that the work is meant “to render a contradiction visible.”⁵⁸ Rather than read it *prima facie* as the “collection of trivialities”⁵⁹ that it is, one ought to consider its value

not as anthropology, but rather as negation of all anthropology, as at once claim and proof that such a thing according to the idea established by Kant, through him and in his way of thinking, is absolutely impossible, intentionally put in place just as he often expressly sets up and peculiarly construes the empty faculties (*Fächer*) in the division of the sciences or its objects.⁶⁰

Like the arbitrary divisions of knowledge in the *Conflict of the Faculties*, Schleiermacher thinks, the *Anthropology* establishes an untenable opposition between pragmatic and physiological anthropology. Indeed, in a remarkable break with the use of the term in both the lectures and the earlier moral philosophy (such as the *Groundwork*), Kant suggests in the preface to the published work that the “pragmatic” perspective considers what the human being as a “free-acting being makes of himself, or can and ought make of himself.”⁶¹ Although Kant had long tried to establish pragmatic anthropology as a “useful” cosmopolitan doctrine of prudence, this is the first time (among the extant lectures) that Kant appeals to human freedom as the basic orientation of the discipline. “Physiological” or “scholastic” anthropology would be, as I have noted previously, a “doctrine of nature” of the human being as a purely natural object; “the examination of what *nature* makes of the human being.”⁶²

As Schleiermacher sees it, these views effectively set the preface against the work itself, for this latter undeniably remained, for the most part, what it had always been in Kant’s lectures: a “*natural doctrine of the human being*.” Indeed, in the first *Critique* Kant argues that, with respect to the empirical character of human beings, “There is no freedom; accordingly we can alone consider the human being when we merely *observe*, and when, as it happens in anthropology, we wish to examine *physiologically* the stirring causes of his actions.”⁶³ There is no place, in other words, for a consideration of the human being as a “free-acting being” in a world governed by the “play of nature.”⁶⁴ Hence, Schleiermacher concludes, the opposition *itself* “makes both impossible.”⁶⁵

Holding a view that would become increasingly popular among the Jena idealists, Schleiermacher accepts an implicit assumption in the opposition, namely that “all will (*Willkür*) in the human being is nature, and that all nature in the human being is will.”⁶⁶ But Kant, Schleiermacher continues, fails to follow where this leads: to the conclusion that “anthropology should be precisely the unification of both, and can not exist other than through this unification; [that] physiological and pragmatic is one and the same, only the aim (*Richtung*) is different.”⁶⁷

Central assumptions of critical philosophy prevent Kant from drawing such a conclusion, and *this* situation is the hidden purpose of Schleiermacher’s attack. Anthropology ought to be a complete science of the human being, Schleiermacher thinks, but it cannot because, within the Kantian system, there is an absolute separation of the willing “I” from nature; but this leaves Kantian anthropology in the impossible situation of positing a mind (*Gemüt*) that cannot account for its own *activity* within the scope of the discipline. As Schleiermacher adds,

Kant wants to ignore [physiological anthropology] since, as it is known, the I for him has no nature, and so the question then emerges of where the “perceptions on that which is hindering or useful to the faculty of mind (*Gemüthsvermögen*)” come from, and how they should be used for this latter’s broadening if there is no physical way of considering and treating the faculty of mind according to the idea that all will is at once nature.⁶⁸

Schleiermacher is certainly right to point out this tension in the published work, however much he – like Hamann, Herder, and Jacobi – can offer only tenuous theological claims in its place. Schleiermacher was probably unaware, however, that this tension had been a long-standing feature of the anthropology lectures since the mid 1770s.

If pragmatic anthropology oscillates between physiological and practical perspectives, and between a doctrine of prudence and applied morals, then it is in the concept of character that Kant will eventually attempt to find unity and locate, in an “absolute” form, the meeting place of the empirical and intelligible characters. In the concept of character there appears a twofold ambiguity that reflects the two central tensions of Kantian anthropology. Firstly, character is a parallel concept to that of prudence insofar as it consists of a

“steadfastness of maxims” at once necessary for instrumental reason and for the transcendence of this latter through moral imperatives. Secondly and more fundamentally, character ought to reveal both the basic psychological constitution of a person and the unmistakable traces of an intelligibly autonomous self. This second ambiguity, which is the focus of my concern here, appears most clearly in the form of historical shifts within the discipline of anthropology.

In the first *Critique*, the concept of character appears as the nomological attribute of a particular kind of cause: “Each efficient cause . . . must have a *character*, that is, a law of its causality, without which it would not at all be a cause.”⁶⁹ From this, as is well known, Kant suggests that rational beings have two “laws of causality” or characters, empirical and intelligible.⁷⁰ Like the heteronomous, inauthentic self that Kant describes in the *Groundwork*, the empirical character of a rational being is an appearance that stands completely under the temporal laws of natural causality. To this extent there is no *essential* difference between such a being and an animal: as phenomena, both are purely “members of a single series of the natural order.”⁷¹ The “*arbitrium liberum*” that Kant posits against the animalistic “*arbitrium brutum*” in the first *Critique* is a practical *empirical* concept and one that is observable when a human being resists acting solely according to the “pathological” necessity that characterizes animal will.⁷² It may identify the possibility of the purely rational will, but the *arbitrium liberum* is as practically necessary for the pursuit of one’s own happiness (according to hypothetical imperatives) as it is for acting out of imperatives of pure reason. It identifies the purposive rational activity that Kant believes animals do not possess.

The determination of the empirical self according to natural laws allows Kant to conceive of human behavior as nomologically predictable (even if human beings do not have access to the totality of information that would allow for such prediction):

Since this empirical character itself must be taken from appearances as effect and from the rules of these appearances, which experience lays before us, so are all actions of the human being determined in the appearance of his empirical character and the other contributing causes according to the order of nature; and if we could explore all of the appearance of his will to the bottom (*Grund*), there would be not a single human act that we could not predict with certainty and recognize as necessary from its preceding conditions.⁷³

This is the character that, in its lack of freedom, anthropology considers *physiologically* “when we alone *observe*”⁷⁴ From the perspective of the first *Critique*, therefore, the empirical character of human beings is the proper subject matter of anthropology.

The intelligible character is a negative concept that Kant posits as the causality of its counterpart. Unlike this latter, it is not subject to “conditions of time”⁷⁵ and hence stands outside of the “series of natural causality.” As a “thing in itself” and “noumenon”⁷⁶ it always lies beyond the reach of our cognitive powers: “Although this intelligible character could never be immediately known since we can only perceive it insofar as it appears, it would have to nevertheless be *thought* in accordance with empirical character.”⁷⁷ The *need* to “think” such a counterexperiential notion of character, Kant later makes clear, is essentially practical: as opposed to simply accepting what *is*, humans, as rational beings, consider what *ought* to occur. By positing an “ought” in a “practical respect” (*Absicht*), “we find a rule and order that is entirely different than the order of nature. For then perhaps there *ought not have occurred* what nevertheless according to the course of nature *has occurred*, and according to its empirical bases (*Gründe*) infallibly had to occur.”⁷⁸ The practical or normative force of this “ought” lies at once in morality and reason: it stipulates what indeed *would* happen if the natural order consisted entirely of beings acting solely according to rational principles.

This moral aspect of the intelligible character is the first of two points of contact with Kant’s use of the term in the anthropology lectures. For, although Kant essentially equates anthropology with physiological inquiry in the first *Critique* (and hence explicitly excludes freedom [in any strong sense] from its knowledge domain), in the lectures he consistently refers to the anthropological character as a *moral* concept. In the first lecture from 1772, for example, Kant says “the characters of human beings are always moral; for morality is exactly the science of all of the ends that are fixed through the nature of the will, and which the objective laws prescribe, and according to which we direct our capacities and strive.”⁷⁹

The second point of contact is the notion of “designation” (*Bezeichnung*). Although the meaning of character in the first *Critique* emphasizes its nomological quality, the anthropology lectures emphasize at times its role as placeholder and stand-in. In *Friedländer*,

the lecture from 1775, Kant addresses the topic of Leibniz's *Facultate characteristica*. Whereas Leibniz equates symbol and character, however, Kant wants to distinguish them: "Symbol is an emblem (*Sinnbild*), character is only a designation. An emblem is an image (*Bild*) that has similarities with the thing itself. Character means nothing in itself, but is rather merely a means of designating something, thus, for example numbers and letters. They serve to bring forth other ideas (*Vorstellungen*) as if through a catchword (*Custos*)."⁸⁰ More than a decade later, Kant takes up the point again and distinguishes in the third *Critique* "hypotyposes" (which are either schematic or symbolic) from "mere *characterizations*, that is, designations of concepts through accompanying sensible signs that contain nothing belonging to the intuition of the object, but rather serve, for a subjective purpose, as a means of reproduction according to the laws of association of the imagination."⁸¹

The first *Critique* also conveys such a relation. The intelligible character (as "way of thinking" [*Denkungsart*]) has a causality in the world of appearances that accords with the natural determination of empirical character (as "way of sensing" [*Sinnesart*]). For if, Kant continues, the intelligible character determines its empirical correlate, this former is still not something that appears to us in experience:

We do not know [the intelligible character], but rather designate it through appearances, which actually only the way of appearing (empirical character) gives to knowing (*erkennen*). Now the action, insofar as it is attributable to the way of thinking as its cause, *results* however not the least according to empirical laws, that is, such that what *precedes* it is not the conditions of pure reason but rather the effects in the appearance of inner sense.⁸²

If one wishes to posit causality for the intelligible character, then it is to its empirical, anthropological counterpart that one must look for a "sign" or designation. The empirical character refers to the *constitutive* quality of rational agency which itself can never become manifest in experience.

Although the lectures begin by treating the concept of character as pure phenomenon, this issue of "designating," marking, or affixing the nontemporal "way of thinking" appears increasingly problematic and threatens to obfuscate the boundary between the respective

knowledge domains of these concepts that is fundamental to critical philosophy.

Character, Kant says in his first anthropology lecture, can be considered in two ways: with respect to the body, that is, according to one's "complexion," or "with respect to the connection of the body with the soul."⁸³ And because Kant is not interested in "the subtle and . . . eternally futile investigation into the manner in which the organs of the body are connected to thought,"⁸⁴ as the letter to Herz from the same year reveals, he adds that this "connection" is nothing other than "temperament."⁸⁵ Character may consist of a person's "superior capacities,"⁸⁶ but Kant has not yet associated it with freedom of the will, much less "designated" it as the marker of an "intelligible" character. For character in this early lecture "concerns the heart"; it "appears" in one's "mien" and is revealed in one's clothes.⁸⁷ And so, while "the characters of men are all moral," in these lectures they refer to a morality that has not yet identified a nontemporal absolute spontaneity as its source.

This situation changes remarkably in the *Friedlaender* lecture, well after the critical project is underway. Although the dualism particular to critical philosophy had been a consistent feature of the more strictly philosophical work since the "Dissertation" of 1770, it now appears – and will remain – in the anthropology lectures as well. The division of knowledge domains within anthropology according to this version is the human being as animal, that is, as pure nature, and "as intelligence or human being."⁸⁸ The topics of anthropology may then be subsumed under two corresponding categories: the qualities of the human being as a natural creature, consisting of nature (*Naturell*), talent, and temperament, and those of *freedom*, which include mind, heart, and character.⁸⁹ To be sure, Kant will later add that the mind and the heart are less anchored to freedom than character (the latter of which Kant sees as the most "active" of the human attributes: whereas heart is activity through instinct, character is activity through *principles*).⁹⁰ But from the moment Kant introduces the critical duality of nature and freedom within the context of an anthropology that is still – as becomes clear from the first *Critique* – essentially a physiological "doctrine of observation," a considerable ambiguity arises.

Character may still appear as an empirical attribute that is in some sense “observable” – such as the behavior of a highly principled person – but it also refers to a far more fundamental attribute, and one that lies in the recesses of the noumenal world. For this reason, it is no accident that Kant chooses this lecture to distinguish symbol from character: far from being a mere emblem that bears a “similarity to the thing itself,” character will increasingly refer to that property which is not present for experience and never can be. Hence, for example, Kant associates “way of thinking,” in this early stage of the lectures, with the empirical character⁹¹ – precisely that quality that he will identify with the intelligible character in the first *Critique* some six years later.

The most remarkable shifts in the lectures regarding the concept of character, however, appear in the following decade. In the *Menschenkunde*, a lecture that seems to be from the publication year of the first *Critique*, Kant introduces the notion “absolute character” (*Charakter schlechthin*). Once again, he tells us that character can be viewed in two ways; but now the determination of the dualism makes the reference to the first *Critique* unmistakable: “Character has a two-fold meaning: either it means the character of a thing, or it is a decisive attribute (*Merkmal*) of a rational being.”⁹² And this second meaning identifies the “way of thinking” of a rational being; as such, “character alone fixes for the human being the concept of his person.”⁹³

In the first *Critique*, Kant introduces a distinction between “happiness” and “worthiness to be happy” that he will reiterate throughout his subsequent writings on moral and ethical theory. It is also a distinction that provides considerable insight into the division of empirical and rational knowledge as it bears on anthropology:

The practical law from the motive of *happiness* I call pragmatic (rule of prudence) and that law, if there is such a law, which has no other motive than *worthiness to be happy*, I call moral (law of morality). The former advises us what we have to do if we wish to achieve happiness; the latter commands how we must behave in order to be worthy of happiness. The former is based on empirical principles; for only by means of experience can I know what inclinations there are which call for satisfaction; or what those natural causes are which are capable of satisfying them. The latter takes no account of inclinations, and the natural means of satisfying them, and considers only the freedom of

a rational being in general, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonize with a distribution of happiness that is made in accordance with principles. This latter law can therefore be based on mere ideas of pure reason, and known *a priori*.⁹⁴

Happiness corresponds to the empirical rules governing inclinations and the purposive rationality necessary for satisfying them; as such, it is the proper subject matter of pragmatic anthropology (as a doctrine of prudence). The “worthiness to be happy” belongs to another order entirely, because no empirical rule can confer such worthiness. To the extent that it is grounded in *a priori* concepts, then, worthiness stands in opposition to experience: it is a rational concept that belongs not only to human beings, but to *any* being endowed with reason. As such, this “worthiness to be happy” cannot have a direct analog in experience, for that would render it a particularly *human* construct.

How peculiar, then, that it is *character* – empirical, anthropological character – that assumes exactly this role in the anthropology lectures, beginning with the *Menschenkunde*:

Character is not like temperament which is itself a disposition toward happiness but rather merely [provides] the worthiness to be happy. Thus one says not a happy, but rather a good character. Since character is a matter of free will, we also regard it not as a natural endowment but rather as our merit (*Verdienst*). Through a good character the human being is not successively happy, but worthy of happiness.⁹⁵

Whereas critical philosophy reserves this “worthiness” as an idea derived from *a priori* concepts (the second *Critique* will identify the term with morality itself), anthropology seeks to determine such a quality in the composition of human beings *such as they exist*, that is, in their character. But far from restricting character to “ideas of pure reason,” the concept also retains, for the most part, its “natural” quality in these lectures. The three maxims of “true character,” Kant continues in the same text, are love of truth, keeping one’s word, and refusing to flatter.⁹⁶

Another decisive turn with respect to character comes in the *Mrongovius* lecture, given in what appears to be the same year as the publication date of the *Groundwork* (1785), and thus the year following

the essays on “universal history” and “enlightenment.” The division of pragmatic anthropology, which had been essentially a variant of “physiology” (as knowledge of the world), now consists of physiology and “practice,” whereby this latter would deal with the “characteristic of the human being.”⁹⁷ In the lectures from the 1770s, character had referred to either “complexion” or temperament, and then, with the emergence of Kant’s practical dualism, to either nature or freedom. The *Menschenkunde* will then continue this dualism with the distinction between nature and rational beings.

Now we find, as would be fitting for the author of the *Groundwork*, that the separation marks the boundary between human being as a “product of nature” and “the moral character of the human being himself.”⁹⁸ “The true character,” Kant later adds, “is the character of freedom. Everything else that nature endowed to the human being – his nature, temperament, and physiognomy – does not constitute his character. Character is the will according to principles. The characteristic of the free will constitutes the true character of the human being and this is the character of the human being in the strictest sense, and one calls it the ‘way of thinking.’”⁹⁹ This, he says, is also the “practical character.” And in a reflection from the same period Kant suggests that character is “what freedom determines” and is “personality,” which “consists not in what the human being receives but rather in what he does.”¹⁰⁰

But the *Mrongovius* anchors character to observable experience no less than had the previous lectures, and Kant still speaks of a “good” or “bad” character according to the common meaning. The peculiarity arises when this reference to observable experience is set together with a stronger notion of freedom. A section heading, for example, begins in this odd way: “To the moral character of the human being himself, where I consider him as a free being, belong: a) the character of the sexes, b) the character of nations, c) the character of the human species.”¹⁰¹

At this point in the lectures, however, the concept stabilizes. The published work, which would not appear until some thirteen years later, essentially rearticulates the notion of character that the *Mrongovius* had fixed. To be sure, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* is no less suggestive of the “designation” of character: such ambiguity, after all, is the source of Schleiermacher’s criticism. Absolute

character “signifies that quality of the will according to which the subject binds himself to determined practical principles which he irrevocably prescribes for himself through his own reason.”¹⁰² And the “moral character” shows what the human being “is ready to make out of himself,” as opposed to what nature has made of him.¹⁰³ But, assuming the dating is accurate, this moral character – as rational agency grounded in *a priori* concepts – is the contemporary of the autonomous subject of the *Groundwork*. It appears at that moment because it is the discreet counterpart to such a subject, a parallel concept existing at the margin of Kantian anthropology. Character “designates” a quality, a kind of causality that is always absent for cognition.

As a speculative construct within the context of critical philosophy this is not terribly problematic, for it merely expresses something that is *thought* without ever being *known*. Kant’s transference of this dualism into the field of anthropology is, however, another matter: for in this knowledge domain, there always *is* something present – an empirical character – that must refer at once to the absent causality of a “way of thinking” *and* to the inescapable chain of natural causality that determines all natural beings absolutely. The *content* of character – as “designation” – is then displaced in two ways: as a “way of sensing” it ought to refer to the “way of thinking” of an intelligible character – a character that does not “appear” in a doctrine of observation. But precisely because it is analyzed in the context of such a “natural doctrine of the human being” it must also refer to its various determinations in nature; for it is in this sense that the “empirical character of the human being” is theoretically knowable with the certainty that the first *Critique* claims.

Although Kant associates the moral character with freedom in the *Mrongovius*, it is significant that he also introduces in this lecture the notion of a collective experience of freedom, just as he had suggested in the “Idea” essay from the previous year. When one considers the “character of the human species” as “intelligence,” he argues, one finds a “calling” (*Bestimmung*) that radically separates humanity from all other earth creatures.

With the animal, each individual reaches the calling of his being already in this life. With the human being, only the species reaches the calling

of humanity from generation to generation such that there is always a generation for the enlightenment of what the previous one had set down, and thus delivers this [enlightenment] more completely (*vollkommner*) than it was received [to the next]. Not only for the enlightenment in the arts and sciences, but also in morality ought the human being to have himself to thank.¹⁰⁴

Yet why, his auditors might have had cause to wonder, does Kant now offer a *collective* notion of the empirical expression of freedom (and indeed imply that it is the only one available for observation) when he had long maintained that it resides *individually* in the concept of character? His former student, Johann Gottfried Herder, of course, was already waiting in the hallway with a response that still echoes in the academy today: “Where and who you were born, oh human being, you are where you ought to be: do not leave the chain or put yourself outside of it, but wrap yourself around it. Only in its concatenation, in which what you receive and give und thus in both cases *become* active, only there resides for you life and peace.”¹⁰⁵ It is a view that Schleiermacher too would later find appealing.

Kant rightly resists the collectivist, “organic” solution to the problem of the descriptive expression of human freedom. Contrary to Herder or Schleiermacher, Kant recognizes that the “chain” of natural causal determination can never serve as the source of human activity; and that Herder’s call to “wrap yourself around” natural causality amounts to little more than the abandonment of the rational subject – while contradictorily presupposing the agency necessary for the self-conscious act of binding oneself to causal laws, a situation that is not without parallel in some contemporary constructivist perspectives. But if Herder’s collectivism is inadequate, it is significant that Kant nevertheless moves considerably toward such a solution. The “Idea” essay and the anthropology lectures from 1785 to the published text suggest that Kant seems to have remained caught between an individual expression of freedom (in the concept of character) and a collective teleology.

Kant had envisioned a unidirectional relationship between rational and empirical knowledge such that the former, universal and merely formal, would confer pure concepts to the latter. Empirical knowledge would then supply these concepts with the content of natural-historical conditions. In the case of anthropology, the combination of pure

concepts and given content ought to convey knowledge about how we ought to act; that is, it ought to provide the knowledge necessary to complete a system of ethics. As Kant's anthropology unfolds historically, the concept of character takes on an increasing ambiguous status: as at once the emblem of an actual self and as the designation of an activity that cannot appear.

It may be that, within the scope of human self-observation, the notion of our own activity – this willing “I” – must remain a regulative principle that is never fully constituted in experience. In the case of Kantian anthropology, it is of course entirely possible to observe character without imbuing it with such activity but doing so would recognize an absence that always leaves the inquiry open-ended.

In considering this result, perhaps Kant himself provides for us the best guidance. Friedrich Jacobi, in coining the term “nihilism,” suggested that any inquiry whose truth content is based on experience alone ends in the complete destruction of meaning and value.¹⁰⁶ What is needed, he thought, was a “salto mortale” – a mortal leap, or leap of faith – at the point of which reason can go no farther.¹⁰⁷ In a beautiful and little read essay, “What does it mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?,” Kant will respond that not only are reason and faith or belief (*Glaube*) compatible, but that they depend upon one another.¹⁰⁸ It is precisely “*Vernunftglaube*” – reason-belief or belief in reason – that provides the compass for orientation in thinking.¹⁰⁹ Hence this contested terrain of human inquiry need not take place in an irrational vacuum to which only religious faith can respond; rather it can be directed by what Kant calls “the subjective feeling of reason’s need.”¹¹⁰

If the notion of our own agency is a necessary yet unclosable fissure in experience, then the empirical assumptions that otherwise fill this fissure are “up to us.” We have always already made these assumptions and because they are our acts we can contest them, and can struggle for or against them. In this sense, the surviving metaphysical node causes a practical, political problem and its solution lies not in more inquiry but in the collective deliberative control of the assumptions. This is one way in which we might address “reason’s need” on the question of our own agency. Such a subjective need emerges from our particular experiences, from the confrontation that we have with our own actuality. And because this is necessarily ongoing, such need

is only satisfied by a succession of alternative inquiries into the self, empowered in turn by the strength of endless self-critique.¹¹¹

Notes

1. Immanuel Kant to Marcus Herz, end of 1773, *Kant's Briefwechsel, Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. X, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1900), 138.
2. Ernst Platner, *Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise* (Leipzig: Dukische Buchhandlung, 1772).
3. Letter to Marcus Herz, 138.
4. *Ibid.*, 138.
5. Collins, "Die Vorlesung des Wintersemesters 1772 / 73 aufgrund der Nachschriften," *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. XXV, bk. II, first half, ed. Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 8.
6. Parow, "Die Vorlesung des Wintersemesters 1772 / 73 aufgrund der Nachschriften," *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. XXV, bk. II, first half, ed. Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 243.
7. Immanuel Kant, *Physische Geographie, Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. IX, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1923), 157
8. Christopher Fox, "How to Prepare a Noble Savage: The Spectacle of Human Science," *Inventing Human Science: eighteenth-century domains*, 3.
9. Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des lois* (Paris: Éditions Garnier Frères, 1961), 6.
10. Giambattista Vico, *New Science*, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin, and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976 [original, third edition 1744]), 97.
11. Letter to Marcus Herz, 138.
12. Reinhard Brandt, among others, makes this claim in his introduction to the aforementioned volume of student lecture notes.
13. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2nd ed., ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), xv.
14. Immanuel Kant, "Moralphilosophie Collins," *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. XXVII, bk. IV, first half, ed. Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter: 1974), 251–2.
15. Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. IV, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1903), 468.
16. *Ibid.*, 468.
17. *Ibid.*, 471.
18. Comte de Buffon (Georges-Louis Leclerc), "De la Manière d'étudier," *Histoire Naturelle, Générale et Particulière* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1749ff), 55.

19. Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, 471.
20. *Ibid.*, 471.
21. *Ibid.*, 471.
22. *Ibid.*, 471.
23. "Kants Idee der Anthropologie," in *Die Frage nach dem Menschen*, (Freiburg / Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1961), 410ff.
24. Immanuel Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. VII, ed. *Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1907), 121.
25. *Ibid.*, 121.
26. *Ibid.*, 121. More accurately, one could say that the relationship between the "Hilfsmittel" is dialogical: for although it counts among its sources history books, novels, and plays, anthropology is a source *for them*. In order to write a history of human beings – of some particular people – the author must first know what they are in their nature. Likewise with fiction: If the play consists in caricature, then the playwright must first base his characters on an accurate description of human nature. "Plays and novels always exaggerate what could otherwise be a characteristic of a person. The authors base themselves on correct observations, but deliver caricatures, i.e., exaggerated characters. In contrast, anthropology will judge plays and novels as to whether or not they concord with human." (*Menschenkunde*, "Die Vorlesung des Wintersemesters 1781 / 82 aufgrund der Nachschriften," *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. XXV, bk. II, second half, ed. *Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997], 858.) Shakespeare produced "masterpieces because he had a deep knowledge of human being." (*Mrongovius*, "Die Vorlesung des Wintersemesters 1784 / 85 aufgrund der Nachschriften," *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. XXV, bk. II, second half, ed. *Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997], 1213.) The characters of pragmatic anthropology presuppose those of the play; but the inverse is also true.
27. *Menschenkunde*, 859.
28. cf. Immanuel Kant, "Idee zu einer Allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht," *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. VIII, ed. *Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1912), 15.
29. Immanuel Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. IV, ed. *Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1903), 388.
30. *Ibid.*, 389.
31. *Mrongovius II*, "Moral Mrongovius II," *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. XXIX, bk. VI, first half, first part, ed. *Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), 599.
32. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 2nd ed., ed. Raymund Schmidt (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1930), A 800 / B 828.
33. *Ibid.*, A 800 / B 828.

34. Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden, Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. VIII, ed. *Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1912), 370.
35. *Menschenkunde*, 1123.
36. Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, 416n.
37. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), 1140b.
38. *Ibid.*, 1140a.
39. Immanuel Kant, *Logik, Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. IX, ed. *Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1923), 25.
40. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 805 / B 833.
41. *Collins*, 8.
42. "Kants pragmatische Anthropologie: Die Vorlesung," in *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Frommann-Holzboog, vol. 19.1, 1994, 43.
43. "Kants pragmatische Anthropologie," 43.
44. Kant, *Anthropologie*, 410.
45. Immanuel Kant to Carl Friedrich Stäudlin, May 4, 1793, *Kant's Briefwechsel, Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. XI, ed. *Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1900), 414.
46. Friedländer, "Die Vorlesung des Wintersemesters 1775 / 76 aufgrund der Nachschriften," *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. XXV, bk. II, first half, ed. *Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 471.
47. *Ibid.*, 471.
48. The editors of the *Akademieausgabe* of the anthropology have elected to leave all spelling and grammatical errors uncorrected; I likewise cite the uncorrected text. *Friedländer*, 473.
49. Immanuel Kant, *Physische Geographie*, 156–7. This is obviously very close to the view Kant holds in the *Groundwork*, except that here physical geography rather than physics constitutes the study of external objects.
50. *Ibid.*, 157.
51. Kant, *Anthropologie*, 119.
52. Brandt, for example, does this in his introduction to the lecture notes.
53. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* A vii.
54. Letter to Marcus Herz, 138.
55. Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann, for example, reports that Kant's anthropology lectures were "an extremely pleasant instruction" that commanded the most attendance of all of Kant's lectures. cf. Ludwig Ernst Borowski, Andreas Christoph Wasianski, and Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann, *Immanuel Kant: Ein lebensbild*, 2nd ed. (Halle: Hugo Peter, 1907), 125.
56. Immanuel Kant, "Entwürfe zu dem Colleg über Anthropologie aus den 70er und 80er Jahren," vol. XV, bk. II, second half, *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, ed. *Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1913), 655–899.
57. *Friedländer*, 472.

58. Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher, "Anthropologie von Immanuel Kant," in *Athenaeum*, 1799, vol. 2, part two, 303. Reprint: ed. Bernhard Sorg (Dortmund: Harenberg, 1989), 687.
59. *Ibid.*, 684.
60. *Ibid.*, 685.
61. Kant, *Anthropologie*, 119.
62. *Ibid.*, 119.
63. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 550 / B 578.
64. Kant, *Anthropologie*, 119–20.
65. Schleiermacher, "Anthropologie," 686.
66. *Ibid.*, 686.
67. *Ibid.*, 686.
68. *Ibid.*, 686.
69. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 539 / B 567.
70. *Ibid.*, A 538 / B 566.
71. *Ibid.*, A 539 / B 567.
72. *Ibid.*, A 534 / B 562.
73. *Ibid.*, A 549–50 / B 577–8.
74. *Ibid.*, A 550 / B 578.
75. *Ibid.*, A 539 / B 567.
76. *Ibid.*, A 541 / B 569.
77. *Ibid.*, A 540 / B 568.
78. *Ibid.*, A 550 / B 578.
79. *Parow*, 438.
80. *Friedländer*, 536.
81. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. V, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1908), 352.
82. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 551 / B 579.
83. *Collins*, 218.
84. Letter to Marcus Herz, 138.
85. *Collins*, 218.
86. *Ibid.*, 227.
87. *Ibid.*, 230.
88. *Friedländer*, 617.
89. *Ibid.*, 625ff.
90. *Ibid.*, 627–8.
91. *Ibid.*, 649.
92. *Menschenkunde*, 1156.
93. *Menschenkunde* (unpublished passage in the *Akademieausgabe*), 350–1 of the original manuscript.
94. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965 [original, 1781 / 87]), A 806 / B 834, translation modified.
95. *Menschenkunde*, 1174.
96. *Ibid.*, 1169–70.

97. *Mrongovius*, 1367.
98. *Ibid.*, 1367.
99. *Ibid.*, 1384–5.
100. Immanuel Kant, *Kant's handschriftlicher Nachlaß, Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, vol. XV, bk. II, second half, ed. *Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1913), 867.
101. *Mrongovius*, 1368.
102. Kant, *Anthropologie*, 292.
103. *Ibid.*, 285.
104. *Mrongovius*, 1417.
105. Johann Gottfried von Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Werke*, vol. VI (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1994), 342.
106. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *Werke*, vol. III, ed. F.H. Jacobi and F. Koeppen, (Leipzig: Fleischer Verlag, 1812), 44.
107. cf. "Brief ueber die Lehre von Spinoza," *Werke*, vol. 4 / 1, 43ff.
108. Immanuel Kant, "Was heißt: Sich im Denken Orientieren?," vol. VIII, ed. *Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1912), 140.
109. *Ibid.*, 140.
110. *Ibid.*, 136.
111. I would like to thank Patrick Kain and John Kim for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this essay.

Beauty, Freedom, and Morality

*Kant's Lectures on Anthropology and the
Development of His Aesthetic Theory*

Paul Guyer

I

A “critique of taste” was one of Kant’s long-standing philosophical ambitions. Indeed, his first announcement in 1771 to his student Marcus Herz of what was to become the *Critique of Pure Reason* included the theory of taste in the scope of the projected work: “I am currently occupied with a work which under the title *The Bounds of Sensibility and of Reason* is to work out in some detail the relationship of the fundamental concepts and laws destined for the sensible world together with the outline of that which the theory of taste, metaphysics, and morals should contain.”¹ But as it turned out, the *Critique of Pure Reason* that Kant finally published in 1781 contained only a dismissive reference to Baumgarten’s “failed hope” for a science of “aesthetics” that would comprise “what others call the critique of taste,”² and the second edition of the *Critique* was only minimally more encouraging on this score.³ Meanwhile, Kant’s first two major works on morals, the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* published in 1785 and the *Critique of Practical Reason*, begun as part of Kant’s revisions for the second edition of the first *Critique* in 1787 but released as a separate work at Easter, 1788, made no mention of the project of a critique of taste at all. Yet in December 1787, when the printing of the *Critique of Practical Reason* had barely been completed, Kant suddenly announced, this time to his new disciple Karl Leonhard Reinhold, that he had returned to the old project of “the critique of taste,” and indeed that he expected

to finish a book on it by the following Easter.⁴ (In fact, it would take him two more years, until the end of January 1790, to finish the newly announced book.) Was there anything other than the obvious fact of having finished his exhausting work on the critiques of metaphysics and morality that suddenly allowed Kant to resume this old project?

The extensive evidence for the development of Kant's aesthetic theory that is now available in his recently published lectures on anthropology from 1772–3 to 1788–9, lectures in which Kant dealt with issues in aesthetics far more extensively than he did in his lectures on logic and metaphysics, puts us in a new position to interpret the letter to Reinhold and to answer this question. The letter is initially confusing, for it suggests two different things as the key to Kant's new project. First, Kant suggests that by reflecting on a tripartite division of the mind into the "faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire," he has been enabled to find an *a priori* principle for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure just as he had previously found *a priori* principles for the faculties of cognition and desire.⁵ Not only do the lectures on anthropology as well as those on logic and metaphysics make it clear that there was nothing new in Kant's tripartite division of the powers of the human mind, but the lectures on anthropology make it clear as no other sources do that Kant had in fact long considered the possibility and sometimes even asserted that there are *a priori* principles for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, in the form of principles of taste.⁶ But Kant suggests a different point when he continues that "he now recognizes three parts of philosophy, each of which has its *a priori* principles which one can enumerate and in such a way determine the scope of possible knowledge – theoretical philosophy, teleology, and practical philosophy. . . ." ⁷ By itself, the idea that teleology might be a central part of philosophy is not new for Kant – in spite of his rejection of its traditional theological foundation in the argument from design, he had clearly been looking for a way to include teleology within his philosophy since his early work on *The Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763). What is unprecedented in Kant's work, however, is the suggestion in the letter to Reinhold that there is an intimate connection between aesthetics and teleology. We can now see that it must be precisely this connection that finally enabled Kant to write the third *Critique*, for what the lectures on anthropology show is that what the *Critique of Judgment* adds

to all the elements of his aesthetic theory that were already in place by the mid-1780s is all and only those elements of the theory that reveal the teleological significance of the experience of beauty and of the existence of both natural and artistic beauty. In other words, what we can now see is that everything in Kant's account of the aesthetic was in place before the end of 1787 except for his understanding of its fundamental significance. Only once the project of the "critique of taste" was transformed into a "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" that would be paired with a "Critique of Teleological Judgment," I propose, did it finally become worth Kant's while to write it.

This claim, of course, depends upon a particular interpretation of Kant's mature teleology. As I understand it, the point of Kant's mature teleology is to unify the system of nature that Kant established in the first *Critique* with the system of freedom that he developed in his writings on moral philosophy by showing that we must and how we can conceive of nature as a realm fit for the realization of the objectives set for us by morality. The teleology of the third *Critique* is a complement to the argument from the highest good to the postulate of the rational authorship of nature that Kant had been making since the first *Critique*. In that argument, Kant argued that morality sets us not merely the single goal of perfecting the virtuousness of our intentions, but also the goal of realizing a systematic form of human happiness, a condition that can be realized only in nature, and in nature only if the laws of nature have been authored to be compatible with the moral law. In the "Critique of Teleological Judgment," Kant then adds that the task of understanding nature itself leads us to the same vision of the unity of the laws of nature and of freedom. Kant argues that we can only understand a particular kind of thing in nature, namely, organisms, as purposive systems; that once we are forced to understand organisms as purposive systems it becomes natural for us to look at nature as a whole as a purposive system; but that we can do this only if we can conceive of some single and determinate ultimate end for nature, which we can do in turn only if we conceive of the only thing that is an end in itself, namely the cultivation of human morality, as the final end of nature. Thus both morality and science drive us to the vision of nature as a realm fit by its own laws for the realization of the objective set by the moral law – a vision, to be sure, that is a regulative ideal produced by reflective judgment, not a speculative assertion demonstrated by

theoretical reason, but which is nevertheless the ultimate and driving vision of Kant's philosophical career.⁸

Against this background, we can now see that the real novelty of Kant's mature aesthetic theory lies in those of its elements that interpret aesthetic experience as evidence of the existence and character of human freedom and the existence of both natural and artistic beauty as evidence of nature's hospitality to human freedom. The lectures on anthropology show that Kant had long understood many of the distinctive features of aesthetic experience and judgment just as he would analyze them in the *Critique of Judgment*, but what is missing from them is precisely his mature understanding of how to preserve the distinctive character of the aesthetic even while showing how it fits into his larger moral and teleological vision.

The lectures on anthropology, for which Kant used as his text the chapter on empirical psychology in Baumgarten's *Metaphysics*, which was also touched upon in Kant's metaphysics lectures but is here treated far more extensively, allow us to discern the following pattern in the development of Kant's aesthetic theory. At the beginning of the 1770s, Kant had already arrived at the idea that a judgment of taste is based on an immediate yet universally and necessarily valid feeling of pleasure in an object, a response that in some sense could even ground an *a priori* judgment. At that point, however, he understood such a universally valid pleasure to arise solely from the harmony between the form of a beautiful object and the universally valid laws of human sensibility, as contrasted to human understanding and reason. However, in the middle of the 1770s – the period that was also decisive for the evolution of the *Critique of Pure Reason* – Kant developed the theory that we usually take to be characteristic only of the later *Critique of Judgment*, the theory, namely, that our pleasure in beauty is the product of a harmonious interaction between sensibility or imagination on the one hand and understanding on the other that is induced in us by a beautiful object. From that insight, Kant was able to begin to develop some of the characteristic features of his later aesthetic theory, particularly his theory of art, including his account of art as the product of genius understood as an exceptional harmony between imagination and understanding and a classification of the arts organized around the different ways in which sensible form and intellectual content can be related. Yet the one thing that is missing throughout all of Kant's

expositions of these ideas throughout the 1770s is any but the most conventional comments on the connection between aesthetic experience and morality. Only in Kant's lectures on anthropology from 1788–9 do we suddenly find him prominently characterizing the harmony between imagination and understanding that is central to both aesthetic experience and artistic creativity as a form of freedom; and only after that happens can the most novel parts of the aesthetic theory of the *Critique of Judgment* emerge, particularly the interpretations of the dynamical sublime and of the experience of beauty as the symbol of the morally good as evidence of the freedom of the human agent and the interpretations of the intellectual interest in natural beauty and genius as the source of artistic beauty as evidence of nature's hospitality to human freedom. This development, in which the freedom of the imagination that is distinctive of aesthetic experience and artistic production turns out to be evidence of the fit between freedom and nature, is what finally allows the integration of Kant's aesthetic theory into his teleological vision and the emergence of a unified *Critique of Judgment*. In what follows, I shall simply trace the course of this development in a little more detail.

II

Kant's basic theory of judgments of taste is built upon two distinct elements: first, a logico-linguistic analysis of the claims of an aesthetic judgment, according to which a person who claims that an object is beautiful is claiming that the pleasure that she takes in the object is one that can reasonably be expected to occur in any other properly situated observer of the object; and, second, a psychological explanation of the causes of such a pleasure, which explains why such an expectation is reasonable.⁹ This structure is already present in Kant's earliest lectures on anthropology, the transcriptions *Collins* and *Parow* from 1772–3, where it is indeed presented in a way that helps to explain the order of exposition in the "Analytic of the Beautiful" of the later *Critique of Judgment*. Kant begins in a way that makes the influence of Francis Hutcheson more obvious than it is in the later book: the first of the "conditions of taste" that he lists is that "Beauty pleases immediately," from which he infers that "pure beauty, which exists solely for taste and affords a certain pure enjoyment, is empty of all utility."¹⁰

From this Kant infers that “taste is a sensible judgment, although not a power of judgment of the senses and of sensation, but rather of intuition and comparison, for obtaining pleasure and displeasure through intuition.”¹¹ Here Kant is clearly following Hutcheson, who had argued that the capacity to detect and respond to beauty “is justly called a *Sense*, because of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the pleasure is different from any *Knowledge* of Principles, Proportions, Cause, or of the Usefulness of the Object; we are struck at first with the Beauty,” and that it follows from this that no “Resolution of our own, nor any *Prospect* of Advantage or Disadvantage, [can] vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object.”¹² Kant does not use the term “disinterested” here, but he is obviously following Hutcheson in taking immediacy to be the most salient feature of aesthetic response and apparently aesthetic judgment – that is, the judgment about an object that we make on the basis of our response to it – as well, and in inferring disinterestedness, in the sense of the irrelevance of the use or other practical value of an object to the aesthetic response to and judgment on it, from this fact. Kant preserves this starting point in the first moment of the “Analytic of the Beautiful,”¹³ although there he simply begins with the assertion of the disinterestedness of judgments of taste rather than inferring that feature from the immediacy of aesthetic response, thus obscuring what should perhaps be regarded as the ultimately psychological starting point of his whole analysis.¹⁴

Kant next introduces his second “condition of taste,” the claim that an object which is to ground a judgment of taste must please universally, that is, please everyone who is in a proper position to respond to the object in question. As he is recorded to have said in one set of the 1772–3 transcriptions, “That which is to be in accordance with taste must please universally, i.e., the judgment of taste is not to be made in accordance with the private disposition [*Beschaffenheit*] of my subject to be affected with pleasure by an object, but in accordance with the rules of universal satisfaction”;¹⁵ in the other set of notes from this year, the statement reveals even more clearly the structure of his emerging theory: “That which is to please in taste must be universal, the judgment that is to be made through it must not be a private but a universal judgment, or a universal ground of satisfaction.”¹⁶ This second formulation suggests more clearly than the first that for a judgment such as the judgment of taste to be universally valid it will have to be based

on a universal ground, so that in this case the pleasure in a beautiful object that is the subject of such a judgment and which by it is to be imputed to others will have to be shown to be something that can itself reasonably be expected to be universally felt at least under appropriate conditions. Kant brings out this last point, that a judgment of taste is concerned with what all would feel under appropriate conditions rather than with what everyone might feel under actual conditions, by characterizing the judgment of taste as “ideal” and “*a priori*”: “With regard to actual taste I must make the judgment about what pleases universally on the basis of experience, but in regard to ideal taste one can make it *a priori*.”¹⁷ The early Kant often seems to suppose that all judgments of taste are merely empirical observations about what happens to please people, as indeed his criticism of Baumgarten in the “Transcendental Aesthetic” of the first *Critique* implies.¹⁸ The present passage shows that matters are not quite that simple, that Kant recognized at least as early as 1772–3 that there is at least some sense in which judgments of taste are *a priori*, and that the innovation of the *Critique of Judgment* cannot lie simply in this assertion, as a hasty reading of the letter to Reinhold might suggest.

I call the thesis that judgments of taste claim universal validity the heart of the “logico-linguistic” aspect of Kant’s theory of taste because in the later “Analytic of the Beautiful” he will present this claim by appeal to the logical concept of the “quantity” of the judgment of taste and will support it by an appeal to how we actually talk about beauty, specifically by the observation that although it sounds right to us to defuse any suggestion of universal validity when we report our own pleasure in something we consider merely agreeable by explicitly restricting our judgment to our own case – as when I say something like “Canary Islands wine is agreeable to me” – it does not sound right to us to add such a restriction to our judgments of beauty.¹⁹ In the lectures on anthropology, Kant does not actually try to support this analytical claim, but instead proceeds more directly to what I consider the psychological aspect of his theory, that is, his characterization of our response to beauty itself, which is necessary in order to show how it can be reasonable for us to claim universal validity for our judgments of taste, at least ideally and *a priori*. Here is where we find the crucial difference between Kant’s earlier and later accounts of taste: while after the mid-1770s Kant will argue that our pleasure in a beautiful

object is caused by the harmonious play between imagination and understanding that it induces, a state that he will argue can reasonably be expected to be induced in any properly situated observer, in the lectures from 1772–3 he argues that our pleasure in beauty is occasioned by the harmony between an object and the laws of our sensibility alone. An object is beautiful simply if it agrees with the laws of human sensibility and by so doing facilitates its own intuition: “What facilitates the sensible intuition pleases and is beautiful, it is in accordance with the subjective laws of sensibility, and it promotes the inner life, since it sets the cognitive powers into activity.”²⁰ The restriction of the explanation to the agreement of an object with the laws of human sensibility is by no means a careless omission; on the contrary, it mirrors precisely what we find in Kant’s lectures on logic from this period and in his lectures on metaphysics from this period and for quite a while longer. Thus, in his lectures on logic in the early 1770s, Kant says that “An aesthetic perfection is a perfection according to laws of sensibility,”²¹ and in logic lectures from the early 1780s, although his discussion of aesthetics is by then considerably more refined, Kant still insists that aesthetic perfection has nothing to do with the understanding and its concern, namely truth, but only with the laws of sensibility: truth, he says, may be the “*conditio sine qua non*” of aesthetic perfection but is at most its “foremost negative condition, since here it is not its principle end”; the principle end in the case of beauty is still just “pleasantness and agreement of sensibility.”²² Likewise, Kant maintains the same view in his lectures on metaphysics from the mid-1770s: “What is an object of intuition or of the sensible power of judgment, that *pleases*, and the object is beautiful. . . . Taste is thus the power of judgment of the senses, through which it is cognized what agrees with the senses of others. . . . The universal agreement of sensibility is what constitutes the ground of satisfaction through taste.”²³

Before Kant even explains what he means by the agreement of a beautiful object with the laws of sensibility, he wants to make it clear that such an explanation of our experience of beauty will be adequate to fulfill the claim raised by the universal validity of a judgment of taste. He does not dignify such an argument, as he later will, with the title of a “deduction of judgments of taste”;²⁴ indeed, it would have been surprising if he had, since as far as we can tell by 1772–3 Kant had not yet introduced the idea of a “deduction” of any form of judgments into his emerging theoretical philosophy. But the basic strategy of his

later deduction of aesthetic judgments was already present, namely that of showing that judgments of taste rest on a foundation that is just as universal as that of ordinary cognitive judgments; only at this point his view is not yet that judgments of taste are grounded in the subjective satisfaction of the conditions for judgment in general that is constituted by harmony between imagination and understanding,²⁵ but simply that the laws of sensibility are just as universal as the laws of understanding, so an object that pleases in virtue of its agreement with the laws of sensibility gives rise to a judgment that is just as objective as a judgment about an object of the understanding made on the basis of concepts of the understanding. In Kant's words,

Judgments about beauty and ugliness are objective, but not in accordance with rules of the understanding, rather in accordance with those of sensibility. Sensibility has its rules as well as the understanding does. Certain principles of taste must be universal and hold universally. Thus there are certain rules of aesthetics.²⁶

The details of Kant's later deduction of aesthetic judgments must of course change as the details of his explanation of aesthetic response change; but the idea of the possibility of such a deduction is not in fact one of the major innovations of the *Critique of Judgment*.

That said, we can now ask what Kant means by the agreement of an object with the laws of sensibility and the facilitation of intuition by such agreement. What he has in mind is simply that such properties of the form of an object as proportion and symmetry make it easier to take in, grasp, and remember the object as a whole than would otherwise be the case. Dividing beautiful objects into those that are spatially extended and those that are temporally extended – a distinction that could have been suggested by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's recently published *Laokoön* (1766), but which of course would also have been suggested by Kant's own analysis of the fundamental forms of sensibility in his inaugural dissertation *On the Forms and Principles of the Sensible and Intellectual World* of 1770 – Kant argues that beautiful objects are ones the spatial or temporal forms of which make it easy for us to grasp them as wholes. In his words,

The facilitation takes place through space and time. Alteration in space is figure, in time it is merely play. The play of alteration is facilitated through proportion in the parts. Symmetry facilitates comprehensibility and is the relation of sensibility. In the case of a disproportionate house I can represent

the whole only with difficulty, while in the case of a well-constructed house, by contrast, I see equality in the two sides. Equality of parts promotes my sensible representation, facilitates the intuition, increases the life of activity and favors it, hence the whole must please me, and for the same reason likewise everything [that is beautiful], for this rule is the basis in all such cases.²⁷

In the case of objects with temporal rather than spatial extension, such as a piece of music (or musical performance), analogous properties such as symmetry and proportion in the rhythm and harmony also “facilitate sensible comprehension.”²⁸ Kant goes on to suggest other sorts of objects, such as dances and gardens, in which it is also the facilitation of the grasp of the whole by the regularity of the relevant parts that is the basis of our pleasure, a pleasure that is universal because “All human beings have conditions under which they can represent a great manifold.”²⁹ These conditions are what Kant means by the laws of sensibility: formal properties such as proportion and equality allow objects to agree with the laws of our sensibility. “Since proportion and equality of division much facilitate our intuitions, they thus accord with the subjective laws of our sensibility, and that holds for everything which makes the representation of the whole easy for us, and which promotes the extension of our cognitions.”³⁰

Such formal properties of spatial and temporal structure will hardly disappear from Kant’s mature theory of beauty; on the contrary, they seem to be precisely what he will continue to consider to be the most important properties of proper objects of pure judgments of taste. Surely it is such properties that Kant has in mind when he argues in the *Critique of Judgment* that “All form of the objects of the senses . . . is either **shape** or **play**,” and thus that while “The **charm** of colors or of the agreeable tones of instruments can be added,” nevertheless “**drawing**” in the case of the plastic arts and “composition” in the case of music “constitute the proper object of the pure judgment of taste.”³¹ Nevertheless, when Kant transforms his basic explanation of our pleasure in beauty from the agreement of an object with the laws of sensibility alone to the harmony between imagination and understanding that an object induces in us, the possible range of objects of taste will be vastly expanded, even if at the cost of the “purity” of judgments of taste; and it is on this expansion of the range and significance of objects of taste that Kant’s eventual inclusion of the aesthetic into his teleological

vision of the unity of the systems of nature and freedom will depend. So let us now see how Kant begins this transformation of his aesthetic theory.

III

Kant's lectures on anthropology from the third quarter of the 1770s are represented by two more sets of lectures, *Friedländer* from 1775–6 and *Pillau* from 1777–8. A fundamental change in Kant's thought is immediately evident: while the overall structure of Kant's aesthetic theory, already apparent in the lectures of 1772–3, remains unchanged, these lectures document Kant's change in the crucial explanation of our response to beauty from his initial theory that our pleasure in beauty is the result of the harmony between an object and the laws of our sensibility alone to the theory that he would henceforth hold, namely, that this pleasure is due to the fact that a beautiful object induces a harmonious play between multiple cognitive faculties, namely sensibility and understanding. In the *Friedländer* lectures, this new idea appears twice. First, it is presented under "The concept of the poet [*Dichter*] and the art of poetry [*Dichtkunst*]," a subdivision of the section on "The faculty for invention" (*Dichten*) that is included in the description of the faculties of cognition, which, in these as in all the anthropology lectures, is the first of the three main divisions of the subject, the latter two concerning pleasure and displeasure and then the faculty of desire. Kant simply begins this section by stating that a poem involves a harmonious play between what must be regarded as aspects of objects that appeal to sensibility on the one hand and to understanding on the other: he says that "The harmonious play of thoughts and sensations is the poem."³² He then reinvokes his earlier language of laws, but in a way that makes clear the new thought that aesthetic response involves a harmonious relationship between multiple faculties within the subject as well as between the subject and the object:

The play of thoughts and sensations is the correspondence [*Uebereinstimmung*] of subjective laws; if the thoughts correspond with my subject then that is a play of them. Secondly, it is to be observed about these thoughts that they stand in relation to the object, and then the thoughts must be true, and that

the course of the thoughts corresponds with the nature of the mental powers, thus with the subject, and therefore the succession of thoughts corresponds with the powers of the mind. This harmonious play of thoughts and sensations is the poem.³³

This account is not yet a completely general account of beauty and our response to it. Since the “thoughts” involved in a poem are, as we would say, propositional, we can respond to them as truths, and this may not be true for other kinds of art, let alone for natural beauties. Further, Kant here refers to the sensory aspect of the poem as “sensations,” whereas in most other passages, both earlier and later, he typically downplays the significance of sensations in contrast to that of the pure forms of intuition in our response to beauty. What will generalize from this account, however, is the suggestion that the relationship between a beautiful object and our response to it is complex, inducing a harmonious relationship between different faculties of the mind itself. This will ultimately open the way to a far more extensive account of the possible range of beautiful objects than Kant has thus far given as well to the complex account of the importance of aesthetic objects and our experience of them that will eventually be offered in the *Critique of Judgment*.

Kant begins to generalize this account of a poem and our response to it later in the same lectures, in the section on pleasure where his chief discussion of aesthetic theory typically occurs. Here Kant divides pleasure into “sensual, ideal and intellectual,” with the second of these terms standing for the aesthetic.³⁴ He then says that “ideal enjoyment . . . rests on the feeling of the free play of the mental faculties.” This free play involves the impression of an object upon the senses, but is not a passive response to that; rather, the impression of the object upon the senses evokes an active response in which the mind brings its powers of thought to bear upon a sensory impression:

The senses are the receptivity of impressions, which promote our sensible enjoyment, but we cannot bring our mental powers into agitation through objects just insofar as they make an impression on us, but rather insofar as we think them, and that is the ideal enjoyments, which are, to be sure, sensible, but not enjoyments of sense. A poem, a novel, a comedy are capable of affording us ideal enjoyments, they arise from the way in which the mind makes cognitions

for itself out of all sorts of representations of the senses. Now if the mind is sensitive of a free play of its powers, that which creates this free play is an ideal enjoyment.³⁵

Clumsy as it sounds, this passage indicates remarkable progress in Kant's thought. Instead of conceiving of a beautiful object as simply agreeing with laws of sensibility, laws according to which we can more readily grasp something symmetrical than we can something asymmetrical, Kant is now clearly conceiving of aesthetic response as more complex and more active: sensibility provides us with a variety of materials, and then the mind sees what it can make of them. Further, Kant suggests that there are different ways in which the mind can make something of its objects for ideal enjoyment: a poem, a novel, a comedy are different genres, and the suggestion seems to be that the mind responds to them differently, more complexly than just detecting symmetry or proportion. This suggestion is strengthened when Kant continues the passage by mentioning tragedy, and suggesting that in this case the mind can even transform pain into pleasure. This can only be done if the mind is thought of as active rather than passive in its aesthetic response.

This passage is also the first in which Kant characterizes the harmonious play of the mind in aesthetic response as a *free* play. This is clearly important to him, since he explains our pleasure in life itself as pleasure in the free exercise of our capacities, and thus explains the pleasurable nature of aesthetic response by the fact that it is a form of the free exercise of our mental powers. At this stage, however, Kant immediately *distinguishes* the free play of the mental powers that is the basis of ideal enjoyment from the "use of freedom in accordance with rules" that is the basis of intellectual enjoyment, or the foundation of morality. Kant does not yet see that he can use the characterization of aesthetic response as a form of free play to *connect* aesthetic response to moral judgment even while preserving the distinctness of aesthetic response. That is the key move that is made only in the *Critique of Judgment*.

The generalization of this new account is also evident in a number of ways in the *Pillau* lectures, given one year later than the *Friedländer* lectures. First, in the section on the faculty for invention, where *Friedländer* had offered its definition of a poem, *Pillau* now makes

a more general statement about beauty in the language that Kant will henceforth use: "We can call the harmonious play of the understanding and of sensibility the beauty of the spirit. A beautiful spirit thinks in such a way that there is understanding, but in harmony with sensibility."³⁶ Second, Kant begins to use the possibilities afforded by his newly complex characterization of aesthetic response to develop what will become central features of his mature theory of the fine arts, the account of genius as the source of fine art, on the one hand, and the classification of the fine arts, on the other, on the basis of the particular relationship between sensibility and understanding that is paradigmatic for each medium of fine art.

Although Kant treats genius prior to the classification of the arts in the *Critique of Judgment*, in the anthropology lectures he treats the arts and their differences first. The key to Kant's approach is his recognition that since aesthetic response involves understanding as well as sensibility, the several fine arts can be distinguished from each other by the particular ways in which sensibility and understanding are related in our response to them. Kant first illustrates this with a distinction that will be repeated in all the subsequent lectures on anthropology and preserved in the *Critique of Judgment*,³⁷ namely the distinction between "oratory" (*Beredsamkeit*) and "poetic art" (*Dichtkunst*) as two species of the "*humaniora*" or "arts which decorate a beautiful spirit." Kant argues that "oratory" is "the art of enlivening ideas of the understanding through sensibility," where the pleasure in the sensible form of the oration has to be subordinated to the orator's underlying intent to convince his audience of the truth of the ideas he is attempting to enliven, while "poetry" is "the art of giving the play of sensibility unity through the understanding," where it is the pleasure that will be produced and not the business of conviction that is the "primary purpose" (*Haupt-Zweck*) of the enterprise.³⁸ This distinction could not be drawn unless each form of art involved both sensibility and understanding. Next, Kant expands his earlier classification of the arts to reflect the fact that the materials of art are not merely spatial and temporal forms of sensibility, but include intellectual elements as well, so that different forms of art differ precisely in the various ways in which they paradigmatically relate sensible and intellectual elements and thereby induce different varieties of free play between our sensibility and understanding. Kant had previously distinguished simply between arts that employ

spatial and temporal manifolds, but he now subsumes that distinction under a broader distinction between “material” and “spiritual” arts. The “material” arts are those in which sensible forms predominate, whether these be spatial forms as in the case of “painting, sculpture, architecture and the art of pleasure-gardening,” or temporal forms, as in the case of “music proper and dance music”; the “spiritual arts” are “oratory” and “poesy” (now *Poësie*).³⁹ All of these forms of art are seen as pleasing us immediately because all of them “harmoniously move the powers of the mind,”⁴⁰ but they differ in which materials of sensibility they employ and in which of the two main faculties, sensibility or understanding, as it were takes the lead in the harmonious dance between them.

The possibilities for such distinctions afforded by Kant’s new conception of aesthetic response are even further exploited in the more extensive discussion of the arts in the *Menschenkunde* lectures from 1781–2, which were originally edited by F. C. Starke and published in 1831.⁴¹ This discussion is interesting not just for its wealth of detail, but also because it introduces yet another vector for the distinction and classification of forms of art, namely, a distinction between “illusion” (*Schein*) or “appearance” (*Apparenz*) on the one hand and “reality” on the other. Kant discusses painting and sculpture as art forms that play with the tension between illusion and reality: painting creates the illusion of three-dimensional space and objects in two dimensions, while sculpture can create the illusion of living corporeal figure out of a nonliving corporeal object.⁴² But it is the sense of a playful tension between illusion and reality that is essential to our pleasure: as we move from sculpture to waxworks, Kant observes, we begin to lose our sense of illusion, “rather the object itself seems to be there,” and we begin to react with distaste rather than pleasure.⁴³ What is crucial for aesthetic response is not just that both sensibility and understanding be involved, but that a sense of play between them, and thus room for the exercise of imagination, be preserved.

This discussion is important, for it suggests that Kant’s concept of harmonious and free play between the faculties of cognition can be a more interesting basis for aesthetic theory than it is often taken to be. But since my main concern is to trace the path by which Kant was ultimately able to integrate his aesthetic theory into his teleology

rather than to pursue the merits of his aesthetic theory for its own sake, I must leave this discussion aside and return to the second main development in Kant's aesthetic theory in the mid-1770s, his concept of genius.

The *Pillau* lectures were the first to be given after the publication of a German translation of Alexander Gerard's *Essay on Genius* in 1776.⁴⁴ Gerard's work may well have accounted for Kant's emphasis on the concept of genius from this time on, but it should also be noted that Kant could not have understood this concept in the way that he did without his new conception of aesthetic response. Kant equates genius (*Genie*) with spirit (*Geist*), and characterizes the latter first simply as the "spontaneity" to invent or produce something.⁴⁵ But then he goes further and states that "Spirit is no particular faculty but that which gives all faculties unity. Understanding and sensibility or now better imagination are the faculties of the human being: now to give these two unity, that is spirit. It is thus the general unity of the human mind, or also the harmony between them."⁴⁶ As the response to beauty has been reinterpreted to consist in a harmony between sensibility – or, as Kant now says, imagination, that is, the ability not just to derive sensible content from current experience but also the capacity to recall and foresee such content – and understanding, so must the capacity to create beauty through human art be understood as depending upon a special degree of harmony and unity between the capacities of mind.⁴⁷

The *Pillau* lectures add a second element to Kant's characterization of genius that also implies a corresponding addition to his concept of art. Kant continues what we have just quoted by stating that "Spirit is also the enlivening of sensibility through the idea [*Idée*]." Such an idea, he says, is not a mere concept, which is just an abstraction, but rather "concerns the unity of the manifold as a whole; it thus contains the principle of the manifold as a whole."⁴⁸ He continues to try to explain what he means in terms that we might think of as a definition of an "ideal" rather than an "idea": it takes genius to come up with the idea that can be enlivened in a work of art, he argues, because an idea, say an idea of a human being as represented in a painting, can go beyond any particular who actually exists, and must therefore "be invented out of the head" of the genius. The point seems to be that genius manifests itself both in the

invention of content for art and in the invention of sensible forms by means of which to present and enliven such content. Again, this is a development that is possible only once the underlying conception of aesthetic response has been changed from that of agreement of an object with laws of sensibility alone to the idea of a free play between sensible and intellectual and active rather than merely passive faculties.

Only in the *Critique of Judgment* will Kant proceed beyond this abstract characterization by showing how the contents of art and the paradigmatic products of genius can be *rational* and *moral* ideas that yet still leave room for the free play of imagination that is indispensable for our pleasure in beauty. The last course on anthropology that Kant gave before the publication of the third *Critique*, however, the *Busolt* lectures of 1788–9, show that at this point, just after the publication of the second *Critique* and when he was already composing the third, Kant was far bolder than ever before in his use of the language of *freedom* in the presentation of the key concepts of his aesthetics. This is evident above all in his treatment of genius. Here Kant states that “genius is the originality of imagination,” and that “In the case of the genius the imagination and its disposition must be extraordinarily great and masterly.” Then he goes on to say, in words that he does not seem to have used before, that:

The freedom of the imagination must also be a chief ingredient. In the other powers of the mind, one seeks rules. But the imagination will be independent. It is bold, it is creative, and it is always doing violence to the rules of the understanding, which would as it were clip its wings. However, the imagination must also be under laws. If it subjects itself to laws, where its greatest freedom takes place, where the happiest agreement with the greatest possible determinacy of the understanding and reason exists, then does it have the disposition which is required for a genius.⁴⁹

In this remarkable passage, the imagination of the genius is described in terms that make it sound like an exemplar for the objective of morality, namely the realization of the greatest possible individual freedom within the limits of the rule of reason – which rules only to ensure that a like degree of freedom is extended to all. For the first time, here on the verge of the completion of the *Critique of Judgment*, does Kant suggest that the essence of aesthetic creativity and the

response it can arouse may not lie in its contrast to morality but in its affinity to it.

IV

This striking characterization of genius is just a hint of what is to come, however. With the hindsight afforded to us by the new documentation of the development of Kant's aesthetic theory prior to the *Critique of Judgment* that we have just considered, we can see that what is most innovative in the published work of 1790 is Kant's systematic elaboration of the connections between the aesthetic and the moral, connections that do not undermine the uniqueness of the aesthetic but do allow the aesthetic to assume its proper place in Kant's teleological vision of the unity of the systems of nature and freedom. These connections are made possible by what have been identified as the two key innovations in Kant's aesthetic theory over the course of its development, namely the explanation of aesthetic response as the harmonious play between our sensible and intellectual capacities and the interpretation of this play in turn as a form of freedom.

To be sure, Kant had not completely neglected links between the aesthetic and the ethical in his lectures on anthropology; given his conception of the importance of these lectures for the moral education of his students – a conception reflected in the title of the handbook that he finally published only once he had ceased lecturing, that is, the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* of 1798 – it would have been surprising if he had. But the connections that he drew throughout the lectures remained conventional. At the very first mention of the fine arts in the lectures, he acknowledges that art can present moral truths in an accessible and powerful way: “The entire use of the beautiful arts is that they present moral propositions of reason in their full glory and powerfully support them.”⁵⁰ Later in the first series of lectures, he argues the cultivation of taste refines us and makes us sociable, in a way that is “somewhat analogical to morality,” by teaching us to take pleasure not merely in things that contribute to our own well-being but also in things that can be shared: “By means of taste my enjoyment can be shared. Taste arranges all the enjoyments of people in such a way that it contributes something to the enjoyments of others. A [piece of] music can be listened to with enjoyment by many

hundreds of people.”⁵¹ Conversely, Kant also argues, taste depends upon the existence of society and the need for sociability, because a person who lived in solitude – on a desert island, as Kant often says, with the image of Robinson Crusoe in mind – would have no need to distinguish between merely private pleasures and those that can be shared with others, nor would he have any incentive to adorn himself or anything else in a way that could be pleasing to others.⁵² But none of these comments can prepare the way for the elaborate framework of connections between the aesthetic and the moral that structures so much of the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” and may well be, if my interpretation of Kant’s letter to Reinhold is correct, its very *raison d’être*.

I have discussed many of these connections before,⁵³ so here I will merely offer an overview that will identify the innovations in Kant’s mature aesthetic theory and show how these innovations allowed Kant to make his aesthetics part of his moral teleology without undermining his account of the uniqueness of aesthetic experience. Kant begins his exposition in the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,” just as he always did in the anthropology lectures, with the distinction between the agreeable, the beautiful and the good.⁵⁴ This division allows him to distinguish aesthetic judgment from a masked or confused judgment of moral perfection,⁵⁵ and leads him to the characterization of pure aesthetic judgment as a response to the form of sensible objects alone, independent of any conception of the representational content and significance of those objects.⁵⁶ But Kant’s conception of the restricted focus of a pure judgment of taste is not, as it turns out, intended to restrict the subject matter of fine art or even, as we ultimately see, the interpretation of the significance of the beauty and sublimity of nature. Rather, the concept of a pure judgment of taste functions heuristically, allowing us to identify the free play of our cognitive faculties as the foundation of all aesthetic response and judgment. As soon as that identification has been completed, in §16 of the “Analytic of the Beautiful,” Kant begins to build upon the underlying notion of the harmony of the faculties, expanding his initial restriction of the object of such free play to sensible form alone and even his initial restriction of the faculties involved to mere sensibility or imagination and understanding. The larger argument of the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” is nothing less than that the imagination can be

in free harmony with reason as well as with understanding, and that this harmony can involve content as well as form. Thus Kant can assign moral and teleological significance to aesthetic response without denying the pleasure of free play that is its hallmark; rather, this significance depends on the characterization of aesthetic response as a form of freedom.

For present purposes, Kant's new insights into the relations between the aesthetic and the moral can be organized into three groups, which I will list in the order in which they are introduced into the text of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment." First, Kant recognizes that art may have content and indeed explicitly moral content without sacrificing the freedom of play between the imagination on the one hand and understanding and/or reason on the other. Second, Kant argues that aesthetic experience can reveal something about our own capacities of morality to us without sacrificing what makes it distinctively aesthetic. Finally, Kant suggests that the experience of beauty in both nature and art can be understood as evidence of the fit between nature and our own objectives that is the fundamental regulative principle of his teleology.

That art can have morally significant content without thereby undermining the possibility of a distinctively aesthetic response to it is the first point that Kant makes after acknowledging that our response to an object can remain aesthetic even when it goes beyond a focus upon pure form as long as there is still room for free play between the imagination and understanding. I take that recognition to be the point of Kant's distinction between two kinds (*Arten*) of beauty, free and dependent, in §16;⁵⁷ after all, if Kant had meant to deny that we can have a properly aesthetic response to anything other than mere form, he would not have maintained that dependent beauty is a kind (*Art*) of beauty at all, but could have maintained only that is a kind of pseudo-beauty, which he pointedly does not. So a judgment of dependent beauty cannot be merely a masked judgment of perfection, but must rather be based on our experience and enjoyment of the room for play between a concept and its constraints on the one hand and the form of an object on the other. In §17, then, under the rubric of the "Ideal of beauty," Kant considers the problem of how there can be a unique or maximal archetype of beauty – a problem that is not set by the logic of taste at all, which requires only that anything that

properly seems beautiful to anyone seem beautiful to everyone, not that there be any one thing that seems maximally beautiful to all – but rather “rests upon reason’s indeterminate idea of a maximum.”⁵⁸ His argument is then that this archetype can be found only in the representation of the human figure as the expression of human morality, because human morality is the only thing that is an end in itself and that can thus even pick out a unique candidate for the status of archetype, but also because the human beauty that is used as an expression of human morality cannot itself be conceived to be discovered by any mechanical process, such as averaging the features of whatever humans any individual has actually encountered, but must be seen as a product of the human imagination.⁵⁹ To make moral ideas “visible in bodily manifestation” therefore requires pure ideas of reason and great force of imagination united in anyone who would merely judge them, let alone anyone who would present them⁶⁰ – in other words, a harmony between the idea of reason and the free play of imagination.

Kant can be seen as expanding this conception when he more fully develops his theory of fine art later in the *Critique*. The heart of this theory is the claim that paradigmatic works of artistic genius are characteristically organized around an “aesthetic idea,” a representation of the imagination that makes a rational or moral idea on the one side palpable through a sensible form and a wealth of imagery on the other.⁶¹ The key to Kant’s thought here is not just that works of art can present moral ideas in their full glory, as he had held from the outset of his anthropology lectures, but that they do this precisely by affording a sense of free play between the rational or moral idea on the one hand and both sensible form and a wealth of imagery on the other. As he puts it:

In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, associated with a given concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial representations in the free use of the imagination that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for it, which therefore allows the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable, the feeling of which animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the mere letter of language.⁶²

Kant’s point here is simply that great art must both deal with serious content and yet retain a sense of play and freedom of the imagination.

These doctrines might be thought of as a refinement of views expressed in Kant's anthropology lectures but not as radical departures. He clearly breaks new ground, however, with his next idea, the idea that we can have genuinely aesthetic experiences that nevertheless give us an intimation of our own moral capacities. This theme is touched upon in Kant's treatment of the sublime and in his thesis that the beautiful is a symbol of the morally good.

Kant's treatment of the sublime is another innovation in the *Critique of Judgment*. Although the sublime had already been well-established as a fundamental aesthetic concept by writers from Addison to Burke, Kant mentions it only rarely in the anthropology lectures, and then only in a limited way that suggests that even without proportion and symmetry the sheer magnitude of natural objects can affect the magnitude of our own feeling.⁶³ This might appear to anticipate his later conception of the "mathematical sublime," but the distinction between the "mathematical" and the "dynamical" sublime, the view that each involves a complex disharmony between imagination and understanding but also a satisfying harmony between imagination and reason, and above all the view that in the experience of the dynamical sublime imagination gives us an intimation of the power of our own practical reason all appear to be new to the *Critique*, further evidence of Kant's newfound confidence that the aesthetic can in fact be connected to the moral without loss of its own freedom. In particular, Kant's view about the experience of the dynamical sublime appears to be that it is a genuine aesthetic experience because in it the independence and power of what is morally important in our own existence is made palpable by a feeling and not just by an abstract concept of how that which is most important in us cannot be threatened by even the most destructive forces of mere physical nature. "Nature is here called sublime merely because it raises the imagination to the point of presenting those cases in which the mind can make palpable to itself the sublimity of its own vocation even over nature."⁶⁴ It might perhaps seem a stretch to describe this experience as one of free play, but the essential idea remains that the imagination can present a fundamental idea of reason while manifesting its own special character as well.

While the sublime makes the independence of practical reason from mere nature palpable, the beautiful can serve as a symbol of the morally good because the freedom of imagination that is the essence

of the experience of beauty can serve as a symbol of the freedom of the will that is the basis of morality, even though the latter must be a form of freedom governed by law while the former only gives a sense of satisfying the understanding's basic desire for unity without being determined by any concept functioning as a rule. The heart of Kant's analogy is the claim that "The **freedom** of the imagination (thus of the sensibility of our faculty) is represented in the judging of the beautiful as in accord with the lawfulness of the understanding (in the moral judgment the freedom of the will is conceived as the agreement of the latter with itself in accordance with universal laws of nature)."⁶⁵ Only once Kant had transformed his initial conception of beauty as the agreement of an object with the laws of our sensibility to that of the object's stimulation of free play between imagination and our higher cognitive faculties did such a conception of the symbolic value of beauty even become possible.

The greatest innovation of the *Critique of Judgment*, however, is its unification of aesthetics into Kant's overarching vision of teleology. Kant is cautious about connecting aesthetics and teleology too soon, before the reader has fully understood aesthetic experience in its own terms; and thus, for example, in introducing the deduction of aesthetic judgment he makes it quite clear that the task of such a deduction is not to offer a teleological explanation of the existence of natural beauty but only to provide a guarantee for the universal validity of our judgments about beauty through their foundation in fundamental facts about our shared cognitive constitution.⁶⁶ However, Kant also argues that once the teleological viewpoint has been forced upon us in our attempt to explain the special nature of organisms anyway, it is only natural for us to take a teleological viewpoint both upon nature as a whole and upon the beauty that we find in nature:

Even beauty in nature, i.e., its agreement with the free play of our cognitive faculties in the apprehension and judging of its appearance, can be considered in this way as an objective purposiveness of nature in its entirety, as a system of which the human being is a member, once the teleological judging of nature by means of natural ends which have been provided to us by organized beings has justified us in the idea of a great system of nature. We may consider it as a favor that nature has done for us that in addition to usefulness it has so richly distributed beauty and charms, and we can love it on that account, just as we regard it with respect because of its immeasurability. . . .⁶⁷

The argument of Kant's teleology, as I suggested at the outset, is that the thought that the world is the product of intelligent design may be suggested to us or even forced upon us by our experience of organic nature, but that the only use we can make of this thought is for the regulative conception of the natural world as designed to be a fit arena within which we can reasonably strive to fulfill our moral vocation. It is into this conception of a world in which we can and must posit that the systems of nature and freedom can be united that the "Critique of Teleological Judgment" now invites us to incorporate our understanding of our aesthetic experience. Once Kant allows us this hindsight, however, we can see that he has already laid the foundation for the incorporation of aesthetic experience into moral teleology in two crucial moments in the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment."

The first of these moments is Kant's account of the "intellectual interest in the beautiful" (§42). Kant presents this interest, which he limits to natural beauty, as a superior alternative to an interest in artistic beauty, which he dismisses – in what seems to be a rejection of an argument running throughout the anthropology lectures – as at best serving an empirical, not deeply moral interest in sociability, and as at worst serving only the purpose of self-aggrandizement.⁶⁸ In the intellectual interest in nature, by contrast, we add to our immediate satisfaction in the experience of a naturally beautiful object – a pleasure that is to be explained strictly in terms of the free play of our cognitive faculties – a further satisfaction in the fact "that nature should at least show some trace or give a sign that it contains in itself some sort of ground for assuming a lawful correspondence of its products with our satisfaction that is independent of all interests."⁶⁹ Our deepest interest, of course, is that nature contain a ground for assuming its correspondence with the satisfaction of our moral interest, which is independent of all empirical interests but not of the interest of practical reason itself; but we can interpret nature's creation of beauty as evidence of its hospitality to our unselfish interest in morality as well. This conception of the intellectual interest in beauty does not depend upon an innovation in Kant's aesthetic theory itself, but rather in his development of the new moral teleology that is the deepest innovation of the *Critique of Judgment*.⁷⁰

The second key step in Kant's integration of the aesthetic into his new moral teleology is implicit in his treatment of artistic genius. As

we saw, Kant had long included the topic of genius in his lectures on anthropology, and once he transformed his conception of aesthetic response into the idea of the harmony between cognitive faculties he correspondingly transformed his conception of genius into that of someone possessing a special degree of harmony among his cognitive faculties and able to express that in ways communicable to others. What he never seems to have done prior to writing the *Critique of Judgment*, however, is to characterize this special degree of harmony and the capacity to communicate it to others as a *gift of nature*, although the equation of this “talent” with a “natural gift” is the very first feature of the third *Critique’s* account of genius.⁷¹ By characterizing genius as a gift of nature, however, Kant implies that the existence of artistic as well as of natural beauty is evidence of the harmonious fit between nature and human objectives: just as the existence of natural beauty, that is, the beauty of nature outside of our own minds and dispositions, such as the beauty of flowers and birds and perhaps even of our own bodies, is evidence or at least a suggestion of nature’s fitness as an arena in which to realize our moral objectives, so nature’s production of a special human disposition, the special talent needed to produce beautiful art, can serve as evidence or at least a suggestion of the receptiveness of our own dispositions to the requirements of morality, that is, the possibility that we can successfully harmonize our own inclinations and reason in the way necessary to formulate morally requisite intentions in the first place. If “nature in the subject (and by means of the disposition of its faculties) must give the rule to art,”⁷² surely that must give us some confidence that by means of the proper disposition of its faculties the subject can generally give the rule to nature in itself.

Such an interpretation of Kant’s concept of genius might seem to mean that we must see him as retracting his dismissive attitude to artistic beauty, expressed only a few sections previously.⁷³ In fact, we do not have to see him as retracting his previous view, but only as refining it by means of a new perspective that has been introduced in the meantime: as long as we think merely of the immediate pleasure to be gained from art, we may be tempted to use it for base purposes such as mere self-aggrandizement; but once we reflect upon the real character of the genius that is needed to produce fine art, we can begin to see the very existence of fine art as one more bit of evidence for

the ultimate harmony between our rational objectives and our natural ones that is the heart of Kant's teleological vision. Perhaps the remarkable progress of Kant's argument within the *Critique of Judgment* itself, in which what has just been set aside is constantly being reintroduced in a subtler way, recapitulates the broader progress of Kant's aesthetic thought as a whole, in which so many of the elements simply described within the framework of his anthropology are suddenly transformed by the driving vision of his teleology.

Notes

1. Letter 67, to Marcus Herz, June 7, 1771; 10: 123. All citations to Kant will be located by volume and page number in *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer [later Walter de Gruyter & Co.], 1900–). Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own.
2. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 21 n; translation from Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 156.
3. *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 35–6 n; Guyer and Wood, p. 173.
4. Letter 313, to Karl Leonhard Reinhold, December, 28 and 31, 1787, 10: 513–16.
5. *Ibid.*, 10: 514.
6. For example, *Anthropologie Collins* (1772–3), 25: 179; *Anthropologie Parow* (1772–3), 25: 376.
7. Letter to Reinhold, 10: 514–15.
8. I have argued for this interpretation of Kant's mature teleology in a number of papers, including "The Unity of Nature and Freedom: Kant's Conception of the System of Philosophy," in Sally S. Sedgwick, ed., *The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 19–53, and "From Nature to Morality: Kant's New Argument in the 'Critique of Teleological Judgment,'" in Hans Friedrich Fulda and Jürgen Stolzenberg, eds., *Architektonik und System in der Philosophie Kants* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001), pp. 375–404.
9. See Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979; 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), ch. 3; in 2nd ed., p. 60.
10. *Collins*, 25: 176; cf. *Parow*, 25: 374.
11. *Collins*, 25: 177; cf. *Parow*, 25: 375.
12. Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, 4th ed. (London: Midwinter, Bettesworth, et al., 1738), treatise I, sec. I, §§xii–xiii, p. 11.
13. See *Critique of Judgment*, §2, 5: 204–5.

14. Kant's framework analysis of what is claimed by the judgment of taste recurs throughout the lectures on anthropology. For a particularly clear version and detailed exposition from ten years after the initial *Collins* and *Parow* lectures, see *Menschenkunde*, 25: 1095–1108.
15. *Collins*, 25: 179.
16. *Parow*, 25: 376.
17. *Collins*, 25: 179; cf. *Parow*, 25: 376.
18. See note 2.
19. See *Critique of Judgment*, §7, 5: 212.
20. *Collins*, 25: 181; cf. *Parow*, 25: 379. The last clause of the sentence cited in the text refers to the general theory of pleasure that Kant maintains in these lectures, namely that pleasure is the consciousness of the promotion of life, which in turn consists in activity, while pain is consciousness of the hindrance of life, or of obstacles to activity; see, for example, *Collins*, 25: 167–9.
21. *Logik Blomberg*, 24: 24; translation from Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, translated and edited by J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 32.
22. *Wiener Logik*, 24: 811; Young, p. 270.
23. *Metaphysik L₁*, 28: 250–1; translation from Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, translated and edited by Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 66.
24. See *Critique of Judgment*, §38, 5: 289–90.
25. See above all the First Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, §VIII, 20: 223–5.
26. *Collins*, 25: 181.
27. *Ibid.*, 25: 181.
28. *Ibid.*, 25: 182.
29. *Ibid.*, 25: 182.
30. *Parow*, 25: 379.
31. *Critique of Judgment*, §14, 5: 225.
32. *Friedländer*, 25: 525.
33. *Ibid.*, 25: 525–6.
34. *Ibid.*, 25: 559.
35. *Ibid.*, 25: 560.
36. *Pillau*, 25: 761.
37. See §51, 5: 321.
38. *Pillau*, 25: 760.
39. *Ibid.*, 25: 760.
40. *Ibid.*, 25: 761.
41. Immanuel Kant's *Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie. Nach handschriftlichen Vorlesungen herausgegeben von Fr. Ch. Starke* (Leipzig, 1831), edited in the *Akademie* edition under the title "*Menschenkunde*" (25: 849–1203). The new edition of *Menschenkunde*, however, supplements its text with additions from a manuscript from the same semester known as *St. Petersburg*. This does not add noticeably to Kant's discussions of poetry,

- genius, and taste, but adds a major section on freedom (25: 1142–54) that will be of great interest for the interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy.
42. *Ibid.*, 25: 1000.
 43. *Ibid.*, 25: 1001.
 44. Gerard, Alexander. *Verusch über das Genie*. Translated by Christian Garve (Leipzig, 1776).
 45. *Pillau*, 25: 781.
 46. *Ibid.*, 25: 782.
 47. For a very similar passage, see also the transcription by *Mrongovius* (1784–5), 25: 1313.
 48. *Pillau*, 25: 782.
 49. *Busolt*, 25: 1493–4.
 50. *Collins*, 25: 33.
 51. *Ibid.*, 25: 187.
 52. For example, *Menschenkunde*, 25: 1096–7. The anthropology lectures afford rich material for a discussion of whether Kant adequately distinguishes between the question of whether one could make a judgment of taste entirely on one’s own, without empirical evidence about the judgments of others by which to form one’s own taste, and whether one would have any incentive to make such judgments and preserve or create objects of beauty apart from the society of others. The anthropology lectures thus noticeably augment the materials for a discussion of these issues found in Kant’s logic notes and lectures, on which my earlier discussion of this issue was based; see Paul Guyer, “Pleasure and Society in Kant’s Theory of Taste,” in Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer, eds., *Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 21–54. These materials will have to be examined more closely on another occasion.
 53. See my *Kant and the Experience of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), and “The Symbols of Freedom in Kant’s Aesthetics,” in Herman Parret, ed., *Kant’s Aesthetik – Kant’s Aesthetics – L’esthétique de Kant* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), pp. 338–55.
 54. *Critique of Judgment*, §§2–5, 5: 204–11.
 55. *Ibid.*, §15, 5: 226–9.
 56. *Ibid.*, §4, 5: 207 and §16, 5: 229–30.
 57. *Ibid.*, 5: 229–30.
 58. *Ibid.*, §17, 5: 232.
 59. *Ibid.*, 5: 233–4.
 60. *Ibid.*, §17, 5: 235.
 61. For a full account of this interpretation of an aesthetic idea, see my “Kant’s Conception of Fine Art,” *Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism* 51 (1994): 175–85, reprinted as ch. 12 in the 2nd ed. of *Kant and the Claims of Taste*.
 62. *Critique of Judgment*, §29, 5: 316.
 63. *Collins*, 25: 198.

64. *Critique of Judgment* §28, 5: 262.
65. *Ibid.*, §59, 5: 354.
66. *Ibid.*, §§30–1, 5: 279–81.
67. *Ibid.*, §67, 5: 380.
68. *Ibid.*, §41, 5: 296–8.
69. *Ibid.*, §42, 5: 300.
70. See my “From Nature to Morality: Kant’s New Argument in the ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment’ ” (see note 8).
71. *Critique of Judgment*, §46, 5: 307.
72. *Ibid.*, §26, 5: 307.
73. That is, in the attack upon the “empirical interest in beauty” in §41.

Kant's Apology for Sensibility

Howard Caygill

The “Apology for Sensibility” that constitutes sections 8–11 of the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798) offers a summary justification for one of the most important innovations of Kant’s critical philosophy. Without the invention and justification of *Sinnlichkeit* or “sensibility” the concept of experience informing the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the critique of traditional metaphysics based upon it would not have been possible and Kant’s philosophy would have remained a footnote to the then prevailing Leibniz-Wolff system of philosophy. Indeed, when his contemporary Eberhard claimed that everything in the critical philosophy had already been said by Leibniz and Wolff, Kant defended the originality of his contribution in terms of the “infinite difference between the theory of sensibility, as a particular mode of intuition” and one that regards sensibility as the “imprecise representation of an intellectual intuition.”¹ Yet the doctrine of sensibility is itself internally complex, drawing together diverse lines and styles of arguments ranging across the disciplines of aesthetics, logic, metaphysics, psychology, politics, and ethics. In order to invent an integrated doctrine of sensibility it was necessary for Kant to find a space for reflection free from the limits imposed by these disciplines. Such a space was opened in the lecture course on anthropology that Kant offered for the first time in 1772–3 and which served as the crucible for the integrated doctrine of sensibility central to the critical philosophy.

The Critical Doctrine of Sensibility

The importance of the doctrine of sensibility is repeatedly underlined in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the discussion of the systematic divisions of the science of transcendental philosophy in the introduction to the first *Critique*, Kant introduced the analysis of sensibility as part of the fundamental “doctrine of elements,” observing “that there are two stems of human knowledge, namely, *sensibility* and *understanding*, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown root” (A 15/B 29). Since sensibility involves the way in which “objects are given to us” and understanding the way “they are thought,” and since “the conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are given must precede those under which they are thought” the doctrine of elements and thus the entire science of transcendental philosophy must begin with the “transcendental doctrine of sensibility” (A 16/B 30). The “Transcendental Aesthetic” thus opens the doctrine of elements with an extended reflection upon *a priori* sensibility.

The “Transcendental Aesthetic” compresses a number of distinct definitions for sensibility. The first “psychological” definition describes sensibility as the “capacity [*Fähigkeit*] (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects” (A 19/B 33). In this description sensibility has two aspects: it is both the capacity to receive representations and the mode in which these representations are produced or how we are affected by objects. This preliminary definition in terms of the subject of sensibility is then supplemented by a further distinction concerning its object: in respect to the “capacity for receiving representations” the effect of an object upon the “faculty of representation” is registered as sensation, however, in terms of “the mode in which we are affected by objects” the “undetermined object” is an appearance. With this step the definition shifts from the psychological to the ontological register. The shift is confirmed by the subsequent distinction between the *matter* of appearance – the appearance carried into representation and given to sensibility – and the *form* of appearance that constitutes the mode through which appearances are admitted to representation – their “being ordered in certain relations” (A 20/B 35).² It is the inquiry into the latter or the “science of all principles of *a priori* sensibility” that forms the object of the first part of the doctrine of elements.

Immediately after giving a title to the science of sensibility, Kant was constrained to distinguish his use of the term “aesthetic” from his predecessor Baumgarten, who had revived the term in his *Reflections on Poetry* (1735). In a tense footnote Kant refers to Baumgarten’s aesthetics in terms of the “abortive attempt” to “bring the treatment of the beautiful under rational principles” (A 21/B 35). In the A (1781) edition Kant advises his readers to “give up using the name [aesthetics] in this sense of critique of taste, and to reserve it for that doctrine of sensibility which is true science – thus approximating to the language and sense of the ancients in their far famed division of knowledge into *aistheta* and *noeta*” (A 21). In the B (1787) edition this sentence is qualified by the addition of the word “either” and the extra clause “or else to share the name with speculative philosophy, employing it partly in the transcendental partly in the psychological sense” (B 36). The change between 1781 and 1787 in the understanding of the science of sensibility does not only reflect the influence of Kant’s reflections on taste and aesthetics, but also his ambivalent relation to Baumgarten. The very distinction between aesthetics as theory of art and as a science of *aistheta* used against Baumgarten was indeed borrowed from him.³

With the footnote Kant introduces another layer of definition for sensibility, this time in terms of aesthetics. However, this is by no means the end of the list of elements that make up his definition. A further element crucial to the argument of the *Critique* involves distinguishing sensibility from the understanding. Kant is very careful to insist that this distinction be transcendental and not merely logical, for reasons that become clear in the “Note on the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection.” Here Kant distinguished his position from that of Leibniz. For Kant, Leibniz made only a logical distinction between sensibility and the understanding: “He compared all things with each other by means of concepts alone, and naturally found no other differences save those only through which the understanding distinguishes its pure concepts from one another” (A 270/B 326). This meant that “The conditions of sensible intuition, which carry with them their own differences, he did not regard as original, sensibility being only for him a confused mode of representation, and not a separate source of representations” (A 270/B 326). For Kant it was necessary to go beyond the logical distinction of clear and confused knowledge to the

transcendental distinction of sensibility and understanding as separate sources of representations.

The recognition of the transcendental distinction between sensibility and understanding is crucial to the entire critical enterprise for without it the entire case for synthetic *a priori* knowledge would be lost. If there were but a logical distinction between sensible and intelligible representations, then all knowledge would be analytic, concerned with abstracting intelligible knowledge from the confusions of sensibility. In this view, sensibility can contribute only confusion, and is better avoided or overcome. Kant however insists (against Leibniz and Locke) on “seeking in understanding and sensibility two sources of representations which, while quite different, can supply objectively valid judgments of things only in *conjunction* with each other” (A 271/B 327). This claim, crucial for the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge, requires not only the existence of sensibility, but also its autonomy in respect to the understanding. Sensibility is not simply the realm of confused representations, but makes an essential contribution to synthetic *a priori* knowledge – for that reason it deserves an apology or defence against the accusation that its sole contribution is to confuse the understanding.

The nature of the synthesis of sensibility and understanding became the central problem of the critical philosophy. Kant at one point goes so far as to concede that “The concept of sensibility and of appearance would be falsified, and our whole teaching with regard to them would be rendered empty and useless, if we were to accept the view that our entire sensibility is nothing but a confused representation of things.”⁴ Consequently, it was necessary to show not only that sensibility and understanding are distinct, but also that they can be conjoined – that the receptivity of the former and the spontaneity of the latter can be unified. Kant’s philosophy is notoriously full of contrivances for effecting this union – “schematism” and the threefold synthesis of the imagination, for example – but each contrivance depends upon a particular understanding of sensibility, emphasising its receptivity, its givenness, its figurality, or its formality. The argument of the *Critique* can only start if its readers concede at the outset the possibility of sensibility: the *Critique* cannot begin without it, but neither can it begin with a full justification of it. The *Critique*’s argument would be excessively compromised and defensive if the central innovation – the

doctrine of sensibility – was so put in question that it itself needed justification. Thus it remains largely assumed, an implicit postulate of the *Critique*. However, it is possible to trace the origins of sensibility to the lectures on logic, metaphysics, and anthropology. The lectures on logic criticise the equation of sensible with confused knowledge while those on metaphysics explore the genetic difference and synthetic complementarity of sensible and intelligible; it is only in the lectures on anthropology that Kant was able to unite the two approaches into the integrated doctrine of sensibility that informs the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The Sources of Sensibility

The inquiry into the sources of sensibility leads back to the lectures on anthropology from early in the “silent decade” of the 1770s. It is in these, and not in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770) that Kant produced the innovative fusion of elements that he entitled sensibility. While the Inaugural Dissertation on *The Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds* marks an important stage on the road to the invention of sensibility, its significance should not be exaggerated. The descriptions of space and time in the Inaugural Dissertation are still largely framed in terms of received Wolffian conceptions of the sensible and intelligible worlds. Indeed, many of the apparent references to sensibility in this text are retrospective projections produced by translation from the Latin. For the most part “sensible” is used adjectivally – a usage entirely consistent with that of the Leibniz-Wolff school. Kant does occasionally use the word “*sensualitas*,” such as in the opening sentence of §3 – “*Sensualitas est receptivas subiecti*” – which may be translated as “sensibility,” but only rarely and without extended reflection. This contrasts with the lectures on anthropology, where already in the surviving transcripts from the 1772–3 series (Collins and Parow) Kant explicitly discussed and felt it necessary to defend the innovative concept of sensibility.

The explicit discussion of sensibility in the lectures on anthropology was made possible by the innovative and open structure of this new discipline. In contrast with his other lecture courses, those on anthropology and physical geography were unique in not following an officially approved manual or *compendium*.⁵ Kant thus enjoyed a

certain freedom to arrange both content and structure of the lectures; his reflections were not confined to the disciplinary limits set by the *compendia*. At the outset of the 1798 published version of his lectures Kant concedes that “although there are no real sources available for anthropology, there are such aids as world history, biographies and even plays and novels” (p. 6). But the structure of the lectures, which remained fairly stable over the decades of lecturing,⁶ was taken from elsewhere: “When Kant began lecturing on Anthropology in the winter of 1772–73, he correlated a good deal of material that he had already been using in his lectures on Ethics, Metaphysics, and Physical Geography”⁷ to which must be added those on logic. In the case of sensibility, this relatively open structure encouraged an approach that confronted and combined the discrete perspectives of the lectures on logic and on metaphysics.

The organisation and content of the lectures on logic and metaphysics that Kant had been giving since the 1750s were tied to officially approved textbooks. The texts used by Kant represented a specific and indeed critical current within the “Leibniz-Wolff philosophy.”⁸ His lectures on metaphysics followed Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica* (1739), which went through seven editions in the forty years after first publication; his lectures on ethics used the same author’s *Initia philosophiae practicae primae* (1740) and *Ethica philosophica* (1740) while his lectures on logic followed the *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre* (1752) by Georg-Friedrich Meier, one of Baumgarten’s closest disciples.⁹

While Baumgarten’s and Meier’s texts followed the systematic organisation of philosophy proposed by Wolff in his German and Latin systems, they nevertheless represented a critical departure from him and from the work of the first generation of Wolffian philosophers. Their work may be described as an “aesthetic” revision of Wolff first announced by Baumgarten in his *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis et poema pertinentibus* (1735). In this text, organised according to the classical rhetorical structure of the “invention,” “disposition,” and “elocution” of a discourse or work of poetry, Baumgarten endorsed the value of a “sensible knowledge” independent of the claims of rational knowledge. This proposition was developed extensively in his lectures on aesthetics and, later, in the incomplete *Aesthetica* (1750–8).

The reform of the Wolffian philosophy implied in the textbooks used by Kant opened the path for his invention of an integrated doctrine of sensibility, even though Baumgarten and Meier themselves did not fully anticipate this step. While they proposed a forceful critique of the Wolffian rejection of sensible knowledge they did not elaborate a full doctrine of sensibility as such. However, their critique of Wolff in logic and metaphysics and the development of the concept of aesthetics implied in their textbooks allowed Kant in his lectures to make the first fragmentary sketches of a concept of “sensibility” rather than simply “sensible knowledge.” However, the development of these sketches into a full doctrine of sensibility was inhibited by the disciplinary contexts of the lectures on logic and metaphysics. He was only able to develop a fuller and synoptic account of the doctrine in the lectures on anthropology, where he was no longer tied to the letter and organisation of the textbooks.

The extent to which Kant’s invention of sensibility builds on the work of Baumgarten and Meier can be appreciated by a brief comparison of their and Wolff’s accounts of sensible knowledge. While neither they nor Wolff possess a concept of sensibility, there is nevertheless a radical difference between their respective treatments of the role of the senses in knowledge and experience. In the seminal “German Metaphysics” – *Vernunftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt* (1719) – Wolff reduces to a minimum the contribution of the senses to the development of knowledge. Departing in some respects from Leibniz, who in the “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas” (1684) classified sense perception as clear but confused, Wolff regarded the senses as making a wholly negative contribution to rational knowledge. Defined as the “capacity for perception” based in the “alterations in the parts of our bodies occasioned by external objects” (§220), the senses distract the understanding (§271), and are sources of error (§793) and even slavery: “For one calls those slaves who allow themselves to be governed by their affections, and remain in the obscure knowledge of the senses and imagination” (§491). While in §223 Wolff concedes that sensible perceptions are tied to consciousness and later even concedes differences of clarity between different senses (sight and smell) (§230), he does not develop these hints into a broader justification of sensible knowledge. Nor does his discussion go beyond the five physical senses

to the discovery of an underlying common “sensibility” informing all sense perception. Wolff throughout remained committed to a model of conscious, rational knowledge in which there is no room for an independent contribution of the senses.

In the *Reflections on Poetry*, Baumgarten took the opportunity of showing not only that Wolff's narrow rational understanding of knowledge made no sense when applied to poetry (as was attempted by Gottsched in his *Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst* [1730])¹⁰ but also that the reflection on poetics afforded a general vindication of sensible knowledge. Baumgarten concluded his reflections with a call for an expanded logic that would be reached by way of poetics and would include both rational *noetic* and sensible *aesthetic* knowledge:

Philosophical poetics is the science guiding sensate discourses to perfection; and since in speaking we have those representations which we communicate, philosophical poetics presupposes in the poet a lower cognitive faculty. It would now be the task of logic in its broader sense to guide this faculty in the sensate cognition of things, but he who knows the state of our logic will not be unaware how uncultivated this field is (§115).

With the explicit critique of Wolffian logic Baumgarten throws down the gage for a new, expanded logic and metaphysics that will include *noeta* and *aistheta* – things known and things perceived: “*things known* are to be known by the superior faculty as the object of logic; *things perceived* as the science of perception or aesthetics” (§116). This programme, closer in inspiration to Leibniz than to Wolff, formed the basis of Baumgarten's attempt in his textbooks to substitute his aesthetically revised and extended logic and metaphysics for those of Wolff. The link that permitted Baumgarten to bring together aesthetics and noetics was the concept of perfection: aesthetic perfection differed from noetic perfection, but together both contributed to the overall perfection of knowledge. For Wolff there was only logical perfection – the senses did not possess their own perfection, but were simply sources of imperfection. Baumgarten's revision of Wolff proved successful: while his texts and those of epigones such as Meier were constantly reprinted during the century, the pages of Wolff's work were reported being used in Berlin during the 1760s for wrapping up butter.¹¹

The texts used by Kant to teach logic and metaphysics already include a justification of sensible knowledge, but by no means a doctrine

of sensibility. While defending the legitimacy of sensible knowledge, Baumgarten at no point developed an argument for sensibility as such. The nearest he came to a doctrine of sensibility was in his notion of the “lower cognitive faculty.” This can be seen emerging in the changing definitions of aesthetics developed through the succeeding editions of the *Metaphysica*. In the first edition (1739) aesthetics is defined as “The science of sensible knowledge and presentation: if a lesser perfection of reflection and sensible speech is sought, then it is rhetoric; if a greater, then it is universal poetics” (§533). Here there is no mention of cognitive faculties or indeed reference to the wider epistemological and ontological implications of the new logic intimated in the closing pages of the *Reflections on Poetry*. In the 1742 edition however, after further reflection and Baumgarten’s departure from the Wolffian University of Halle for the Viadrina University at Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, the definition of aesthetics was expanded to contain the ambition of the new logic: “Aesthetics is the science of sensible knowledge (logic of the lower cognitive faculty)” (§533). The reference to the lower cognitive faculty is further extended in the 1757 edition to include the “doctrine of lower knowledge, the art of beautiful thinking and the art of thinking by analogy to reason” (§533).

In spite of these developments, neither Baumgarten nor Meier fully developed the link between sensible knowledge and the lower cognitive faculty. Baumgarten hinted at link through the concept of “perfection” (defined as the unity of a manifold), but wracked by sickness was unable to do more than publish the two fragmentary and undeveloped volumes of his *Aesthetica* based on his lectures. Meier and other disciples preferred to use aesthetics as an excuse not for expanding but for rejecting logic. Instead of a new logic combining noetics and aesthetics, the preference in the 1760s was for “thinking beautifully” instead of systematically. Meier in aesthetics (*Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften* [1748–50]) as well as in his logic (*Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*) dedicated aesthetics to the sensible figuration of abstract thinking, thus subordinating rational thought to rhetorical *elocutio* or the persuasive presentation of a rational discourse.

Kant to some extent shared the antisystematic trend of “beautiful thinking” in the 1760s, as is evident from the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764) and from parts of the lectures on anthropology where he repeated Meier’s defence of sensible knowledge

in terms of *elocutio* or the lively, sensible figuration of dry abstract thought. Nevertheless, the daily grind at “the anvil” of his lectern inclined Kant to reconsider the option of the expanded logic and metaphysics proposed by Baumgarten that would combine rational and sensible knowledge. The transcripts of his lectures on these subjects show him reasoning the need for a rigorous concept of sensibility in both didactic contexts, but not bringing together the metaphysical and logical accounts into the “broader logic” intimated by Baumgarten. His commentaries remain faithful to Baumgarten’s suggestion that aesthetic and noetic knowledge be unified by the concept of perfection, even though on occasions they point beyond to a new principle of synthesis in the notion of “sensibility.” The key to this synthesis lay in the fusion of the logical and the metaphysical/psychological aspects of sensible knowledge and experience: Kant was able to bring the concerns together, not so much in the lectures on metaphysics and logic as in those on anthropology. Here he juxtaposed Meier’s defence of sensible knowledge in terms of *elocutio*, or to use Kant’s later term “hypotyposis,” with a new and comprehensive doctrine of sensibility that brought together the analyses of sensible knowledge developed in the lectures on logic and metaphysics.

The move toward a doctrine of sensibility as opposed to sensible knowledge is evident in the transcripts of Kant’s lecture course on logic from the early 1770s known as the “Blomberg Logic.” In commenting on Meier’s *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre* Kant intimates aspects of the doctrine of sensibility. This emerged against the grain of Meier’s text, which proposes a quite different understanding of the relationship between aesthetics and logic. Kant’s thoughts on sensible knowledge and sensibility are clustered in two sections of commentary: the first corresponds to Meier’s paragraphs 19–35 on “Logical and Aesthetic Perfection of Cognition,” the second to paragraphs 122–140 on “Clear, Distinct and Obscure Cognition.” The distribution of Kant’s comments on sensibility corresponds in the first case to Meier’s presentation of Baumgarten’s attempt to extend logic to include aesthetics, and in the second to the nature of the “obscure cognitions” that make up aesthetic cognition.

Kant begins the first group of comments by clarifying Meier and Baumgarten’s distinction between logical and aesthetic perfection of cognition: the former “consist in agreement with objective laws

and conditions” the latter “in agreement with subjective laws and conditions.”¹² Kant’s gloss on the two perfections of cognition moves between underlining the generic differences between logic and aesthetics and making further specific differences within aesthetic perfection. The two interpretative movements are not entirely consistent, since the view of aesthetics necessary to support the generic difference is complicated by the specific differences within the concept of aesthetics itself. The generic difference is first established in terms of the agreement of cognition “with the constitution of the thing” in logic and its aesthetic “effect on our feeling and our taste” (p. 31). The assignment of the perfection of aesthetic cognition to feeling and taste illustrates the narrow reading of Baumgarten’s aesthetics promoted by Meier, taking the latter’s exemplar of aesthetic cognition – taste in art – for its entire content.

The ensuing discussion of aesthetic perfection is conducted in terms of the theory of taste. It is in the course of the analysis of the relationship between taste and the understanding and communicability that Kant introduces the phrase “laws of sensibility.” The phrase is used on two occasions and not with complete consistency. The second reference is consistent with the limitation of aesthetic perfection to taste, and anticipates one of the theses of the *Critique of Judgement*. Criticising the view that taste is personal and cannot be disputed, Kant reflects: “Taste also has certain universal laws, but can these laws be cognised *in abstracto a priori*? No. But *in concreto*; because the laws of taste are really not laws of the understanding, but universal laws of sensibility.”¹³ In this context the nature of the universal laws is assumed to consist in the universality of feeling, an assumption that had already been undermined by a previous reference to the “laws of sensibility” and its indication that these laws do not necessarily address the realm of affect but are in some way also cognitive.

Prior to focusing upon the generic distinction between aesthetic and logical perfection, Kant drew an interesting specific difference within aesthetic cognition itself. This distinction was framed in terms of sensation and intuition, a distinction immediately qualified by describing both as the limit points of a continuum of aesthetic perfection: “For we cannot judge by means of sensation but we can by means of intuition, and just for that reason the former has the lowest position in what has to do with aesthetic perfection, the latter the highest”

(p. 31). Sensation consists in being “affected by the presence of the object” while intuition involves judgment, but not a logical judgment. The nature of this judgment seems problematic – is it a cognitive judgment based on the discernment of the grades of perfection present in the object of judgment or is it affective, depending on differences of the degree of pleasure or displeasure excited by the object?

It would have been conceivable for Kant to have followed Baumgarten and linked the subjective and objective aspects of aesthetics, correlating the degree of pleasure with the degree of perfection present in the given object. However, he did not do so. Instead he made the claim that:

An aesthetic perfection is a perfection according to laws of sensibility. We make something sensible when we make the object awaken and excite a sensation, and when I make something capable of intuition. The greater art of taste consists in now making sensible what I first expounded dryly, in clothing it in objects of sensibility, but in such a way that the understanding loses nothing thereby.¹⁴

First Kant defines aesthetic perfection according to “laws of sensibility” and then describes the act of “making something sensible” – an action that both excites sensation but also makes it “capable of intuition” that is to say, capable of being judged.¹⁵ The act of “making something sensible” the *elocutio* that Kant will later term “hypotyposis” and under which he gathered the schema, the *typic*, the analogy, and the symbol¹⁶ here serves both to excite sensation and to enable judgment. This is confirmed by the gloss on the “greater art of taste” that consists in presenting a logical discourse in a sensible guise. The capacity to judge is implied in the logical discourse, but is presented and perceived in a way that will excite sensation.

In this discussion the precise location and character of the “laws of sensibility” remains undetermined. According to the first distinction between sensation and intuition it seems as if intuition has its own form of judgment with its own laws. Yet according to the definition of the accord of aesthetic perfection with the laws of sensibility, these laws are the laws of logic but presented under the guise of sensation. Thirdly, it also seems as if the definition of the laws of sensibility in terms of the universal laws of taste locates the universality of the laws in the universal capacity for the pleasure of sensation. Kant juxtaposes

three distinct descriptions of the laws of sensation: one in terms of the distinction between sensation and intuition; another in terms of *elocutio* or the lively sensible presentation of abstract ideas and a third in terms of the universality of affect. However, the underlying claim that aesthetics judges in a different way from logic is affirmed in Kant's concluding attempt to bring together the judgment of taste and intuition: "The judgment of taste is: One judges concerning this or that thing by means of and according to its look" (p. 33). Such a judgment is cognitive and not affective, but its cognitive claim cannot be couched in logical terms. Here Kant points to a judgment based on discriminations between "looks" rather than a subsumption of individuals under generic concepts. Laws of sensibility are drawn from the judgment of the "look" of individual objects; they do not precede but follow judgment: as he will later explain, they are laws based on coordination rather than subordination and coordination.

Baumgarten united aesthetic cognition and affect through the concept of perfection, a solution that Kant retained in his lectures but evidently did not fully endorse. While recognising a relationship between sensible (i.e., confused) cognition and sensible affect (feeling) he did not think it possible logically to determine this relationship and thus raise aesthetics to the status of a science:

Feeling is stirred by confused cognition, and on that account it is very hard to observe it, so that in general a science of it, i.e., *aesthetica*, has very many difficulties. Baumgarten first made a science of it (p. 49).

Kant thus passes over Baumgarten's claim that the affect of the beautiful offers a clue to the understanding of confused cognition while nevertheless acknowledging a link between cognition and affect.¹⁷ Yet the lectures on logic were not the place to explore the link between human cognition and affectivity: this was assumed in order to pursue the link between aesthetics and logic. Following Meier, Kant is interested above all in how clear, rational thoughts can be presented in the confused but more pleasing medium of sensibility.

The discussion of sensibility that appears later in the Blomberg logic is consistent with this position. In the commentary upon Meier's discussion of clear, distinct, and obscure cognition the focus is overwhelmingly on how to present rational thoughts in an aesthetically pleasing way. Yet even here, Kant's insights point beyond the text on which he

is commenting. He claims, for example, in full agreement with Meier, that “Aesthetics is occupied only with painting things” but then adds that aesthetic as opposed to logical judgment is lateral, concerned with distinctions between “coordinate marks” while logic operates through subordination, and is concerned with genera.¹⁸ In the definitions of sensibility that follow, the concern with the aesthetic presentation of rational cognition evident in claims such as “Sensibility is the perfection of cognition when we represent a thing like objects of the senses” and “sensibility brings about liveliness” is interrupted by the claim that sensibility belongs to things “insofar as we represent a thing through individual concepts,” which describes a cognitive characteristic of sensibility rather than how its affective properties can be of use to reason. Liveliness, indeed, becomes the defining character of perfect aesthetic cognition, providing a link between sensible affect and the clarity of sensible cognition: “Sensible clarity is nothing other than liveliness[;] in intuition there is clarity, but sensible clarity” (p. 101). Yet the liveliness manifest in clarity and experienced in sensation is strictly in the service of the persuasive presentation of rational cognitions, or rhetorical *elocutio*.

Kant was aware that the limits of his discussion of sensibility were to some extent given by the discipline – logic – upon which he was commenting. The analysis of the relationship between aesthetic and logical cognition and between sensible affect and cognition was largely assumed. Further speculation on the character of these relations was beyond the province of logic. Speaking in particular of the analysis of obscure cognitions – one of the main objects of analysis in Baumgarten’s aesthetics – he noted:

The doctrine of obscure cognitions is not at all logical but only metaphysical. *Logica* is not a science concerning the nature of the subject, of the human soul, for cognising what really lies hidden within it. Instead it presupposes clear concepts and treats of the use of our understanding and of our reason (p. 96).

In spite of the return to the narrow Wolffian definition of logic criticised by Baumgarten and Meier, this passage contains an important hint that further development of the doctrine of obscure cognitions, or sensibility, is to be sought in metaphysics, by which is meant Baumgarten’s metaphysics and in particular the section on empirical

psychology. In his discussion of sensibility in his metaphysics lectures Kant offers a crucial supplement to the doctrine of sensibility developed in the lectures on logic. But already these lectures evoke a cluster of relations between intuition, judgment, sensation, and affect that marks the partial emergence of a new doctrine of sensibility.

The discussion of aesthetics and sensibility in the lectures on metaphysics is found in Kant's comments upon the section of Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* dedicated to empirical psychology. The subdivision of metaphysics according to ontology, psychology, cosmology, and theology that continues to govern the architecture of the *Critique of Pure Reason* originates in Wolff, as does the distinction between empirical and rational psychology prominent in Baumgarten but absent in the *Critique*. Wolff framed the distinction between empirical and rational psychology in terms of a descriptive and an essential definition of the soul. At the outset of chapter three of the German Metaphysics on the soul in general, Wolff claims not to define what the soul is, but "merely to relate what we perceive of it through daily experience" [*mein Vorhaben ist jetzund bloss zu erzehlen, was wir durch die tägliche Erfahrung von ihr wahrnehmen*] (Wolff, §191). This approach – which Kant will later describe as "anthropological" – differs from that of rational psychology, which begins not from the everyday experience of the soul but from the rational definition of "the essence of the soul" [*das Wesen der Seele*] moving from consciousness to self-consciousness (§727).

The distinction between empirical and rational psychology is not observed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which focuses almost exclusively upon the critique of the paralogsms of rational psychology. This is largely due to the transfer of much of the commentary on Baumgarten's empirical psychology to the first part of the lectures on anthropology. The transfer of this material is also evident from the transcripts of the lectures on metaphysics and anthropology. While the coverage of empirical psychology was still fairly comprehensive in the anon-L transcript of the mid-1770s (forty-one pages in the *Akademie Ausgabe*) it is reduced in the Mrongrovius transcript of 1782–3 to twenty-seven pages and further reduced in all subsequent transcripts to a token presence. The transfer of the comments on sensibility that formed part of empirical psychology to anthropology liberated them from the context of metaphysical commentary and allowed them to be

complemented by comments on sensibility from the lectures on logic previously described.

In the introduction to the section of the *Metaphysica* devoted to psychology, Baumgarten follows Wolff in distinguishing between an empirical psychology derived from experience and a rational psychology derived from the concept of the soul. Baumgarten departs from Wolff in organising the theoretical part of the empirical psychology around the distinction between the lower and the higher faculties of the soul. Although the empirical psychology claims to be derived from experience it in fact depends on an *a priori* definition of the soul as a representative power *vis repraesentativa*. Following this definition Baumgarten is able first to describe all thoughts as representations and then to grade them upon a continuum ranging from obscure and confused to clear and distinct. The lower faculty of knowledge is concerned with obscure and confused representations, identified by Baumgarten with sensible perception and analysed by the science of aesthetics as “the science of sensible knowledge and presentation.”¹⁹

Unlike Meier, Baumgarten's account of aesthetics does not focus exclusively upon “sensible presentation, although section II of the empirical psychology on the lower faculty is largely devoted to the contribution of the lower faculty to the presentation or the “liveliness of representation.” The third section on the senses, however, also considers aesthetic knowledge, here considered in terms of the lower grades of a continuum of representations. The assumption of a continuum of representations qualifies the distinction between the lower and higher faculties, with the obscure and confused representations of the lower faculty merging into the clear and distinct knowledge of higher. There is no room for a separate doctrine of sensibility, and the discussion remains confined to examples of sensuous perception.

Kant's commentary of the mid-1770s on the early sections of Baumgarten's empirical psychology substantially reorganises the account of the soul, replacing the continuum of representations spanning the lower and higher faculties by a radical distinction between them. Where Baumgarten begins from the *cogito* and derives from it the power of the soul (§504) – “I think and my soul is altered; therefore thoughts are accidents of my soul which must have some sufficient reason in my soul. Consequently my soul is a power” – Kant begins from the experience of passivity and self-activity: “I feel myself either

as *passive* or as *self-active*.”²⁰ From this distinction he derives the upper and lower faculties upon which he then projects the three main capacities of the soul: its capacity for representation, for desire, and for pleasure and displeasure. From this principle of a discontinuous operation of the soul, Kant derives the distinction between sensibility and intellectuality: “All lower faculties constitute *sensibility* and all higher faculties constitute *intellectuality*” (p. 48). Sensibility is characterised by passivity and intellectuality by self-activity: “Sensibility is the passive property of the faculty of our cognition so far as we are affected by objects. But intellectuality is the spontaneity of our faculty so far as we ourselves either cognise or desire something or have satisfaction of dissatisfaction in something” (p. 48). Thus the continuum of representations proposed by Baumgarten is replaced by a radical distinction between those representations that are occasioned by an object and those that “arise from ourselves.”

Kant was not content simply to base the distinction between sensibility and understanding on that between passivity and activity, but also identified passive and active modalities within sensibility. He thus distinguishes between passive sensation – the confusion of representations that issue from the senses – and a self-active sensibility that “consists in intuition.” This is consistent with the description of aesthetic intuition in the lectures on logic as a judgment of sense, but it means that Kant has now to give a justification of self-active sensibility.

Paradoxically, Kant supplies this justification by means of mobilising one of the resources of empirical psychology that Baumgarten inherited from Wolff. This is the description of states of mind such as fantasy and invention, memory and anticipation. Kant reorganises Baumgarten’s (and Wolff’s) discussion of these mental states by distinguishing between “the faculty of the senses themselves and the imitated cognition of the senses,” the former being passive, the latter being self-active; the former “*representations of the senses themselves*” and the latter “*cognitions of the formative power*” (p. 49). These distinctions are then brought together into a classification of passive and active sensibility in terms of whether sensible cognitions are *given* or *made*. He then, without great fidelity to his text, redescribes Baumgarten’s discussions of the states corresponding to past, present, and future perception as “faculties of the formative power.” The operation of these faculties,

in turn, is distinguished from both passive sensibility and the activity characteristic of the understanding.

The distinction is significant not only for introducing self-activity in sensibility, and thus illuminating one of the puzzles of the lectures on logic – how aesthetic intuition is able to judge – but also for distinguishing this “formative power” of the sensibility from the “thinking power” of the understanding. The assignment to intuition of a self-active formative power, necessary for Kant to sustain consistency in his critique of Baumgarten, eventually opened the possibility of the entirely original understanding of sensibility that was presented in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The beginnings are evident a little later in the transcript of Anon-L. The formative power of sensibility is described as “a faculty for making out of ourselves cognitions which in themselves nevertheless have the form according to which objects would affect our senses” (p. 53). Yet the power of producing this form applies not only to past and future – memory and anticipation – but also to the present: the formative faculty “produces representations, either of the *present* time, or representations of the *past* time, or also representations of the *future* time” as the faculties of illustration, imitation, and anticipation. Thus present perception is not simply the domain of passive sensibility, but also involves the exercise of formative sensibility: even sensations are no longer merely given but are made. Furthermore, when these temporal modes of formative power are explained in terms of examples, it becomes clear they all involve the creation of spatial manifolds or images. Thus the modes of the formative sensibility reduce essentially to modes of space and time, and the ground is prepared for their reduction to the temporal and spatial forms of intuition of the Transcendental Aesthetic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The step of reducing the baroque descriptions of the formative sensibility to the pure forms of intuition remains an extraordinary act of philosophical invention. It would not have been possible without the lectures on anthropology, which provided a space for reflecting upon the doctrine of sensibility in its essentials, rather than refracted through commentary. Nevertheless, even in the lectures and the approved text of the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* much of the psychological machinery of Wolff and Baumgarten remains in place: the latter half of Book One on “The Cognitive Faculty”

remains indebted to the structure of the partial reorganisation of Baumgarten's empirical psychology already achieved in Anon-L.²¹ Yet in the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* this discussion is preceded by an "Apology for Sensibility" that reflects upon, and justifies, the new notion of sensibility discovered in the critical commentaries upon Meier and Baumgarten.

The Apology for Sensibility

The "Apology for Sensibility" is not an absolute novelty, indeed it marks the continuation of Kant's critical commentary upon Baumgarten. Baumgarten himself, in his lectures on aesthetics, and later in the *Aesthetica*, wrote an "apology for sensibility" to defend sensible knowledge against the religious objections of pietists (the emphasis in the lectures) and against the objections of Wolffians (the emphasis in the *Aesthetica*).²² Thus Kant's unusual choice of the literary form of an apology for sensibility has a direct antecedent in Baumgarten. His critique of Baumgarten's doctrine of sensible knowledge and the consequent invention of the concept of sensibility is defended using the form of defence already used by Baumgarten in the *Aesthetica*.

In the "Prolegomena" to the first volume of *Aesthetica* Baumgarten develops an extended apology for his new science. After four paragraphs summarily defining the object and scope of aesthetics, Baumgarten considers and replies to the objections against the new science. The objections and replies fall into three groups: the first, comprising objections 1–3 and 8, concerns the object and method of aesthetics; the second, comprising objections 4–7 and 10 concern confused knowledge and sensibility; while the third, comprising objection 9, concerns the qualifications of the aesthetician. The first and third groups of objections concern the discipline of aesthetics, as opposed to the second, which concerns the concept of sensible knowledge that underlies it. It was the second group that has the closest similarity to Kant's apology.²³

The second group of objections constitutes Baumgarten's own apology for sensible cognition. All of them concern the metaphysical and logical basis of aesthetic cognitions. Against the opening objection that it is below the dignity of philosophy to concern itself with "sensible perceptions, fantasies, inventions and the perturbations of affect,"²⁴

Baumgarten replies that the philosopher must be concerned with all aspects of human cognition and that it is necessary not to confuse the reflection upon confused knowledge with confusion. The following objection is the Wolffian claim that “confusion is the mother of error,” confusion meaning “confused cognition.” Baumgarten replies that confusion is the necessary presupposition for the discovery of truth, given that there is a continuity between obscure and clear thinking. He adds that it is the lack of reflection upon confused thought that leads to error, and that aesthetics does not endorse confused cognition but seeks to improve it. The sixth objection claims that clear thinking must have precedence over confused thinking, which Baumgarten concedes for some things while claiming that the beautiful is the concern of aesthetics. The seventh objection that rational thought will be damaged by the cultivation of sensible thought by analogy with it [*analogi rationis*] is turned around by Baumgarten, saying that precisely this threat means that sensible cognition should be taken seriously and that its neglect would lead to greater damage. Baumgarten replies to the tenth objection, that the lower faculty of knowledge is better fought than encouraged, by saying that the lower faculties should be ruled and not tyrannised, that aesthetics would undertake this guidance, and that the aesthete would not strengthen the corruption of the lower faculty, but would guide it in the right direction away from corruption.²⁵

The form and some aspects of the content of Baumgarten's defence of sensible knowledge anticipates Kant's apology for sensibility in the lectures on anthropology. In the published 1798 *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, the “Apology for Sensibility” is Kant's heading for an extended three-point justification for sensibility against the charges of its adversaries. While the heading itself is an editorial addition by Kant, the need to defend sensibility at this early point in the lectures is evident already in the transcripts of the first series of lectures in 1772–3 and became more urgent during the 1770s.

The transcripts of the first run of the lecture series in 1772–3 – Collins and Parow – both testify to Kant's concern to defend the concept of sensibility against a range of objections. The discussion of sensibility according to Collins is distributed between sections on *Die Sinnlichkeit* and *Theorie der Sinnlichkeit*. The first opens with a definition of sensibility as the “capacity to be affected by external things.”²⁶

This metaphysical definition is then elaborated by means of a critique of the claim (here attributed to Mendelssohn but common to all the Wolffians) that the “logical” distinction between distinct and indistinct representations can be mapped onto the distinction between the understanding and the sensibility. Kant argues that the two kinds of representation should be distinguished according to their “source” and not only according to their “logical form,” or in other words, that the logical understanding of sensible knowledge should be supplemented by a metaphysical account of its source.

By making this distinction Kant prepares the way for his first defence of sensibility: it is a genetically distinct source of representations and not simply a logically inferior version of the intelligible variety. The transcript records him as saying:

*We have seen that sensibility is not an evil. Confusion would be an evil, but by itself sensibility does not confuse. Whoever uses only the senses, whose representation lacks the processing of the understanding, without which representations cannot be grasped or ordered. . . . this is not an evil but only a lack.*²⁷

Similarly, understanding without sensibility would also be lacking, since it would be restricted to self-knowledge and not knowledge of external things. This argument for the distinction and complementarity of sensibility and understanding forms the first defence of sensibility. The second defence is couched in terms of hypotyposis: sensibility allows “the discursive knowledge of the understanding to be brought into intuition” (32) through sensible examples – Meier’s “beautiful knowledge.” These two lines of defence are separated by a further objection for which no response is recorded in the transcript, namely, “That man is only inclined to denigrate the sensibility because sensible desires bind our freedom, and we hold anything that limits our freedom to be demeaning” (32). The later section on “Theory of Sensibility” does not name sensibility as such, but distinguishes between material and formal sensible representations, seeing the latter as spatial and temporal intuition and the former as the sensible ground of all knowledge. However, this section seems an afterthought and does not appear in other transcripts.

The early sections of the Parow transcript of the 1772–3 lectures are less well organised than Collins, subdivisions beginning only with “*Schwierigkeit und Leichtigkeit*,” which is the sixth of Collins’s sections.

However, the auditor did pick up some additional details of Kant's defence of sensibility. The transcript is initially consistent with the Collins section on sensibility – alluding to the formal and genetic distinctions between sensible and intelligible representations – but adds an example that is drawn from the lectures on logic.²⁸ The transcript then records that “sensibility gives us the material” while “the understanding has *Potestas rectoria* to arrange it.”²⁹ This offers a more specific description of the relationship between the understanding and sensibility than Collins and leads into a more extensive record of the 1772–3 version of the apology for sensibility.

Parow illustrates the relationship between understanding and sensibility by means of analogy with the relationship of a ruler of a state to his peasantry – in both cases, contempt for sensibility/peasantry would be out of place. The transcript then returns to the distinction between evil and lack recorded by Collins, adding “It is not necessary for one to hold one's nose when the word sensibility occurs; it has its uses when guided by the understanding and not abused” (p. 259). The following paragraph records the objection to sensibility as an obstacle to freedom and the unconnected defence in terms of its giving sensible examples of discursive knowledge, but proceeds with a fascinating anecdote. Parow records Kant noting, with reference to P. Pallas's account of his travels in Tibet, that “sensibility is so hated by some” that they take a pill “in order to be eternally free from it.”³⁰ Parow then rehearses a number of classic oppositions between sensibility and the understanding, without, however, taking a position in defence of sensibility: couched in terms of the higher and lower faculties: sensibility is passive, understanding active; the lower faculty is blind, the higher free “*willkühr*”; the lower faculty is animal, the higher human.

While the earliest transcripts do not evince a fully developed “apology for sensibility” they do show Kant's concern to defend sensibility against its Wolffian critics. They also show how he brings together arguments drawn from both the lectures on logic and metaphysics. The juristic form of objection and defence adumbrated in Collins and Parow is more developed in the Friedländer transcript from 1775–6, which echoes Baumgarten's catalogue of complaint and defence. The discussion of sensibility begins by recalling Baumgarten's objections: “We hear sensibility accused of being the source of all confusion and error; it is also accused of being the cause of errors and it is

complained that the understanding no longer rules, but sensibility.”³¹ These complaints are followed by a first defence in terms of the figuration of the understanding through sensibility. This is then developed into an argument in terms of human perfection: two parts are necessary for perfection “*potestas rectoria* and *executoria*.” The *rectoria* is blind without the *executoria*, sensibility is a major part of humanity, insofar as it has an executive force that has effect through the understanding, when it is bound with the senses’ (p. 486). To this it added that the senses are hard to rule and are sometimes advantageous, other times a hindrance. The defence at this point is summed up with the claim that errors of sensibility arise from its not being disciplined. The defence continues with the claim that sensibility cannot be a source of error because it cannot judge. The basic conclusion of the hearing of sensibility is that it is essential to understanding in that it gives understanding its material, but that sensibility “must be disciplined in order to be an instrument of the understanding” (p. 487).

The possibility of systematising the growing list of objections to and defences for sensibility is first considered in the *Menschenkunde* transcript from 1781–2. The section *Von der Sinnlichkeit im Gegensatz mit dem Verstande* begins with a reference to the objections made by “moralists” (*die Moralisten*) that sensibility completely confuses reason and is the cause of innumerable disorders. Kant adds to this the complaint of “the logicians” (*die Logiker*) that sensibility is the cause of deception, that it interrupts the operation of the understanding and creates the illusions that lead the understanding astray. Kant offers four defences: the first, that sensibility (senses and intuition) supply the material for the understanding with which to think; the second, that the sensibility cannot deceive because it is incapable of judgment; the third, that it does not confuse the understanding; and the fourth, that it offers the possibility for hypotyposis and the enlivenment of abstract thought.

Leaving aside the fourth reply, which is heritage of rhetorical *elocutio* – the first three replies are for the first time unified around the concept of intuition (sensibility with spatio-temporal discrimination). In the first reply intuition is pivotal in explaining the mutual dependence of sensibility and understanding: “without the senses we would be unable to intuit” while without the understanding “the senses would have at best intuitions.”³² In the second reply, the senses are incapable

of deception because “they give only intuitions of objects” that the understanding might incorrectly judge. Similarly in the third reply, the responsibility for confused knowledge is laid at the door of the understanding and not the senses which give “no thoughts but only intuitions.”³³ The centrality of sensible intuition and its property of discriminating without judging allows a coherent defence of sensibility to emerge, and indeed Kant for the first time speaks of an “apology for the senses”: he is recorded as saying “We do not want to make a eulogy but certainly to sketch out an apology for the senses, and if not to raise them then to make them innocent.”³⁴ The apology for sensibility is also given a broader anthropological justification in the links Kant makes between the predominance of sensibility and age, sex, and nation: youth are more inclined to sensibility than the aged, women more than men, and the “Oriental peoples” more than Europeans. This “anthropological justification” accompanies the philosophical apology in all the subsequent transcripts, but is absent in the published version.

While the *Menschenkunde* transcript detects the distinction between the senses and sensibility (comprising sense and intuition) that Kant developed in the lectures on metaphysics, the transcript is on the whole inconsistent, often using “senses” where “sensibility” is meant. The transcript thus refers to an “*Apologie der Sinnen*,” an apology for the senses. That this usage is probably due to the auditor rather than Kant is supported by the version of this section of the lectures recorded in the Mrongovius transcript from 1784–5. The section *Von der Sinnlichkeit* begins by combining under sensibility “perception and intuition” and listing the accusations that sensibility deceives, obscures, and confuses the understanding. After the charges against sensibility have been noted, the transcript continues: “We want now to give an apology for sensibility and to try and free it from these offenses: but no panegyric *note* Apology means to present a thing as it is, not to raise it nor to lower it through invented lack, rather to free it from prejudices.”³⁵ The prejudices from which sensibility is to be freed are in the case of the Mrongovius not those of the logician and the moralist but also those of religion: “to ascribe sensibility a lack as if it were a left-over [*Rückbleibsel*] of the Fall is madness.”³⁶ In addition to the usual line of defence of sensibility Mrongovius also contains an interesting gloss on the need to discipline sensibility. As in Baumgarten’s reflection on the disciplining of sensible knowledge, sensibility for Kant “must not

be dominated but allow itself to be disciplined by the understanding,” for if it is allowed to gain the “upper-hand” “it would be as with those Republicans in whom anarchy *sich einschleicht*” (p. 1231).

Kant’s reasoning of the need for an apology for sensibility in the lectures on anthropology seems not to have resulted in a full-fledged apology before his published version of the lectures in 1798. The Busolt transcript from 1778–9 refers to the need for an “anthropological justification” of sensibility that gives equal weight to the philosophical defence and to the anthropological characterisations of the sensibility of women, youth, and eastern peoples. The introduction of a discrete chapter entitled “Apology for Sensibility” containing a systematic defence is thus one of the few major structural innovations of the published *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* with respect to the lectures. It also contains in compressed form the doctrine of sensibility central to the critical philosophy.

Kant’s “Apology for Sensibility” (§§8–11 of *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*) is introduced by means of a double contrast, first between understanding and sensibility and then between a panegyric and an apology for sensibility. Understanding does not need praise because it is “highly esteemed by everyone” while sensibility “is in bad repute”³⁷ except with “poets and people of good taste” who praise the “figurative representation of ideas.” In this way Kant establishes both the contrast with understanding as well as assigning the rhetorical defence of sensibility to “poets and people of taste,” whose interest in defending it is not disinterested. Kant presents his own disinterested apology for sensibility as the work of an advocate refuting the prejudiced charges of its accusers.

Kant begins the defence by referring to the “passive element” in sensibility as “the cause of the difficulties we ascribe to it” (§8). This passivity, consistent with the discovery of the lectures on metaphysics, does not characterise the entirety of sensibility, but only its empirical part, sensibility being composed of both empirical intuition (perception – *Empfindung*) and pure intuition.³⁸ In spite of identifying sensibility with the “rabble” (*Pöbel*) that does not think, Kant insists that “the understanding should rule without weakening it” because without it there would be no “raw material” to be “processed by the legislative understanding” (§8). As in the lectures on logic and metaphysics, sensibility and the understanding are generically

different but also capable of being conjoined. From this reference to the mutual dependence and tension between understanding and sensibility Kant moves on to the defence. His apology consists of a defence of sensibility against three clear charges: that it confuses the power of representation, that it dominates the understanding and that it is deceptive. The first reply is logical and the second and third metaphysical.

In the first reply Kant deploys the rhetorical trope of turning the guilt back upon the accuser. Because only the understanding is capable of joining and combining perceptions, any deficiency in the combination – that is, “confusion” – is the responsibility of the understanding “which it blames on man’s sensual nature” (§9). The second reply maintains that the senses offer themselves to knowledge wishing only to be heard but not to dominate it. Resorting again to a political analogy Kant likens the senses to “the common people, though not like the rabble (*ignobile vulgus*), who are happily willing to subordinate themselves to their superior, the understanding, as long as they are listened to.”³⁹ Sensibility is thus already articulated – as intuition it has its own activity and source of order – but does not offer judgments; it offers pre-judgments, or intuitions, to the understanding but is itself incapable of forming complete judgments. The inability of sensibility to judge is central also to the third reply: the senses do not deceive because deception is a function of judgment. The responsibility for appearances that turn out to be deceptive lies with the understanding that hastily takes a sensible perception to be true. The third reply then adds, almost as an afterthought, a further reference to the role of sensibility in “popularising” abstract thought by clothing it in sensible dress.

The replies that make up the “apology for sensibility” add up to a case for the cooperation of sensibility and understanding based on a recognition of their differences. Kant refuses either to subordinate sensibility to the understanding, or to demonise it. Yet he also recognises that sensibility involves more than the logical distinction between sensible and intelligible knowledge proposed by Baumgarten in its defence. In order to make a transcendental distinction between sensibility and understanding, Kant distinguished between the sources of the two faculties and the limits of their respective forms of judgment. The “Apology” thus presents a summary of the doctrine of sensibility

developed in the course of the lectures on anthropology. Although they provided the occasion for reflection and experiment, the full elaboration of the “apology for sensibility” and a survey of its implications is not to be found in the lectures but rather in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

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Notes

1. *Über eine Entdeckung nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll*, 1790, p. 65; in Weischedel, ed. 5: 335.
2. This relationship is described later in the *Critique* in terms of the catena “conditions of possibility of their object... conditions of sensibility... form of appearances” (A 240 / B 299).
3. See the concluding paragraphs of the *Reflections on Poetry*, which make the distinction between *aistheta* and *noeta* (§ 116). The position criticised by Kant was not that of Baumgarten but of the orthodox Wolffian philosopher of art Gottsched, himself criticised by Baumgarten. For more detailed discussion see my *Art of Judgement*, chapter 3.
4. He goes on immediately to comment that “The philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff, in thus treating the difference between the sensible and the intelligible as merely logical, has given a completely wrong direction to all investigations into the nature and origins of our knowledge” (A 44 / B 61).
5. This rule was affirmed by von Zedlitz, the enlightened minister for Church and Educational Affairs, with the exception of “Professor Kant and his course on physical geography, for which as is known there is not a suitable teaching text” cited in Vorländer, p. 43.
6. Brandt and Stark write in the introduction to their edition of the lectures: “Betrachtet man die Struktur der Anthropologie-Vorlesung im ganzen, so ergibt sich eine grosse Konstanz von den frühesten Nachschriften bis hin zur Buchpublikation von 1798” (p. XXIV).
7. Frederick P. Van De Pitte, Introduction to Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. xi.
8. More properly the systematic philosophy of Wolff that was partially inspired by some of Leibniz's mathematical and epistemological theses.
9. Meier – in many respects the disciple of Baumgarten – wrote a life of Baumgarten, and his writings in German “paralleled” the Latin writings of Baumgarten.
10. For more detailed discussion of the origins of aesthetics see chapter 3 of my *Art of Judgement*.
11. See Maimon, p. 74.
12. Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, p. 30.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 32. Kant adds that taste is “itself an object” about which we can reason, but that this reasoning does not constitute taste but “rather only increases it.” It is interesting to reflect upon whether there are any other objects that can be increased by means of reasoning about them, or whether taste constitutes a special kind of object.

14. Ibid., p. 32.
15. The distinction between “making sensible” and making “capable of intuition” anticipates and to some extent clarifies the purpose of the distinction between the two aspects of sensibility introduced at the beginning of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” – with the object being given as sensation and as intuition.
16. See the second introduction to the *Critique of Judgement* and note 1.
17. He seems even to have misunderstood Baumgarten and Meier’s method when he accuses the latter of restricting aesthetics to the beautiful and thus forgetting the sublime. While Meier to a degree aestheticised cognition by trying to make reason poetic, Baumgarten insisted that poetics was the clue to a broader conception of reason.
18. “Logical clarity, however, rests on subordination; sensible clarity, on the other hand, rests on coordination of marks” (p. 101).
19. *Metaphysica*, §533.
20. *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 47.
21. Heidegger used this material as part of his claim that the *Anthropology* “must provide us with information concerning the already laid ground for metaphysics,” *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 88. While this is uncontroversial, Heidegger’s way of stating his case is extremely problematic. While recognising the importance of the formative faculty, his alignment of it with imagination by means of the *facultas imaginandi* overlooks that this is only one of the subfaculties of the formative faculty, and is indeed the “faculty of imitation . . . whose representations are of past time” (op. cit., 53). Perhaps more seriously, his gloss on the spontaneous character of “power of imagination” and its relationship to intuition aligns it “with intuitive presentation, of giving” overlooking that its representations are precisely not given, but made. Finally, his claim that the *Anthropology* “shows that the productive power of the imagination is still dependent upon the representations of the senses” whereas it is not in the first *Critique* simplifies a complex problem. Already in the commentary on *Metaphysica* Kant was clear that formative sensibility “is originally pictorial in the pure image of time” and the question of dependence is by no means fully solved in the *Critique*.
22. Baumgarten as the source for Kant’s apology for sensibility seems far more plausible than Brandt and Stark’s suggested precedent in Democritus’s litigation between the body and the soul (see p. 886, n. 030).
23. The first objection of the first group involves the inordinate claims of aesthetics, which Baumgarten concedes. The second and third concern the relationship between aesthetics and other disciplines such as rhetoric, poetics, and criticism: aesthetics, replies Baumgarten, has a different object to rhetoric and poetic taste and an approach to criticism that distinguishes it from logical criticism and from mere reflection upon taste; the eighth objection that aesthetics is an art and not a science, is denied on the grounds that the relationship between art and science is flexible and that art is worthy of a scientific treatment. The ninth objection, that

aestheticians are born and not made is refuted by appeal to the authority of Horace, Cicero, Bilfinger, and Breitingger.

24. *Aesthetica*, §6.
25. In the earlier version of the *Aesthetica* preserved in a lecture transcript, the last objection is made in a pietist idiom: "They say the Bible tells us to crusade against the flesh, the corrupted lower faculty of the soul, and not to improve it" (§11). Baumgarten's reply is similarly framed: "Aesthetics does not strengthen fleshy desires, but convinces them of the advantages of fearing God. . . . Since there is a trace of God's likeness in this knowledge, we can make it clearer through aesthetics and understand it better."
26. Brandt and Stark, p. 31.
27. *Ibid.*, 32.
28. The example is that of "ein Wilder" who, visiting a European city, has clear knowledge of the parts of the house that he perceives but no concept of what they add up to.
29. *Ibid.*, 258. *Potestas rectoris* is "the executive power of the *supreme ruler (summi rectoris)*." *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 127.
30. The reference is in fact to a form of pain reliever for the terminally ill, but the use of it as an example of aversion to sensibility is characteristic.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 485. These form the three generic charges to which Kant responds in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*.
32. *Ibid.*, 887. This is an early version of the *Critique of Pure Reason's* "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (A 51 / B 75).
33. *Ibid.*, 887–8.
34. *Ibid.*, 887.
35. *Ibid.*, 1229. It is noteworthy in this connection that in the reply to Eberhard, Kant concludes by describing the *Critique of Pure Reason* as an "apology for Leibniz."
36. *Ibid.*, 1230.
37. *Anthropology*, §8.
38. This by now familiar distinction, repeated in a clarificatory footnote to §8 is completely garbled in Dowdell's translation, which translates perception (*Empfindung*) as "sensibility." As a result, Kant's crucial distinction between the empirical and pure elements of sensibility is mistranslated into one between "sensibility" and pure intuition.
39. *Ibid.*, §10.

Kant's "True Economy of Human Nature"

Rousseau, Count Verri, and the Problem of Happiness

Susan Meld Shell

The recently published *Vorlesungen über Anthropologie*¹ sheds important light on Kant's emerging views on a variety of topics of central importance to his thought.² Throughout, Kant's anthropology presents itself as an elaboration or extension of a project explicitly Rousseauian in inspiration and theme: to unite man's divided entelechies, so that nature and art no longer conflict.³ From the 1772–3 *Collins* and *Parow* series to the final version that Kant himself published in the late 1790s, Kant's lectures on anthropology support a project first suggested by the author who, as Kant once put it, "set him upright."⁴ This said, there are significant, indeed fundamental, differences between Kant and Rousseau, as well as important changes in Kant's own understanding over the course of the lectures. The first issue cannot here be addressed at length, though a few words will be helpful. Kant understands *Emile*, Rousseau's famous novel on "education," to be his response to the problem of civilized man as laid out in the *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* and the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*. *Emile* purports to show how an ordinary individual, provided with the right sort of "natural" education, could escape the societal ills to which the rest of us are subject, while at the same time perfecting qualities that in the rude state of nature remain merely latent. Rousseau's imaginary student joins the goodness of savage man, the virtue of the Spartan citizen, and the sensitivity of the lover, with the reasonableness of the philosopher, without succumbing to their limitations and/or failings. At the same time, *Emile*'s education requires the total dedication, and

extraordinary efforts, sometimes improbably contrived, of a single tutor, who devotes his life to educating a single boy. Whatever Rousseau himself may have meant by this conceit, it seems fair to say that Kant was far more hopeful than Rousseau that the pedagogy sketched out in *Emile* could serve as a model for the education of mankind generally.⁵

The second issue forms the backdrop to this essay: what significant changes in Kant's treatment of anthropology are registered over the course of the lectures, and what is the bearing of these changes on Kant's thought more generally? The publication of several lecture series from the 1770s, the so-called "silent decade" in which Kant was composing the *Critique of Pure Reason*, gives the question added interest and importance. That the two short essays Kant published during this period (his *Review of Moscati* [1771] and his *Essay on the Various Races of Men* [1775]) elaborate or revisit themes explored in the lectures suggests that anthropological concerns, during this crucial period of Kant's intellectual formation, were close to the center of his thinking.

In what follows, I will trace one strand of argument that marks a transformation in his conception of happiness, as well as a turning point in his understanding of nature and history – changes that modify his use of the Rousseauian model, and, in so doing, encourage new directions in his thinking. The focus of that turning point is Kant's reading of Pietro Verri's *del piacere e del dolere*, which appeared in German in 1777.⁶ Verri showed to Kant's satisfaction both that human life involves more pain than pleasure, and why it must be so: we are moved to act, not by the anticipation of pleasure, but by pains both blatant and "ineffable," as Verri has it, reminiscent of Lockean "unease."⁷ Kant claimed to find in Verri what Kant called "the true economy of human nature." Pain, on his new understanding, is the natural good by which man is prompted to develop his inborn talents and abilities before reason is ready to take over. Accordingly, Kant:

1. modifies his earlier account of happiness as achievable through fortitude of mind;
2. retreats from earlier intimations of a single principle of "life" or "spirit" uniting the physical and intellectual realms;
3. stresses political (and racial) factors in world history at the expense of sexual and aesthetic features earlier given greater prominence;

4. places new emphasis on work, ultimately directed toward moral perfection, as the only way of making human life worth living.

There are, to be sure, important continuities that unite Kant's early and late discussions, of which the following especially bear noting.

- a. Pain as the real opposite of pleasure

As early as his *Essay on Negative Magnitudes*⁸ Kant treats pain, not as a mere absence or negation of pleasure, but as something real in its own right. Pleasure (*Lust*) and pain relate as contraries, or what he calls "real opposites": enjoyment is to pain not as "profit" is to "lack of profit," but as "profit" is to "loss" (*Verlust*).

- b. Stoic self-control; Cynical simplicity; Epicurean cheerfulness of heart

In general, Kant entertains two distinct conceptions of happiness. One is based on a notion of dynamic balance (in which positive pleasure and negative pain cancel to zero), the other on one of maximum positive pleasure. The former conception takes the double form, for Kant, of Stoic self-control (in which inclination is mastered) and Cynical simplicity (in which inclination is eliminated or reduced). The latter conception Kant associates with "cheerful" Epicurus (who, to be sure [and as Kant is at pains to point out], identified the voluptuous life with feasting on "water and polenta"). Animals can feel pleasure and pain, according to Kant, but not happiness and misery, each of which involve an estimation, of which man alone is capable, of the "value" of our condition in its entirety or as a "whole." Happiness or misery, then, is not a direct consequence of pleasure and pain, but a state mediated by the mind (*Gemüth*). According to the Stoic view, which Kant tends to favor, the mind can either admit, or, by dint of strength, repel disruption by sensation. The resulting equanimity (*Gleichmüthigkeit*) differs from indifference (*Gleichgültigkeit*),⁹ which lies in a mere absence of feeling or sensation. Equanimity implies composure (*Fassung*) of mind, and is accompanied by contentment (*Zufriedenheit*), as distinct from positive enjoyment or delight (*Genuß*). Kant consistently encourages meditation on the "insignificance" of human life (as distinguished from the righteousness of human conduct) as an aid to such contentment.

c. Pleasure and the furtherance of life

Kant associates pleasure with feelings of (the furtherance of) life; pain with (feelings of) its hindrance. His account is complicated by the fact that (1) some hindrances to life are pleasurable (e.g., opium); (2) what hinders life in part may promote it as a whole; (3) life itself is multifaceted; animal and spiritual life are neither unambiguously one nor unambiguously separable. Throughout, pleasures of taste and beauty serve to link the animal and the spiritual.

The Problem of Happiness

Readers of Kant's later work have long been struck by the dourness of his views concerning the possibility of human happiness. As he states in a famous passage:

The value of life for us, if it is assessed merely in terms of *what one enjoys/delights in* [*was man genießt*] (i.e., happiness [*Glückseligkeit*]), the natural purpose of the sum of all inclinations), is easy to decide. It sinks below zero; for who would enter life anew under the same conditions, or even according to a new, self-projected plan (though in conformity with the course of nature), were it set merely toward delight? (V: 434 n)¹⁰

In a similar vein, Kant's argument in the *Groundlaying of the Metaphysics of Morals* against suicide suggests that pain is the necessary means by which life itself is promoted.¹¹ Kant's sober view of man as a "being of need" also bears on his discussion of parental duty, which he traces to the fact that children are brought into the world without their consent and, by implication, to a state that it cannot be reasonably supposed they would themselves have chosen. In striking contrast with traditional sensibilities, Kant here treats life less as a gift demanding gratitude on the part of children, than an injury requiring compensation on the part of parents.¹²

Kant's pessimism concerning human happiness both echoes and exceeds the Rousseauian complaint, repeated elsewhere in the *Groundlaying*, that reason makes us less happy than we would be were we guided solely by instinct (IV: 395–6).¹³ On Rousseau's view, happiness of a kind can be attributed to our prereflective ancestors: life itself is sweet.¹⁴ For the later Kant, on the other hand, the feeling of existence

is accompanied by “ineffable pains” that leave enjoyment’s balance sheet perpetually in the red.

Lectures Prior to 1777

Kant’s early lectures on anthropology present a somewhat different view of happiness. They are distinguished, above all, by the conviction that human happiness is possible through a kind of feeling reminiscent of Rousseau’s “sentiment of existence.”¹⁵ In *Collins and Parow* (1772–3), pleasure is associated with feeling one’s life’s activity “as a whole.”¹⁶ The “principle of all pleasure [*Lust*] and pain is that which favors or restricts our life capacities [*Fähigkeiten*].” “Man gladly does all that lets him feel his existence” (XXV: 27). Pleasure is “all that harmonizes in us to make our life feelable” by favoring our activity (XXV: 369, 35).

Kant distinguishes three ways in which we “feel our life” – the soul in its capacity to be affected by bodily impressions (*anima*), the soul in its capacity to be self-active (*mens, Geist*), and the soul as the unity of both (*animus*, mind [*Gemüth*]) (XXV: 16). To these three facets of the human soul there correspond three kinds of pleasure (*Lust*): what pleases in sensation is “agreeable”; what pleases according to laws of appearance is “beautiful”; what pleases in concepts is “good” (XXV: 175, 167).

Pleasure in the form of sensual enjoyment (*Vergnügen*) derives from the (passive) setting in motion of organs and senses in a way that lets us feel our life; pain, from bodily injury that inhibits life (XXV: 367). Enjoyment arises both from the activation of individual senses, and from the “sum of all sensations” – a “feeling of total life,” for example, after an ample meal, when the “life channels” are “inwardly *fed* and one needs nothing” (XXV: 369). A person who “immediately feels” the “sum of all sensations,” and thus feels “his entire life,” is “satisfied” (XXV: 368).

Sensual enjoyment is not a promotion of life, but merely of the *feeling* of life (XXV: 169) – that is, of activity that may actually exceed the amount consistent with life as a whole. The convulsive movement accompanying positive enjoyment upsets the mind’s composure, and makes our nervous fluid overflow its banks, leaving misery and dejection in its wake (XXV: 372). Such pleasure “uses itself up,” without renewing itself (XXV: 171), and “robs the soul of its greatest forces”

(XXV: 173). Hence, satisfaction, or the feeling of one's life as a whole, is "nothing positive," but merely an absence of hindrances to life (XXV: 169). The mind that judges with understanding prefers such satisfaction to positive enjoyment, and thus dispenses with unnecessary pleasures.

The mind that judges soundly also readily withstands bodily pain, which indicates a hindrance to a part of life but not the whole. (A hindrance to the whole of life would be equivalent to death, which can't be felt.) A person can thus feel bodily pain, and yet be of cheerful mind and joyful spirit (XXV: 17). Those who do not let either pain or enjoyment "reach their mind" or "disturb their mental rest" (i.e., who estimate the value of pain and pleasure correctly)¹⁷ are generally pleased with life. That things of the world do not go as one might wish should not rob one of satisfaction, for the composed mind does not depend upon (external) conditions (XXV: 170, 369). Man's greatest perfection lies in "having all his activity in his power." The happiest human being "can regulate attention and abstraction at will"; his soul is strong enough to cheerfully accept whatever pains and enjoyments come his way (XXV: 38, 369). Man has a capacity to make use of all his forces, capacities, and talents: to set desire in play or hold it back, according to moral ends posited by the nature of the will." This higher, moral force, called "character," constitutes "the greatest happiness [*Glück*] in the world" (XXV: 438, 29).¹⁸ Persons of stout heart or mind mock the "tyranny of fate" and know a "loophole" for what might otherwise be painful: namely, regard for life's brevity and lack of importance (XXV: 370). The "best means" of achieving satisfaction and peace of mind is studied contemplation of the "shortness of [(corporeal)] life." A second means is "exact compliance with what morality prescribes" so that one avoids "the reproaches of conscience." (True) satisfaction thus "entirely consists," not in events and objects, but "in the way that one accepts things. . . . The great work of art to be achieved is to take away importance from things in the world, so that pain [and pleasure] only faintly affects us." If "a life without any [positive] enjoyment seems not worth wishing for" (XXV: 171) the answer lies in not dampening one's hopes of bettering one's condition in a future world. To be a human being "is actually an unimportant thing; what is important to a human being is his own integrity [*Rechtschaffenheit*]" (XXV: 169). "The moral character of a man is the only thing important/weighty to *him*. This

constitutes his true satisfaction and enjoyment, and makes him not unworthy of hoping for something better in the future" (XXV: 170).

Rational living, integrity, and virtue, then, are all weapons against the discomforts of life, not only by strengthening our ability to remain mentally at peace, but also by permitting hope "concerning another world" in which "we may occupy a better post" (XXV: 370). Merely negative action, or forbearance from error (as with Rousseau's method of educating the young [XXV: 260]) opposes the "implanted instinct" of man to always "exert himself" in "positive action." When one senses all one's nerves "in motion," one "feels one's entire life," and "enjoys oneself" (*ist vergnügt*); but when one's nerves are all immediately "taut," so that "they can be set in motion at will," one finds oneself in an even higher state of "rest and satisfaction." Such a state, in which "one senses [one's] understanding, one's body, and remembers having injured no one," is "the happiest condition of man" (XXV: 262).

Judgments of taste and beauty please by freely activating our powers of mind, setting its powers "in play," in "harmony" with "ideas" developed (*gebildet*) either by rules of reason¹⁹ or by rules of sensibility²⁰ (XXV: 27, 379, 384). Pleasures of taste please universally (at least among the well-educated) and thus increase total human well-being even when they contribute little individual enjoyment (XXV: 337). The culture of taste refines men, making them more capable of ideal enjoyments, which, by their very nature, can be shared: it makes us better able to produce enjoyments for ourselves and others (XXV: 187). Beauty is constituted, in the last analysis, by "connectedness and form," and, as such, "promotes morality" (XXV: 387, 187).²¹ It also furthers social cohesion (XXV: 376). The cultivated man chooses what "universally pleases," and regards things "from a universal standpoint" (XXV: 191). Taste, which eases the harshness of morality's command, is "the analog of perfection." It is "in intuition what morals (*Sittlichkeit*) is in reason," and "a constant culture" and "preparation" of virtue (XXV: 195). In a word, taste promotes the activity of our life *in toto* (XXV: 388–9).

The "school of human taste" is social intercourse (*Umgang*), in which men learn to please women (XXV: 201, 394): "tender love," consists not in great "affect," but in "fineness of judgment," on the part of men, concerning everything that the beloved might find agreeable (XXV: 423). The resulting elevation of sensibility (which turns on

granting women more than they deserve) both refines and universalizes judgment, and thus prepares the way for virtue proper. National character can thus easily be judged on the basis of a nation's taste, which revolves mainly around its treatment of women (XXV: 398–9). Turkey, where women "dance alone," is without taste, as, for the most part, is the rest of Asia, which substitutes sense for reason rather than making sense reason's servant (XXV: 401–2).

To be sure, such "ideal pleasures" are often accompanied by the related dangers of boredom on the one hand and "empty" longing on the other: he who hankers after impossible ideals "inflates the heart, so to speak, with moral wind" (XXV: 406). Hence the importance of "really working," which "empties vessels distended by a superfluity of nervous fluid" (and which might otherwise dangerously overflow their banks). One can desire and yet be content if one regards desire as superfluous and thus dispensable. Such desires, the wise man knows, are the means by which nature moves us to choose what we are not ready to choose by reason. All drives taken together constitute the "flesh"; the motive ground of reason, on the other hand, is "spirit" (XXV: 410). Flesh and spirit often conflict, because "inclination is blind" when not connected with knowledge, or directed by moral character. The key, then, is not to eliminate nature's drives but to properly direct them. Those (like the native inhabitants of North America) who lack drive are defectively "unfeeling" (XXV: 409);²² whereas the "greatest enjoyment" is a mind that is both "full of feeling" and "at rest" (XXV: 414).

In sum, Kant's account of pain and enjoyment in the early 1770s both distinguishes corporeal and spiritual life, and (problematically) unites them²³ via aesthetic taste (which lets us sense our life activity "in toto") and moral hope (which projectively joins the Stoical idea of human perfection as equilibrium with the Epicurean idea of human perfection as maximum enjoyment).²⁴ In attempting this juncture, Kant is already struggling with the problem of how an idea of reason can motivate the will, or as he later puts it, how "pure reason can be practical" – that is, "how freedom is possible."²⁵ The Stoics, as he here puts it, "speak well theoretically"; only "they fail to show how their rule can be made effective" (XXV: 39). In short, the Stoics provide a rule consistent with the possibility of freedom but not activity; the Epicureans provide one consistent with activity but not freedom. Pleasure is the "motive spring of activity"; while life is "activity" and "free

choice" (XXV: 175) – that is, both identical and nonidentical with freedom. It is for this reason, perhaps, that Kant speaks equivocally of "spirit," which he defines both as "life" and as "the first ground of life" (XXV: 18).

In any event, morality is both good in itself and the surest means to happiness understood as satisfaction, in as much as character produces equanimity of mind. Affects, which exceed the bounds of prudence by substituting a partial enjoyment for satisfaction as a whole, are nature's way of promoting man's natural ends until man is able to choose them freely. In effecting this transition, taste and beauty (and hence mixed society) plays a predominant role, in a manner that recalls Kant's treatment of the subject in *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, published almost a decade earlier. Through social intercourse with cultivated women, young men abandon or transform raw sexual desire (which treats the beloved object as a "thing") and instead seek what pleases others.

Hence (for reasons drawn mainly from Rousseau's *Emile*)²⁶ the manifold weaknesses of women should be excused. Without the opinion of men, women "would be nothing" (or, alternatively, "the lowest creatures in the world" [XXV: 462]),²⁷ and yet women are proud and demand men's tribute. The amazing thing is that men are so glad to see this pride and prickliness in those whom they love. This double fissure (*Zweispalt*) of nature in regard to the sexes is "very important"; and knowledge concerning it has "the most considerable uses" in social intercourse, marriage, and education (XXV: 238). *Collins* thus closes with an at least apparent exception to Kant's earlier insistence that "things of the world" not be "considered" as "important."

The lecture series of winter semester 1775–6 (*Friedländer*) introduces the concept of "pragmatic" anthropology. Anthropology is no longer justified, as in *Collins*, as a speculative or empirical science that can provide the "surest proof" that the soul survives without the body (and which is, as such, a powerful vehicle of moral hope).²⁸ Instead the task is a more immediately practical and prudential one: pragmatic anthropology is knowledge of man's permanent attributes, with a view to uncovering what man can (morally) make of himself: "the reason why moral . . . discourse, so full of admonitions, . . . has so little effect is lack of knowledge of man" (XXV: 471–2; cf. 7). Kant is thus interested, not in a description of "the succession of regimes and battles" (which from

a world standpoint are a mere "trifle") but of the regular, observable relations that characterize the permanent human phenomena.

Kant now divides the soul into *mens* or spirit (*Geist*), and mind (*Gemüth*); and distinguishes between man's intelligence and his animality (XXV: 475). ("*Anima*" is no longer singled out as an aspect of the human soul coequal with mind and spirit; and spirit is now unequivocally identified with "activity" as such.) Mind is the way the soul is affected by things, but also, its capacity to reflect and to relate things to itself (XXV: 474-5). The conflict between intelligence (or "personality") and animality arises from the distinction between the soul's mastery of and the soul's dependence on the body, which replaces "*anima*" as the self's (mysterious) third. Another definition of spirit is power over one's condition and one's animality. Man's peculiar duality is reflected (above all) in the experience of (moral) self-rebuke: no one hates himself and wishes himself ill, but many are angry with themselves. Similarly, man as animal judges what tastes good and man as intelligence judges what is good (XXV: 476).

Life, for its part, is "consciousness of a free and regular play of all the forces and faculties of man." Enjoyment arises whenever one senses a powerful increase in the movement of the blood and spirits of life. Pain is the "feeling of a hindrance in a place of life." If, in feeling "the entire sum of life," from which pain "subtracts," enjoyment outweighs pain, we gladly go on living; if pain "so outweighs the sum of life" that we are no longer able to feel "life's enjoyment," we prefer to die (XXV: 559).

Enjoyment is, in turn, divided into the sensuous, the ideal, and the intellectual. Pleasures of sense arise from our receptivity to objective impressions; ideal pleasures from the agitation of our mental forces through our mere thinking of an object. Because ideal pain does not involve bodily susceptibility, it can itself be pleasurable and life promoting, as with tragic dramas, which produce an inner agitation that gives rise to pleasurable feeling, and which promote health better than any doctor (XXV: 560). Inasmuch as ideal pleasure is "enlivening" (rather than merely moving, as are pleasures of the senses) the play of mental forces must be both lively and free. Intellectual pleasure takes life one step further, and consists in consciousness of the use of freedom according to rules. Freedom is itself "the greatest life of man" through which he exercises his activity without hindrance. Freedom, and hence

life, is hindered when freedom is not subject to the compulsion of a rule, for lawlessness is a “hindrance to itself.” Hence, freedom can only come about under the rule of understanding. Intellectual pleasure, for its part, consists in consciousness of the lawful use of freedom (XXV: 560).²⁹

Life and morality, then, are of a piece, each bound up with the “phenomenon” of lawful freedom; the different kinds of pleasures, on the other hand, reflect the soul’s complex duality as the body’s master and dependent. Although “the objects of our enjoyments are different in kind [*nicht gleichartig*],” the enjoyments themselves “can be added up to form a ‘sum’ that constitutes ‘total well-being’ [*gantze Wohlbefinden*]” (XXV: 560–1). We can do this, says Kant, because “all enjoyments relate themselves to life.” Life is a “unity,” and hence however different our pleasures may be, and whatever their source, “they are alike in kind inasmuch as they all aim at life” (XXV: 561).³⁰

Enjoyments [*Vergnügens*] in regard to objects can be divided between those pertaining to objects and those pertaining to understanding. . . . With regard to objects, the mind comports itself, firstly, indifferently [*gleichgültig*]. This indifference can stem from lack of feeling, or from insensitivity [*Unempfindlichkeit*], or from equipoise [*Gleichgewicht*]. Insensitivity is an indifference that relates to impressions, and equipoise is an indifference that relates to choice. Indifference is to be distinguished from equanimity [*Gleichmüthigkeit*]. Indifference from insensitivity is stupidity, but equanimity is an effect of strength rather than weakness, and consists in the possession of wellbeing whatever the condition of outer objects, and in the consciousness of a quantity [*Große*] of wellbeing which outweighs all outer circumstances. Equanimity befits philosophers. Sensibility [*Empfindsamkeit*] is a capacity to receive ideal pleasures, and is opposed to indifference but not to equanimity (XXV: 561).

Sensitivity (*Empfindlichkeit*), by contrast, is a weakness by which “the entire condition of a human being is altered” – for example, by an insult, or a broken utensil. Equanimity, on the other hand is, properly speaking:

a self-feeling of a healthy soul, just as complete health is the self-feeling of a healthy body. One feels the source of life in oneself. Health of soul and body is surely the greatest happiness/fortune [*Glück*]; it is the maximum sum [*größte Summe*] of pleasure and enjoyment, a greatest sum of pleasure one always feels even when there are pains. The basis of this lies

in the human being himself. He who has such strength of mind as to feel the whole sum [*ganze Summe*] of pleasure and enjoyment . . . neither gladdens himself over enjoyment, nor grieves himself over pain . . . Well-being must thus be a determinate sum [*bestimmte Summe*] that I feel in myself, one that can neither be extraordinarily enlarged through supplements of pleasure, nor extraordinarily diminished through disappointments (XXV: 561–2).

Precisely because pain is *not* a hindrance of life but merely the *feeling* of such a hindrance, it can be overridden by the pleasurable feeling of life as such.³¹ One who would be happy (*glücklich*) must thus remain indifferent to pain and enjoyment. Though such a person feels “constant enjoyment in itself” – a pleasure that, as Kant admits, also “depends upon the body.” Since we aren’t master of the outcome of things, we must give ourselves a “uniform frame [*Fassung*] of mind,” which can be acquired by practice, especially if started early. Without that frame of mind, human life is composed (*zusammen gesetzt*) of empty trifles (XXV: 562). So long, on the other hand, as one maintains one’s frame of mind, and, above all, avoids reproach, “nothing in the world is in a position to do one injury” (XXV: 563). Such frame of mind is supported by the conceptual distinction between pain – that is, the feeling, through bodily injury, of a hindrance to life – and a true hindrance to our life activity.

Happiness, on this view, is attainable; life itself, or the free and regular play of one’s forces and capacities, is pleasurable; and morality is the highest expression of life. We should not estimate ourselves unhappy unless, through moral fault, we have made ourselves unworthy of living (XXV: 597). (The *Friedländer Anthropology* thus represents a high watermark in Kant’s experiments with the view that we can be motivated to virtue by an idea of happiness, here understood both as contentment and as “maximum pleasure.”)³²

The upshot of this optimism concerning happiness, however, is an insistence upon the homogeneity and unity of life verging on vitalism. Spirit no longer “grounds” activity or “uses” life, but is the “activity” of life itself.³³ It is perhaps not surprising that unpublished remarks from this period flirt with notions of a “world soul” and other appeals to a single, unified life spirit.³⁴

The composed and steady man estimates his pleasures and his pains by their relation to the “whole” and “determinate” sum that

corresponds to his life principle, a sum that requires “reason” for its estimation:

To the estimation of the result of the influence and effect of pain and enjoyment on total well-being, there belongs not only sense but also reason. It ill becomes a steady man [*gesetzten Mann*] to gladden or sadden himself over trifles that have no influence on his whole happiness [*ganzes Glück*] or unhappiness (XXV: 571–2).

In the same way that a rich man is foolish to trouble himself over a piddling loss, a rational man estimates his sensual pains and pleasures as trifling in relation to the whole pleasure of life. (The issue of happiness thus raises the problem of the relation between a sensibly realized aggregate and a rationally grasped whole, with which Kant’s metaphysical reflections at this time were also grappling.)³⁵

In addition to cognition and pleasure the soul is capable of desire, which Kant defines as “pleasure [*Wohlgefallen*] in the *actuality* of the object,” and as “the active force of self determination to action on the part of thinking being.” This faculty, which Kant admits he cannot clarify fully (he calls it “subtle”), is to thinking being what moving force is in the corporeal world. All desires are directed toward activity, and lifeless being acts similarly when it is driven by an external force. Rather mysteriously, however, some (but not all) desires “directed only to ideas” remain mere idle wishes. An active or driving desire, on the other hand, is a ground “determining us to action.” The more sources of activity a person “senses” in himself, the more “driving” are his desires (XXV: 577). Whereas idle desires are weakening, driving ones make for sturdiness in women and strong comportment of thinking (*Denkungsart*) in men (XXV: 578).

Satisfaction is a state of “superfluity” with which desire can co-exist so long as one is conscious of the fact that one does not desire out of necessity. Satisfaction, or the “happiest condition of sufficiency,” arises from “enjoyment” of the mind in which “need” is minimized, based on consciousness of life in the fullest sense, along with its true requirements. Natural sufficiency or satisfaction arises from possessing what (little) one desires, acquired satisfaction from not lacking what one reckons that one needs. *Rational* desire directs itself toward the harmonious satisfaction of one’s being in its entirety, which happens only when reason stipulates desire’s end. *Human*

desire, on the other hand, pursues an object to which sensibility moves us, but in which reason is the master (XXV: 579). (The status of ideas as motivating grounds for human beings remains, to this extent, equivocal.)

Rest is "the view point of all men," each "thinks first about what he should learn, then about assuming a post, then about marrying, and dying at peace, and this lazy effort to acquire rest makes us industrious." We are driven, on this account, by the "foretaste of future rest." This foretaste, which is "connected with delights," is what "all men seek." Thus all men have a natural tendency (*Hang*) to laziness, which only "external conditions" turn into industry. States, for example, overcome their barbarous lack of culture only when proximity to other states makes culture necessary (XXV: 580).

The mind, for its part, is either at peace or in movement. When the mind is at rest, the movement of the mind can be more a matter of sensing than of desiring – for example, our sensation on a clear and pretty morning. But one can also desire and be mentally at rest – for example, when we are "busy at our post" or "with some plan." Mental rest, and activity, then, are not opposed, at least when we direct ourselves effectively toward some end (XXV: 588).³⁶ Indeed, man is at rest, whenever his mind is composed (*in Fassung ist*), that is, under his control (*unter unserer Willkühr ist*). We can conclude that planful activity, governed by rationally stipulated ends, offers a rest both greater than, and different in kind from that which motivates men still under the (partial) sway of animality. To the latter (false) ideal – that is, maximum pleasure arising from the completion, *per impossibile*, of an infinite series of satisfactions, Kant opposes an ideal of maximum pleasure as the feeling of one's entire life activity – an activity that is directed by wholly rational (i.e., moral) ends. (His account of happiness, in *Friedländer*, thus maps the more general problem, with which Kant was then struggling, of the relation between sensibility and reason.) Unlike the former notion, which bespeaks perpetual (and irrational) activity for the sake of rest (or what one thinker has called the "joyless quest for joy"), the latter offers a rest that is rationally consistent with maximum life activity.

That there are problems with the idea of happiness as a "maximum sum" of pleasure in which we "feel our life as a whole" is suggested, however, by Kant's subsequent discussion of "love of life." In general,

affects and passions are nature's way of "straining our powers" until reason can come on the scene and carry out its own ends directly (XXV: 617). Hence passions, though in a certain sense justified, are never "honorable." Kant makes a curious exception, however, for that "passion" for life which would lead one to choose to live forever in this world; here, in the willing embrace of endless time, the immediate love of life becomes (uniquely) honor worthy:

Immediate love of life does not once and for all [*einmal*] harmonize with reason, for one must also live to be truly miserable. . . . Hence love of life is only conditionally to be approved of. . . . [Yet] if a human being were allowed. . . to choose whether he would live here for all eternity, so that he also must live and be subjected to fate and wait for happiness and unhappiness, or die, as now happens, that person would be terrified of living to the immeasurable end (XXV: 615).

Under such (impossible) terms, love of life would become an "honorworthy" passion. Kant's exception, which conflates eternity and immeasurable time, both arouses and describes what he elsewhere refers to as the *horror vacui*. The foretaste of rest (a prospect of perpetual time we are unable to fill up) is a presentiment of death from which we (automatically) recoil. The representation of what most attracts – life on end – collapses into one that most repels. Like the foretaste of future peace from which it is (superficially) distinguished, Kant's notion of a happiness arising from "feeling one's life as a whole," suffers from the difficulty that makes the representation of eternity sublimely terrifying.³⁷

For a similar reason, the relation between nature and freedom in *Friedländer* remains peculiarly indeterminate. On the one hand, Kant divides "everything with human beings into nature and freedom." "To nature we reckon aptitude, talent and temperament; to freedom mind, heart and character." In the latter respect alone, ill can be reckoned to man as something he is guilty of (XXV: 625). And yet Kant's repeated efforts to describe a single principle of life in keeping with his notion of happiness as a determined maximum sum undercuts this conceptual and moral dualism. Kant's ambiguity here is echoed in the general incoherence of his treatment of temperament, a discussion that turns both on the distinction between feeling and activity and their identity (XXV: 637; cf. 625).

In keeping with Kant's increased interest in *Friedländer*, with making moral goals effectual, conflict and industry play an expanded role, supplementing the culture of refinement with the progressive discipline of rivalry and competition (see, e.g., XXV: 581–2, 612, 679). Nations are distinguished, not only by their taste, but also by their choice of means (be it wealth, honor, health, or freedom) to satisfy inclination generally (XXV: 583). Preeminent among general conditions for the satisfaction of all inclinations is love of life and happiness (XXV: 584). Some inclinations are private, others social (XXV: 585). Among the latter, some are sociable, others unsociable, and of the unsociable inclinations some are negative (e.g., self-defense) and others positive (e.g., self-expansion).

Without this strife, man, being naturally lazy and inert (*träge*), would always have remained so. Man's natural inclination to rest must be disrupted by external hardship and competition (XXV: 681). Indeed, man's two determinations/destinies (*Bestimmungen*) – the perfection of his animality and that of his humanity – conflict with one another, most obviously and manifestly, in the discrepancy between the natural capacity to have a child and the civil capacity to raise one. Thus Rousseau's "important question" – "whether the condition of nature or that of the civil constitution is the true condition of man?"

Natural man is not remodeled and *transformed* [*umgebildet*] through any art. Art has not suppressed in him the predisposition [*Anlage*]³⁸ of nature. The civil condition, however, is that in which man is disciplined, and through discipline violence is done to nature. . . . It has been believed that Rousseau preferred the man of nature to the man of art, and, on the one hand, his opinion also really seems to attach to natural man. But, on the other hand, this serves to arouse the attention of the philosopher to investigating how the perfection of the civil condition might be formed [*gebildet*] so that the perfections of nature are not destroyed, and no violence is done to nature (XXV: 684).

Civil perfection has the advantage of making possible a positive kind of happiness and positive kind of virtue, whereas natural perfection is merely negative (XXV: 685). Rousseau did not mean to say that it was the destiny of man to be a savage, but that we should not sacrifice all the advantages of nature in pursuit of civil ones. He intended, that is to say, a "plan of education and government" through which

such a perfect civil condition might be brought about (XXV: 689). Such positive happiness and virtue depend not only on the individual but also on society as a whole: “man as an animal is destined for the forest” but “man as man” is destined to “make himself happy and good as a member of the whole society” (XXV: 690). Up until now, civil perfection has been furthered by a combination of civil and social compulsion. Men are compelled by the sovereign and compel themselves through a refined regard for the opinion of others. If, however, we could ascend no higher than this in our civil constitution, humanity would “have lost more than it gained” in abandoning the rude state of nature. But man, Kant insists, always does climb higher (XXV: 692), inasmuch as it “appears” that every creature must obtain the perfection for which it was made (XXV: 693). Everything thus turns on the only kind of compulsion remaining: the inner, moral compulsion of reverence for the moral law as such. Under such conditions, each would take it for an honor to be taken for an upright man (*Mann*). The morally deficient would be spurned; and positions of honor would go only to those of good character (XXV: 693).

Such a “kingdom of God on earth” requires, then, not only inward reverence for the law, but also what Kant here calls a “moral establishment,” in which moral judgment is “externalized.” The honorable desire for political and social recognition commensurate with one’s desert – a wish that Kant’s satisfied man was earlier forced to renounce (XXV: 370, 563) – could finally, under these conditions, be gratified (XXV: 693).³⁹

To promote such conditions “the philosopher must make his concepts known,” and the student “must develop [*bilden*] his own character” (XXV: 696). Kant’s own educational project is thus itself a purveyor of “hope” – a hope, to be sure, that extends beyond his audience’s lifetime.

In this way such a condition could come about that we have no hope of experiencing. Such a condition cannot be destroyed, but will rather endure, as long as it pleases God to maintain our globe of earth. This consideration is very agreeable in that it is an idea which is possible, though it require a millennium. Nature will always be adequate, until there arises such an earthly paradise. Thus has *nature always developed itself* [*sich ausbildet*] and thus . . . [as with the gradual assimilation of the ecliptic and the equator]⁴⁰ *it continues to develop itself* (XXV: 696–7, emphasis added).

Unlike the impossible, and hence idle longings previously described as "moral wind" (XXV: 406), such a consideration [*Betrachtung*] is "agreeable," because it rests on an idea that is "possible" inasmuch as nature "will always suffice [*zureichen*]" (XXV: 696). It is on nature's own sufficient self-development, then, that Kant pegs his hopes for an eventual "paradise on earth."

The special role of women now lies, above all, in bringing about civil order and refinement "through inclination" rather than compulsion (XXV: 701, 706). (Men can, for once, be "mastered" by inclination without succumbing to unreason.) For this role, civilized woman, despite all her apparent faults, is very aptly equipped – the sister always at home, who in her conversation, politeness, decency, etc., "far surpasses her older brother away at University" (XXV: 701). For this women need only a "negative education" that preserves their native wit and playfulness and encourages a sense of (outer) honor: the letters of a housebound sister have more wit and vivacity [*Lebhaftigkeit*] than those of her college educated brother (XXV: 705). Where women are excluded from society, as in the Orient, the society of men remains crude. In general, wives rule, through inclination, while husbands govern, through understanding. (To this extent, at least, marriage overcomes the gap between sensibility and reason previously referred to.) That woman busies herself at home, where man seeks only peace, injects a further note of healthy conflict necessary to the vitality of the domestic union, which would otherwise "congeal" into a unity producing "complete inactivity and rest" (XXV: 703, 718–19).

Men's and women's specific differences in virtue and vice are expressions of nature's "double end and object" – union, on the one hand, disunion on the other – moving forces necessary to prevent "all sink[ing] into . . . inactivity" (XXV: 718). Even the war between the sexes is enlisted in the services of such vitalizing motion:

Human beings have an inclination to society but also to war; it is *vis activa* and *reactiva*, for otherwise human beings might congeal [*zusammenschmelzen*] into constant union, from which would arise complete inactivity and quiet.⁴¹ Thus in marriage too there is a predisposition to unity and to war. The female aptitude gives occasion to quarrel and war, which serves new unification; and even peace founded after such a war serves to enliven the household, so long as there is no *subjection* but instead complete equality (XXV: 719).

Indeed, all women's apparent imperfections can be traced, in the first instance, to nature's interest in maximizing reproductive vitality [*Lebhaftigkeit*]. Because "receiving is easier than giving," man must be stronger (XXV: 709).⁴² Women's vices are thus those of "weakness" (XXV: 722), which goes together both with greater natural artfulness and an incapacity for genuine virtue.

Boys, who are less naturally refined than girls, require for that very reason greater discipline. Accordingly, Kant praises Basedow's *Philanthropin* (The "greatest phenomenon to appear in this century for the improvement of the perfection of humanity" [XXV: 722–3]), where, in a departure from the strict teaching of Rousseau, young boys are, for example, taught a second language.⁴³ Youths need more than the purely negative education of Rousseau – that "finer Diogenes, who posited perfection in the simplicity of nature" (XXV: 724). The final level of education is respect for the dignity of man in one's own person, a respect that consists in true love of honor. From this one turns, finally, to ethics and religion:

When must religion first be taught? At the point at which the child can see that there must be an author [*Urheber*]. If a child becomes accustomed to religion earlier, so that he babbles his prayers in mimicry, this has no effect. If this could make one blessed, magpies, who also can be taught to babble in mimicry, would also become blessed.⁴⁴ But if he *learns to see the order in nature and the traces of its author*, then one must say to him that there is an author, and what this author will have – what is his law and will – and then one can influence him to be grateful to God (XXV: 728).

Gratitude toward God – precisely on the grounds that nature's purposiveness reveals the traces of His wisdom – does not limit itself to the merely physical order, stressed by Rousseau's tutor,⁴⁵ but, and even especially, extends to human affairs. Pragmatic anthropology, so construed, becomes a quasi-religious exercise – a physicotheology that not only yields "agreeable hope" but also exercises the "influence" that helps make up youth's "positive" instruction in morality. That Kant's auditors are of just the age for which, on his account, such instruction is appropriate makes Kant's pragmatic anthropology the natural continuation and completion of the pedagogy that informs Basedow's *Philanthropin*.⁴⁶

In sum, Kant's *Friedländer* lectures represent a high watermark in his effort to reconcile nature and freedom in terms of a single principle

of "life," in which sense and reason are (somehow) united.⁴⁷ The goal of humanity, on such a view, is the simultaneous realization of our animal and human perfections, the two natural ends whose historical and sexual divergence keeps human development in motion. (Kant singles out observation that seeks out these divergent sexual ends as "important" and "worthy of philosophy" [XXV: 707].) There is, however, this difficulty: the natural aim of our desires – satisfaction of all our inclinations – is indistinguishable, in human terms, from death. We are naturally prompted toward a goal we cannot imagine otherwise than as the absence of existence; while its wholly rational substitute – a mind both absolutely in motion and absolutely at rest – remains strangely elusive. All of nature's purported purposiveness would founder on this fact, but for the "double" end and "double" object nature pursues by virtue of the sexual difference. (Man's "natural" drive toward rest – which repels even as it attracts – is insufficient.) Hence, the special debt of gratitude men owe to women, whose divergence from male perfection keeps human affairs in motion and thus guarantees the ongoing progress and perfection of the species. This gratitude is reflected, perhaps, in Kant's particularly lively and sympathetic depictions of women in these lectures, side by side his usual criticisms.

Anthropology after 1777: *Pillau* and *Menschenkunde*

The *Pillau* lectures of 1777–8 are the first to mention the theories of Pietro Verri, whose essay on pleasure and pain appeared in German in 1777. Here, for the first time, Kant endorses Verri's claim that a preponderance of pain over enjoyment is a necessary condition of human life – a thesis that Kant will hereafter consistently maintain.⁴⁸ The *Pillau* lectures display other new features related to that change, including (1) new emphasis on the difference between happiness and what he calls "self-satisfaction"⁴⁹; (2) a new account of human progress, with a much diminished role for women and the relation of the sexes generally, along with a greatly expanded role for what he calls the characterization of peoples: the special advantage of Europe no longer lies, essentially, in its treatment of women but instead in its unique possession of "spirit" and accompanying qualities of inventiveness and industriousness;⁵⁰ (3) finally, a marked change in tone: where *Friedländer* is almost contemplative, *Pillau* is all business – the former, inviting meditation on the purposiveness of human nature as a mark of

divine authorship, the latter, resting that purposiveness, more precariously and urgently, upon future human effort and discovery.⁵¹ *Pillau* ends, not, as with the *Friedländer* lectures, in a kind of humanized and historicized physicotheology, but in a list of human inventions. These historical “milestones” stretch from the development of agriculture and the division of labor through the discovery of money, the compass, and gunpowder, and culminate in “the thought of Rousseau.” Kant continues, by way of explanation:

[Rousseau] has written a book that has made a great stir, called “On Human Inequality,” in which much misanthropy rules but out of benevolence. He shows what is terrible and intolerable in the civil condition and, on the other hand, what is agreeable in the raw condition. But one must not understand this to mean that he preferred the raw condition to every civil condition; instead he shows only that our present civil condition is less in conformity with human nature than was the raw condition we left behind, and if we had no hope of going further he would advise our going back to the state of nature. But he does not maintain, as some believe, that the destiny of man was to live in the forest. . . . Rousseau showed how a civil constitution must be to achieve the entire *end* of human nature. He showed how youth must be educated. . . . and in which constitution various peoples must step in order to reduce many barbaric wars to friendly conflict. He thus showed, above all, that the seeds of the development of our determination lie in us, and that we need on this account a civil constitution in order to fulfill the ends of nature. But if we remain in the current civil constitution, it would be better to return to the state of savagery (XXV: 846–7).

Rousseau remains Kant’s guide – indeed, Kant now compares his thought to such epochal human achievements as the discovery of agriculture and the invention of writing. The proof text, however, has changed, from *Emile* to the *Discourse on Inequality*. The accompanying “misanthropy,” bespeaks a new and sober resolution. Man is naturally driven forward, not by his anticipation of future rest, but by present pain.

This new mood is deepened in the *Menschenkunde* lectures of 1781– 2, which discuss at length Count Verri’s claims – claims that “ground,” on Kant’s report, a “true economy of human nature” (XXV: 1073). The general tone is established early on:

One wonders whether enjoyments can be present alone . . . , and whether we are capable of having one at any time, or whether they must always be preceded

by pains, so that enjoyment is merely the cancellation of pain, and not lasting, pain alone being self-sufficient. *Here human life seems to be melancholy*, and not to contain anything of value (XXV: 1069).

Yet this indeed seems to be the case. Human life, Kant now confidently insists, involves more pain than enjoyment. With Verri's help, Kant is able to resolve the difficulty created by the fact that pleasures are not homogeneous – a consideration that once led him to dispute the Stoic claim, repeated by Maupertuis, that our pains necessarily exceed our pleasures. Life force expresses itself in a certain neutral measure of well-being (*Wohlbefinden*). Enjoyment is possible only when this force is somehow reduced, so that a hindrance to life can be canceled and life thereby promoted. Thus, enjoyment must follow pain, but not conversely. Because pain is self-sufficient, whereas enjoyment requires contrast, pain can persist indefinitely; man, on the other hand, "cannot stand ever-enduring pleasure" (XXV: 1070). Hence, the total sum of pain always outweighs the total sum of enjoyments. We find ourselves "constantly gripped by nameless pains," which we call "restlessness" and "desire"; and the more life force one has "the more strongly one feels pain" (XXV: 1075).

Because of this painful feeling endemic to human life, time without an alteration of impressions weighs heavily on us; boredom literally makes time pass more slowly. And because pain makes life longer to us, "it must constitute the true [*recht*] feeling of life." Enjoyment, on the other hand, makes time shorter – another proof that it is not a positive enhancement of life, but merely a negation of life's hindrance (XXV: 1074).⁵²

Enjoyment does not "entice us into the future" but instead encourages us to conserve our forces. (Enjoyment is thus "conservative" in a most literal sense.) Pain, on the other hand, impels us to "propose something new" (XXV: 1071):

A kind of impatience assails men to alleviate their little pains – one sees from this that we seek out an object of enjoyment in advance; without yet knowing that object, we merely ferret it out as a cure for the unrest that drives and torments us. . . . If man is constantly occupied, and always making plans, it is not that he is enticed by the prospect of enjoyment; rather, he himself first seeks to acquire it; he is driven to leave behind the condition of pain in order to procure alleviation (XXV: 1070).

Even when nothing hurts our body, we are racked by “nameless pains” that compel us to “propose something” (XXV: 1070–1).

When we direct our eyes to the course of things, we find a drive in us that compels us at each moment to go out of our condition. We are forced [*genöthigt*] to this by a goad [*Stachel*], a driving spring, through which all men (as animals) are set in activity: man is always troubled [*gequält*] in thought. . . . He . . . lives always in a future time, and cannot linger [*verweilen*] in the present. . . . Man thus finds himself in constant pain, and this is the spur to activity in human nature. [However it may be with creatures on other planets] our lot is so constituted that nothing endures with us but pain (XXV: 1069–70).

Kant thus definitively abandons the attempt, advanced in *Friedländer*, to understand happiness as a determinate, maximum sum arising from “feeling one’s life as a whole.” Contrary to earlier claims, the notion of our condition as a whole cannot be united with one of maximum pleasure. (Accordingly, Kant no longer praises “fullness of feeling” as “the greatest enjoyment” [XXV: 794]).⁵³ Happiness understood (following Lucretius) as the “maximum sum of joys,” or “complete satisfaction of all our inclinations” is “a kind of ideal” of which “we can make no concept” (XXV: 1081):⁵⁴

We cannot even a single time represent such a possibility to ourselves of a life entirely composed of delight in pure enjoyments. We can never bring forth a complete whole with which we might be completely satisfied; this is thus an image [*Einbildung*] to which no concept corresponds (XXV: 1081).

According to Kant’s new economy, we can represent constant suffering but not constant joy. Pain, not the “foretaste of future delights,” has the power to impel us:

Although Mohammed tried to fill heaven with pure, sensible wantonness, it effected as little as when we promise unnamable joys. Pain effects more forcefully; of it we can make a graspable [*faßlich*] concept – as is already shown by the Mosaic story of creation. . . . Happiness [*Glück*] is what frees us from pain . . . Man cannot represent to himself what an enduring enjoyment would be, in which fear and hope did not interchange. Mohammed said of Paradise that it contains a very great supply of food, and very great enjoyment with the female sex, with the so-called beautiful Houris. But human beings are not much enticed by this, and fear of future ill has more effect; for we cannot think to ourselves an idea of unbroken happiness [*Glück*]; our concepts of happiness depend upon an exchange of well-being and pain (XXV: 1073–5).⁵⁵

To be sure, happiness can also be understood (in the manner of Zeno the Stoic and Diogenes) as sufficiency.⁵⁶ And "one can represent to oneself such happiness," which touches upon "very cheap conditions." The difficulty is that "we cannot see how a merely negative satisfaction can be a motive"; for if we could give up enough to be self-sufficient, "we would lack the motive spring to action." Desire cannot arise from the mere representation of its absence.⁵⁷ Hence, though we can represent it, we can find "no true example of such satisfaction" (XXV: 1081–2).⁵⁸

We can call life happy when it is equipped with all remedies directed against pain; for we have no other concept of happiness [*Glück*]. Satisfaction is when one would persist in the condition *in which one is*, and will dispense with all means of enjoyment. Thus the dispensability of all enjoyments is the condition of well being, in which one is above all remedies against pain; only this is not a condition we find with any human being (XXV: 1072).

Either understanding of happiness – as the satisfaction of all inclinations or as "sufficiency," that is, the cancellation of all need – can provoke idle longing, but not true desire, which presupposes the ability to effectuate its object (XXV: 1109).⁵⁹ Happiness, then, is not the perfection of our nature, as the Stoics, Cynics, and Epicureans differently believed. We are *naturally* impelled by pain to develop our rational talents (XXV: 1075; cf. 681–2). And we are *rationally* motivated by "the moral example that man gives himself" – the sole ground of desire consistent with human freedom.

Man is thus led beyond instinctual determination of desire, not just by external obstacles, but by human consciousness itself, which is intrinsically inventive: we seek out objects of enjoyment (as remedies for our pain) even before "we [are in a position to] know the object" (XXV: 1070). Although some might think it "ungrateful to creation" to speak so of providence, it is in fact a "wise establishment of human nature" in order to "drive us to activity" – terms that anticipate Kant's famous assertion that we should thank nature for so arranging things that we have nothing for which to thank her (XXV: 1071).⁶⁰

And yet, Kant adds, "we find that we might be happy, according to our concept of happiness" as panacea. The best remedy for the pain of being alive is work (*Arbeit*). Work is "compelled occupation" and

differs from idle time (*Muße*), in that work involves burdens that one undertakes “for the sake of an end” (XXV: 1075):

One should therefore think that work gives enjoyment only with respect to the end; only, work must give our mind greater rest, and the end cannot promote the enjoyment of man. For the *possession* of enjoyment does not constitute *delight* in it; delight lies, rather, in that which is in prospect. Because work, however, is nothing more than an effort, it can serve thereby to make us ready for the happiness of life, in that work holds back pain; for in work we forget the unnamable griefs that always pursue us (XXV: 1075–6).

The happiness available through labor, according to Kant’s new “economy of human nature” gives us “more” (but not “total”) peace of mind—a remedy for pain consistent (as liquor and opium are not) with ongoing (if not total) enjoyment. Work provides “constant relief” from life’s discomforts by allowing enjoyment in prospect. Unlike possessed enjoyments, which quickly grow stale, enjoyments in prospect delight us continually through the alleviation they provide, above all, to boredom: work is “the best way of killing [*vertreiben*] time” (XXV: 1075), but also makes life at the end seem longer, so that we are the readier to leave it.⁶¹ Enjoyments in foretaste are the most forceful (XXV: 1087). Ordinary enjoyments are “discharges” that “spend/squander” the life force; whereas what is disagreeable compresses it (XXV: 1089). Sexual enjoyment especially exhausts itself, profligacy in youth spelling a limp old age. Enjoyment from work, on the other hand, is an ever-renewable resource; like ideal enjoyments, it puts one in a position “to produce more of the same” both for oneself and others (XXV: 1087). Like ideal enjoyment, and unlike ordinary delight, work nourishes our talents and thus encourages rather than exhausting our life force. By such means, “no tool [*Organ*]⁶² of our life force is converted [*verwandt*]⁶³; the life principle remains [*steckt*] in thinking spirit” (XXV: 1089). Like money well invested, such improvement through labor is capital [*ein Fonds*] for true enjoyment.⁶⁴ The effort we expend, moreover, allows us to claim credit for developing what nature lays in us; labor and exertion transform something passively received into something actively produced: Man is “determined/destined to become himself the author of his own fitness [*Geschicklichkeit*], and even his benignity, through the development of his inner *Anlagen*” (XXV: 1195): man is so fashioned so that the development of his *Anlagen* must be the effect of his own

labor (XXV: 887). Because character is a matter of free will, Kant now emphasizes, "we see it not as a gift of nature, but as something meritorious":

We characterize a human being either through that which is a gift of nature and not to be imputed to him, or we can characterize what constitutes him through what is most inward in a human being. The first is called a merit of fortune. The proper character of a human being, however, consists in the relations of a human being through that which properly belongs to him, and is not to be attributed either to nature or to fortune. This character consists in the fundamental *Anlage* of the will to make good use [*bedienen*] of all one's talents [and] to manage well with one's temperament. Through a good character a man becomes author [*Urheber*] of his own value; he can also substitute for lack of talent through industry [*Fleiß*] and this must originate in character. The foundation for the improvement of all our talents lies in character. One calls it will, and it is the *Anlage* to make use of one's talents for the best ends. It thus depends upon a human being whether he has a character or whether he has a good or bad character (XXV: 1174-5).⁶⁵

Man, not God, is now the "author" to whom gratitude is due (cf. XXV: 728); "man has himself to thank for his perfection, though the *Anlagen* thereto lies in nature" (XXV: 877). The tension between character as natural *fond* and character as personally earned is mediated by the notion that effort, which is in our power, deserves reward. By actively cultivating our talents we enhance what we are given (like the good servants in the parable) with interest that is to our credit. But not just any effort will do: to be genuinely our own it must be directed toward an end that flows from rational self-legislation. The cultivation of character is thus, above all, a cultivation of the talent of reason.

But if effort establishes, or at least marks, desert, it also has its drawbacks as a mode of cultivation:

We make use of wit to pass the time and of reason out of duty. Hence all exercise of reason is a serious occupation for us; but man gladly calls reason away from its post and abandons himself to carefree and agreeable foolishness. . . . Reason is a human property that man most highly esteems, to be sure, yet doesn't love, and he seeks to escape its compulsion. Reason is too earnest [*ernsthaf*] for man, and very much constrains him" (XXV: 1044).

Hence, it seems, the special value of social intercourse as a kind of antidote to labor (XXV: 896), stimulating activity without compulsion. In taking the side of Home⁶⁶ here against Rousseau, Kant has in mind

the value of such society in furthering human cultivation. For the first time, Kant alludes to Rousseau's "fantastical" suspicion of others – a distrust, Kant says, bordering on madness (XXV: 1010). Rousseau's inordinate suspicion of society blinded him, it seems, to the positive value of social intercourse, not only as a necessary vehicle of moral discourse, but also as a stimulant to self-improvement (XXV: 931), and an enlivening relief from work too focused and constrained to be consistent with good health (XXV: 1151). That such society diminishes satisfaction and equanimity is not too high a price to pay for these advantages (XXV: 1103ff.).⁶⁷

The measured praise of Rousseau in *Menschenkunde* – in striking contrast with his near apotheosis in *Pillau* – emphasizes Kant's renewed insistence on the dividedness of man. Rousseau is right to question the compatibility of luxury and human happiness but wrong to think that nature's purpose is our happiness. Both individually, and collectively, nature has so arranged things that we have only ourselves to thank for our perfection. Man's consciousness is "twofold" (XXV: 862), a claim in keeping with the first *Critique*, with which *Menschenkunde* is (nearly) contemporaneous.⁶⁸ The "true economy of human nature" supports Kant's newly established, critical outlook by freeing us from the illusion of happiness as a "maximum sum" of enjoyments. Happiness is merely an "ideal of the imagination," demanding attainment, *per impossibile*, of "the totality of a series of results that is in fact infinite."⁶⁹ Kant's "true economy" is thus consistent with his critical distinction between infinity (in the field of appearances) and totality (as an idea of reason) more generally.⁷⁰ Human nature is such "that man will have a unity of the whole, and is not satisfied unless he sees all in a particular connection to an end" (XXV: 886). Such unity, however, is in tension with the twofold, and hence (partly) fractured, nature of human consciousness. Satisfaction is thus best represented, not as a determinate whole but rather as an ongoing task,⁷¹ congruent with philosophy, which shows the relation of all to the final end of human reason (XXV: 1042–3).⁷²

In *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* Kant gives final expression to the views elaborated in lectures on anthropology from 1778 onward:

Filling our time with planfully progressive occupations that have as their result a great end we intend (*vitam extendere factis*) is the only sure means of being cheerful about life and yet also sated with life. . . . Such a conclusion of life now

happens with contentment. But how does it stand with contentment . . . during life (*acquiescentia*)? – this for man is unachievable: either in a moral . . . or pragmatic regard. . . . Nature has laid [*gelegt*] in him pain as a goad to activity, and even in the last moment of life contentment with its final segment is to be called contentment only comparatively. . . . – To be (absolutely) contented in life would be a deedless rest and stoppage [*Stillstand*] of the motive springs, or a blunting of sensation and the activity connected with it. But this is no more compatible with man's intellectual life than is stoppage of the heart in an animal body, such that, if there does not occur new stimulus (through pain), death inevitably follows (VII: 234–5).

Happiness understood as perfect satisfaction is thinkable only as a kind of living death. Relative satisfaction, on the other hand, consists in pursuing a "great end," through "planfully progressive occupation." As one who has devoted himself in singular fashion to "philosophy" so defined, Kant has himself followed what he here designates as the only course of wisdom, securing him a "capital [*Capital*] of satisfaction" to draw on that does not depend upon "contingencies or the law of nature" (VII: 237).⁷³

The most fundamental and easiest means of relief [*Besänftigungsmittel*] for any pain is the thought . . . that life as such, considered in terms of our delight in it . . . has no intrinsic value at all. Life has value only on the basis of the use made of it, the ends to which it is directed. . . . [This value], which cannot be drawn from fortune [*Glück*] but only from the wisdom of man . . . is thus within his power (VII: 239).

Rousseau located human happiness in sufficiency arising from employment of all one's faculties so that one "feel[s] one's life as a whole." Owing, in part, to his reading of Count Verri, Kant came to reject Rousseau's association of human consciousness with a feeling for the wholeness of our existence.⁷⁴ Totality is an idea of reason that cannot be felt (except, perhaps, in the toils of the sublime); and happiness is not the natural end of life (in any but a terminal sense). We can think of happiness "only in progress" that "can never be completed"; should it do so, "happiness would cease."⁷⁵

Notes

1. Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Akademie edition), vol. XXV, edited by Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997). See especially the editors' valuable comments on Verri, pp. XLII–XLVI.

2. One must, to be sure, exercise caution in drawing conclusions about the development of Kant's thought from student lecture notes whose accuracy, with respect to both content and date, is less than sure. There is, however, enough consistency in these lectures, both internally and with respect to one another and to other (published) material to inspire some confidence in their overall usefulness in conveying the general direction of Kant's thinking.
3. See, for example, Rousseau, *Emile*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 41.
4. Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: Preußischen Akademie, 1911–), vol. XX, 44. (All references to Kant's work cite the Akademie edition by volume and page).
5. See, for example, the following early remark: "Would that Rousseau showed how [from *Emile*] schools could originate" (XX: 29 [1764]).
6. See Kant, XV (*Reflexionen zur Anthropologie*) 717 n. Volume XV of the Akademie edition of Kant's work contains generous excerpts of the German translation by Christoph Meiners (XV: 717 n–722 n).
7. See Verri, *Del piacere e del dolore ed altri scritti* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1964), pp. 16, 37; and John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, bk. II, ch. XXI ("Of Power"); ch. XX, §6: "the chief if not only spur to human industry and action, is uneasiness."
8. *Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy* (1763). Kant's "psychological" application of this concept characterizes displeasure (*Unlust*) as not merely a lack of pleasure (*Lust*), but, rather, as "the ground of the latter's deprivation [*Beraubung*]" (II: 180). By this he means not only that displeasure is a positive feeling in its own right, but that it is opposed to pleasure in a way that "subtracts from" the latter (just as a debt subtracts from a credit). His example of the latter is the Spartan mother (also described at the beginning of *Emile*) whose joy on hearing that her son has fought heroically for his country is diminished by the subsequent news that he has died in battle. Estimating the total value of one's whole (*gesamten*) pleasure is like calculating the total yield of an estate, that is, a function of income (pleasure) minus expenses (displeasure). Pleasure and displeasure, to the extent that they really oppose each other, stem from opposing grounds. When both grounds are lacking, the result is indifference. When both grounds are present and equal, the result is equilibrium. On the basis of such concepts, Kant says, Maupertuis argued that the sum of human happiness is negative – a calculation that is humanly impossible, according to Kant, owing to the "diversity" of our feelings. Only if our feelings were, like money, homogeneous (*gleichartig*) could such a calculation succeed (II: 182) – a statement in striking contrast with Kant's later view. See Maupertuis, *Essai de philosophie morale* (London: chez Jacques Brakstone, 1750), pp. 4–10; cf. Verri, p. 31.
9. Literally, "sameness of value."
10. *Critique of Judgment*; see also *Anthropology* (IX: 239).

11. "One, who, through a series of ills mounting to hopelessness, feels [*empfinden*] a surfeit of life, still remains sufficiently in possession of his reason to ask himself whether taking his own life may not be contrary to his duty to himself. He now applies the test: can the maxim of my action be a universal law of nature? His maxim is, 'from self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life if its continuance threatens more ill than it promises agreeableness.' He asks himself only whether this principle of self-love could constitute a universal law of nature. One immediately then sees that a nature whose law it was that the same sentiment [*Empfindung*] whose determination it is to bring about a furtherance of life should instead destroy life would contradict itself. Hence such a maxim cannot find a place as a universal law of nature" (IV: 421–2). Commentators have generally taken the "sentiment" in question to be "self-love"; in fact, however, the only sentiment mentioned in the passage is that of pain (bordering on despair).
12. *Metaphysics of Morals* (VI: 281): "From a *practical* point of view it is a quite correct and even necessary idea to regard the act of procreation as one by which we have brought a person into the world without his consent and highhandedly [*eigenmächtig*] on our part, for which deed the parents incur an obligation to make the child satisfied with his condition so far as it lies within their power."
13. This is so, for Kant, not only because natural instinct would lead us more surely than reason toward the satisfaction of our inclinations, but also because reason multiplies those inclinations. (Both of these claims are elaborated at length in Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* and *Emile*.) Since nature can be presumed to have a different purpose (*Zweck*) in mind for us (i.e., cultivation of our reason, whose destiny [*Bestimmung*] is to produce a good will) happiness can, "in this life at least," be reduced to "less than zero" without nature seeming to proceed contrary to its purpose (IV: 396).
14. To be sure, Rousseau is most explicit on this point in works to which Kant lacked access; see, for example, Rousseau, *The Reveries of a Solitary Walker*, trans. C. Butterworth (New York: Harper, 1979), pp. 68–9; and *Lettre à Voltaire (Oeuvres complètes, v. 4* [Paris: Gallimard, 1969]), p. 1063. Cf. *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), p. 60; *Emile*, p. 80. On Kant's access to Rousseau, see Jean Ferrari, *Les sources françaises de la philosophie de Kant* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1979), pp. 171–88.
15. See, for example, *Emile*, pp. 61, 270, 42: he "has lived the most . . . who has most felt life."
16. Cf. *Emile*, pp. 80–1. The true road to human happiness, according to Rousseau, lies neither in simply "diminishing our desires" (for "if they were beneath our power, a part of our faculties would remain idle, and we would not enjoy our whole being") nor simply in "extending our faculties" (for "if our desires were more extended" we "would only become unhappier"). Our unhappiness consists in the "disproportion between

our desires and our faculties." A "being endowed with senses whose faculties equaled his desires would be an absolutely happy being." Rousseau adds, however, that "more suffering than enjoyment" is the condition of all men.

17. See, for example, (XXV: 367): pleasure (as distinguished from enjoyment) is the "feeling" through which "the value of the human condition is determined."
18. Kant at this stage emphasizes the ultimate dependence of such character on nature: "one who has a bad character, will never achieve the opposing good one, because the true *seed* is lacking, a seed which must be deposited [*gelegt*] in our nature as its end." All we can do is encourage or hinder the development of this seed (XXV: 438).
19. "The representation of an intellectual composition is called an idea," which one "makes oneself" in "thinking the maximum of a concept"; this can happen, Kant adds, in various ways – hence "the difference between the Stoical and Epicurean idea of the happy man" (XXV: 98). Each idea of happiness is a different sort of maximum: for the Stoics, that of equanimity (or enjoyment and pain canceling to zero), for the Epicureans, maximum positive pleasure. Both, says Kant, are "ideas of human perfection."
20. cf. *Inaugural Dissertation* (1770), §§3–§5 (II: 392–4). Kant distinguishes, without further elaboration, among intellectual, aesthetic, and practical ideas. Compare the similar reticence of the *Inaugural Dissertation* concerning the character of "noumenal perfection" (II: 395–6). For a general consideration of these themes, see G. Felicitas Munzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
21. cf. Kant's later view that it has a tendency to do so but only "externally" (IX: 244).
22. Kant elsewhere suggests that this race is likely to die out, owing, in part, to (sexual) apathy (XXV: 840).
23. See, for example, his reference to wisdom (i.e., the understanding necessary to estimate the "universal or relational value of things") as involving a "palingenesis" or "rebirth" (XXV: 150; 159). See, too, his assertion that the "transition between bodily and spiritual movement cannot be further clarified"; "it follows that Bonnet and various others very much err when they believe they can securely draw conclusions from the brain to the soul" (XXV: 9). Similarly, concerning his "new course on anthropology," Kant now writes (in a letter to Marcus Herz, dated "toward the end of 1773" [X: 145]): "I omit entirely the subtle . . . and eternally futile inquiries as to the manner in which bodily organs are connected with thought."
24. On this point see also Kant's contemporaneous letter to Herz (X: 145): the highest ground of morality must be "pleasing in the highest degree" for it must be able to "move," that is, "have a direct relation with the primary springs of the will."
25. Kant will definitively address these questions only in the *Groundlaying* (1785).

26. See especially *Emile*, pp. 357–64; 373–7; 384–7.
27. Without the falsely high regard paid them by civilized men, women would be slaves, as they remain among the savage nations.
28. See *Collins* (XXV: 8–9).
29. cf. Kant's descriptions of juridical community in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (VII: 231): punishment, on this account, is literally a life enhancing remedy for the body politic.
30. See also "Metaphysik L₁" (XXVIII: 248): life is threefold: "animal, human, and spiritual."
31. cf. *Collins* (XXV: 169): "pain is a true hindrance to life." The argument in *Collins* appears to be as follows: enjoyment registers activity, which is not always benign (e.g., when it exceeds what one's life force can support); whereas pain registers a real blockage to activity, which (unlike cessation of activity arising, say, from effectual expenditure of force) is always malignant. In *Friedländer*, by way of contrast, activity, directly registered by pleasure, is always benign, so long as it supports life activity as a whole.
32. cf., in this regard, "Metaphysik L₁," *Vorlesungen zur Metaphysik* (XXVIII: 254–6).
33. The point is made even more forcefully in Kant's roughly contemporaneous lectures on metaphysics ("Metaphysik L₁"), (XXVIII: 287; 248–50): "Whatever harmonizes with freedom agrees with the whole of life. Whatever agrees with the whole of life, pleases."
34. See, for example, *Reflexion* 938 (XV: 416): "Because spirit goes forth from the universal it is, so to speak, a particular divine aura [*divina particula aerae*], drawn from the universal spirit. Thus spirit has no particular properties; rather according to the various talents and sensibilities [*Empfindsamkeiten*] that it precipitates, it variously enlivens, and because this is so multifarious, each spirit has something that is peculiar. One must not say: the genius's. It is the unity of the world soul."

Other notes from around the same period identify spirit's capacity to "enliven" with its status as an originating source of unity: "Spirit is aroused and cultivated, if we set a talent from one standpoint in relation to all others. Then the entire force of the soul is aroused and the universal life is moved" (*Reflexion* 937; XV: 416). Spirit is thus called the "production ground" of the ideas (which "determine whole[s] through concept[s]"): "The 'moving force' by which the mind is first moved lies in the products that obtain unity through relation to their idea. . . . Spirit is the enlivening of sensibility through the idea." Such enlivening must proceed from understanding to sensibility; otherwise it is merely feverish heating. In keeping with traditional views of generation, this "enlivening" function is the peculiar province of men: "Man [*Der Mann*] has not only suitability [*Geschicklichkeit*] but also spirit. Spirit is. . . not a particular talent, but an enlivening principium of all talents" (*Reflexion* 933, 935; XV: 414–15). Similarly, "spirit is the inner. . . principium of the enlivening of (the forces of the mind) thoughts. Soul is that which is enlivened. A new

series of thoughts originates out of itself. From this, ideas. Spirit is the original enlivening, that comes from itself and is not derived. (Aptitude [*Naturel*] is the receptivity of the forces of the mind, talent their spontaneity.)” (Reflexion 934; XV: 415). Moral freedom or spontaneity as an individuating source of moral agency, has yet to separate as decisively as it later will from aesthetic freedom, or spontaneity as an individuating source of original production. Freedom in the latter sense eludes the power of our free will (*Reflexion* 932; XV: 413). See also *Reflexion* 1033 (XV: 463): The life spirit seems to be a particular principium of the union of the soul with the body . . . on which the will has no influence. The heart is seized, and this is the basis of [their] commerce.”

35. See *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* (XVIII: 153–6).
36. Indeed, it takes much effort and exercise to maintain the mind at rest, which we accomplish, above all, by stipulating to oneself (*sich festsetzen*) that one act from principles. One who loves can be at rest; one in love cannot (XXV: 591). The mind “in movement” cannot properly estimate the value of an object in relation to its well-being as a whole. Mental rest is thus less a goal than a condition of the rational estimation of pleasure.
37. See *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (II: 209–10 n).
38. “Anlage” can mean both economic investment and hereditary germ. In his early *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, Kant treats the natural development of the universe as an orderly unfolding of tendencies invested/implanted in matter at the Creation by the inexhaustible richness/potency of God; see Shell, *The Embodiment of Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
39. Kant’s position here (and in his roughly contemporary letters to Lavater [X: 175–80]) anticipates his later treatment of the church visible and invisible in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*.
40. Kant speculates that one day night and day will be of equal length all over the world.
41. cf. Kant’s similar complaints about world monarchy in *Perpetual Peace* (VIII: 367).
42. This emphasis on the greater life force reproductively required of the male is an addition on Kant’s part to an account of the relation between the sexes that otherwise follows Book Five of *Emile* very closely. Kant consistently maintained that sexual intercourse is for men a depletion of vital force, comparable in danger to that of death in childbirth for women.
43. Similarly, unlike Rousseau, who encourages honesty in the child as a means of controlling him, Kant stresses only its moral aspect.
44. *Emile*, p. 257.
45. *Emile*, p. 314.
46. Not surprisingly, this period represents the peak of Kant’s active support for that institution. (See especially his letters to Basedow and to Christian Heinrich Wolke, headmaster of the school, of March and June 1776 [X: 156–9]. During the same year, Kant used Basedow’s *Methodenbuch* for his own lectures on Pedagogy.)

47. See *Friedländer* (XXV: 599–612); cf. *Pillau*, according to which anthropology has “little to say” about the community of soul and body (XXV: 813).
48. Concerning the feeling of pleasure and displeasure Kant now writes: “this is very important and indispensable material,” which “contains the principles of the human passions” and on which an Italian has written (XXV: 784–5). “It is easy to understand something [of this matter], but not so easy to have insight.” As Verri says, enjoyment cannot be determined (conceptually). Enjoyment is the feeling of the promotion of life; not life itself, since pain conveys the feeling of being alive even more than pleasure does (XXV: 786). (Kant’s adoption of Verri thus represents a partial return to the position of *Collins* on this point over that of *Friedländer*.) Enjoyment of life cannot exceed the pain of life, but the reverse can easily occur. That which “lets us feel our existence is not *easy* for us.” It “makes time long for us,” and “pains us” (XXV: 787). (Verri also distinguishes between physical and moral pains and pleasures.) See Verri, *Del piacere e del dolore ed altri scritti*, pp. 9–15. Not least of the advantages of Verri’s argument is its immunity to Kant’s early objection, on the grounds that pleasures and pains are not homogeneous, to similar claims advanced by Maupertuis.
49. See (XXV: 734; 804–7).
50. See (XXV: 814–16; 831–47). This characterization of “peoples” (which *Friedländer* disposes of in a few [relatively early] pages [XXV: 654–61]) is now called “a necessary condition of world-knowledge,” and the “final end” of both histories and travel (XXV: 831). Kant’s earlier worries as to the intrinsic inferiority of the non-European races here hardens into doctrine: whereas he had once allowed that Greenlanders contain the same “germs,” ripe for development, as do Parisians, he now insists that future progress will come only from the peoples of Europe. Peoples of the other continents are at a “standstill” (XXV: 846), owing to their lack of “spirit.” (Americans, he speculates, will die out completely [XXV: 839–40].) (Kant’s later treatment of race – which is both philosophically and rhetorically complex – cannot be further dealt with here.) Kant’s treatment of the “character of the female sex,” by way of contrast, is now meager to the point of being perfunctory (XXV: 835–8).
51. Where Kant had once identified “intelligence” and “spirit,” reason now stands out clearly as a distinct faculty of “laws” (as distinguished from mere rules), a faculty whose “supreme value” lies in providing “the highest ground of unity.” Thus “understanding gives the unity of appearances”; whereas reason gives the rules of understanding their unity. Rules relate themselves to a given end. Law, on the other hand, “determines the end.” And “because the end is the highest ground of unity, reason is the law-giver” (XXV: 777). Spirit, on the other hand, is what gives all capacities unity – that is, the “general unity or harmony of the human mind,” or the “enlivening of sensibility through the idea” (XXV: 782). Spirit is in turn bound up with newness and discovery, because progress requires, in knowledge as well as art, making new use of our talents (XXV: 783).

52. But cf. Kant's later claim that "activity" (*handeln*) makes life both more pleasant and more "real" to us and hence retrospectively more satisfying (XXV: 1081).
53. cf. *Parow* (XXV: 414): "The mind full of feeling and at rest is the greatest enjoyment."
54. cf. *Groundlaying of the Metaphysics of Morals* (IV: 418–19).
55. Locke makes a similar argument in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*; man is naturally driven to act, not by contemplation of some good but by feelings of "uneasiness": " 'It is better to marry than to burn,' says St. Paul, where we may see, what it is, that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life. A little burning felt pushes us more powerfully, than greater pleasures in prospect draw or allure" (II: XXI, § 34).
56. For Zeno and the Stoics, sufficiency is achieved through self-mastery; for Diogenes and the Cynics (of whom Rousseau, according to Kant, is a latter-day example), by relinquishing unnecessary desires. Kant's persistent objection to stoicism is not its principle of *animus sui compos* – a principle he basically shares – but its inability to show how such a rule can be effectual. See, for example, XXV: 39; cf. *Conflict of the Faculties* (VII: 100).
57. For a useful discussion of the relation of Kant's understanding of happiness to his theory of real opposition generally, see Peter König, *Autonomie und Autokratie: über Kants Metaphysik der Sitten* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994).
58. Kant notes, in this regard, that "human beings may well call themselves satisfied with their condition" so long as they think they have "means to free themselves from any pain." Hence the attraction of liquor, opium, and other intoxicants to the rude and uncultivated, despite the fact that such remedies are also immediately painful (XXV: 1072).
59. In the *Lectures on Ethics* Kant adds Plato's understanding of the highest good as spiritual community with God – an idea we are also incapable of representing to ourselves as a real possibility (XXVII: 250).
60. *Idea for a Universal History* (VIII: 19–20).
61. Kant notes that nations to whom nature "gives all" have fewer "true enjoyments" than those (e.g., in Northern Europe) where nature's harshness prompts activity (XXV: 1078).
62. cf. *Dreams of a Spirit Seer*, where "Organ" (problematically) designates the "soul's sensorium" – that is, that part of the brain whose movements usually accompany the images and representations of the thinking soul, "as the philosophers maintain" (II: 339 n).
63. *Verwandeln* can mean "change," "convert," "transmute" (as in alchemy), and "transubstantiate" (as in the Christian Mass); Kant's usage here suggests "convert" as in the realization of an investment through its conversion into money or other immediately useful wealth.
64. Kant plays here on the "parable of the talents" (*Matthew* 25: 14–30), with which the term "talent" (meaning, originally, a deposit from God) is etymologically associated.

65. This passage is part of an interpolation from the *Petersburg* manuscript not contained in *Menschenkunde*.
66. The editors (of XXV) give "Hume" as an alternate reading.
67. Not least of these advantages is the ability of social intercourse to counter a dangerous tendency in some to self-preoccupation. Like pragmatic anthropology itself, social intercourse is a powerful remedy against hypochondria and related illnesses (XXV: 862f.). On the latter point, see also Shell, *The Embodiment of Reason*, pp. 283ff.
68. The first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* appeared in 1781.
69. See *Groundlaying of the Metaphysics of Morals* (IV: 418–19): "although every human being wishes to attain [happiness], he can still never say determinately and self-consistently what he really wishes and wills. . . . The cause is that all the elements belonging to the concept of happiness are . . . empirical . . . and that nevertheless the idea of happiness requires an absolute whole, a maximum of well-being in my present and every future condition." But "it is impossible for a most insightful and most powerful and yet finite being to make here a determinate concept of what he really wills."
70. See *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 416–17 / B 443–55).
71. See, for example, "Metaphysik L₂" (XXVIII: 593); "Metaphysik Volckmann" (XXVIII: 446): "here on earth happiness is nothing but a progress, each sensation drives us to go from one to another; accordingly we cannot think at all of an *enduring* state after this which would be happy in a constant way, for we think of happiness only in progress."
72. See also *Critique of Pure Reason* A 839 / B 867; and Richard Velkley, *Freedom and the Ends of Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
73. Kant's discussion of pleasure and pain, in the late *Anthropology*, continues to pay homage to Verri (See [VII: 232]).
74. Only moral character – as he now insists – can "fix" the "concept" of our person (XXV: 1175).
75. "Metaphysik Volckmann" (XXVIII: 446).

Prudential Reason in Kant's Anthropology

Patrick Kain

For all pragmatic doctrines are doctrines of prudence, where for all our skills we also have the means to make proper use of everything. For we study human beings in order to become more prudent . . .

*Anthropology Friedländer 25: 471*¹

Anthropology should have a prudential or pragmatic orientation, according to Kant, a thought emphasized in the title of his 1798 “textbook,” *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. According to the Parow notes (1772–3) of an early lecture course on anthropology, Kant described prudence as “the capacity to choose the best means to our happiness” (25: 413), a description that fits well with his suggestion in the *Groundwork* that prudence is “skill in the choice of means to one’s own greatest well-being” or happiness, or “the insight to unite all [one’s own] purposes to his own enduring advantage” (G 4: 416).² While Kant is quick to contend that the prudent pursuit of well-being or happiness is not the only or the most dignified purpose of practical reason (this esteemed place is reserved for morality), he insists that, in a finite rational agent,

reason certainly has a commission from the side of his sensibility which it cannot refuse, to attend to its interest and to form practical maxims with a view to happiness in this life and, where possible, in a future life as well (KpV 5: 61).³

In fact, when he discusses this prudential "commission" in the *Religion*, Kant suggests that the exercise of prudence is both natural and *rational*.

To incorporate [self-love as good will toward oneself] into one's maxim is natural (for who will not will that things always go well for him?). This love is, however, rational to the extent that, with respect to the end only what is consistent with the greatest and most abiding well-being is chosen, and that also the most apt means for each of these components of happiness are chosen. Here reason only occupies the place of a handmaiden to natural inclination . . . (R 6: 45 n).

It is proper, both natural and rational, Kant seems to say, that our own happiness or well-being always carries at least a certain weight in our deliberations.

Yet, recent work has often taken Kant's moral theory and its critique of eudaimonistic, hedonistic, and desire-based rivals to imply that happiness, well-being, or satisfaction, taken by itself, cannot generate any reasons for action; that imprudence, even in the absence of contrary inclinations or moral demands, is not, by itself, a failure of practical rationality.⁴ Such claims seem to be supported by an influential interpretation of Kant's theory of value that suggests that the good will "functions as a source of the goodness of happiness in the sense of providing the reason to pursue it."⁵ This allegedly Kantian "source thesis" implies that, without a positive connection to a prior conception of moral value and moral norms, there is nothing *per se* irrational about imprudence. Aside from the unreasonableness of dishonesty, it would seem, there would be no further irrationality manifested by an imprudent "burglar who was caught because he sat down to watch television in the house he was burgling."⁶

In addition to the peculiarity of this result, several features of Kant's moral philosophy seem to count against imputation of the source thesis to him. His moral philosophy seems to presuppose prudential normativity, rather than ground it. Kant's arguments for the existence of duties of virtue, the obligatory positive ends he identifies as the happiness of others and one's own perfection, rely upon the idea that finite rational agents have their own happiness as an end. That there is this initial determination of the finite rational will to pursue happiness is crucial to the derivation of these duties.⁷ More importantly,

it seems that an agent's prudential concerns, including his relatively determinate conception of happiness, play a critical role in the formulation of all particular maxims, without which he cannot act.⁸ The problem is that, if, as the source thesis implies, happiness or personal well-being were not an original, standing concern of a finite rational being, a concern with rational weight, then it is hard to imagine how prudential concerns or, for that matter, any determinate course of action, could ever be rationally pursued. The mere fact that a potential end *could* be pursued in a morally permissible way does not, by itself, give an agent any positive reason to pursue it. If the relation of an end to an agent's conception of happiness carries no rational weight in the first instance, it is hard to see why the further fact of moral permissibility would generate a reason to pursue it. It seems, rather, that there must be a sense in which, in Rawls's familiar terminology, the morally "reasonable" presupposes a serviceable conception of the prudentially "rational."⁹

I will argue that Kant articulated such a conception of prudential reason at several points in the development of his anthropology and of his theory of practical reason. On this account, helpfully manifested in the newly available anthropology lectures, prudence can be seen to be a genuine manifestation of rational agency, involving a distinctive sort of normative authority, an authority distinguishable from and conceptually prior to that of moral norms, though still overridable by them.¹⁰ In the present essay, I will not consider all of the potential difficulties in reconciling such a conception with other aspects of Kant's thought nor will I directly settle questions about the "source thesis," rather I will present and explicate some of the key evidence for the presence of this account of prudence in Kant's anthropology.¹¹ First, I will argue that within the theory of rational agency found in the anthropology lectures and sketched in the moral philosophy, prudence involves the exercise of a distinctive, nonmoral rational capacity. Second, I will argue that the anthropology lectures make an important contribution to the understanding of Kant's account of the distinctive prudential task. Despite Kant's familiar complaints about human finitude and the natural dialectic of our desires, he offers useful suggestions in those lectures about how prudential reflection can generate genuine practical guidance. Third, I examine a bit more closely Kant's suggestions that prudence can function prior to and independently of

specifically moral capacities and norms. Even with significant developments in Kant's anthropological theory over the years, I will suggest, prudential norms can still be regarded as distinctive and conceptually independent of morality. Finally, I close with a brief discussion of Kant's account of the normative ground of prudential imperatives and a few of the implications this conception of prudence would seem to have for the relationship between prudence and morality in Kant's theory.

I

On Kant's account of rational agency or moral psychology, prudence is conceived of as the exercise of a distinctive practical capacity.¹² Unfortunately, a succinct summary of this account is impeded by the fact that none of his writings on practical philosophy is primarily intended to provide a general moral psychology or a general account of practical reason. While Kant's moral theory does not preclude an account of practical rationality in general, his primary focus in the ethical works is on the distinctive nature of the categorical requirements of pure practical reason, leaving little room for an extensive discussion of nonmoral practical reason.¹³ Yet, in *Groundwork II* and in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant does sketch a general theory of practical rationality to prepare the way for his account of moral obligation. Kant introduces the *Metaphysics of Morals* with a discussion of the practical "faculties of the human mind" and a section subtitled "*philosophia practica universalis*." Similarly, early in the second section of the *Groundwork*, Kant declares his plan to "follow and present distinctly the practical faculty of reason, from its general rules of determination to the point where the concept of duty arises from it" (G 4: 412). In the *Groundwork*, Kant seeks to uncover the supreme principle of morality by identifying several formulations of the categorical imperative, formulations derived from a consideration of the formal features of practical principles, the alleged universality and necessity of the moral law, and its relationship to a specific conception of rational agency.¹⁴ A rational agent, he suggests, is a being with the capacity "to act in accordance with the representation of laws, i.e., in accordance with principles" (G 4: 412). "The will is thought of as a capacity to determine itself to action in conformity with the representation of certain laws. And such a capacity can be

found only in rational beings” (G 4: 427). In his lectures and published writings on anthropology, Kant elaborates upon, among other things, the conception of our “practical faculties” hinted at in these familiar ethical texts.¹⁵ In particular, the anthropological discussions of freedom and character clarify the distinctive place that prudence occupies within Kant’s general conception of moral psychology.

Life, Kant suggests (or at least the life of each member of a certain class of animals) involves the susceptibility to feelings of pleasure and pain and the capacity to act or behave in accordance with one’s own desires or representations.¹⁶ Within the context of “pragmatic” anthropology, Kant explicates this “faculty of desire” (*Begehrensvermögen*) or principle of action. As he taught his students in 1775–6,

The third faculty of the [human] soul is the faculty of desire. . . . One cannot explain the desires exactly, yet to the extent it appertains to anthropology, it is then that [aspect] in the thinking being, which is the motive force in the physical world. It is the active power of self-determination of the actions of the thinking being. This is something subtle. . . . All desires are directed to activity, for living beings do something according to the faculty of desire, and lifeless beings do something then when they are impelled by an outside force” (25: 577).

In general, “desire [*Begierde*] (*appetitus*) is the self-determination of a subject’s power through the representation of some future thing as an effect of that power” (APH 7: 251).¹⁷ Kant consistently emphasizes the way that desires are directed at action or activity and that the faculty of desire involves a kind of causal power. As he explained in the introduction to the *Metaphysics of Morals*, “the *faculty of desire* is the faculty to be, by means of one’s representations, the cause of the objects of these representations” (MdS 6: 211, cf. Reichel ms. 102). The conception of desire at issue in this “faculty of desire” involves much more than passive sensation; it has to do with willing and action, not mere feeling. A significant part of the anthropology course each year was devoted to analyzing and cataloguing the range of human conative elements (desires, inclinations, instincts, propensities, passions, etc.) and the range of objects to which they are directed.

Kant suggests that, in addition to the simple faculty of desire, some animals seem to have the ability to employ *concepts* or rules to make use of these desires and representations, a capacity that may lead

to a further, genuinely practical capacity. "The faculty of desire in accordance with concepts, insofar as the ground determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object, is called the faculty to *do or to refrain from doing as one pleases*" (MdS 6: 213).¹⁸ As Kant repeatedly emphasizes, in contrast to other animals, we human beings think that we can reflect on, judge, and act contrary to these desires and inclinations, and wish for better ones (25: 208–10, 411, 474). Although we do not have direct and immediate control over most of our desires, with effort and over time, we can strengthen or weaken many of them. Kant conceives of this as a special kind of causal power. We believe we possess the freedom "to make up our mind [*beschließen*] about which desires to act upon [*ausführen*]. This is the characteristic of human beings, since animals have instincts which they must blindly follow" (25: 1338). What allows the study of anthropology to be *pragmatic* is precisely the fact that we are able to make use of information about human beings (ourselves and others); this is what grounds the periodic counsel and recommendations for living well that we find throughout the lectures. "Prudence is the capacity to choose the best means to our happiness. Happiness consists in the satisfaction of all of our inclinations, and thus to be able to choose it, one must be free," at least free from complete determination by one's present desires (25: 413).

In the earliest anthropology lectures, Kant calls the capacity we have to freely make use of our faculties *character* (25: 218, 426). By the mid-1770s, he began to associate character not just with relative spontaneity but specifically with the capacity to act on rules and principles: "Character is the employment of our power of choice [*Willkühr*] to act according to rules and principles, . . . the origin of free actions from principles" (25: 630). And he maintains that character is a distinctive capacity of freely acting beings (25: 625, 630, 1174, 1384–5, 1530; Dohna ms. 309; Reichel ms. 122).

While it may be surprising to readers familiar with his "empirical determinism," in the context of his pragmatic anthropology, Kant employs conceptions of the human practical capacities that presuppose spontaneity. In the anthropology lectures, arguments about the presence and exact nature of this spontaneity are generally avoided, but at numerous points it is clearly presupposed.¹⁹ Aside from claims like those we find in *Friedländer* about the difficulty of understanding the

subtlety of this faculty and explaining how it works (25: 577, 649–50), the lectures seem content to leave the details of spontaneity (or a justification for the lack of details) to be settled in ethical and meta-physical contexts.

In the *Groundwork*, Kant suggests that a rational being, a being with a free will, is a being that can act upon principle. The action of a rational agent is not behavior completely caused by forces external to him; it is action on a general rule, a principle chosen in rational deliberation. Such a being can act not only in a way that is describable in a lawlike way; he can act in the light of his adoption or recognition of principles. He has a capacity to really act *from* his concepts, rather than merely behave in accord with them.²⁰ This requires not only acting in accord with a principle, but also accepting it as a principle with some validity. Our putative capacity to reflect on and act contrary to our inclinations suggests a place for reason and judgment.²¹

While Kant does maintain in the anthropology lectures that character is characteristic of freely acting beings, he also insists that genuine acquaintance with acting on principle and the “strength of soul” involved in standing by one’s principles over time are not innate.²² In a claim that may be surprising to contemporary students of his moral philosophy, Kant claims that many human beings lack character altogether, never actually acting upon maxims, moral or otherwise. Such people are likened to “soft wax”: to the extent they ever adopt principles, they change them so constantly that the supposed principles are unable to provide any enduring shape to their behavior (25: 630–1; cf. 822–3, 1169, 1175, 1385; Reichel ms.123–5). In this context, Kant regularly suggests that it is better to have an evil character than to be without character altogether. Genuine character, he notes, presupposes insight into principles and the judgment required to apply them; moreover, one must first be accustomed to acting according to principle as such before a specifically good or evil character can be formed (25: 633–5).

In the anthropology lectures, freedom from complete control by instinct plays an important role in Kant’s account of the origin of evil and the possibility of goodness (25: 843, 1199, 1420). Conversely, Kant’s discussion of the origins of good and evil in the *Religion* help to clarify his account of human agency. Kant maintains that there is an original predisposition to good present in human nature that coexists

with a propensity to evil, and he subdivides this “predisposition to good” into three further practical predispositions.²³ First, there is a “predisposition to animality.” This predisposition is manifested in a “physical and merely mechanical self-love, i.e., a love for which reason is not required.” Such animalistic behavior is directed by natural instincts toward self-preservation, the propagation of the species, and community with others. Second, there is a “predisposition to humanity” that manifests itself in a “self-love which is physical and yet involves comparison (for which reason is required); that is, only in comparison with others does one judge oneself happy or unhappy.”²⁴ Third, there is the “predisposition to personality” that involves “the susceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself a sufficient incentive to the will.” Kant insists that human beings necessarily have all three of these predispositions, that each predisposition is an ineradicable part of human nature. He also specifically points out that these three predispositions are distinct and can be distinguished in terms of the kinds of practical rationality they presuppose: “animal” behavior does not require reason or judgment at all; “human” action involves comparison and “is indeed rooted in practical reason, but only as it is subservient to other incentives”; and action that is expressive of personality involves more than just spontaneity and the presence of judgment. Personality presupposes a special kind of judgment; it “alone is rooted in reason which is practical of itself, i.e., in reason legislating unconditionally.” Personality is conceived of as positive freedom, the freedom to act out of respect for the moral law. It is in virtue of this special capacity that someone can be considered a moral agent: while humanity is a feature of man considered as a rational being, personality is a feature of man considered as a “rational and at the same time [morally] responsible” (*der Zurechnung fähigen*) being (R 6: 26–8).²⁵ Interestingly, “humanity” seems to presuppose genuine spontaneity even though Kant had become convinced, in the late 1780s, that there is no theoretical argument to prove that we have this genuine spontaneity and that only “personality” or the “fact of reason,” the consciousness of the moral law, can ground our philosophical cognition of such spontaneity.²⁶

In the anthropology lectures, Kant does not explicitly identify and distinguish these three predispositions described in the *Religion*, but the lectures do contain extended discussions of the tension between

humanity and animality. They also contain discussions of related trichotomies. Kant typically introduced a three-way division between skill, prudence, and wisdom or morality (25: 412–13, 855–6, 1211, 1435). In the 1798 *Anthropology*, we do find a tripartite subdivision of practical predispositions that bears a certain resemblance to the analysis in the *Religion*. In a section devoted to determining the “character of the human species,” Kant suggests that human beings are distinguished from other living beings on earth by, first, a *technical* predisposition that enables us to manipulate things; second, a *pragmatic* predisposition that enables us to use others for our ends; and third, a *moral* predisposition that enables us to treat ourselves and others consistent with freedom under laws.²⁷ Rather than reading differences between these accounts as evidence of a deep inconsistency or significant change in doctrine, I believe such differences primarily reflect a difference in context.²⁸ In the discussions of the “character of the species” found in *Menschenkunde*, *Mrongovius*, and *Busolt* notes, Kant often discusses the practical capacities in terms of one or another two-way rather than three-way contrasts: for example, in terms of a tension between prudence and skill, between humanity and animality, between intelligence and animality, between a conception of oneself as a being with personality and as an animal, between man as animal and man as a free being, or between the *homo noumenon* and *homo phenomenon*. Sometimes this seems to be a matter of selective focus, while in other cases, one or the other term seems silently to subsume the absent third term. This fluidity in terminology and points of contrast comes to the fore when the trichotomy of skill, prudence, and wisdom is compared with the related distinction, familiar in ethical contexts, between technical, prudential or pragmatic, and moral imperatives.²⁹ For example, in the anthropology course, Kant typically focused upon the contrast between skill and prudence, whereas in the ethics course, he typically emphasized the contrast between prudence and wisdom or morality.³⁰

Although there are some differences and developments in the account of the practical predispositions provided across the anthropology lectures, the published *Anthropology*, the *Religion*, and the familiar ethical texts, there is substantial evidence that Kant consistently conceived of prudence as the exercise of a distinctive capacity, one distinguishable from specifically moral capacities.

II

The anthropology lectures do not only identify prudence with a distinctive practical capacity; they also provide some detail to Kant's account of prudential reflection. As Kant suggested in the *Religion*, prudence seems to involve two interrelated tasks: one focused on choosing as an end "only what is consistent with the greatest and most abiding well-being"; the other on choosing "the most apt means for each of these components of happiness" (R 6: 45 n).³¹ The anthropology lectures contain important reflections on each aspect of this ambitious undertaking.

If prudence is to have any practical significance, the concept of this prudential end, that is, well-being or happiness, must be filled in and concretized. On Kant's account, what constitutes happiness or well-being is at least partially determined by one's needs and desires.³² So, it is tempting to begin such an account with the fact that finite rational beings all have inclinations, including many natural and ineradicable inclinations,³³ but, as Kant consistently emphasizes, the shape of these needs and inclinations is very plastic. *Friedländer*, for example, contains sections entitled "On the Variability of the Desires" and "On the Object of Inclination" that elaborate upon the way we displace or replace our instinctual drives and desires with new drives and inclinations (25: 578–88, 1362ff.). In the anthropology lectures and his historical essays, Kant proposes a broad quasi-Rousseauian history of how, over time, a natural dialectic has changed the shape of human inclinations from an exclusive concern with basic physical needs to involve a powerful attachment to complex social, aesthetic, and even moral values. In addition, he notes how the particular inclinations vary within cultures as well. Different individuals have different inclinations³⁴ and the inclinations of each individual change significantly over time (25: 580–1).³⁵ Moreover, our desires and inclinations regularly come into conflict with one another (25: 578, 580, 586, 590–1).³⁶ And human contentment is fleeting.³⁷ It is not in our nature to remain satisfied; once one desire or group of desires is fulfilled, another inevitably arises.³⁸ These considerations are part of the support for Kant's claims that we have a multiplicity of ends (25: 438) and a complex interest (25: 208; 590; 1140–1). Part of prudence's task is to harmonize the inclinations into a whole so that they do not

“chafe” against one another (R 6: 58).³⁹ Reason should direct instinct (25: 1150), resolve conflicts between inclinations, and, more generally, unite or harmonize an agent’s various ends. As Kant explained in the first *Critique*,

in the doctrine of prudence, the unification of all ends that are given to us by our inclinations into the single end of happiness and the harmonization of the means for attaining that end constitute the entire business of reason (KrV A 800/B 828).

This is no small challenge.⁴⁰

It may appear that Kant thinks this is a fruitless endeavor, given his pessimism about the attainability of happiness. Readers of the *Groundwork*, for example, are familiar with his comments about the status and “phenomenology” of prudential advice (G 4: 418–19). Kant emphasizes how difficult it is to know what human happiness requires because inclinations are so variable and so fickle. This epistemic problem translates into an immense practical problem for human prudence.⁴¹ Kant insists that the conclusions of prudential reasoning are hard to come by and much less certain than our conclusions about our moral obligations, and that our limited power hampers our pursuit of happiness. Kant also became convinced that, on the whole, human life involves more pain than pleasure.⁴² At times, such observations seem to push Kant to the brink of despair about humans even approximating a state of complete happiness in this life, as his worries about “misology” in the *Groundwork* attest (G 4: 395). What he does conclude is that our limited knowledge and the instability of our desires render prudential reflection primarily a form of advice based on averages and educated though fallible predictions, rather than a set of absolute, nonnegotiable commands (G 4: 428).⁴³ But it is important to note that, on their own, these claims about the nature of human inclinations and the limits of our power and knowledge do not compromise the rational basis of prudential reasons. Even in the *Groundwork*, Kant maintains that prudential counsel still involves rational necessity (G 4: 416).

The anthropology lectures reveal hints about how prudential reflection may be of genuine practical value. When it comes to the end of prudence, Kant suggests a number of dimensions along which we may analyze and compare our ends and the desires we have for them,

dimensions that do not seem readily reducible to a single phenomenological feature of strength or intensity. Some desires certainly are phenomenologically stronger than others; some dominate our thoughts and our attention and color our perceptions to a greater degree; similarly the satisfaction of some desires may dominate our thoughts because of its particular intensity. Such desires involve a risk of negatively influencing our judgment and the exercise of reason.⁴⁴ Some desires are closely linked to our physical and psychological needs. Some desires are more persistent features of our lives than others: they are longer-lasting and harder to eradicate. They may provide a certain sort of continuity or stability, or conversely may pose a long-term challenge or frustration. Some are easier to manage or less addictive: they do not as easily grow to dominate or take control of our mental lives. Others are more dangerous. Some desires are easier to satisfy than others. Some of our desires may be disciplined, transformed, or cultivated to become finely grained (producing what Kant calls “luxury”), or redirected, or they may open new horizons of experience. Some of our desires and some of their objects fit well with our conceptions of ourselves, while others do not. Each of these factors seems to have a role to play in our reasoning and judgments about the constituents and structure of our own well-being or happiness (25: 579; 1516–17).⁴⁵

In addition to these useful observations about the determination of the prudential end, the anthropology lectures also elaborate upon the other side of prudence’s task. In a discussion of all-purpose means (what he calls the “formal inclinations”) Kant emphasizes that the freedom to pursue our happiness as we conceive of it and resources such as health, strength, skill, money, and the respect or cooperation of others are each critical for achieving our ends, whatever they are (25: 214, 417, 581, 798, 1141, 1354, 1520). Likewise, Kant emphasizes that character is of pragmatic significance because happiness cannot be attained without stable principles (25: 1089, 1519).

Ultimately, Kant concludes that the balance of prudential considerations favors a life of self-control, the pursuit of equanimity, and learning to do without unnecessary and unattainable (or unsustainable) satisfactions (25: 561–3, 1082; Reichel ms. 76).⁴⁶ Though this quick summary of anthropological observations about prudential reflection may not be sufficient to ground a unique, fully determinate

conception of happiness or a detailed account of all of the means necessary for achieving it, it does suggest how rational reflection may genuinely guide human agents in the pursuit of well-being, perhaps even independently of specifically moral considerations.

III

To this point, we have considered Kant's suggestions about the prudential capacity and its exercise more or less in abstraction from moral considerations. Given the title of the 1798 *Anthropology* and the "pragmatic" or prudential point of view that it shares with the anthropology course, we might expect that Kant's discussions of prudence would proceed in exactly this way. Yet the evidence from the anthropology lectures appears more mixed. Kant's treatment of character, for example, is of obvious relevance to moral philosophy, and more generally, the pragmatic anthropology so frequently ventures into moral territory that it might seem to suggest that prudence is fundamentally dependent upon morality.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, I contend that on Kant's theory prudence may involve a form of practical reflection that can function prior to and independently of moral capacities and norms. After presenting some of the key textual evidence for this claim, I will develop the case for it in response to two important objections.

A recurrent theme of both the *Anthropology* and the anthropology lectures is the conflict and tension between our "humanity" and our "animality." Kant's perennial analysis of two manifestations of this tension implies that prudential reflection possesses a certain independence from morality. First, Kant's pet example concerning the desire for the propagation of the species suggests this conclusion. By the age of fifteen or sixteen, Kant says, man in his natural state is capable of reproducing and maintaining his offspring and is impelled by his instincts to do so. Yet, in the context of society and a civil state, Kant observes, a prudent man recognizes that he must wait until he is twenty (on average) or twenty-five (in the more refined classes) or even thirty years old, so that he is in a position to support his wife and children. This five to ten-year (or longer) "interval of forced and unnatural celibacy" results from a tension between animality and humanity that is at root premoral (though not entirely presocial) (25: 682, 839, 1197, 1418–9; APH 7: 325; MAM 8: 116).

While Kant argues that this tension may ultimately serve a moral purpose in the course of history, and while morality has something to say about how this tension should be resolved (MdS 6: 424ff.), the fundamental tension is not specifically moral. This tension between humanity, on the one hand, and the influence of our animal instincts, on the other, need not presuppose a specifically moral predisposition, "personality," or an ability to act out of respect for the moral law.⁴⁸

Second, Kant's treatment of our instincts and the nature of emotions and passions suggests a similar conclusion about the status of prudence. Kant claims that nonhuman animals, while they can experience pleasures and pains, cannot be happy or suffer distress because they cannot reflect upon their condition (25: 248, 474). He emphasizes, in contrast, that in human beings, reason is empowered to reflect upon, control, and modify our instinctual ends and the feelings and desires that direct us to pursue them. On Kant's account, emotions (*Affekten*) and passions (*Leidenschaften*) are feelings or desires, respectively, that render us unable to assess something in terms of its relation to our overall sensation or to the sum total of our desires, that is, emotions and passions render us unable to exercise prudence and may even preclude us from acting skillfully in the pursuit of particular ends (25: 208, 590, 1140–1). Emotions and passions are mental agitations that involve a loss of composure; they can function like a cloud of smoke, hindering or distorting our vision, perhaps even temporarily blinding us (25: 1121).⁴⁹ Our animality is manifested in the fact that our instincts predispose us to certain emotions that can lead us to our instinctual ends independently of our rational reflection. Nature has predisposed us to these instinctual emotions; thereby providing for stages of human development in which the capacity to reason is insufficiently developed. While Hume had suggested that reason would likely lead to our demise were instinct not generally overpowering in ordinary life, Kant argues that the predisposition to instinctual emotions is present in us only *provisionally*, until reason can take over (25: 208, 616, 796, 1120, 1342, 1524). While our instincts direct us to "wise ends," Kant argues, reason and reflection lead to those ends more effectively and with greater certainty than our instincts or blind passions ever could (25: 1120, 1524).⁵⁰ This reinforces Kant's stoic conclusion that emotions and passions should be controlled and

not intentionally cultivated or strengthened. We need to avoid the influence of emotions and passions and “rule ourselves” so that we are in a position to choose and pursue the happiest life (25: 1516). What is noteworthy about this line of thought in the anthropology lectures is its reliance upon prudential rather than specifically moral considerations.⁵¹

Such anecdotal evidence of prudence’s independence is reinforced by Kant’s historical treatment of the practical predispositions. Kant regularly suggests that we can view the historical development of human beings and human culture in terms of a sequential development of our rational capacities. In his essay on the *Speculative Beginning of Human History*, for example, Kant distinguished four stages of human rational development (rather than the familiar three), only the fourth of which includes a developed capacity for morality. Similarly, as we saw previously, Kant is recorded in the *Friedländer* notes insisting that the development of a good or evil character is subsequent to the development of character in general. This developmental conception of the practical predispositions implies that the prudential component of practical reason has a certain historical and, perhaps, even conceptual priority to morality and that it may be able to function independently of the moral component.⁵²

This suggestion is confirmed in an important footnote to the *Religion’s* philosophical treatment of the practical predispositions. Kant explicitly claims that the predispositions to humanity and personality are not only conceptually distinct but that possession of the former does not entail or presuppose possession of the latter. As he explained,

... from the fact that a being has reason [it] does not at all follow that, simply by virtue of representing its maxims as suited to universal legislation, this reason contains a faculty of determining the power of choice unconditionally, and hence to be “practical” on its own; at least not so far as we can see. The most rational being in this world might still need certain incentives, coming to him from the objects of inclination, to determine his power of choice. He might apply the most rational reflection to [these objects] – about what concerns the greatest sum of these incentives as well as the means for attaining the end thereby determined – without thereby even suspecting the possibility of such a thing as the absolutely imperative moral law which proclaims itself to be itself an incentive ... (R 6: 26–7 n).⁵³

The prudential capacities involved in humanity are distinguishable from the specifically moral capacity of personality, the capacity to be determined to action by pure practical reason, by respect for the moral law. Moreover, the capacity for prudential rationality need not presuppose the complete autonomy or "motivational independence" involved in moral "personality," the susceptibility to a particular form of influence by pure practical reason.⁵⁴ Although Kant does not believe that there are beings subject to prudential norms yet not subject to categorical moral norms, he does insist that it is *possible*, at least "so far as we can see," that there are. This implies that, on Kant's account, the authority of prudential rationality is, in this limited yet important sense, independent of moral rationality.

But, it may be objected, might such claims about prudence's independence be taken only as claims about moral psychology and epistemology? Might they not amount to nothing more than the thought that an agent could be *aware* of one set of demands (the prudential) without realizing that he is *also* obligated by another set (moral obligations)?⁵⁵

In reply, it is important to note why it is, on Kant's account, that a person with humanity but not personality would fail to recognize that he has moral obligations. On Kant's account, moral obligation is grounded in personality or autonomy, the capacity to be motivated by pure practical reason, to act out of respect for the moral law. This entails that one could not lack personality and yet be categorically bound by the moral law. A genuine lack of personality is more than a cognitive limitation (the inability to recognize that one has moral obligations); it implies that one does not have such moral obligations (though one may still have prudential reasons to behave as if one had moral obligations). A being with humanity but not personality would stand under prudential imperatives, but not be subject to moral obligation.⁵⁶ This implies that the fundamental normative authority of prudential imperatives does not depend upon that of moral imperatives.

Yet, this conclusion is subject to a second objection, one stemming from further examination of Kant's reflections on the nature of human happiness or well-being. As we have already seen, Kant worried about the problems posed by the plasticity of and conflict among our needs and desires. Our desires could turn out to be configured such that, even with perfect information and thorough prudential reflection,

their reconciliation or harmonization would be impossible.⁵⁷ The depth of Kant's reflection on these Rousseauian concerns is reflected in a feature of Kant's treatment of prudence that we have not yet considered: the tripartite divisions of practical predispositions, at least those found in the *Religion* and the 1798 *Anthropology*, manifest a profoundly social conception of prudence. Kant repeatedly emphasized that the process of displacing and replacing our instinctual drives with new drives is markedly intensified and ramified by living in society with others (25: 585). (The "comparison with others" mentioned in the *Religion's* account of the predisposition to humanity is part of this.) In fact, one of the most significant developments in Kant's conception of prudence over the course of the anthropology lectures is an increasing emphasis upon the significance of the human social context. The problem for the current thesis about the independence of prudence is that this emerging social emphasis may seem to presuppose moral considerations. To address this objection, then, it is necessary to examine this development more closely and consider its implications for claims about the independence of prudence.

Kant comes to emphasize the fact that those around us influence our conception of happiness in many ways, both obvious and subtle. Observing what others are like, what they have, and how they live may inspire changes in my own pursuits or may trigger jealousy and a competitive impulse to acquire what they have. Furthermore, I need cooperation from, or at least toleration by others to achieve my personal ends. In many cases, other people are the most important means to the attainment of my ends. In fact, in the later anthropology lectures, Kant comes to classify our influence over others as the most important of the "formal inclinations" or all-purpose means (25: 1141, 1355, 1520; cf. APH 8: 271). In light of these insights, Kant becomes increasingly convinced that the pursuit of happiness in society depends upon an understanding of these dynamics, an understanding that reveals, he concludes, that a prudent individual seeks to conform himself to the ways of his fellows, seeks to be intelligible and interesting to them, and avoids being perceived as "difficult" or provoking their distrust, envy, or pride (25: 1210, 1363–4, 1436). By the *Menschenkunde* notes from 1781–2, Kant begins to identify prudence, not with the broad "skill in the choice of means to one's own greatest well-being," but more narrowly as the *skillful use of other people*, as opposed to things, in the pursuit of one's own ends (APH 8: 322; 25: 855, 1037, 1296, 1436).⁵⁸

On such a conception, the allegedly independent authority of imperatives aimed at individual well-being may seem to be compromised.

Yet there are several reasons to reject this suggestion. First, it is important not to conflate actual interaction and cooperation between prudential and moral norms with a necessary connection between them. Because Kant was convinced that human beings possess the predispositions to both humanity and personality and that we are subject to both moral and prudential imperatives, it is unsurprising that his discussions of human nature and the practical life include an account that aims to integrate both.⁵⁹ But this does not establish that prudential normativity must presuppose moral normativity.

Second, it must be noted that the social emphasis that emerged in Kant's account of "prudence" does not indicate a fundamental change in the conception of prudence: the *Mrongovius* notes from 1784–5, for example, still consider prudence in both the narrower and broader senses (25: 1210) and the *Groundwork* attends to both when it distinguishes between "world prudence" and "private prudence."⁶⁰ Thus, it seems that the deeply social conception that emerges *supplements* without entirely replacing the earlier conception,⁶¹ as well it should, given the conceptual, not merely genetic, dependence of the former upon the latter. A deep understanding of social dynamics is prudentially important precisely because they constitute a critical challenge for prudence, more broadly conceived. As Kant observed, the value of "skill in the use of people" is determined by its contribution to our well-being, otherwise it is merely clever (*gescheit*) or cunning (*verschlagen*) (G 4: 416 n).

Third, we must distinguish compliance with conventional social norms, which, on this account, is of great prudential significance, from compliance with genuine moral norms, which may or may not be prudentially significant. Because extant social norms do not necessarily coincide with genuine moral norms, the prudential importance of social norms does not entail that prudential norms presuppose moral norms. Finally, it must be noted that even if there were a prudential justification for acting in accord with genuine moral rules that would not reveal a fundamental dependence of prudential capacities or normativity upon moral normativity because, on Kant's mature moral theory, action merely in accord with moral rules, motivated entirely by self-interest, need not involve the specifically moral capacities or the specifically moral demand.⁶² An argument for conformity to moral

norms that emerges from prudential reflection, while it may provide a *simulacrum* of morality and serve as a preparation for virtue, remains a prudential argument.⁶³ Thus, despite the additional complexity it introduces, the growing social emphasis within Kant's conception of prudence remains consistent with the suggested normative independence of prudence. Kant's conception of prudence seems to involve a form of practical reflection that can function prior to and independently of moral capacities and norms.

IV

In the *Groundwork*, Kant claims that there is an "imperative that refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness," which he calls the precept of prudence (G 4: 416). Because, as he explains, "imperatives are only formulae expressing the relation of objective laws of volition in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being" (G 4: 414), he seems committed to the existence of an objective principle of volition directing rational agents to exercise prudence. The foregoing consideration of the anthropology lectures and related texts has helped to identify a conception of the distinctive capacities required by such an imperative and clarify how prudential reflection could provide practical guidance. In particular, it has helped to explicate and elaborate Kant's suggestions that prudential norms can have genuine authority, independent of morality. On this account, human beings have a standing reason to pursue their well-being or happiness which is independent of morality.⁶⁴

Ultimately, the interpretive and philosophical adequacy of this account are tied up with the resolution of at least two important concerns to which it gives rise. First, there is a genuine question about what grounds there could be, independent of morality, "on which a rational being should form the idea of an overall sum of satisfaction and subordinate its particular desires to this idea."⁶⁵ Second, there is the question about the possible fit between this account of prudence and Kant's familiar claims about the supremacy of morality. While neither question can be decisively answered here, in the space that remains, I will briefly suggest some promising lines of thought.

In response to the first question, consider the way Kant connects the rational authority of prudence with the idea that it is natural for a finite

rational being to adopt his own happiness as an end. In his ethical writings, we find a number of closely related claims about the role of happiness. Sometimes he emphasizes that there is a natural *desire* for happiness: happiness is “necessarily the desire [*Verlangen*] of every rational but finite being” and “an unavoidable determining ground [*Bestimmungsgrund*] of his faculty of desire” (KpV 5: 25; cf. G 4: 399). But Kant insists that this desire is more than just an instinctual urge. He speaks of the universal *wish* for happiness,⁶⁶ and even insists that all (or at least all imperfect) rational beings *will* their own happiness and that it is “the natural end [*Naturzweck*] all human beings have” (G 4: 430), “an end [*Zweck*] every human has (by virtue of the impulses of his nature)” that he wills unavoidably (MdS 6: 386).⁶⁷ Happiness is an end all people have by natural necessity, “a purpose [*Absicht*] that can be presupposed with certainty and *a priori* [to be present] in every human being, because it belongs to his essence” (G 4: 415–16). It is “the subjective final end [*Endzweck*] of rational beings in this world” that we have “by virtue of [our] nature which is dependent upon sensible objects” (R 6: 6 n). On this account, particular nonmoral ends acquire prudential significance to the extent they are constituents of our well-being. What constitutes our happiness or well-being is, at least in part, a function of the wise ends set for us by our nature and transformed by our choices and historical and social forces (25: 438, 1524). Yet, unlike other animals, our nature does not guarantee that we clearly conceive of this end, nor that we pursue it in action. In finite rational beings like us, Kant suggests, these are tasks or commissions assigned to rational reflection.⁶⁸

One thing that is puzzling about these suggestions is that they seem to imply that our having of this necessary end (our own well-being or happiness) and our pursuit of it are simultaneously a fact and a task. Regardless of how this puzzle might be resolved, Kant seems to think that the claim that finite rational beings necessarily will their own happiness supports the further claim that prudence is an objective requirement of practical reason. As he explains,

The hypothetical imperative that represents the practical necessity of an action as a means to the promotion of happiness is *assertoric*. It may be set forth not merely as necessary to some uncertain, merely possible purpose but to a purpose that can be presupposed with certainty and *a priori* [to be present]

in every human being, because it belongs to his essence. Now skill in the choice of means to one's own greatest well-being can be called *prudence* in the narrowest sense. Hence, the imperative that refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness, i.e., the precept of prudence, is still always *hypothetical*; the action is not commanded absolutely but only as a means to another purpose (G 4: 415–16).

Kant suggests that prudential imperatives possess rational weight for finite rational beings like us precisely because happiness is a necessary end for us. The rational requirement of prudence is, in Kant's terms, at once hypothetical and assertoric: this end is grounded in a "subjective condition," but it is a condition that in fact obtains. The thought seems to be that because each finite rational agent necessarily wills his own happiness as an end and reason directs him to will the means to his ends, it follows that he has a reason to will the means to his own happiness.⁶⁹ In essence, prudence is required by an application of the requirement of "The Hypothetical Imperative" to the fact that finite agents necessarily will their own happiness. On this understanding of Kant's account, the determinate action of finite rational beings is shaped by a standing interest in prudential ends. A finite, prudentially rational agent begins, in a sense, by aiming at happiness or well-being. He adopts particular ends and desires that present themselves as constituents of this end and proceeds, through reflection, to bracket or pare off particular ends or desires that appear to conflict with it.

As it stands, this account of the normative authority of prudence is certainly incomplete. In addition to the questions it raises about happiness being a necessary end, it leaves unclear, for example, precisely what Kant thinks is irrational about pursuing a particular end or object of desire in the face of one's clear overall well-being. Perhaps the idea is that, because well-being is a *necessary* end, if the pursuit of a particular nonmoral end invariably conflicts with one's overall well-being, then the only rational way to resolve the conflict would be to abandon the end that can be rationally abandoned, namely the particular end. Of course, the adequacy of this suggestion would depend upon a satisfactory account of why and in what sense(s) happiness should be considered a necessary end.

As for the question concerning the relation between prudential and moral norms, we have already noted that Kant was convinced

that human beings are subject to both moral and prudential imperatives. He is committed to there being an account of practical reason that integrates both kinds of norms and, in particular, preserves the supremacy of the categorical imperative.⁷⁰ The moral law is, he suggests, supreme or overriding: it requires the adoption of certain obligatory ends and it demands that moral agents “abstract” from any ends the pursuit of which would conflict with the demands of morality.⁷¹ On the present account of prudence, nothing explicitly precludes Kant's claims that in the case of an agent with moral personality, rational reflection upon one's ends demands something more than prudence and that, in cases of conflict, some of these other demands, as a rule, override the prudential demands.⁷² When overridden in this way, genuine prudential demands may leave a “residue”; this is why morality may be genuinely *costly*. Much more needs to be said, but as long as there may be a rational resolution to such conflicts, it is not obvious that morality's supremacy entails that the reason-giving force of prudence is merely apparent or ultimately derivative from moral normativity.⁷³

In conclusion, if the argument of this essay is correct, on the conception of prudence persistently suggested in Kant's anthropology lectures and related texts, prudence involves genuine demands of its own, demands that need not presuppose or be derived from an account of the demands of morality, though the former demands may still cohere with and yield to the latter's supremacy. This account of prudence does have at least one important moral implication. It implies that there may be no generic argument against forms of moral skepticism that acknowledge the authority of prudential norms while denying the authority and/or supremacy of categorical norms.⁷⁴ This seems to be part of what Kant was suggesting when, in the *Religion*, he distinguished “humanity” and “personality” and explicitly conceded the possibility of nonmoral rational agency.⁷⁵ On the present account, Kant's critique of practical reason may certainly help to undermine skeptical arguments against the possibility and reality of categorical moral norms. Such arguments may prepare the skeptic to acknowledge the “fact of reason”: that he is bound by the moral law. Nonetheless, such a recognition and the associated recognition of the special value involved in acting autonomously⁷⁶ are distinct from the recognition of prudential norms and need not be inconsistent with the genuine authority of prudential norms.⁷⁷

Notes

1. Apart from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, all references to Kant are to the volume and page number of the “*Akademie-Ausgabe*.” (*Kants gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin [formerly the Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften], 29 vols. [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902–]). References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the standard A and B pagination of the first and second editions. Specific published works are cited by means of the abbreviations listed as follows.

- KrV *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Critique of Pure Reason). 1st ed. (A), 1781; 2nd ed. (B), 1787.
 G *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals). 1st ed., 1785; 2nd ed., 1786.
 MAM *Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte* (Speculative Beginning of Human History). 1786.
 KpV *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (Critique of Practical Reason). 1788.
 KU *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Critique of Judgment). 1st ed., 1790; 2nd ed., 1793; 3rd ed., 1799.
 R *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* (Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone). 1st ed., 1793; 2nd ed., 1794.
 TP *Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis* (On the Proverb: That may be true in theory, but it is of no use in practice). 1793.
 MdS *Die Metaphysik der Sitten* (The Metaphysics of Morals). 1st ed., 1797; 2nd ed., 1798.
 APH *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View). 1st ed., 1798; 2nd ed., 1800.

Citations to the recently published critical editions of student notes from Kant’s lectures on anthropology are cited to the pagination in volume 25 of the *Akademie-Ausgabe*.

<i>Collins</i>	(1772–3)	25: 1–238
<i>Parow</i>	(1772–3)	25: 239–463
<i>Friedländer</i>	(1775–6)	25: 465–728
<i>Pillau</i>	(1777–8)	25: 729–847
<i>Menschenkunde</i>	(1781–2 [?])	25: 849–1203
<i>Mrongovius</i>	(1784–5)	25: 1205–1429
<i>Busolt</i>	(1788–9 [?])	25: 1431–1531

Translations from G, KpV, MdS are based upon the translations of Mary Gregor in *Practical Philosophy* (1996); from R on the translation by George di Giovanni in *Religion and Rational Theology* (1996); from KrV upon the translation by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood in *Critique of Practical Reason* (1997), all part of *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel*

Kant. Translations of passages from the *Friedländer* notes are based upon Felicitas Munzel's translation for the forthcoming *Cambridge Edition* volume of the *Lectures on Anthropology*. Many thanks to her for sharing an advance version of her work and many helpful comments on this paper. I have occasionally modified these translations as I have seen fit. References to the "Reichel," "Dohna," and "anon-Berlin" manuscripts follow the manuscript pagination; transcriptions of these texts are available on the Internet at the Marburg Kant-Archiv Web site. Citations to *Reflexionen* and student notes from Kant's lectures on ethics are made by reference to the reflection number (Refl.) or common title for the set of notes, followed by the volume and page number from the *Akademie-Ausgabe*.

2. As Patrick Frierson has emphasized, Kant's conception of the "pragmatic" and even of "prudence" is sometimes broader than a concern with one's own happiness. See his *Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy: Saving Kant from Schleiermacher's Dilemma* (diss., University of Notre Dame, 2001), esp. ch. 3. In fact, as we will see, some passages even suggest a narrower conception of prudence. Nevertheless, the language and content of the anthropology suggest that the current sense of prudence and the pragmatic are a significant, though not exclusive, part of Kant's concerns there. Final revisions of this paper have benefited significantly from Frierson's comments and contact with his work.

Especially when it comes to historical discussions of Kant's theory of practical reason, it is unfortunately appropriate to maintain the "generic" use of masculine pronouns, because sexist aspects of Kant's anthropological theory leave the status of women somewhat ambiguous.

3. cf. G 4: 395–6.
4. See, for example, Thomas Hill, Jr., "Kant's Theory of Practical Reason," *Monist* 72 (1989): 363–83; T. H. Irwin, "Kant's Criticisms of Eudae-monism," in *Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Virtue* ed. Engstrom and Whiting, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 63–101.
5. Henry E. Allison, *Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). (Hereafter *IF*), p. 114. This is Allison's summary of the implications of Stephen Engstrom's claim that "for Kant there is an important sense in which we would not be bound by imperatives at all if we were not bound by the categorical imperative," a claim that Allison rejects. Stephen E. Engstrom, "Allison on Rational Agency," *Inquiry* 36 (1993): 405–18, p. 413. cf. Korsgaard's claim that "the view that there are only hypothetical imperatives is not only false, but *incoherent*." Christine M. Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity*, ed. Onora O'Neill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 164n. Korsgaard suggests that instrumental and prudential reasons should be treated as merely *prima facie* reasons or "candidate reasons," which possess no real reason-giving force of their own. Christine M. Korsgaard, "Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value," *Ethics* 96 (1986): 486–505. (Hereafter, "AKSV"), p. 487. See also

- Christine M. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in *Ethics and Practical Reason*, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 215–54. (Hereafter, "NIR"), p. 247 n. 65. See also Barbara Herman, "Leaving Deontology Behind," in *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 208–40, p. 209. For two recent discussions of the implications such a theory has for physician-assisted suicide, see J. David Velleman, "A Right of Self-Termination?," *Ethics* 109 (1999): 606–28 and F. M. Kamm, "Physician-Assisted Suicide, the Doctrine of Double Effect, and the Ground of Value," *Ethics* 109 (1999): 586–605.
6. Philippa Foot, *Natural Goodness* (Oxford: Oxford, 2001), p. 14.
 7. See, for example, KpV 5: 34–5.
 8. The action of finite rational beings seems to presuppose the presence of desire-based ends, but of course this is not to say that the action of such beings must always be motivated by desire for such ends. See Allen Wood, *Kant's Moral Religion* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970). (Hereafter, *KMR*), p. 57; and Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). (Hereafter, *KTF*), pp. 65, 97 and *IF*, p. 111.
 9. John Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 164–7; cf. Barbara Herman, *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 214–15.
 10. In other words, following Allison, I will be suggesting that on Kant's theory, instrumental or prudential "rationality has its own sphere and its own logic – I am almost tempted to say its own autonomy – which holds independently of any moral considerations." Allison, *IF*, p. 114. Although Allison mentions only "instrumental rationality," he seems to have in mind both prudential and instrumental reasoning, more narrowly understood. On Allison's reading, needs and desires provide a source of reasons to act that is not dependent upon the moral law. *IF*, pp. 126; 135.
 11. For one recent discussion of the "source thesis," see Samuel Kerstein, "Korsgaard's Kantian Arguments for the Value of Humanity," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 31 (2001): 23–52.
 12. For the sake of brevity, this section abstracts from a number of interesting and important developmental shifts in Kant's conception of agency and neglects a number of interpretative disputes about several specific claims that are quite important to Kant's theory of moral motivation. The term "moral psychology" may be misleading here given the special sense of "morality" in Kant. The topic is practical psychology, an account of rational agency in general, not just as it relates to morality. But the term "practical psychology" is also misleading because Kant often equates the "practical" (which he often opposes to the "pragmatic") with the "moral." For recent discussions in English of such terminological issues, see Frierson, esp. ch. 3; Wood, "Kant and the Problem of Human Nature"

(in this volume); and Robert Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Prior to Kant, Christian Wolff had proposed a detailed account of "universal practical philosophy," a general science of free action that precedes moral philosophy. As Alexander Baumgarten explained in the textbook Kant used in his lectures on moral philosophy, "Universal first practical philosophy is the first science of the remaining practical disciplines, since it contains the common principles of these several [disciplines]." Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Initia philosophiae practicae primae* (Halle: Hemmerde, 1760), 1–91. Prolegomena §6, p. 3. Reprinted in *Kants gesammelte Schriften* 19: 10. See also Christian Wolff, *Der vernünftige Gedanken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, zu Beförderung ihrer Glückseligkeit, den Liebhabern der Wahrheit (deutsche Ethik)* (Frankfurt und Leipzig: Renger, 1733). Prolegomena §3, p. 2. Early in his philosophical career, Kant rejected the compatibilist moral psychology that undergirded the universal practical philosophy of Wolff and Baumgarten, but he never made replacing their discussions of "practical philosophy in general" into a focal point of his own writings or teachings on practical philosophy or anthropology. Yet, unsurprisingly, such topics were explored in the anthropology course that was, in part, a commentary upon Baumgarten's empirical psychology.

13. Kant explicitly declared in the preface to the *Groundwork* that universal practical philosophy, at least as practiced by his predecessors, was unsuitable as a foundation for moral philosophy (G 4: 390–1). In his ethical treatises, Kant is interested primarily in morality and the role of the *a priori* in practical reason. This certainly requires that he discuss the pretensions of empirical practical reason to encroach on the territory of pure practical reason, but it never requires a comprehensive account of empirical practical reason itself. It is clear that Kant thinks that empirical practical reason is insufficient for morality, but that need not imply that the highest principles of empirical practical reason cannot be treated in a philosophical account of practical reason. After all, even in its empirical exercise, the will is a rational will. But in the introduction to the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant does seem to go further and to suggest that empirical practical reason has no place in practical philosophy (MdS 6: 217–18). The idea seems to be that, since technically practical reason is so heavily dependent upon theoretical reason (all of its *a priori* principles seem to be identified by theoretical reason), it is not a distinct kind of reason relying on a distinct set of *a priori* principles, while morally practical reason is quite distinctive. See also the preface and "First Introduction" to the *Critique of Judgment*, 5: 172–3; 20: 199–200. This seems to be an overstatement. Even if the "material" principles of prudential and instrumental reason are just generalizations from experience based upon the deployment of theoretical reason, the "foundations" of prudential and instrumental reason do not seem to be identified by theoretical reason. For example, the principle that finite rational agents ought

to pursue the means to their ends, “The Hypothetical Imperative” as it has been called, which underlies particular hypothetical imperatives, does not seem to be itself a product of theoretical reason. Kant’s point seems to be primarily methodological and terminological. The classification based upon Kant’s epistemological concerns obscures the place for, but need not rule out, a metaphysical investigation of free action in general.

14. For further elaboration of this suggestion, see Paul Guyer, “The Possibility of the Categorical Imperative,” *Philosophical Review* 104 (1995): 353–85.
15. This should not be entirely surprising because, as Stark has noted, Kant typically taught both ethics and anthropology in the same semester and could expect some students to attend both courses, demanding a certain kind of coherence between the two courses. Stark, “Historical Notes and Interpretive Questions about Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology” (this volume).
16. “The faculty of a being to act in accordance with its representations is called *life*” (MdS 6: 211). Sometimes in the lectures, Kant describes life in relation to desire, or laws of desire. cf. *Busolt* 25: 1517; anon-Berlin ms. 121.
17. In the broadest sense, Kant explains, “desire” can cover such diverse intentional attitudes as inclinations, wishes, volitions, and passions. Kant’s discussion of affects and passions in the anthropology, discussed in the following text, is much more sensitive and fine-grained than the apparently one-dimensional hedonism of the second *Critique*. Kant sometimes contrasts desire with purely rational motivation, yet in other places, he distinguishes between sensible desires and intellectual or rational desires, which are not exclusively moral (25: 207, 579, 796, 1229). On ambiguities in our contemporary concept of desire, see T. M. Scanlon’s idea of “desire in the attention-directed sense” in *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). (Hereafter *WWEEO*), p. 39; and Jean Hampton, *The Authority of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). (Hereafter, *TAR*), p. 92.
18. Generally, Kant maintains that, while nonhuman animals may have representations, they lack concepts and the ability to reflect upon their representations. Yet, the student notes on metaphysics known as “*Metaphysik L₂*” suggests that nonhuman animals can have *Willkür* but no *Wille*, primarily because they cannot form representations or form a reason (*Zweck*) for doing something they desire (28: 589). See also Allison, *KTF*, p. 269.
19. In one sense, we may consider the foregoing discussion as an empirically based analysis of behavior: classifying beings based upon what mental processes they seem to perform and which processes we suspect play a role in their behavior, for example, whether they have concepts, whether they can employ rules, etc. The application of these concepts can be primarily empirically grounded. Yet the practical recommendations, both prudential and moral, seem to presuppose that the audience is composed of spontaneous beings. For more on this point, see Wood, “Kant and

the Problem of Human Nature" (this volume) and *Kant's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). (Hereafter, *KET*), p. 206. This may seem inconsistent with critical distinctions between empirical and rational investigations and between the theoretical and practical uses of reason. For a brief discussion of some of these tensions, see Jacobs and Kain, "Introduction" (this volume). My point here is simply that parts of the anthropology lectures do seem to presuppose genuine spontaneity. As Howard Caygill has pointed out in a different context, one virtue of this novel disciple is that it allows Kant the freedom to explore ideas in ways that do not immediately fit into preestablished disciplines. Caygill, "Kant's Apology for Sensibility" (this volume).

20. In the *Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant did seem to employ a compatibilist conception of beings who have and behave in accord with "concepts," but whose action is still completely causally determined. But when he explicitly insists later that, while such beings could behave in *accord* with their concepts, they could never truly act *from* their concepts, it is clear that he has in mind a capacity that cannot be empirically discerned. cf. Karl Ameriks, "Kant and Hegel on Freedom: Two New Interpretations," *Inquiry* 35 (1992): 219–32. (Hereafter, "KHF").
21. It is worth noting that, in the earliest anthropology lectures, for example, *Collins* and *Parow*, judgment has not yet been distinguished from understanding and reason. In his moral philosophy, Kant emphasizes the idea of an *interest* (*Interesse*), a link between desire and pleasure that "the understanding judges to hold as a general rule (though only for the subject)" (MdS 6: 212). The behavior of a nonhuman animal is said to be causally determined by its inclinations, without any intervening interest. While the causality may be exercised through that creature's faculty of representation, judgment, in the form of an interest or in the rational inference from an interest, plays no role. Rules and judgment, mediate or immediate, seem to have no role to play in generating the behavior of such a being. Humans, in contrast, are said to possess a capacity for self-determination in accordance with their own concepts that is not causally determined by sensuous inclination. (In anthropological contexts, "interest" seems to lack this technical sense – it typically stands for "self-interest.")
22. This, of course, raises a nest of thorny issues that we cannot resolve here concerning the consistency of Kant's accounts of empirical influence and transcendental freedom. For a helpful discussion of some of these issues, particularly as they bear on moral contexts, see Frierson.
23. For an important recent discussion of Kant's theory of predispositions, capacities, and inclinations and their relation to anthropology and character, see G. Felicitas Munzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The "Critical" Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), esp. ch. 2 and 3.
24. It is worth noting that, in this context, "humanity" is the name for a predisposition or capacity possessed by some rational beings, but it does

not pick out some unique property that is exemplified by all and only members of the kind “human being.” In fact, as we will see, Kant believes that all rational beings (which he believed to include more than just human beings) have humanity and that there may be other, distinct properties that distinguish human beings from other kinds of being. Humanity, in this sense, is one element in Kant’s account of what it is to be a human being, a kind of finite rational agent.

25. It is worth noting that the conception of “human choice” found in *Metaphysics of Morals* seems to involve what *Religion* calls “personality” or the capacity to be determined to actions by pure will (i.e., positive freedom), yet “free will” seems to involve negative freedom, but not necessarily positive freedom. The first mention of “free will” suggests both negative and positive freedom, the second mention, only the former (Mds 6: 213–14). *Busolt* 25: 1514, suggests a similar distinction between *Wille* (involving reason) and *Wollen* (involving inclination, which is not, however, identical with desire). It is important, however, to keep in mind that Kantian morality requires that there be an affection-independent source of motivation, not that all motivation is so independent.
26. See *Busolt* 25: 1486; KpV 5: 29; and the “Rostock” anthropology manuscript “H” 7: 399. On the “Great Reversal,” see Karl Ameriks, *Kant’s Theory of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982 / 2000), ch. 6; “Kant on Spontaneity: Some New Data,” in *Proceedings of the VII International Kant-Kongress* (de Gruyter, 1991), pp. 436–46, and “KHF.” Although I know of no direct evidence that Kant proposed an argument that derived absolute freedom from the recognition of prudential norms, it would be consistent with his position in the late 1770s and early 1780s and during this period such an argument is never subject to criticism. Compared to the theoretical argument of *Groundwork III* which is based upon the nature of judgment or of “pure thought,” such an argument might appear both redundant and less philosophically satisfying, but need not be reckoned illegitimate. After the “Great Reversal” in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, it might seem that Kant insists that spontaneity is required only for specifically *moral* agency. Although I cannot argue for this here, I believe that the reversal is really best seen as a change regarding the legitimate starting points for arguments for the presence of spontaneity: Kant comes to believe that the “fact of reason” is a good starting point, but the simple belief that we stand under prudential imperatives is not. On this interpretation of the “Great Reversal,” Kant would deny that our philosophical knowledge that we have the capacity to act prudentially could be independent of our knowledge that we have the capacity to act morally. Nonetheless, what is important is that this epistemic point entails neither that discussions of prudence must presuppose discussions of morality nor that the two capacities are metaphysically inseparable.

It is not completely clear why Kant adopted this epistemological position. For one hint, see TP 8: 285n. Another reason for distinguishing morality and prudence vis à vis spontaneity is that a lack of spontaneity

may seem to undermine morality more than prudence. Our well-being would still be real and valuable to us whether we acquired it freely or not; but moral worth is only real if we are autonomous...if we are not genuinely spontaneous, the concept of moral value would be a chimera, a mere "cobweb of the brain." Following Ameriks, we may still wonder, from a contemporary perspective, whether true spontaneity or transcendental freedom is as essential to any of the capacities of practical reason as Kant comes to think they are.

27. More generally, in his discussions of the cognitive capacities of human beings, Kant suggests that the presence of concepts, and more particularly the "I" in our thought already distinguishes us from other animals.
28. There are obvious and interesting differences between the *Religion's* animality and the *Anthropology's* technical predisposition, but this would take us too far afield. See Reinhard Brandt, *Kritischer Kommentar zu Kants Anthropology in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798)*, vol. 10 of *Kant-Forschungen* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1999), p. 474.
29. Schwaiger notes that the term "imperative" does not appear in the 1798 *Anthropology* or the extant *Nachschriften* from the anthropology lectures, though it does occur in a few places in the anthropology *Nachlaß* and once in the Rostock manuscript "H" of the 1798 *Anthropology*. Clemens Schwaiger, *Kategorische und andere Imperative: zur Entwicklung von Kants praktischer Philosophie bis 1785* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1999). (Hereafter, *KAI*), pp. 113–14. It is also worth noting that the use of "ought" that is definitive of imperatives is found throughout the anthropology materials in obviously noncategorical senses. For one example of the nonmoral use of "ought" in anthropological contexts, see the Rostock manuscript (7: 413).
30. I do not mean to deny that there are significant changes in Kant's conception of these matters over time, but simply to suggest that every variation in terminology and usage need not reflect such a shift. Schwaiger has undertaken an extensive study of such two-, three-, and four-way distinctions throughout the course of Kant's development. See esp. Schwaiger, *KAI*, pp. 129–30; 137; 172–83.
31. As Schwaiger has noted, sometimes Kant, following Baumgarten, identifies the task of determining the end with "wisdom" (though not necessarily in a moral sense) and the task of choosing appropriate means to it with "prudence" (25: 779). See Schwaiger, *KAI*, p. 127.

Schwaiger also argues that in the *Groundwork* and after, Kant abandons the idea that prudence concerns both ends and means. *KAI*, pp. 184–6. I am not convinced that this duality entirely disappears. Given the pervasiveness of the transformations triggered by life in society (discussed at the conclusion of Section III), it is unsurprising that the distinction between the conception of the end and the means to it becomes blurred. But, as this passage from the *Religion* suggests, Kant still continues to employ the distinction in late sources. See also *Metaphysik der Sitten*

Vigilantius 27: 500 where he distinguishes between several “ways” of being happy and the “means” to them.

32. A survey of the anthropology lectures and the broader Kantian corpus reveals much ambiguity and fluidity surrounding the conception of happiness. Sometimes Kant suggests that happiness is just the satisfaction of *all* of our inclinations or a state of complete satisfaction. 25: 413, KrV A 806 / B 834, G 4: 399, KU 5: 434 n. In *Friedländer*, however, Kant suggests that happiness is not a straightforward sum (25: 561–2, 572). In *Menschenkunde*, Kant suggested that we can form no genuine concept of happiness as a mere amalgamation of pleasures. Yet he simultaneously suggested that we can conceive of happiness in a negative way (25: 1081). In any event, even in *Menschenkunde*, it is clear that happiness or well-being continues to ground prudential advice. See for example 25: 1089. For a discussion of some changes and developments in Kant’s conception of happiness, especially the growing importance of pain in the lectures of the late 1770s and early 1780s, see Susan Shell, “Kant’s ‘True Economy of Human Nature’: Rousseau, Count Verri, and the Problem of Happiness” (in this volume). There are also a number of familiar ambiguities in Kant’s conception of happiness and his claims that happiness is a “wavering concept,” that, in part because of the way our mind generates the idea, we change our mind about its content very often. KU 5: 430, cf. discussion of the “fluctuating idea” or “ideal of imagination” G 4: 399, 418 and *Menschenkunde* 25: 1081. Although I cannot argue for the claim here, I believe that these claims should be interpreted primarily as another epistemic barrier, rather than as an additional source of ontological indeterminacy. For further discussion of the conception of happiness, see my “A Preliminary Defense of Kantian Prudence,” *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Proceedings of the IX. International Kant Congress)*, ed. Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Ralph Schumacher (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001). Vol. III, pp. 239–46. See also Victoria Wike, *Kant on Happiness in Ethics* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994).
33. R 6: 51; KpV 5: 84, 118.
34. KpV 5: 25, 36; MdS 6: 215.
35. G 4: 399; KpV 5: 25, 61, 118; MdS 6: 215–16, 409.
36. G 4: 399; KpV 5: 61.
37. KpV 5: 25, 118.
38. KU 5: 430.
39. R 6: 58 (according to the 2nd ed.); cf. *Friedländer* 590–1.
40. There is, of course, significant disagreement in the literature about whether it is reason or feeling or desire that would be doing the work here, and if it is reason, whether it is genuinely *practical* reason. See Korsgaard, “AKSV,” p. 487 n; and “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” *Journal of Philosophy* 83 (1986): 5–25. See also Hannah Ginsborg, “Korsgaard on Choosing Nonmoral Ends,” *Ethics* 109 (1998): 5–21, p. 16. It certainly is not a matter of *pure* practical reason, and most of

the principles employed will not be *a priori*. But as we will see Kant suggest, it is not simply a matter of mechanically weighing a single phenomenological factor or passively observing a causal interaction amongst incentives. Moreover, the demand for maximality or totality in the idea of happiness is a product of the understanding, not sensibility.

41. Kant thinks it also precludes the possibility that there could be a universal "system" of happiness apart from morality (KrV A 811 / B 839).
42. For the importance of Count Verri's influence on this point, see Shell (this volume), and Brandt and Stark's "Einleitung" to the *Akademie-Ausgabe* of the lectures, pp. xli–xlvi.
43. cf. KpV 5: 36; MdS 6: 216.
44. See Kant's treatment of the emotions and passions, discussed in Section III.
45. Such suggestions reveal a conception of happiness that is more than a simple sum of pleasures or the satisfaction of our "strongest" inclinations. On its own, the intensity and persistence of a desire may not give us a reason to act (or not act) on it, but intensity and persistence may be among the factors (though not even uniformly positive factors) that we use in determining how to reconcile and integrate competing desires and determine what our happiness consists in. On Kant's conception, this in turn only guides action (or gives us a reason to act) to the extent that happiness is an end that we do (or must) have. For more on this last point, see Section IV.
46. See also Manfred Kuehn's discussion of character, maxims, and prudence in his magisterial *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), esp. pp. 144–51.
47. For example, Kant draws connections between character and the good will, though the precise nature of these connections is difficult to make out. Frierson has argued persuasively for the moral relevance and explicit moral intentions of Kant's pragmatic anthropology in Chapter 3 of his dissertation.
48. There is of course, also significant discussion in the *Anthropology* and *Religion* of the tension between "personality" and "humanity" or between the tasks of civilization and moralization, but that does not change the present point.
49. Kant does not insist that all feelings and desires disable us in this way. And in the ordinary sense, we might object that many "emotions" and "passions" need not do so either. As Kant uses the terms, emotions and passions are species of feelings and desires, respectively, which do disable us. He would also be likely to claim that emotions and passions, in the broader sense, may disable us more than we are willing to admit.
50. Kant explicitly discusses this contrast with Hume in the *Menschenkunde* notes (25: 1120). Compare with the assessment of instinct and the discussion of "misology" in the *Groundwork*.
51. Of course Kant also makes the case that the affects and passion are contrary to virtue or good character. The point is that these arguments are clearly distinguishable. Frierson has emphasized to me in correspondence

that in anthropological contexts, Kant seems to emphasize the problems the affects and passion cause for the pursuit of happiness, while in the ethics lectures and *Metaphysics of Morals* he emphasizes the obstacle they pose for morality. See also Frierson, Chapter 3.

52. Kant does seem to think that the predispositions to “humanity” and “personality” of the *Religion* share a set of necessary conditions involving free agency. But, at least by the mid-1780s, Kant insists that personality requires an additional condition, namely autonomy or the susceptibility to the influence of pure practical reason. It is worth noting that even if the sufficient conditions for humanity and personality were identical, that would not imply the source thesis (that moral norms and value are the source of prudential norms and value). It would only imply the weaker thesis that the same agents are subject to the demands of both.
53. It is worth noting that under this conception of nonpersonal humanity, Kant seems to see reason as “representing maxims as suited to universal legislation,” that is, with the pretensions of “self-conceit.” What is lacking is only the capacity to be motivated by pure practical reason. But Kant’s discussion of self-love at R 6: 45 n does leave the possibility of nonconceited rational self-love open. See also KU 5: 449.
54. On “motivational independence,” see Allison, *KTF*, pp. 97ff.
55. I thank Eric Watkins for pressing me for greater clarity on this and several other points.
56. Strictly speaking, when it comes to the historical development of predispositions, this argument leaves Kant free to claim that those who have not yet developed (or in fact never will develop) their moral personality may have moral obligations, but it does commit him to the claim that beings lacking this predisposition would be without moral obligations.
57. Rousseau seemed to fear that this was a direct result of leaving the “state of nature.” It is worth noting that, at certain points in his career (especially in the late 1760s and into the mid-1770s), Kant explored the possibility that morality could serve as a “fixed point” or stabilizing element for a conception of happiness or well-being, as the anchor for a rational system of universal happiness. See, for example, Paul Guyer, “Freedom as the Inner Value of the World,” in *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) (Hereafter, *KFLH*) and Dieter Henrich, “The Moral Image of the World” in *Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). The focus of these reflections seems to be on morality as a means to a stable *universal* system of happiness, that is, the happiness of all, not necessarily as a means to the more limited, perhaps thereby less “philosophically” interesting, prudential goal of the happiness of an individual agent.
58. This shift also facilitates a tighter parallelism between technical, pragmatic, and moral predispositions on the one hand and the tasks of cultivation, civilization, and moralization on the other, which can be found in the 1798 *Anthropology* and the later lecture notes.

59. Again, it is natural that pragmatic anthropological lectures to students on the topic of character and action upon principle would include reminders about the value of good character, the good will and specifically moral principles, for example, *Mrongovius* 25: 1384–92.
60. G 4: 416 n. “Private prudence” is narrower in one sense, in virtue of its narrower object: *individual* “advantage” or well-being; yet broader in another: it is concerned with a larger set of potential means, not simply the use of other *people*. The *Religion's* (6: 45 n) conception seems rather broad, even if not under the name of “prudence” (which is quite sparse in the *Religion* anyhow). *Moral Mrongovius II* is ambiguous on this point.
61. Schwaiger, *KAI*, p. 127, correcting earlier work by Hinske.
62. It is worth noting, as Kant sometimes does, that the overall well-being or satisfaction of a *moral* being will ultimately need to involve the special satisfaction that can be found only in morally worthy action. For this suggestion, see Mds 6: 387–8, *Friedländer* 25: 560, and Guyer “FIVW,” Sec. II. If, as a consequence, prudence is taken to demand action out of respect for the moral law, this would be a reflection of the coexistence of “humanity” and “personality” in us, but would not be evidence that the authority of prudence presupposed the authority of moral norms, nor evidence for the source thesis. In any event, this does not seem to be a thought pursued in much detail in the anthropology lectures.
63. As the anthropology course, the historical essays, and the *Critique of Judgment* suggest, in this way, prudence can serve a moral purpose in history, regardless of the moral intentions of particular individuals.
64. The idea, in contemporary terminology, is that prudential reasons function, not as mere *prima facie* or “candidate” reasons, but as *pro tanto*, though not necessarily decisive reasons. On this distinction, see Shelly Kagan, *The Limits of Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 17. Scanlon, *WVVOEO*, pp. 50–1; S.L. Hurley, *Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 130ff.; Kurt Baier, *The Rational and the Moral Order: The Social Roots of Reason and Morality* (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), pp. 58ff; and Hampton, *TAR*, p. 51–2.
65. Wood, *KET*, p. 365. Wood argues that there can be no such grounds, and that, as a result, humanity and personality must be coextensive.
66. G 4: 418; KpV 5: 37; R 6: 125. In Kant, wishing is not mere desiring, because it presupposes an interest or act of incorporation, yet wishing does not entail willing or attempting to produce the object.
67. Some translations obscure Kant's claim that finite rational agents necessarily *will* happiness. For example, at Mds 6: 386 Kant uses the verb *wollen*, but Mary Gregor renders this as “want” rather than “will.” Of course, in colloquial German, *wollen* can mean either; the question is whether in this context Kant is (or should be) using it in a technical way, which he seems to be. In any event, Kant's references to happiness as a necessary end, while perhaps puzzling, are not ambiguous. It may seem that the very idea of a necessary end is inconsistent with Kant's conception of an end as

an object of free choice. I have attempted to address part of this problem elsewhere. See my "A Preliminary Defense of Kantian Prudence."

68. This task seems to be connected with reason's general demand for totality, in this case a totality of our ends, mentioned in note 40. As Felicitas Munzel has suggested in correspondence, in the *Anthropology*, Kant derives his definition of the class of humans, not from a conception of pure rationality nor directly from nature, but from the consideration of rational beings *in relation to* nature (7: 321), further supporting the idea that the proper use of reason for humans is directed toward our relations in that natural system.
69. Korsgaard has argued that the underlying normative principle must presuppose a distinction between what a person's end is and the means he employs, a distinction she thinks could only be based upon a further, unconditional normative principle. "NIR" pp. 220, 250, 252. This would seem to imply the source thesis and undermine the normative independence of prudence. While Korsgaard's analysis of why Hume cannot draw the necessary distinction is persuasive (p. 230), I follow Jean Hampton in being unconvinced that only an unconditional normative principle (i.e., the categorical imperative) could ground the distinction. Hampton agreed that an instrumental principle can only function in the context of an end, and because there is dispute about what it takes for a preference to attain that status, settling this issue involves taking a further normative stance. But she argued that this stance need not specify the content of the end; picking out its structural features may be sufficient, and need not distinguish between the ends an agent *ought* to have and the end she happens to have. *TAR*, ch. 5.
70. For a recent discussion of this issue, though with a different understanding of prudence, see David O. Brink, "Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy," in *Ethics and Practical Reason*, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), pp. 255–91.
71. TP 8: 278. Kant insists that we can "abstract" from our prudential end if morality requires this of us, but we can never "renounce" it. For a similar point, see *Metaphysik der Sitten Vigilantius* 27: 487. On the notion of "obligatory ends," see *MdS* 6: 382ff.
72. Exactly how these norms are related is a difficult matter. Korsgaard has suggested that both moral and prudential norms may be grounded in a rational agent's need for "volitional unity." "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," *Journal of Ethics* 3 (1999): 1–29. Perhaps such a common context could provide the basis for an argument for morality's supremacy.
73. Kant's own resolution of such conflicts is manifested in his account of the "highest good," which relies upon his moral religion, the postulation of the existence of God. *KpV* 5: 124ff. For a still useful discussion of this issue, see Wood, *KMR*. I should note that none of the foregoing is intended to deny that there may also be a special kind of reason for moral agents to promote the happiness or well-being of other moral

agents. The point is that such a special kind of reason does not itself ground, and may in fact presuppose ordinary prudential normativity.

74. Wood, *KET*, pp. 365–6, cf. 380. Again, it is still possible that the reasons that people typically act upon when they pursue their own happiness do involve claims of universality that can only be fulfilled by or in the context of moral reasons. See for example, Kant's derivation of the formula of humanity and his discussions of "self-conceit" in the *Groundwork*, the second *Critique* and the *Religion*.
75. R 6: 26 n. See also Refl. 7201 (19: 275) and the discussion of the "fact of reason" in the second *Critique* 5: 30–1.
76. On the fundamental importance of the value of autonomy, see Paul Guyer, *KFLH*.
77. I would like to thank Karl Ameriks, David Solomon, Felicitas Munzel, Eric Watkins, Patrick Frierson, Brian Jacobs, and my colleagues at Purdue University for helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.